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Comparative Study of Family Policy in East Asia

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Forward

Though the government has made efforts and new initiatives, still Korea faces many things to overcome to deal with the population issues successfully. So far our government and scholars have mainly focused on introducing policies of foreign countries in Europe or North America. It is important to learn lessons from advanced Western countries, however, it would be more useful to know about the Asian countries which share similar culture and history. Any attempt to introduce policies of foreign countries will face limitations unless we sufficiently consider the context to which such policies are introduced. This study enhances our understanding on the second demographic challenges in the Asian context and provides valuable insight to wisely solve the population problem Asian countries are faced with. Based on the results, this report will derive useful policy implications for promising everlasting prosperity in the Asian region.

December, 2015

Sangho Kim, President

Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs

Contents

Abstract ····· 1

Summary ····· 3

Chapter 1. Introduction ····· 7

1. Background and Purpose ····· 9
2. Contents and Methods ····· 15

Chapter 2. Family Database in East Asian Regions ····· 21

1. Introduction ····· 23
2. Characterization of Problems and Method of Evaluation ····· 31
3. Results of the Evaluation ····· 42
4. Discussions and Conclusions ····· 52

Chapter 3. Discrepancy of the Ideal and Actual Parity among Hong Kong Married Women ····· 59

1. Introduction ····· 61
2. Data and Methods ····· 68
3. Results ····· 72
4. Discussions and Conclusions ····· 82

Chapter 4. Determinants of Fertility Intentions among Young Adults in Japan ····· 87

1. Introduction ····· 89
2. Research Hypotheses and Method ····· 95

3. Results ····· 101
4. Discussions and Conclusions ····· 112

Chapter 5. Intergenerational Solidarity of Adult Child-Parent and Social Class in Urban Areas of China ····· 115
1. Introduction ····· 117
2. Theoretical Paradigm and Literature Review ····· 120
3. Data and Method ····· 130
4. Results ····· 138
5. Discussions and Conclusions ····· 150

Chapter 6. Single Parent Family in Thailand: Putting it in Empowering Context ····· 153
1. Introduction ····· 155
2. Theoretical Paradigm and Literature Review ····· 157
3. Data and Method ····· 160
4. Results ····· 161
5. Discussions and Conclusions ····· 179

Chapter 7. Family Changes in Vietnam: Characteristics and Policy Implications ····· 185
1. Socioeconomic Context of the Family Changes ····· 187
2. Characteristics of Family Changes ····· 194
3. Impact of the Changes on Vietnamese Families ····· 208

4. Discussions and Conclusions ····· 212

Chapter 8. Population and Development in Singapore ····· 215

1. Introduction ····· 217
2. National Development and Population Policies in Singapore ····· 218
3. National Development and Population Indicators ····· 240
4. Reaping the Demographic Dividend amidst Rapid Demographic Transition ····· 246
5. Future Policy Directions and Discussions ····· 250

Chapter 9. Expansion of Childcare Policy in Korea ····· 255

1. Introduction ····· 257
2. Development of Childcare Policy in Korea ····· 261
3. Results of the Expansion of Childcare Policy ····· 270
4. Recent Debates and Discussions ····· 279

Chapter 10. Conclusions ····· 287

1. Implication of the Results ····· 289
2. Future Challenges ····· 298

Bibliography ····· 303

Appendix ····· 333

Lists of Tables

〈Table 2-1〉 Summary of the availability of the OECD FD indicators for each country in East Asia ····· 43
〈Table 2-2〉 Comparison of the Korea's statistics between the OECD Family Database and the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database ····· 46
〈Table 3-1〉 Selected measures of nuptiality in Hong Kong 1986~2011 ····· 64
〈Table 3-2〉 Descriptive statistics of variables and social demographic profile of the women in the analyses ····· 71
〈Table 3-3〉 Ideal parity and childbearing intention of women at different parities ····· 75
〈Table 3-4〉 Odds ratios in logistic regression of childbearing intention of women at different parities ····· 77
〈Table 3-5〉 Reasons to give birth of the wife and husband by actual parity ····· 80
〈Table 3-6〉 Top three major difficulties for raising children ····· 81
〈Table 4-1〉 Fertility intention of childless respondents, by gender and age ··· 101
〈Table 4-2〉 Fertility intention of respondents with one child, by gender and age ····· 101
〈Table 4-3〉 Fertility intention of respondents with two or more children, by gender and age ····· 102
〈Table 4-4〉 Descriptive statistics for the analysis of fertility intentions of married women and men (random effects model) ····· 104
〈Table 4-5〉 Determinants of fertility intention of married women and men ··· 105
〈Table 4-6〉 Descriptive statistics for the analysis of fertility intentions of never-married women and men (random effects model) ····· 110
〈Table 4-7〉 Determinants of fertility intention of never-married women and men ····· 110

〈Table 5-1〉 Distribution of items measuring dimensions of intergenerational solidarity ····· 135
〈Table 5-2〉 Distribution of items measuring dimensions of socioeconomic status ·· 137
〈Table 5-3〉 Latent class models of intergenerational relations using eight dichotomous indicators of solidarity ····· 139
〈Table 5-4〉 Conditional probabilities for latent five-class model of adult child-parent relations ····· 140
〈Table 5-5〉 Latent classes of intergenerational relations ····· 141
〈Table 5-6〉 Latent class models of social class using five dichotomous indicators ····· 143
〈Table 5-7〉 Conditional probabilities for latent four-class model of social class ····· 144
〈Table 5-8〉 Latent classes of social class ····· 145
〈Table 5-9〉 Regression equations predicting probability that adult child-parent relationship are characterized by each of five latent classes ····· 149
〈Table 7-1〉 The average age of the first marriage by gender and the proportion of married people by gender and age groups, 1989~2006 ····· 201
〈Table 7-2〉 The average ages for the first marriage by gender and their differences by gender and regions, 2006 ····· 201
〈Table 8-1〉 Trends in Singapore's Human Capital Development ····· 242
〈Table 8-2〉 Total age, young-age and old-age dependency ratios, 1970~2014 ····· 244
〈Table 9-1〉 Support rates of "Parental childcare subsidy" for children aged 0~2 years old in Korea, 2004~2013 ····· 265
〈Table 9-2〉 Trends of the amounts of childcare subsidy for children aged 0~2 years old in Korea, 2005~2014 ····· 266

〈Table 9-3〉 Trends of income level eligible for full coverage of childcare subsidy, 2004~2012 ····· 266
〈Table 9-4〉 Expansion of childcare allowance in Korea, 2009~2013 ····· 269

Lists of Appendix Tables

〈Appendix Table 1-1-1〉 Availability of OECD Family Database Indicators in East Asian Countries: Dimension 1, 'The Structure of Families (SF)' - Family & Chindren ····· 333
〈Appendix Table 1-1-2〉 Availability of OECD Family Database Indicators in East Asian Countries: Dimension 1, 'The Structure of Families (SF)' - Fertility ····· 335
〈Appendix Table 1-1-3〉 Availability of OECD Family Database Indicators in East Asian Countries: Dimension 1, 'The Structure of Families (SF)' - Marital & Partnership Status ····· 337
〈Appendix Table 1-2-1〉 Availability of OECD Family Database Indicators in East Asian Countries: Dimension 2, 'The Labor Market Position of Families' (LMF) - Families, Children, and Employment Status ····· 339
〈Appendix Table 1-2-2〉 Availability of OECD Family Database Indicators in East Asian Countries: Dimension 2, 'The Labor Market Position of Families' (LMF) - Workplace Hours & Time for Caring ····· 342
〈Appendix Table 1-3-1〉 Availability of OECD Family Database Indicators in East Asian Countries, Dimension 3, 'Public Policies for Families and Children' (PF) - General Policies for Families w/ Children ····· 345

〈Appendix Table 1-3-2〉 Availability of OECD Family Database Indicators in East Asian Countries, Dimension 3, 'Public Policies for Families and Children' (PF) - Child-Related Leave ····· 348
〈Appendix Table 1-3-3〉 Availability of OECD Family Database Indicators in East Asian Countries, Dimension 3, 'Public Policies for Families and Children' (PF) - Formal Care & Education for Very Young Children ····· 350
〈Appendix Table 1-3-4〉 Availability of OECD Family Database Indicators in East Asian Countries, Dimension 3, 'Public Policies for Families and Children' (PF) - Typology of Childcare Benefits & Net Parental Fees by Family Type & Income Level ····· 352

Lists of Figures

[Figure 3-1] TFR and family size of Hong Kong over 1981~2012 ····· 63
[Figure 3-2] Median age at low-order births and the proportion of higher-order births in 1981~2011 ····· 65
[Figure 3-3] The average ideal number of children in 1976~2012: Hong Kong, Japan and Korea ····· 67
[Figure 3-4] Distribution of ideal numbers of children from the KAP Surveys 1992~2012 ····· 72
[Figure 3-5] Distribution of actual numbers of children from the KAP Surveys 1992~2012 ····· 74
[Figure 4-1] Change of marital fertility in Japan ····· 91
[Figure 4-2] Change in ideal number of children in Japan ····· 92
[Figure 4-3] Change in fertility intentions of never-married young adults in Japan ····· 93
[Figure 4-4] Fertility intentions and subsequent childbirth ····· 103
[Figure 4-5] Fertility intentions and subsequent marriage ····· 109
[Figure 5-1] Analytic Framework ····· 132
[Figure 6-1] Thai family trend classified by type of family, 1980~2010 ····· 164
[Figure 6-2] Number of single-parent family, 1987~2013 ····· 165
[Figure 6-3] Number of married and divorced couples, 2002~2014 ····· 167
[Figure 6-4] Delivery rate (per 1,000) in women aged 15~19, 1990~2013 ··· 168
[Figure 6-5] Issues and relationships among different kinds of families and SPF ····· 171
[Figure 7-1] Vietnam's long-term growth performance ····· 188
[Figure 7-2] Urbanization and the transition from slow to fast growth ····· 192
[Figure 7-3] Population shares by age group ····· 207
[Figure 7-4] Increase in Old-Age Dependency Ratio, 1975~2075 ····· 208

