사회보장 분야 사각지대 축소와 부적정 지출 관리 방안 연구: 긴급지원을 중심으로

Abstract

코로나19는 우리 사회의 재난 대응 체계와 사회안전망의 현 주소를 보여주었다. 코로나19의 영향을 가장 직접적으로 받은 영세 자영업자와 플랫폼노동자 등은 고용보험의 사각지대에 있었고, 소득과 자산 조사를 기반으로 하는 공공부조는 여타 사회보장제도의 기준이 되기 때문에 재난에 대응한 일시적이고 탄력적인 운영에 한계가 있었다. 이러한 이유로 코로나19로 인한 긴급 지원은 전 국민 재난지원금과 고용보험 사각지대에 대한 정책 자금 지원, 긴급복지지원제도 등을 통해 이뤄졌다. 지난 두 차례의 경제위기에서 우리는 고용안전망과 소득안전망으로 구성된 사회안전망을 구축하였다. 그러나 우리의 사회보장제도는 여전히 사각지대를 안고 있다. 또한 신종 감염병으로 인한 사회적 거리두기는 사회적 돌봄에 대한 논의를 촉발시켰다. 이제 우리는 경제 수준과 인구구조를 고려하여 지속가능한 한국형 복지국가의 질적 전환을 모색할 때이다. 여전히 사회보장제도의 사각지대를 해소하고 사회안전망을 두텁고 촘촘하게 만드는 것은 중요하다. 이에 더하여 인구구조 변화에 대한 대응이자 감염병으로 인한 사회재난에 대응하는 돌봄안전망을 구축하는 것은 새로운 과제이다. 이와 함께 자연 재난과 사회재난을 포괄할 수 있는 재난대응 체계도 보다 촘촘하게 구축될 필요가 있다. 우리나라의 재난 대응은 국지적인 자연 재난에 초점을 맞추고 있으나, 이제 신종 감염병 등 국가 단위에 영향을 미치는 사회재난에 포괄적으로 대응할 수 있도록 체계를 구축할 필요가 있다. 특히 전국 단위의 사회재난 대응은 패스트트랙을 통해 선지원-후징수 방식으로 적극적인 선제적 지원과 재정의 지속가능성을 담보하는 재정 전략이 필요하다.

1. Background

This research is a six-year study on "Reducing Blind Spots in the Social Security Field and Plans for Managing Improper Expenditure,” conducted by the Korea Institute of Health and Social Affairs(KIHASA) as a mid-term project since 2016. Our institute has developed a monitoring (social security monitoring) framework for managing blind spots and improper expenditures in the social security system and applied it to the income security and social service system. In 2021, the social security monitoring framework was applied to emergency assistance in response to COVID-19. In this study, emergency support refers to various cash and in-kind packages provided by the central and local governments in response to unemployment and closure, income reduction, and the gap in care due to COVID-19. There are three main reasons emergency support was selected as a target of analysis. First, COVID-19 affected everyone regardless of their income and wealth, but it had a more profound effect on chronically ill, vulnerable groups with lack of care (infants, children, disabled, older people), and vulnerable workers (young people, uninsured). The government is expanding and restructuring the existing social security system to take action on emergency support for COVID-19. Second, within the existing social security framework, COVID-19 response emergency support was provided in segments by each ministry and there was a limitation of not providing the support to those in need in a timely manner while providing it to those who did not need it at the same time. Of course, more appropriate support would have been possible if the COVID-19 emergency assistance recipients could have been specified according to the severity of COVID-19 while ensuring universality and urgency. Third, our society witnessed the limitations of the existing social security system. This is different from the traditional risks that surfaced in the industrialization process and also from the new social risks that emerged during the post-industrial era. In this sense, the social safety net composed of the employment and income safety net revealed its limitations and urged interest in the care safety net. In addition, it raised doubts about the sustainability of Korea's social security system as a response system to social disasters such as the climate crisis and infectious disease.