[Figure 8- 1] Singapore's Total Fertility Rate and family planning policies/ measures ····· 233
[Figure 8- 2] Singapore total and resident population growth and estimated net migration ····· 237
[Figure 8- 3] GDP per capita: World average, Singapore, Japan, Korea and Hong Kong SAR ····· 241
[Figure 8- 4] University degree-holding economically active residents aged 15 years and over ('000s) ····· 243
[Figure 8- 5] Singapore: Life expectancy at birth, males and females ····· 243
[Figure 8- 6] Age pyramids, 1970~2015 ····· 245
[Figure 8- 7] Proportion single, resident females aged 45~49 years 1970~2013 ····· 247
[Figure 8- 8] Resident female age-specific marriage rates, 1980~2013 ····· 248
[Figure 8- 9] Resident female age-specific fertility rates, 1980~2013 ····· 248
[Figure 8-10] Female employment rates in 2011 ····· 249
[Figure 9- 1] Public expenditure on childcare and pre-school in percentage of GDP for selected OECD member countries, 2004~2011 ····· 258
[Figure 9- 2] Increase in the amounts of public expenditure on childcare policy by support on demand and support on supply, 2004~2014 ····· 271
[Figure 9- 3] Proportion of public expenditure on childcare policy by support on demand and support on supply, 2004~2014 ····· 272
[Figure 9- 4] Public spending on family benefits in cash, service, and tax measures in per cent of GDP (2011) ····· 273
[Figure 9- 5] Number of childcare facilities and their proportions by types, 2004~2014 ····· 275

[Figure 9- 6] Places on the childcare service at the childcare facilities and their proportion, 2004~2014 ····· 275
[Figure 9- 7] Number of available places per a child (2004~2014) ····· 276
[Figure 9- 8] Trends of children enrolled in childcare facilities, 2004~2014 ··· 277
[Figure 9- 9] Number of children enrolled in the childcare facilities and their proportion by types, 2004~2014 ····· 278
[Figure 9-10] Enrolment rate of children aged 0~2 years old, female employment rate, and TFR, 2004~2014 ····· 280
[Figure 9-11] Proportion of children by average hours of cared at childcare facilities per day, 2012 ····· 283

Abstract

This study discusses the ways to enhance the contents and quality of the "OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database," which the series of this project have compiled for Korea, China, Japan, Singapore, Hong-Kong China, Thailand and Vietnam. Based on the results from the previous comparative works, it analyzed special demographic issues such as fertility, changes in family, and family policy in these Asian settings. The results show that it is necessary to complement missing data and evaluate regularly the quality of data in the dataset. The studies on Hong-Kong and Japan show that efforts should be made to enhance fertility intention as well as actual fertility rates in these countries. Changes in family structure of China, Thailand, and Vietnam indicate that inclusive social policy dealing with the changes in family is needed. The study on Singapore shows that fertility rates of citizens should be maintained at reasonable levels and the immigration policy should be carefully adopted with consideration of its possible effects on its society. Experience of Korean childcare policy implies that balanced supports are necessary to derive effective family policy. Even the universal support for childcare service that were achieved in Korea, still remain up for debate in terms of equity and efficiency perspectives.

Summary

As the fourth follow-up project on "Comparative Study of Family Policy in East Asia," this report discussed the ways to enhance the contents and quality of "OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database," which the series of this project have compiled for Korea, China, Japan, Hong-Kong China, Thailand, and Vietnam. It analyzed special demographic issues of the 7 Asian settings especially on fertility, changes in family structure, and family policy which were found from the previous comparative works. Improvement of the Asian family database will enable researchers to conduct comparative work not only among Asian countries but also between Asian and Western countries. The analysis on a specific topic for each country helps to understand particular issues each country faced with in the era of the second demographic transitions.

With the purpose of helping improvement of the data in the Asian family database, the current evaluation study tries to check closely into the Asian family database to see if and to what it is plagued with different sorts of problems. The results show that it is necessary to complement missing data and evaluate regularly the quality of data in the database. The cross-validation check shows that a few Korean data provided by this project do not match with the data on the OECD Family Database. Specific

guidelines for data collection need to be provided and data providers in each country should be designated.

The next part of this report examines special population issues in each country. Factors on fertility intention were analyzed for Hong-Kong China and Japan. Intergenerational support by different social class was analyzed for China. Thailand's situation of single-parent families and recent movement for supporting the single-parent family are discussed. Changes in Vietnamese family with respect to family type, function, relations, social norms on children and mother are analyzed. Development of population policy in Singapore and its current situation are described. Childcare policy in Korea and its debates are discussed.

Results from Hong-Kong and Japan show that having just one child is becoming a norm among married women in these countries. These studies show that actual fertility rates and fertility intentions are closely related to each other. Thus efforts should be made to enhance fertility intention with special focus on young people in order to recover fertility rates. Changes in family structure of China, Thailand, and Vietnam reveal that the traditional form of Asian Family is transforming, new types of families are emerging, and modern relationships among family members are being established. Faced with the challenge of changes in family structure, these developing countries are required to improve their social policies from the current ones mainly focusing on needy people to more inclusive ones in-

corporating diverse changes in family structure. The Singaporean case gives implication that fertility rates of citizens should be maintained at reasonable levels and the immigration policy should be carefully adopted with consideration of its possible negative effects on the society. Experience of Korean childcare policy shows that balanced supports among cash benefits, service, and parental leave are necessary to derive effectiveness on family policy on both fertility rates and female employment rates. Even if Korean childcare policy achieves the goal of universal support, debates are still ongoing with regards to the equity and efficiency. The "path-dependency" toward universal support and many stakeholders surrounding childcare services could hinder any new government initiatives from improving its efficiency and equity.

As future challenges arise, the Asian Family database needs to be updated annually or at least every other year to deliver the most recent information on fertility, family, and family policy in East Asia. Problems on missing, outdated, unclear or unknown, and varying time points of data should be corrected in future studies. Analyzing fertility intention of people in Korea and Singapore in addition to Japan and Hong-Kong China would produce more powerful results. Based on the additional in-depth works on Asian family, "Regime of Family" in Asia should be derived for the better understanding about Asian families.

Keywords: Fertility, Family, Family policy, East Asia, Population

1 Introduction

1. Background and Purpose
2. Contents and Methods

1 Introduction

1. Background and Purpose

East Asian countries currently face many demographic challenges. Japan, which is the front-runner in terms of Asian development, experienced a decrease in fertility rate in the early of 1950. After that, fertility rates of Asian tigers such as Singapore, Hong-Kong China, and Korea fell below the replacement rate. Recently emerging Asian countries also have shown a significant drop in their fertility rates. In addition to the decline of the fertility rates, features related with family are transforming such as structure of family, gender roles in the labor market and care work, value of leisure etc. Besides the Asian tigers these phenomenon are appearing in the emerging Asian countries such as China, Thailand, and Vietnam.

These changes reflect that Asian countries might follow the second demographic transition which happened in western societies in the mid-1960s (Van de Kaa 1994). However, when we look at the details of the changes there are distinctive differences between western and Asian countries. First, changes in fertility rate happened more rapidly in Asian countries compared with western countries. For example in France it took around 33 years for the TFR to decrease from 2.74 in 1960 to

1.66 in 1993. In Korea a similar degree of drop in the TFR happened in about 5 years: from 2.82 in 1980 to 1.66 in 1985 (OECD Family Database 2015). The dramatic drops in TFR can be found in other Asian settings such as Hong-Kong China, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The success of family planning programs in Asian countries, which few western societies had hardly experienced, could accelerate the speed of fertility decline (Robinson & Ross 2007). Second, an increase in divorce rates in the Asian settings reflect that marriage ties were loose, however, the proportion of births out of wedlock still remained at very low levels. It suggests that the societal norm of a legitimate child stays strong in Asian countries even though expectations of couples relationship has become more relaxed than before. Third, though the traditional role of mothers has changed and more and more fathers are getting involved in housework and child care, Asian women spend much more time in housework and child care. Due to the difficulties of balancing work and family, many mothers with young children drop out of the labor market and interrupt their career building.

Korea, Japan, and Singapore initiated national plans and the governments committed to expand family policy: Japan started the "Angel Plan" in 1995, Singapore initiated the "Marriage and Parenthood Package" in 2001, and Korea started the "Basic Plan for low fertility and Population aging" in 2006. Even with

the national efforts to combat TFR, these countries remain at low fertility levels. If Asian countries cannot deal with the issues of low fertility effectively, future sustainability cannot be guaranteed due to the increase of the dependency ratio and social security costs.

In contrast with the Asian countries, there has been a visible trend in the turnaround in fertility of European countries (Goldstein.et.al. 2009). TFRs of European countries has increased in the 2000s' and now no member countries have TFRs below the lowest-low level of 1.3 (European Commission 2010). In France and Sweden TFRs have reached close to the replacement level. In the background of the recovery of the European fertility rates, there has been a significant number of comparative studies on fertility issues in European countries (D'Addio & d'Ercole 2005; Thévenon 2011; OECD 2011; Gauthier 2007). Useful policy recommendations can be derived from empirical findings by examining fertility decline and changes in family structure. Quality data such as Eurostat and OECD Family Database make it possible for many researchers to conduct valuable studies.

There have been many studies on low fertility and changes in family structure in Asian settings with comparative perspectives (Frejka.et.al. 2007; Gubhaju 2007; Jones 2007; Jones 2012; Seetharam 2012). Most studies focused on a distinctive topic such as fertility behavior, family structure, or marriage but had

little consideration for a comprehensive contextual frame work related with the fertility issues in Asian settings. Child births are realized in the complicated context of marital behavior, characteristics of family, gender equality, childcare cost, situation of labor market, social norms, and family policy (OECD 2011). Implications for effective policy to recover fertility rates in Asian countries can be derived from a thorough understanding of the mechanisms in child bearing and births in these countries.

Different from European countries there are few Asian Family databases with standard indicators on fertility, family structure, female employment, and family policy altogether. Limitations in the data might cause researchers difficulties in conducting analysis on Asian demographic issues with a comprehensive view point. The dearth of data might be one of the reasons that Asian countries – especially Korea, Japan, and Singapore – could not find any clues to tackle population issues as of yet.

In this regard, OECD KOREA Policy Centre and Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA) carried out a series of projects to develop an Asian family database. For the first year of 2012 the research team updated missing or outdated Korean data on the OECD Family Database using data from the Korean Population Census and several National Surveys conducted in Korea (Shin.et.al. 2012). As a result

among the total of 163 outdated or missing variables, 137 variables were updated. It turned out that much Korean data did not match with the methodology of the OECD Family Database. In addition some of the definitions of variables in the OECD Family Database hardly reflect norms and culture of family life, gender relations, and contents of family policy of Korea. Future challenges for the development of the Korean family data are suggested based on the findings.

As a second follow-up study the research team collected data on selected important variables in the OECD Family Database for Korea, Japan, China, and Singapore, and conducted a comparative analysis on fertility, family structure, female employment, and family policy (Shin.et.al. 2013). This is a noble study which collected family data according to the definition and methodology of the OECD Family Database for China and Singapore which are non-OECD member countries. In addition to compiling family data, family policy challenges faced by each country were discussed.

The third year of study adds Hong-Kong China, Thailand, and Vietnam in addition to Korea, Japan, China, and Singapore for the comparative analysis (Shin.et.al. 2014). The Asian and the Pacific countries have achieved enormous success in economic activities, however concurrently its TFR has dropped rapidly below the replacement level of 2.0. The Asian family database was constructed based on the data collected from the

7 Asian regions. It was much more challenging than the previous work since not only data from China and Singapore but also data from Hong-Kong China, Thailand, and Vietnam which are non-OECD member countries were collected according to the definitions of the OECD Family Database. The comparative analysis based on the Asian family database for 7 Asian regions produced much more intuitive results than the previous studies. Converging as well as diverging patterns on fertility, changes in family structure, and family policies were found from the comparative works. The 7 Asian countries and the Pacific territories not only share similar cultures and historical experiences but also are on different stages of social and economic development and have unique ethnic and racial compositions. Further development of the Asian family database and in-depth analysis on the specific issues on fertility and family would contribute to the development of studies in the areas of academics as well as public policy.

In this regard, as the fourth follow-up this study seeks to find ways to enhance the family database for the 7 Asian and the Pacific regions by checking its quality and cross validity. In order to extend our knowledge on demographic challenges of Asian countries this study carries out an in-depth examination on specific topics of fertility and transformation of family and policy issues which were found in the previous studies. The improvement of the family database will contribute to better

comparative work not only among the Asian and the Pacific countries but also between Asian countries and the Western countries. The analysis on a specific topic for each country will help to understand particular issues each country faced with in the era of the population transitions. With the implication from this study, effective policy to deal with demographic challenges in Asia and the Pacific regions are expected to be derived.

2. Contents and Methods

The contents of this study are composed of two parts. The first part discusses the ways to enhance the contents and quality of the Asian family database which the series of this project have compiled. The second part analyzes specific demographic and policy issues found from the previous comparative analysis. Each part of the study used specific methodologies and data relevant to examine its own issue.

The first part checks closely into the "OECD KOREA Policy Center-KIHASA family database" to see if and what has plagued it and the different sorts of problems. Though the previous studies identify and retrieve diverse information on families and children in East Asia, there has been no chance up to this point to pay attention to the "quality" aspect of the data collected. The first part of this study identifies and retrieves unavailable indicators and conducts cross-validation of avail-

able indicators.

The second part examines special population issues each country has. TFRs of Asian developed countries are maintained at the lowest low levels it is required further analysis on the reasons for the low fertility rates. In addition the developed Asian countries also need to evaluate the effectiveness of population policy or family policy which had launched to improve fertility rates. The policy needs to seek new directions since population issues are getting more complicated as their TFRs remain at low levels despite the policy initiatives. In this respect, factors on fertility intention, which have strong forecasting power of fertility, were analyzed for Hong-Kong China and Japan. For Singapore and Korea the current situation of population policy and childcare policy and their implication were discussed.

Asian developing countries have experienced changes in the family structure and relations of family together with decreases in fertility rates. The developing countries need to advance family policy dealing with these changes in the family, however it would be a big challenge for those countries because they are still struggling with developing social welfare policy for needy people. Intergenerational support by different social class was analyzed for China, the situation of Thailand's single-mother household and recent movements for supporting them are discussed. Changes in Vietnamese family in terms of family

type, function, relations, social norms on children and mother are analyzed.

Each topic is discussed in the separate chapters of fertility intention (Hong-Kong China, Japan), changes in family (China, Thailand, Vietnam), and issues on population policy and child-care policy (Singapore, Korea). Contents and methodologies used in each chapter are as follows.

Hong-Kong examines the differences between the ideal number of children and actual number of children for the women aged between 15 and 49 years old, and evaluated influential factors on the fertility intention by the number of children. Hong Kong China faces not only drops of TFR but also increases in the gap between actual TFR and average ideal number of children. Many people living in Hong-Kong do not realize the number of children they want. Data from "Knowledge, attitude, and practice (KAP)" collected in 2012 was analyzed by using a logistic regression model.

Japanese fertility decline after the 1970's has been driven by decreases in rates of marriage, and worsening economic conditions of young men has further lead to drops in marriage rates. A significant decrease in fertility intention has been observed among non-married men and women. This study investigates factors which determine the fertility intentions of young men and women including both married as well as un-married. It estimates using a "fixed and random effect model" by using

panel data from the "Japanese Generations and Gender Program" in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2013. The sample includes women aged 25~40 years old and men 25~45 years old. Not only fertility intention of married women and men but also fertility intention of unmarried women and men are analyzed.

While an aging society is progressing, how to care for the elderly has become widely discussed in China. Though caring for the elderly has been a family responsibility it is becoming to introduce the collective provision of public old age insurance. However, the public investment for the elderly could not meet with the requirements of the elderly, in China still family intergenerational contract is more important than social contractor for individual well-being. In this regard, the study of China develops a multidimensional typology of adult child-parent relationship in urban areas of China and defines the five empirically generated types. It explores the relations between the types of adult child-parent relationship and social class and examines individual and social-structural factors that differentiate types. Intergenerational solidarity model and latent class analysis are used for the analysis. Data from the Survey on Family Structure and Family Relations administered by the Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Science in 2008 are used.

In Thai society there has been evidence of increasing prevalence of divorce, teenage pregnancy, and different types of

families such as skipped generation and extended families. In these circumstances the single parent family is perceived as abnormal or an imperfect type of family. This study presents the situation of the sole parent family, explores possible factors that lead to single parent families, investigates aspects of being a single parent family and their coping mechanisms. Policy recommendation and initiatives on helping single mother households are suggested. Data from Population Census, survey on economic activities and socioeconomic condition of household are used to review the situation of single mothers. In order to examine the life of single mothers a qualitative analysis was conducted by interviewing single mothers and social workers.

Vietnam is currently experiencing family transformation as they experience economic and social development. In this regard, changes in Vietnamese family in the Vietnam's developmental context are discussed with special focus on the situation of traditional and current family, spousal relationships, parent-child relationships, and population aging and care. Positive side as well as negative side of the changes in family are discussed and then a future direction of family policy in Vietnam is suggested. Data from Population Census, Nationwide Survey on the Family in Vietnam in 2006, and other national statistics are used for the analysis.

Singapore was a small city-state and had no natural resources which is still true today. There was great urgency felt by leaders

for economic development and also to control population growth. Control of fertility rates and immigration have been the two pillars of the population policy in Singapore. In this study national development and population policies, immigration policies and related social and political issues and future policy directions are discussed. National census data on trends of population and data from the labour force survey are used for analysis with intensive review on literature on these subjects.

Korea has the lowest fertility level in the OECD member countries. Among the recently initiated family policy to recover fertility rates the most expanded policy would be child care services. However there have been little improvement in the goals of childcare policy with respect to fertility rates and female employment. After developments of childcare policy for children aged 0~2 years old since 2004 are described, outcomes from the expansion of childcare policy in terms of public expenditure, supply and demand of the childcare services are analyzed. Finally, recent debates, policy initiatives, and their implications are discussed.

To conclude, it summarizes the main results, describes implications of this study and suggests future policy direction based on the findings.

2 Family Database in East Asian Regions

1. Introduction
2. Characterization of Problems and Method of Evaluation
3. Results of the Evaluation
4. Discussions and Conclusions

2 Family Database in East Asian Regions[1)]

1. Introduction

The purpose of this study is to evaluate and enhance data quality for the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database in the research project, 'Comparative Study of Family Policy in East Asia.' The project, hereafter called the CSFPEA for short, is an ongoing research project that has been carried out each year since 2012 by the ambitious joint effort of the two organizations of KIHASA and OECD KOREA Policy Centre. Launched for the first time in 2012, CSFPEA endeavored to collect and provide a variety of cross-national data on the structure and change of families in East Asia, concerning fertility, aging, the female labor force, and the like, thereby facilitating the eventual formulation and implementation of a set of governmental policies to help improve the socio-economic lives of families in the region. In particular, the identification of some of the most important homogeneities and heterogeneities in the phenomenon within East Asian countries and even across the West has been one of the most enduring concerns of these

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times.

The OECD Family Database, renowned all over the world, is an invaluable source of information concerning the most up-to-date situation of families and children in the West. With the strong support of the European Union and the unfailing commitment of the OECD headquarters that recognized, well in advance, the perennial social problem of so-called 'fertility and aging' prevalent in Europe for a long period of time, construction of the Database and public releases from it began in 2006. These made possible the dissemination of numerous data on family outcomes and family policies across OECD countries, and enhanced engagement with partners and EU member countries. The database is hierarchically structured, in essence, in such a way to contain a set of standardized measurement indicators that include, most important, the four major dimensions — Structure of Families (SF), Labor Market position of Families (LMF), Public policies for Families and children (PF), and Child Outcomes (CO) — with each dimension, in turn, containing a plethora of minute indicators and sub-indicators. After undergoing a series of updates and the adoption of new indicators post-2006, the database is known to consist, as of July 2012, of a total of 4 dimensions, 13 sub-dimensions, 70 indicators, and 263 measurements.[2] Equipped with concise defi-

2) Note that the total number of detailed measurements tends to vary a little bit depending on whether some of the sub-measurements are also counted into the calculation.

nitions, precise methodologies, data issues, and information sources, each indicator is known to typically represent the data on a particular issue of interest. As such, the database is a huge reservoir of data that brings together all kinds of information from various national and international sources on diverse topics related to families and children in the West.[3)]

In spite of its outstanding achievements and contributions over the last 10 years or so, however, the database, it should be emphasized, used to contain some crucial void and limitation: no equivalent data were reported to be readily available or accessible in non-Western regions, particularly in East Asia. Although several reasons and rationales could probably be attributed to help explain the void (e.g. funding, personnel, etc.), the sheer result and ramification still remained the same: in the absence of comparable datasets in East Asia, one could hardly attempt a cross-national and cross-continental comparison or analysis that included both the West and East at the same time. Korea and Japan, two of the visible countries in East Asia, have been OECD members since 1996 and 1964, respectively, which means that the OECD Family Database has constantly been constructed and data made available for these countries for the last few decades. As will be made clear later in this chapter, however, not only was such data compromised by a series of

3) Comprehensive list of all components of dimensions, sub-dimensions, indicators, and measurements in the OECD Family Database is in the website of http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm.

limitations and problems, but in many cases, in particular outside of the OECD, in East Asian countries such as China, Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand and Vietnam, much of it was entirely missing.