2. Main Research Results

The study results are summarized as follows. First, we examined the social security system response to the social disaster triggered by COVID-19. There is no system in Korea's social security system to respond to social disasters triggered by infectious diseases. Social disasters were completely different from the local natural disasters and employment disasters and fully revealed the blind spots of the existing Korean social security system. Emergency aid due to COVID-19 is only a tinkering prescription for these blind spots and is not sustainable. Above all, because it is an emergency social disaster, it is necessary to decide whether to create a permanent system or to specify an emergency connection system Next, through a nationwide survey, this study examined the impact of COVID-19, the supply and demand of emergency support systems, blind spots for emergency support systems, and perceptions of false claims. Based on the descriptive statistical results, an in-depth analysis was conducted on the unemployment insurance blind spots, youth, and groups with declining status in employment that were most severely hit by COVID-19. First, an in-depth analysis was conducted on the blind spots of employment insurance, including self-employed and special types of workers. Compared to wage workers (regular workers and temporary daily workers), the probability of personal income decrease for the self-employed and special type workers was about 30% higher and compared to manufacturing, food, and the probability of personal income was high if they were engaged in the lodging industry. Within the blind spot of employment insurance, there were no differences in individual characteristics or by industry or region to which workers belong. This means that intensive assistance for some industries that are expected to suffer significant damage needs to be approached with caution. Second, the impact of COVID-19 on age groups experiencing different labor market entry and life cycles was examined. Although the income level of young people is generally low, they do not experience much change in income before and after COVID-19. However, many young people feel burdened with housing costs and it is an important factor causing debt. In addition, the study found that young people experienced more depression, health problems, and conflicts with people around them after COVID-19. Third, we investigated people whose occupational status in the labor market declined before and after COVID-19. The labor market status before and after COVID-19 was 52.3% for the internal retention group and 32.1% for the external retention group, an increase of 6.2%, and a decrease of 9.3%. The group that maintained their employment status in the internal labor market experienced less deduction in income and less increase in depression or stress. On the other hand, the group with lower occupational status experienced a deduction in income and faced complex difficulties such as depression, stress, and conflict with others. This group had the lowest ratio of receiving and receiving a number of emergency assistance benefits, and negative perceptions of emergency assistance were also prevalent. In particular, the groups whose occupational status declined were the traditionally vulnerable groups in employment insurance blind spots and unstable employment situations, such as self-employed people with employees, temporary daily workers, workers in small businesses with fewer than five employees, women, and low-educated people. Lastly, we examined the household consumption impact of emergency support for COVID-19 using the household trend survey. The national disaster relief fund was provided until April 30, 2020, and people had to spend the fund before the end of August 2020. Similarly, the disaster aid provided by some metropolitan governments had a limited expiration date from the end of July to the end of September depending on the region. Separately, the second emergency disaster fund was selectively provided to the self-employed and special types of workers. Under the assumption that households receiving government subsidies will not use their temporarily increased income immediately, an analysis of the marginal consumption tendency of government subsidies paid in 2020 revealed that they decreased overtime to 0.421 in the second quarter, 0.399 in the third quarter, and 0.274 in the fourth quarter. However, the overall marginal propensity in the second and fourth quarters of 2020 was 0.781, indicating that a significant portion of the government subsidy was linked to consumption.

3. Conclusion and Implications

The analysis results suggest the following implications. First, we need to reexamine the social safety net of our society. Korea has established a social safety net consisting of selective public assistance and residual emergency welfare support systems based on the social insurance system. However, there is a limit to responding to social disasters through social insurance because the small business owners and platform workers who have been most directly affected by COVID-19 are in the blind spot of employment insurance. In particular, considering that the proportion of self-employed people engaged in food and retail industries is quite high, enhancing the inclusiveness of employment insurance is essential to establishing a tight social safety net. Second, public assistance, which has to prove poverty based on income and means tests, was also insufficient in responding to social disasters. Although it has the advantage of being able to provide emergency assistance quickly without applying through selective cash benefits and social allowances, it cannot be used as a response to a sudden disaster. Rather, the response to disasters was made through the emergency welfare support system. Although the reason for the emergency welfare assistance system was quickly expanded, it had limitations in functioning as a fundamental alternative in terms of time required for system improvement and practical use. Third, our social safety net was built around the employment and income safety net based on the old social risks. Although there is a new social risk policy, it has limitations in functioning as a safety net in emergency situations such as social disasters. In particular, changes in the demographic structure, such as a low birth rate and aging population, and the gap between the supply and demand for care between regions were not systematically managed. In particular, the need to establish a caring safety net was raised in that caring services directly affect the survival of infants, children, the elderly, and the disabled. Now is the time to push for a sustainable Korean-style welfare state considering the economic level and demographic structure. In the past two economic crises, we have steadily built a social safety net consisting of an employment safety net and an income safety net. However, there are still blind spots in the social safety net; therefore, efforts to build a tighter social safety net are still needed. At the same time, it is the mission of our times to build a care safety net that responds to demographic changes. In this respect, COVID-19 has expanded the income-oriented social security system. It opened a new chapter in policy design to reexamine whether to reform or seek the qualitative transformation of the social security system. It must respond flexibly to new social risks while responding to existing social risks. At the same time, a disaster response system that can encompass both natural and social disasters should be established. The disaster response system needs to be built as a tertiary social safety net that systematically responds to emergencies by using the regular social security system. Since the response system centered on local natural disasters is already at a certain standard, it is necessary to add a response system for social disasters that affect the national level due to new infectious diseases, and so on. To prevent misuse of social disaster response, macroeconomic indicators, domestic growth indicators, and employment indicators, the first, second, and third safety nets should be systematically implemented. A strategy is needed to systematically implement a safety net and to ensure financial sustainability and prompt support through pre-support and post-collection methods when necessary.