In retrospect, focus on and interest in East Asia on the part of the current research team in Korea for the last few years was not surprising at all, not merely because East Asia has indeed been constantly on the rise in the world in recent decades both socio-economically and geopolitically, but because the 'fertility and aging' issue that used to plague the West for a long time might even be more serious in its speed and ramifications to East Asia. The fertility and aging issue looked even more serious and acute since most East Asian countries are now well known for experiencing sharp shrinkages in their younger populations, for one thing, and dramatic increments of their older populations, for another. These phenomena have occurred at such unprecedented rates over the last few decades that they are now, in turn, alleged to be acting as huge obstacles to the continuous and sustainable development of the region.

Triggered by this limitation in the boundary of countries and regions that are encompassed in the OECD Family Database, KIHASA did launch an enthusiastic research project in 2012, proposing that the OECD KOREA Policy Centre initiate the production and construction of equivalent and comparable datasets in East Asia. In doing so, the OECD Social Policy Division

also urged KIHASA and OECD KOREA Policy Centre to propel this kind of data collection activity (Shin.et.al. 2013). and one of the most important driving forces behind such activity was, once again, the latest socio-economic problem of combined low fertility and population aging.

To delineate the trajectory on and after 2012 in some more detail year by year, the first-year of 2012 round was devoted mostly to the identification of some of the most significant indicators in Korea that had been left absent from the OECD Family Database. Given that it was the very first year of the annually planned project, the research team tried to concentrate on the so-called 'priority indicators' (Shin.et.al. 2012), in which only some of the most prominent indicators were strategically chosen and measurements obtained merely for them. As such, the focus was exclusively on Korea, and by the end of 2012 the research team somehow managed to retrieve as many as 71 among hundreds of missing indicators in Korea (Shin.et.al. 2012). The procedures employed for the 2012 round (and thereafter, as well) in collecting missing indicators included two basic steps: ① when available statistics already existed that fit appropriately to the OECD measurement standard, they were adopted as they were; ② when those statistics were not available, however, some re-analysis, estimation, or even rudimentary imputation was attempted on the basis of the existing statistics (Shin.et.al. 2012). Note that a vast majority of these data were from existing sta-

tistics published by government and/or quasi-government agencies, such as Statistics Korea, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and dozens of government think tank research institutes in Korea.

The second-year of 2013 round differed from the previous round in moving beyond Korea: in addition to Korea, three noticeable countries in East Asia — Japan, China and Singapore — were included (Shin.et.al. 2013) and similar efforts as the previous round for Korea were made for these countries, too. In an effort to gain cooperation and facilitate an understanding on the part of those partner countries, the principal investigator (Dr. Shin) visited each to help explain the purpose of the study and the procedures of data collection and forwarding. The 2013 round was different from the previous round, as well, with its heavier focus on the first three dimensions (structure of families, labor market position of families, and public policies for families and children) at the expense of the last dimension (child outcomes). Although not as neat or comprehensive as Korea in 2012, the research team could again identify and retrieve some of the most important missing indicators for these countries (Shin.et.al. 2013).

The third-year of 2014 round was even more ambitious in having three additional countries in East Asia—Hong Kong, Thailand, and Vietnam—and, out of the same effort targeted for the four countries in previous rounds, the research team could

again end up with a rich source of data for a total of seven East Asian countries (Shin.et.al. 2014). And hereafter the database came to be known as the "OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database." The focus of the third-year round, as was the case for the second-year round, was on the three dimensions (SF, LMF, and PF), too, but a more serious effort was made to fill the database with greater detail, and to include those indicators that were left out from the second-year round. Obviously, focus on these particular seven countries in the absence of other countries in the region was not surprising in the sense of their socio-economic visibility on the one hand, and the afore-mentioned problems of fertility and aging prevalence on the other. Unlike the traditional expectation or common understanding that most East Asian countries, with a strong sense of familism and Confucian legacy, would probably be similar in fertility, aging, and related phenomena of interests, they are in fact quite different, it should be emphasized, due primarily to differential levels of socio-economic development, political and/or welfare regimes, rank-and-file populace's attitudes and behaviors, and the like. This was another strong rationale or motivation to try to include multiple East Asian countries in the CSFPEA project.

Now, to try to summarize and evaluate the three-year rounds from 2012 to 2014 of CSFPEA altogether, both the advantages and disadvantages could probably be pointed out. The most sig-

nificant advantage should certainly be the identification and retrieval of diverse information on some of the most important indicators for the OECD Family Database that have remained absent or missing from those noticeable countries in East Asia. This, in effect, implies that a cross-national or cross-continental comparative analysis could now be conducted including the East and the West simultaneously. Despite this clear advantage and great contribution, however, the previous rounds were far from being appropriate or complete in some respects. Most critical was the relative negligence or failure, it should be emphasized, to pay attention to the quality of data collected from the countries in East Asia. Although a lot of detailed reasoning and rationale should surely be provided later on in this research report in trying to provide an answer to this candid self-diagnosis within the research team, not a sufficient amount of energy has been put together, admittedly, up to this point to figure out how sound the collected data were. Obviously three years was not a long enough time span to pay serious attention to the quality issue, and one could argue, quite persuasively, that the quantitative accumulation and construction of those datasets in as much as seven East Asian countries in such a short period of time is itself simply amazing. Nevertheless, the quantitative contribution can in no way justify the qualitative standing or status of the accumulated data. It is the strong belief and commitment of the research team that the time has arrived to be prepared to turn focus to the

quality aspects of the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database constructed in East Asia for the last three years, and try to evaluate, rectify, and ultimately enhance the database. Interestingly enough, the two consecutive international conferences held in Seoul, Korea in 2013 and 2014, respectively, with a view to present diverse results of data collection and some sophisticated data analysis in each country failed to have any single piece of information concerning the quality issue to which the current study tries to address. Obviously, a preliminary assessment of the quality of massive data collected over the last three years at this point of time is urgent, not merely to look closely into the current status or standing of accumulated data, but also to be prepared for better guidelines about data collection procedures from now on. It goes almost without saying that all these efforts are designed ultimately to pave the way to help improve and enhance the data quality for a family database in East Asia, which, in turn, would lead to a better formulation and implementation of a set of fruitful social policies targeted to the populations in the region.

2. Characterization of Problems and Method of Evaluation

The foremost thing required for a solid evaluation of the accumulated data over the years is to try to characterize the kinds

of specific problems underlying the data. Depending on the diagnosis of detailed problems underlying the data, corresponding remedies or prescription might be set forth in due course. Although a scrutinized diagnosis was certainly made in the foremost part of the current study, an overview and perusal running through the available dataset up to this point reveals basically two broad kinds of problems — (1) identification and retrieval of unavailable indicators and (2) cross-validation of available indicators — and each needs to be elaborated in some further details below.

1) Identification and retrieval of unavailable indicators

The list of indicators collected over the last three years from the countries in East Asia, it should be noted, is far from being complete or comprehensive. As indicated above, the OECD Family Database contains hundreds of detailed indicators and sub-indicators. These sophisticated indicators are, of course, designed, from the outset, to be applied unequivocally and universally to all OECD countries in the West. The three years of continuous endeavor led by the research team and followed consequently by the seven countries involved, however, left much room for improvement in leaving out some of the most important indicators. To be more precise, in the case of the two OECD member countries of Korea and Japan, as many as

156 and 163 indicators respectively remain outstanding. Quite expectedly, the situation looks even more serious for the remaining five non-member countries of China, Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, and Vietnam: the number of missing indicators for each is 177, 170, 173, 200, and 203, respectively. Note that detailed counts of missing indicators are presented in Appendix Tables 1-1-1 through 1-3-4.[4)]

In an effort to more visibly identify which kinds of detailed indicators are available and which are not for each of the seven countries, the current research team tried to invest a substantial portion of its time and energy to construct an Excel table that exhibits the current status of data availability for each country. In order to identify missing indicators and the problems of data, a table based on an Excel spreadsheet was constructed. The table contains a few important characteristics. First, rows in the table amount to about 300, which include the most detailed indicators in the OECD FD. Second, columns refer primarily to each country. The table tried to juxtapose each country in order to figure out precisely what indicators are available and unavailable for a certain country, on the one hand, and to see to what extent the current status (numbers

4) The OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database does not include all the indicators of the OECD Family Database. The research team asked major indicators which reflect specific features of the Asian family to collaborating national specialists in each country. Thus, there are possibilities that each country may have more data than what are listed in the Appendix tables.

and/or figures) matches or does not match one another for the seven countries in East Asia. In regards to the OECD members of Korea and Japan, however, one more column has been superimposed next to each in order to have the current status of data as shown in the OECD FD. Comparison of the two statuses — numbers or figures collected for each country by the KIHASA research team for the last three years or so, and those shown in the OECD FD — with respect to each country is expected to demonstrate the extent to which the two statuses, which are normally expected to be exactly same, are compatible or incompatible with each other. Third, in the hundreds of cells in which rows and columns cross each other, an attempt was made to identify the relevant information (figures and/or numbers), and whenever available, inserted. If information turned out to be non-available after all efforts, the N.A. (not-applicable) sign was inserted. Finally, one more final column of 'comments' was prepared at the end in order to jot down what kinds of problems were identified or diagnosed, and what sorts of remedies or prescriptions need to be dealt with. With overall comments on the most minute diagnosis and prescription, if any, with respect to each detailed indicator, this last column is essentially one of the most crucial parts or outcomes of the current study.[5] As will be made clear later on in this chapter,

5) Due to the huge amounts of information in the Excel table, this report does not provide it. The Excel table can be released by personal contact with the principal researcher, Dr. Yoon-Jeong Shin (yjshin@kihasa.re.kr).

the evaluation results of this study refer primarily to this table, particularly the comments column.

The research team, of course, fully recognizes that retrieval of a full list of indicators is hardly a simple and straightforward task for non-member, as well as member, countries in East Asia. Probably a number of diverse reasons could account for this difficulty, which includes the virtual shortage or de facto absence of available information, the lack of full support or co-operation from the party (i.e. person or organization) in charge of data collection and forwarding at the local level, the mis-match between different sources of data (e.g. public vs. private), and the like. Nevertheless, the fact still remains that missing indicators are certainly destined in whatever ways to produce some serious backdrop in the cross-national comparison of whatever research interests. Although it remains to be seen later on in this evaluation study to what extent different countries are void of some of the most crucial indicators, an unfaltering attempt to come up with a full and comprehensive list as much as possible by all possible means (i.e. direct contact with local personnel in charge of data forwarding in each country, online navigation and searching into some of the most prominent websites in and outside the country) should always be an enduring endeavor on the part of the research team.

2) Cross-validation of available indicators

Apart from the unavailability of some of the most important indicators, no known attempt has yet been made by the research team in the last three years to look closely into the validity of available indicators. In a sense, this issue of the validity assessment for the available data is, by its nature, pretty much complicated and thus requires some detailed description and explanation concerning the data collection guidelines and procedures for the last few years. The previous research team attempted to get in touch with local personnel in each country and asked them to discover and forward the relevant data. They were reminded of two basic guidelines: ① try to retrieve as much information as possible; ② try to compare and contrast, whenever multiple sources exist out there, different information and forward the best one they figure out with any supporting rationale or reasoning.

A glance at the available data that have been forwarded to the research team for the last three years indicates that some information or indicators appear to be based on local governmental statistics while others were from private agencies in the country. Furthermore, some information was apparently retrieved from renowned international statistics, such as the WHO, World Bank, UN, ILO, IMF, EU, etc., whereas others came directly from local sources. Besides the source of data, time frame tended to vary, as well: some were more up to date

while others were more outdated. Although it is not so easy and clear-cut to say if public and international sources are more reliable and creditworthy than private and local sources, a rule of thumb or hunch on the part of the research team reveals that the former tends to be more creditworthy and possesses better validity. In short, it should be noted that, with diverse, or even heterogeneous, sources of indicators that are sometimes not amenable to an easy coordination or could even be conflicting with each other, an orderly standardization and consequent harmonization across countries are likely to suffer to a significant extent.

All in all, this provides a strong case to suggest that the research team now try the so-called 'cross-validation' activity in which the specific source of information (public vs. private/international vs. local/up-to-date vs. outdated) is identified pretty much closely for each available indicator and then seeing if and to what extent some information is deviating significantly from others. Granted that all kinds of validation activities are always subject to the issue of validity criterion — i.e. which one should become the primary criterion to assess the validity and what is the plausible reasoning or rationale underlying it — the research team, whenever warranted, is determined to use the public, international, and most up-to-date sources, at the expense of private, local, and outdated ones, as their major criterion, since they are ordinarily assumed, as already indicated, to

possess better psychometric properties. In particular, trying to validate local indicators with respect to some of the most prominent statistics released from world-renowned organizations (e.g. WHO, World Bank, UN, ILO, etc.) should always be one of the most challenging and time-consuming tasks confronting the research team.

It is another belief and commitment of the research team that the cross-validation activity does not really have to rely heavily on the above-indicated macro statistics provided by organizations in charge of family and/or gender at the local or international level. A close look at some of the most prominent surveys around the world, noticeably the ISSP (International Social Survey Programme), EASS (East Asian Social Survey), CNES (Comparative National Election Survey), WVS (World Value Survey), ELFS (European Labor Force Survey), etc. reveals that they also keep producing and disseminating a number of micro data relevant to the topic of interests in this evaluation research. Carefully designed by means of multi-country coordination and subsequently fielded in each country in some yearly time interval, these survey frameworks do indeed contain a diverse source of information on attitudes and behaviors concerning family, gender, aging, fertility, and the like. Included there, to illustrate, are gender preferences, ideal (and actual) number of children, family-work interaction or balance, household division of labor, intergenerational support relation-

ships, attitudes toward marriage and childbearing, and the like and these could also be very useful sources of information for this evaluation research. Note that these data can be accessed and are made readily available through some of the most famous data archives in the world nowadays (e.g. ICPSR, GESIS, Roper Center, CESSDA, ASEP, SSJDA, EASSDA, etc.) and that a scrutinized reliance on them should have a lot of relevance and implications for this research. As far as the research team realizes, however, no known local personnel or partner, including Korea's, has yet tried to make full use of these international datasets in trying to forward its indicators. Quite expectedly, these internationally coordinated survey data could be used for two different purposes in this study, i.e., the identification of missing information for one thing and the cross-validation for another. Arguably, the previous installments of the CSFPEA project for the last three years tended to be pretty much overwhelmed by the macro or factual data in the relative absence or paucity of micro or perceptual ones. When it comes to the international survey data in particular, the blind-mindedness to the latter has apparently been another serious shortcoming in previous research and the attention to them for the first time this year should probably be one more innovative aspect or defining characteristics of the current evaluation study.

As the first step in cross-validation, this study conducts some rudimentary validation work. This includes checking into some

of the incompatible numbers and figures coming from different sources, unexpectedly extreme (high or low) numbers and figures in a certain country as compared to those in other countries, apparently wrongful or misleading numbers and figures judging from the standardized measurement guidelines in the OECD FD, reliance on some unreliable data sources (e.g. some small and/or local scale private surveys), and the like.

As for the detailed methods of cross-validation from the next year on, basically two of the most important methods or vehicles would probably be employed by the research team: direct contact with local personnel in charge of data forwarding, on the one hand, and online navigation and searching into some of the most prominent websites in and outside the country, on the other. In terms of direct contact with local personnel, to begin with, the research team will try to keep approaching local representatives in each country once again on a constant basis, notify them of any potential problems identified by the research team, have them check into the problems more meticulously, and try to rectify them by sending back new information. Obviously, email would probably be the most salient means of communication with them, but other means, such as phone-calls or even in-person visits, might have also had to be used whenever needed or warranted.

In addition to direct contact, online surfing into a whole batch of websites all around the world will be another most

tangible means or method employed throughout the entire phase or process of the cross-validation activity. Recalling the purpose and procedures of the evaluation study, one may not be surprised to hear that web surfing could be the most primary and crucial activity in the course of the cross-validation of available indicators, as well as in the identification of missing information mentioned above. Web surfing is essentially going to be a data-searching activity and, with the primary lead of the research team, the surfing will go through the gamut of sources (public and private), ranges (macro and micro), directions (international and local), and dates (up-to-date and outdated). Admittedly, the research team might have a critical limitation in surfing only into websites written in English, but an effort would be made, whenever needed and made possible, to ask local representatives to take a close look at websites written in local, or non-English, languages, as well. Web surfing is certainly going to be another rather challenging and time-consuming task of the research team, but it is believed it will contribute significantly to finding out new and lively data, including those that are otherwise incompatible or outdated.

All local representatives from the seven East Asian countries were participated in the Second Family Policy Seminar, which was organized by OECD Korea Policy Centre and KIHASA on October 29, 2015 in Seoul, Korea. The research team attempted to make use of this opportunity to present and demonstrate the

major results of the 2015 evaluation study. By seeing what kinds of detailed problems have been identified from this study, each local representative could become aware of and ponder the problems more seriously, leading ultimately and hopefully to the creation of fruitful remedies, solutions or prescriptions from that point on upon returning home.[6]

3. Results of the Evaluation

Recalling that two of the most significant and tangible targets in trying to figure out the detailed problems underlying the OECD FD in East Asia were (1) the identification of unavailable indicators and the retrieval of information on available indicators and (2) the cross-validation of available (non-missing) indicators, results of the evaluation in this study need to be exhibited by following each of the two targets consecutively.

1) Results of the identification of unavailable indicators and the retrieval of information on available indicators

As noted above, results of the identification of unavailable or missing indicators for each country in East Asia, along with the

6) Note that some of the most important results of these kinds of cross-validation activity for this year are contained in the comments column of Excel table.

retrieval of information on available indicators, are contained in details in the Excel table. Now that the table tends to be pretty much complicated, a simplified and handy table, in which only availability or unavailability is indicated without any detailed information on the available indicators, is also made and presented in Appendix Tables 1-1-1 through 1-3-4.

Table 2-1 is a brief summary of the availability of the OECD FD for each country with respect to each indicator that has been extracted, in order to promote visibility, from Appendix Tables 1-1-1 through 1-3-4.

〈Table 2-1〉 Summary of the availability of the OECD FD indicators for each country in East Asia

Country	Dimension 1: 'SF'	Dimension 2: 'LMF'	Dimension 3: 'PF'	Total
Korea	41 / 69 (59.4%)	35 / 65 (53.8%)	30 / 66 (45.5%)	106 / 200 (53.0%)
Japan	37 / 69 (53.6%)	33 / 65 (50.8%)	29 / 66 (43.9%)	99 / 200 (49.5%)
China	31 / 69 (44.9%)	32 / 65 (49.2%)	22 / 66 (33.3%)	85 / 200 (42.5%)
Singapore	40 / 69 (58.0%)	27 / 65 (41.5%)	25 / 66 (37.9%)	92 / 200 (46.0%)
Hong Kong	39 / 69 (56.5%)	25 / 65 (38.5%)	25 / 66 (37.9%)	89 / 200 (44.5%)
Thailand	29 / 69 (42.0%)	22 / 65 (33.8%)	11 / 66 (16.7%)	62 / 200 (31.0%)
Vietnam	24 / 69 (34.8%)	18 / 65 (27.7%)	17 / 66 (25.8%)	59 / 200 (29.5%)

Notes: SF=Structure of Families; LMF=Labor Market positions of Families; PF=Public policies for Families and children; Excluded is the fourth dimension of CO (Child Outcome).

As shown in Table 2-1, Korea ranks first in managing to retrieve a total of 106 out of 200 initial indicators (excluding the final dimension of CO)—53.0 percent retrieval rate. Japan follows with 49.5%, followed, in order, by Singapore (46.0%), Hong Kong (44.5%), China (42.5%), Thailand (31.0%), and Vietnam (29.5%). This order remains almost the same with respect to each dimension, as well. To try to compare the retrieval rates with respect to the three dimensions across all countries, SF stands the highest, followed by LMF and PF in order.[7)]

Taken together, the results of examining the data availability in East Asia illustrate that a substantial portion (more than 50%, with the exception only of Korea) of the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database indicators are still left missing even after the tireless efforts of the last three years (2012-14), and that this void tends to be particularly critical for the non-OECD countries (China, Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, and Vietnam) and also for the two dimensions of LMF and PF. As such, this provides a strong case to suggest that further effort be made from this point on to try to retrieve as much information as possible to fill the void.

7) The OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database does not include all the indicators of OECD Family Database. The research team asked major indicators which reflect the specific features of the Asian family to collaborating national specialists in each countries. Thus, there are possibility that the retrieval rates can be higher than what are listed in Table 2-1.

2) Results of the Cross-Validation of Available Indicators

As indicated above, the Excel table contains every piece of information concerning the results of cross-validating the available indicators, and major results about them are briefly summarized in the comments column there. A close examination of the comments demonstrates the following kinds of problems or concerns throughout the countries.

First and foremost, in the case of the two OECD member countries of Korea and Japan, there, in fact, exists some significant, non-negligible, amount of discrepancy between the statistics kept in the OECD FD and the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database, i. e. those retrieved locally by the research team for the last three years. The two statistics, which are expected to be pretty similar or exactly the same, tend to differ from each other to a significant degree with respect to a lot of minute indicators in both countries. As indicated already, the research team initially tried to juxtapose the two columns in the Excel table in order to probe into this kind of possibility in detail and the results indeed serve to empirically confirm the possibility. As such, the result constitutes one of the most important findings in this study, since it suggests that one of the two data, either the OECD FD or the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database (or even both), is likely to be invalid.

〈Table 2-2〉 Comparison of the Korea's statistics between the OECD Family Database and the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database

Indicators	OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database	OECD Family Database
SF 1-1. Family size and composition		
Types of household, latest year (1=couple families; 2=single person households; 3=sole-parent families; 4=other private households)	1=52.4%; 2=23.9%; 3=9.2%; 4=14.5% [2010] (Population and Housing Census, 2010)	1=72.6%; 2=?; 3=9.4%; 4=18.6 [2011] (Population and Housing Census, 2010)
Proportion of couple or nuclear families	52.4% [2010] (Population and Housing Census, 2010)	72.6% [2011] (Population and Housing Census, 2010)
Proportion of other private households	14.5% [2010] (Population and Housing Census, 2010)	18.6% [2011] (Population and Housing Census, 2010)
SF 1-2. Children in families		
Share of households with children in all households	52.7% [2010] (Population and Housing Census, 2010)	73.9% [2011] (Population and Housing Census, 2010)
Share of couples with children in all couple families	70.6% [2010] (Population and Housing Census, 2010)	79.6% [2011] (Population and Housing Census, 2010)
SF 2-2. Ideal and actual number of children		
Ideal and actual fertility rates	Ideal=2.01 [2012] (National Survey on Dynamics of Marriage and Family, 2012)	Ideal=2.43 [2012] (World Value Survey Wave 60)
SF 2-3. Age of mother at childbirth		
Mean age of women at the first birth	30.5 [2012] (Annual Reports on the Vital Statistics, 2012)	29.9 [2012] (United Nations, World Fertility Data, 2012)
SF 2-4. Share of births		
Proportion of births out of wedlock	2.11 [2011] (Annual Reports on the Vital Statistics, 2012)	1.5 [2006] (UN Statistical Divisions 2013, Eurostat 2013)
Adolescent fertility rates	1.8 [2011] (Annual Reports on the Vital Statistics)	5.5 [2011] (Eurostat 2013)

Indicators	OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database	OECD Family Database
SF 3-1. Marriage and divorce rate		
Crude marriage rate	6.4 [2013] (Annual Reports on the Vital Statistics, 2014)	7.13 [2007] (UN Statistical Divisions 2011, Eurostat 2012)
Crude divorce rates	2.3 [2013] (Annual Reports on the Vital Statistics, 2014)	2.6 [2008] (UN Statistical Divisions 2011, Eurostat 2012)

Sources: OECD (2014); Shin.et.al.(2014)

Although it is not easy and straightforward to arrive at a final and conclusive judgment about the validity of one set of statistics against the other, an important clue can nevertheless be found by trying to answer the question of precisely how the data have been collected or retrieved, respectively, by the OECD and local team. As a matter of fact, one of the continuous questions confronted by the research team in the course of carrying out the evaluation research this year concerned the detailed procedure of the OECD to collect data for each indicator. This question, in fact, included a series of further detailed questions: is there an agency, if any, in each OECD country that is officially in charge of data collection and forwarding? If there is, what is it specifically in Korea and Japan and what are some of the procedures, protocols, rules, and regulations concerning the data collection and forwarding that the OECD headquarter assigns or delegates? Although the research team still fails to have definitive answers to these kinds of procedural questions

(perhaps, the OECD headquarter might have to be contacted later on to obtain more conclusive answers), it is now the hunch or conjecture of the research team that no such agency actually exits and that no such protocols or rules exist out there. Presumably, the OECD FD has been collected by relying basically on two different routes or procedures: ① whenever available and warranted, the OECD staff in Paris tried to retrieve data by going through a whole batch of internationally renowned websites and published booklets; ② when some of the data turn out to be unavailable, however, they might have tried to get in touch with local personnel or agencies (e.g. OECD Korea Policy Center, Statistics Korea, or even some private agencies of people, etc.) on an intermittent basis and asked or urged them to collect and forward the relevant data. This, in effect, demonstrates that no known or reported central coordination function has been working in Korea or Japan to strictly impose the measurement guidelines and personal/organizational commitment in the process of data collection, thereby also suggesting that, unlike the ordinary expectation, the OECD FD is not necessarily inherently valid and reliable.

The local collection of the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database in Korea and Japan for the last three years, however, was pretty much different from what has presumably been done in the OECD headquarters. As already indicated, the research team tried physically to find every single

piece of information by taking a close look at all sorts of materials, on- and off-line at both domestic and international levels. This guideline has been delivered to every local partner involved in East Asia including Korea and Japan. This suggests a cautious but more plausible scenario that, whenever any discrepancies or mismatches are observed between the two data sources, the locally retrieved OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database is likely to be more valid and reliable than the OECD FD. Of course, this is not to firmly say that it always is the case. Perhaps there could be some cases, also, in which quite the opposite is in fact true. Nonetheless, insofar as the findings and clues up to this point are concerned, the research team is more inclined to side with the validity of the local OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database, as opposed to the OECD FD. As will be pointed out later in this chapter, depending on the diagnosis on this sort of mismatch problem, an entirely different kind of solution, remedy, or prescription might have to be sought to deal with the problem.

Second, in a lot of cases for the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database (but lesser cases for the OECD FD), it was observed that the standardized measurement guidelines have not been properly abided by. As indicated already, the OECD FD is pretty well equipped with streamlined conceptual definitions and scrupulous measurement guidelines to tap each indicator. Despite these definitions and guidelines, a

significant amount of deviance from them has indeed been observed in non-OECD, as well as in the OECD countries in East Asia. As such, this should work as a clear evidence to suggest that there still remains room for improvement to come up with a better and more appropriate measurement on the part of each country involved in the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database. It goes almost without saying that, without such improvement, standardization and harmonization across different countries for a cross-national comparison is likely to suffer to a significant extent.

Third, a non-negligible amount of data in the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database, as well as in the OECD FD, turned out to be outdated. Some of the numbers or figures there can, of course, be outdated, since the most up-to-date data is hardly likely to be retrieved on a constant basis. But the update problem is a matter of degree, and there indeed were a lot of cases in which the data were too outdated to use for any studies of comparative purpose. Some were even more than 10 years old! Apart from the outdate problem, not only was it unknown or unclear specifically which year the data refers to, but the year of publication was not known or was not clear-cut, either. There were some cases, as well, in which the data source was not reported at all. Further, some of the indicators turned out to have pretty much divergent criterion years (i.e. the year to which data refers) across the countries. This in fact

was especially the case for the non-OECD countries in East Asia. With outdated, unclear or unknown, and varying time points to which the data is referenced, a smooth comparison of whatever purposes can seldom be conducted.

Fourth, some cases were observed, too, in which the figures and numbers in the data are fluctuating too much across different countries. For instance, household by number of children, one of the indicators in SF 1.3, did indeed have pretty much abnormal (extremely high or extremely low) numbers for a few countries. This casts reasonable doubt that some sort of error might have been made there in the process of data collection, forwarding, or processing, and should be checked into more closely and rectified later on.

Finally, some of the data in the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database relied too much on some small-scale or regionally confined, less creditworthy, survey data. To illustrate, information on a few indicators for a certain country in East Asia turned out to be obtained from a small-scaled survey that was conducted at a regional, not national, level. To be qualified for international comparison and analysis, the data has somehow got to be retrieved from a truly national sample survey in due course. As long as this kind of data scale problem exists out there, it should be identified and substituted by national-level data that can better guarantee the international comparison.

Aside from the data scale, other cases have often been observed, too, in which survey data, albeit at national level, have been used too much in the absence of some official governmental statistics. It is not clear to the research team if the country concerned had any other alternative but to use the survey data due simply to the unavailability of governmental statistics. Whenever macro-level governmental statistics are available, however, the local team in each country is encouraged and obliged to try its best to find out those statistics instead of some micro-level survey data.

4. Discussions and Conclusions

This evaluation study was triggered by the need and concern that the three-year (2012-14) rounds of the breathlessly conducted ongoing research project, 'Comparative Study of Family Policy in East Asia,' failed to take a pause up to this point to ruminate over any sort of problems or limitations underlying the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database that has been constructed and accumulated ambitiously during that time. Most importantly, in an effort to characterize and look closely into the quality aspect of the data, two of the most significant and tangible research questions were set forth: ① which indicators are not available yet and which ones are made readily available with precisely what statistics and/or figures?;

② how sound are the retrieved available indicators in their measurement or psychometric properties? Major findings from the results of evaluation illustrated so far in the above might be summarized like the following below.

First, an examination of the data availability with respect to hundreds of measurement indicators across the seven East Asian countries revealed that a substantial portion, mostly more than 50%, of the OECD FD indicators were still left missing in the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database. This substantially means that, despite the unwavering efforts of the research team to construct the database in a way to parallel or catch up with the OECD FD, there still exists a crucial void in the completeness of the data, and the team, aided by the coordinated efforts of local representatives in each country, might have to go much further to fill the void in the near future.

Second, the cross-validation of available indicators has demonstrated that some significant and non-negligible amount of discrepancy or mismatch exists between the OECD FD and OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database. Then, faced with the possible question of which one is more valid among the two, the research team has posited a cautious, but seemingly plausible, diagnosis that the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database is likely to possess sounder measurement properties than the OECD FD, considering the way data are collected, retrieved, and forwarded to headquarters. If

this self-diagnosis is correct, then a strong case could probably be made to suggest that the OECD FD be closely examined against its data validity. Perhaps, not only the data in East Asia, but those in other OECD countries, might have to be checked into in terms of their validity with the primary lead of the OECD headquarters in Paris. Although this could certainly be an enormous, time-consuming task, it nonetheless is believed to be a worthwhile and crucial job that awaits. And, as pointed out above, an installment of some central coordination functions, in which each OECD country is urged and obliged to retrieve and forward its data with the official auspices of some centrally designated headquarters or branches, might have to be seriously considered, too. All this effort and implementation will eventually work together to help improve the data quality of the OECD FD.

Third, the cross-validation in this evaluation study also revealed that some of the most important measurement guidelines and protocols prepared by the OECD FD have failed to be abided by the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database. As such, this suggests that a more stringent effort has to be made from now on to come up with a streamlined construction of measurement indicators in the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database, thereby facilitating a better harmonization and standardization for any sort of comparative study in the future.

Fourth, the cross-validation effort in the current study also exhibited a lot of instances in which statistics in the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database tend to be outdated, on the one hand, and the criterion and year of publication are unknown or unclear, on the other. This evidence suggests that a serious attempt should be made from now on to try to come up with more up-to-date and clear-cut information on the time point to which the data refers. With outdated and ambiguous data, a comparative study of whatever purpose can hardly be carried out.

Fifth, some of the statistics retrieved in the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database turned out to fluctuate too much across the countries in East Asia. A reason of doubt could probably be cast to this kind of fluctuation and the research team has to work together with local representatives in East Asia from now on to check more closely into the problem, thereby constructing data sets that are free from such problems.

The final result from the cross-validation in this study concerned the scale and/or credit-worth of the local data sources. To be more precise, not merely did some indicators in the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database come from some small, regionally confined, survey frameworks, instead of a national sample survey, but there also were a lot of cases in which the micro-level survey data were overwhelmingly used in place of corresponding official governmental macro-statistics.

As emphasized above, it is always encouraged and suggested by the current research team that, whenever national sample surveys and governmental macro-statistics are readily available in each country, they need to be employed as much as possible in place of regionally confined sample survey datasets.

As a final word of notice before wrapping up this chapter, the research team would like to point out a few administrative things for future studies in this area. The first thing concerns the enduring commitment of the concerned parties to help continue this sort of evaluation study in the near future. As already indicated, the literally 'full-fledged' cross-validation of the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database indeed requires an enormous amount of time, funding, and personnel. To illustrate, one might be able to easily image how hard, time-consuming, and even tortuous it would be to try to validate certain numbers or figures in a specific indicator of the East Asian database against some renowned and creditworthy numbers or figures on and off-line worldwide. To everybody's rightful expectation, this in no way is a simple and straightforward task. In this respect, the current evaluation study was only a beginning or preliminary step towards full-blown validation endeavors in the future, and the research team firmly expects that an ongoing effort is required in the near future to keep propelling the evaluation research in the long run.

Another administrative thing the research team wants to point out concerns the launching of a more formal and sustainable network of coordination among the local representatives involved in the construction and development of the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database. A formal network of data coordination and harmonization, like the ISSP or CNES should be contrived and formulated for efficient and effective construction and sustainable development of a family database in East Asia. Although trying to launch such a network on a more formal and sustainable basis is obviously another serious challenge and huge task on the part of all people and agencies involved in this project, it nonetheless is believed to be a job worthy of pursuing from now on so as to promote the current status and enhance the quality of the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database.

3 Discrepancy of the Ideal and Actual Parity among Hong Kong Married Women

1. Introduction
2. Data and Method
3. Results
4. Discussions and Conclusions

3 Discrepancy of the Ideal and Actual Parity among Hong Kong Married Women[8)]

1. Introduction

Fertility in Hong Kong has been declining continuously over the past three decades. The low fertility issue has become a major challenge to the sustainable development of Hong Kong with an ageing population and shrinking workforce. Without replacement migration, such prolonged ultra-low fertility will aggravate the shortage of labor supply in the coming decades. It is anticipated the workforce is about to decline from 2018 onwards despite a continuous increase of population size. Moreover, the extremely low fertility rate will also accelerate the population aging. According to the projections of Census and Statistics Department, if Hong Kong's TFR remains below 1.2 during the period of 2011~2041 the median age of the entire population will rise to 50 years old in 2041 from the current 42 years old; the proportion of elderly population (aged 65 and over) will increase more than twice from the current 14% to 30 % in 2041; and the elderly dependency ratio (i.e. ratio of the number of older adults aged 65 or over to one hundred persons

8) This chapter was written by Mengni Chen and Paul S. F. Yip (Department of Social Work and Social Administration, the University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong).

aged 15-64) will increase from 18 in 2011 to 50 in 2041 (HKCSD 2012b).

The rapid fertility decline is accompanied by dramatic changes in Hong Kong's family structure. Figure 3-1 shows the trends of Hong Kong's total fertility rate (TFR) and average family size over 1981~2012. The TFR plummeted from 1.93 (close to the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman) in 1981 to a record low of 0.90 in 2003. The TFR has recovered since 2004, reaching 1.28 in 2012. Some of the possible factors contributing to the recovery include: increasing number of babies born to non-local mothers, which may lead to an overestimation about the local TFR (Basten & Verropoulou 2013; Leung 2011); and the catch-up effect after delay in marriage and children (Bongaarts & Sobotka 2012; Goldstein.et.al. 2009; HKCSD 2012a; Sobotka.et.al. 2011), which implies that the recent fertility recovery may not lead to a radical change in Hong Kong's situation (Frejka et al., 2010). As shown in Figure 3-1, after excluding babies born to non-local mothers, the TFR of Hong Kong local women reduced by 15~20% and it was about 1.0 child per woman for the year 2014. In the same period of 1981~2012 when the TFR decreased by almost 1 child per woman, the average family size has decreased continuously, from 3.9 persons to 2.9 persons. All these seem to indicate that Hong Kong has fallen into the "low-fertility trap" (Lutz.et.al. 2006; Straughan.et.al. 2008).

[Figure 3-1] TFR and family size of Hong Kong over 1981~2012



Data: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department (2012a)

The transition of Hong Kong's fertility to this ultra-low level was driven by substantial changes in marital structure-marriage delay and increasing spinsterhood, as well as changes in child-bearing behavior (Yip & Lee 2002; Yip.et.al. 2006). Marriages have been increasingly postponed. Table 3-1 shows the median age at first marriage for females has increased to 28.9 years in 2011, comparing to 23.9 year in 1981; and for males the median age has reached 31.2 years, which was only 27 years in 1981. Besides, an increasing trend of spinsterhood is observed. Also, in 1981 only 30.3% of women aged 25-29 were never-married but this proportion reached 69.3% in 2011. And 37.7% of women aged 30-34 were never-married in 2011, compared to 11% in 1981. Now, 22% of women aged 35-39 still remained single while only 4.5% was found in the 1980s. The rise in females'

education has attracted much attention and was believed to contribute to the marriage delay as well as the ultra-low fertility in many high-income East Asian countries (Frejka.et.al. 2010; Jones 2007; Yip.et.al. 2008).

〈Table 3-1〉 Selected measures of nuptiality in Hong Kong 1986~2011

	1981	1986	1991	1996	2001	2006	2011
Median age at first marriage							
Female	23.9	25.3	26.2	26.9	27.5	28.2	28.9
Male	27.0	28.0	29.1	30.0	30.2	31.2	31.2
Percentage of never married female (%)							
Age 25~29	30.3	37.5	45.5	52.0	59.7	67.7	69.3
Age 30~34	11.0	14.5	19.8	26.5	31.2	35.0	37.7
Age 35~39	4.5	7.4	10.4	14.6	18.8	22.6	22.0

Data: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department (2012a)

Low-order births have been increasingly postponed by young women and the recuperation of high-order births among older women is very weak as the window of conceiving babies has been narrowed due to the increase in age at marriage and out-of-wedlock births are not that common in Hong Kong as in other western countries. Figure 3-2 shows the increasing median age of low-order births. The median age at first birth increased from 25.1 years in 1981 to 30.0 years in 2011. And the median age at second birth has risen up to 33.1 years in 2011, compared to 27.5 years in 1981. Meanwhile the significant drop of third births has also depressed Hong Kong's fertility to an

extremely low level (Figure 3-2). In 1981 there were 86,751 live births and about 23% were of third and higher orders while only about 9% of 95,451 babies were observed in 2011 (HKCSD 2012a). All these have implied that both "tempo effect" and "quantum effect" (Bongaarts & Feeney 1998) have led to Hong Kong's fertility decline.

[Figure 3-2] Median age at low-order births and the proportion of higher-order births in 1981~2011



Data: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department (2012a)

As reminded by some demographers, the prevalent behavior of delaying marriage among young generations may be "a direct response to a desire to avoid or delay childbearing" (Frejka. et.al. 2010). Low fertility among married couples may also reflect changes in their fertility desire and intention (Berrington 2004; Billingsley & Ferrarini 2014). With the wide spread of fertility

decline in the world, a lot of recent studies have attempted to investigate whether the childbearing behavior adequately reflects people's aspiration and preferences for children (Philipov 2009). As not only Hong Kong but also other East Asian countries such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, have faced similar low fertility problems, many demographers believe that changes in reproductive values, norms and preference have taken place silently behind the fall of nuptiality and TFR and indicate the arrival of "the second demographic transition" in Asia (Atoh.et.al. 2004; Frejka.et.al. 2010).

Figure 3-3 shows the trend of the average ideal number of children in Hong Kong, Japan and Korea, 1981~2011. The average ideal parity of Hong Kong in 1982 was 2.4 children and has decreased to 1.7 in 2012. Compared to Hong Kong, though South Korea's average ideal parity has also declined greatly during this period, it is still fluctuating at about 2.0 children. Unlike Hong Kong and Korea, Japan's average ideal parity is more stable, only with a slight drop from 2.6 to 2.4 children but the actual TFR is only 1.3 in 2015. The fertility aspiration in these high-income Asian economies has declined and Hong Kong has gone down further than that of Korea and Japan. Nevertheless, in Hong Kong, the average ideal parity is still much higher than the TFR of Hong Kong, resulting in a large gap between ideal and actual parity. To narrow or even close this gap, it's important to understand the factors or barriers

which are preventing Hong Kong married women from achieving the ideal parity. Are these factors related to parity level? More specifically, this paper aims to answer the following questions: for women with no child, with 1 child, or with 2 children what are the factors or barriers relating to their childbearing intention? By identifying barriers to childbearing intentions for women at different parity levels, some insights can be generated for formulating efficient pro-natalistic policies.

[Figure 3-3] The average ideal number of children in 1976~2012: Hong Kong, Japan and Korea



Data: KAP surveys by the Family Planning Association of Hong Kong; national surveys on dynamics of marriage and family by Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs; national fertility surveys by National Institute of Population and Social Security Research of Japan.

2. Data and Methods

In this study, we aim at examining the profiles of discrepancy between ideal and actual parity, and associated factors of the intention to give birth, in order to identify noticeable barriers to family formation and childbearing among Hong Kong married women aged 15-49 years.

The present study mainly makes use of data from the latest Knowledge, Attitude and Practice (KAP) survey conducted by the Family Planning Association of Hong Kong (FPAHK) in 2012. The KAP survey is the longest running community-based survey on family planning in Hong Kong and has been implemented every five years since 1967. The topics of the survey cover a wide range of family planning and related issues on family planning among married or cohabited women aged 15-49 years. The sampling frame was the Frame of Quarters, which is maintained by the Census and Statistical Department, HKSAR. It is the most complete and up-to-date registry of residential addresses in the territory. A nuclear family is the basic unit for respondent selection, from which an eligible woman (aged 15-49 and married or cohabited) is requested to participate in the survey. Before the fieldwork, a total of 20 couples were interviewed for pilot testing. The sampling yielded 1,518 married or cohabited women aged 15-49 with a response rate of 83%, and 1,059 husband or partners with a response rate of 70%. 11 respondents whom they or their husbands were born

infertile were excluded from the current analysis. For comparison with previous waves of KAP, we used the sample of 1,507 women only, in order to capture the changing profiles of ideal parity and actual parity. But for further regression analysis, our samples consists of 1,039 couples after some data cleaning.

Fertility preference was measured by the ideal parity (i.e. the ideal number of children) by asking married women the question "How many children do you want ideally?" The question "How many children do you have currently?" was used to evaluate the actual number of children the women had. The fertility gap refers to the discrepancy between the ideal and actual number of children. To measure fertility intentions, married women who already had children were asked the question "Would you like to give birth again?" and the married women who had no children were asked the question "Would you like to give birth?" The response options were as follows: "1 = yes," "2 = no," "3= have not decided," and "4 = don't know."

Several demographic and socioeconomic variables were evaluated, including age, whether respondent was a Hong Kong permanent resident, birthplace, religion, educational attainment, type of housing (public rental, temporary, nonresidential, subsidized purchasing, or private permanent house), employment status, occupation, and monthly household income.

We also investigated factors such as partnership quality, communication between husbands and wives on fertility plans,

and gender inequality in housework. To examine a couple's relationship, two questions were asked: "Compared with the past 12 months, what do you think of your current relationship with your spouse?" (responses ranged from "1 = much better" to "5 = much worse"); "Currently, are you satisfied with your marital life?" (responses ranged from "1 = very satisfied" to "5 = very dissatisfied"). Communication between husband and wife on childbearing decisions was measured by two questions: "Have you had a discussion with your husband on the number of children to have?"; "Do you and your husband have the same opinion on the number of children you should have?" As the KAP survey included questions on the proportions of housework done by the wife and the husband, gender inequality in housework was measured by taking the difference between the two proportions — the larger the difference, the higher the inequality in the division of housework.

A series of logistic regression models was used to examine the fertility intention of women to have a(nother) child. All items in our regression models, are shown in Table 3-2, except for two continuous variables- age and burden of housework. The first model examines the factors associated with intention to have a(nother) child among overall married women; the second, third and fourth models focus on intention of parity transitions from 0 to 1, from 1 to 2, and from 2 to 3. Stata 13.0 was used for the statistical analyses.

〈Table 3-2〉 Descriptive statistics of variables and social demographic profile of the women in the analyses

	N	%
Intention to have a(nother) child		
have	204	19.8
not sure	159	15.5
not have	666	64.7
Ideal number of children		
0	65	6.3
1	295	28.7
2	582	56.6
3	76	7.5
4	11	1.1
Wife is HK permanent resident		
Yes	918	89.2
No	111	10.8
Wife's education level		
lower secondary and below	258	25.1
upper secondary	623	60.5
postsecondary	148	14.4
Wife's working status		
Not working	350	34.0
Part-time job	103	10.0
Full-time job	576	56.0
Monthly household income (HKD)		
$14,999 and less	230	22.4
$15,000~24,999	287	27.9
$25,000~39,999	301	29.3
$40,000 and above	211	20.5
Discussion with Husband on No. of children		
No	356	34.6
Yes but not agree	77	7.5
Yes and agree	596	57.9
Marital life satisfaction		
Average and below	223	21.7
Satisfied	639	62.1
Very Satisfied	167	16.2

Data: Sample of couple data under KAP 2012

3. Results

1) Ideal number of children during 1992~2012

The KAP study revealed that the average ideal number of children dropped to a record low of 1.7 per married or cohabiting couples in 2012, compared to the 2.4 in 1982. Figure 3-4 shows the distribution of ideal numbers of children among married women in recent five waves of surveys (others denotes no response or inapplicable).

[Figure 3-4] Distribution of ideal numbers of children from the KAP Surveys 1992~2012



Data: Sample of couple data under KAP 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012.

Between 2007 and 2012, there was a 5.5% decrease in the proportion of desiring zero children, and a 2.4% and 5.4% increase in the proportion of desiring one child and two children. According to the survey in 2012, only 7.1% of them desired zero children, 28.6% desired one child, 55.1% desired two children and 8.5% desired three or more children.

2) Actual number of children during 1992~2012

The KAP 2012 revealed that the average actual number of children dropped to a record low of 1.2 per married or cohabiting woman. It was 1.5 in KAP 2007 and 1.6 in KAP 2002. Figure 3-5 shows the distribution of actual parity among married or cohabiting woman in the recent five waves of surveys. For the first time, the proportion of one-child families (37.5%) outnumbered that of two-child families (32.0%). Between 2007 and 2012, there was a 5.0% and a 7.3% increase in the proportion of one-child and zero-child families, which was accompanied with an 8.5% drop in that of two-child families. Noticeably, 23.4% of the respondents had no children. Combined with those had one, more than 60% of the respondents had one or less than one child, which indicated a large shortfall to reach the replacement level of two children.

[Figure 3-5] Distribution of actual numbers of children from the KAP Surveys 1992~2012



Data: Sample of couple data under KAP 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012.

3) Intention of childbearing: the parity-specific pattern

Table 3-3 shows the proportion of women at each parity who have reached the ideal parity. Among women at parity 0, 28.4% of them reported their ideal number of children is 0; and about 71.6 % have not realized their ideal number of children; and 68% of women at parity 0 expressed their intention to have a child in the future. Among women at parity 1, 47.8% have achieved the ideal parity and about 51.4% of them have not realized their ideal parity; but only about 19.2%% of women at parity 1 intended to have a second. Among women at parity 2, 83.4% of them have given birth to children up to their ideal lev-

el; about only 5.8% of them indicates intention to have a third child. In contrast to the fertility intention of women at parity 0, those who already have 1 or 2 children seem to make their childbearing decision with more prudence. This table indicates the transition to parenthood (i.e. from no child to 1child) may be very different from transition to parity 2 or 3.

〈Table 3-3〉 Ideal parity and childbearing intention of women at different parities

(unit: %)

Ideal parity	Actual parity at					
	0	1	2	3	4	5+
0	28.4	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
1	40.4	47.8	5.5	1.5	0.0	0.0
2	29.4	49.9	83.4	50.7	0.0	25.0
3	1.8	1.3	10.2	44.9	33.3	0.0
4	0.0	0.3	0.9	2.9	66.7	75.0
Total (N)	100.0 (218)	100.0 (391)	100.0 (344)	100.0 (69)	100.0 (3)	100.0 (4)
Intend to have a(nother) child	68.0	19.2	5.8	1.5	-	-

Data: Sample of couple data under KAP 2012

4) Factors influencing intention of childbearing among women at different parity levels

Our multi-group regression analysis revealed that factors of childbearing intention vary a lot across women at different parity levels. In Table 3-4, Model 1 shows results for all married women, regardless of their actual parity level. The factors

which are positively associated with childbearing intention include: high monthly household income; women whose ideal number of children are 2; having discussions with the husband on childbearing decisions and reaching agreement; high level of marital life satisfaction. The factor which are negatively associated with childbearing intention include: wife's age; whether the wife is a Hong Kong permanent resident; women whose ideal number of children are 0.

Model 2, 3, and 4 identify factors that influence the fertility intention of women at parity 0, parity 1 and parity 2. More importantly, these models also unveil some factors which seem to influence the general childbearing intention (shown in Model 1) but actually are only associated with intention among women at different parity levels, and factors which seem unrelated with general childbearing intentions but actually have a significant influence on intention of women at certain parity levels.

Model 2 shows that for women at parity 0, factors which are negatively related to childbearing intention, include wife's age, the wife being a Hong Kong permanent resident, and the ideal number of children being zero; whereas a higher household income, the ideal number of children being two, good communication with husband on the number of children, and marital life satisfaction have significant positive associations with the childbearing intention of women at parity 0.

〈Table 3-4〉 Odds ratios in logistic regression of childbearing intention of women at different parities

	Model 1 (all parities)	Model 2 (parity 0→1)	Model 3 (parity 1→2)	Model 4 (parity 2→3)
Wife's age	0.82***	0.917**	0.81***	0.88***
Wife being HKPR[a]				
No (=ref.)				
Yes	0.48**	0.05***	0.60	1.21
Wife's education level				
Lower[b] (=ref.)				
Middle	0.97	1.31	1.13	0.39
High (postsecondary)	1.24	1.17	1.44	0.16
Wife's working status				
Not working (=ref.)				
Part-time job	0.65	0.25	0.29*	0.91
Full-time job	1.23	1.31	0.75	0.29*
Monthly Household income				
$14,999 or less (=ref.)				
$15,000~24,999	1.24	5.27*	0.62	1.10
$25,000~39,999	1.65	9.93**	0.62	0.95
$40,000 or above	1.90*	7.68**	0.59	3.36
Ideal N of children				
No child	0.03***	0.01***	-	-
1 child (=ref.)[c]				
2 children	1.98***	3.59***	23.5***	0.84
3 or more children	1.84	0.87	252.7***	6.65
Communication with husband				
No discussion with husband (=ref.)				
Discussion but no agreement	1.34	1.77	1.64	0.45
Discussion and agreement	1.42*	7.12***	1.63	1.42
Gender inequality in housework	1.00	1.01	1.01	0.98***
Marital life satisfaction				
Average and below (=ref.)				
Satisfied	1.61*	3.67**	1.78	0.38
Very satisfied	1.97**	4.94**	0.91	1.47
Observations	1,029	218	391	344
Pseudo R^2	0.27	0.48	0.39	0.28

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Data: Sample of couple data under KAP 2012

Notes: ref. = reference group; [a] HKPR is an abbreviation of Hong Kong permanent residents; [b] Low education refers to 'lower secondary or below'; [c] In Model 3 and 4, the reference group includes married women whose ideal number is zero or 1, as the proportion of women with an ideal number being 0 is very small.

Model 3 shows that only wife's age, wife's working status (having a part-time job) are negatively related to have another child; whereas, the ideal parity being 2 or 3, are significantly and positively associated with intention of having a second child. Compared to women whose ideal parity is one children, those who desire 2 or more children are much more likely to desire a second birth. What is interesting is that factors, such as household income, communication with husband, and marital life satisfaction have no significant association with the intention of having a second child. Meanwhile, the wife's working status- especially being a part-time employee, which is insignificant in Model 1, now turns out to have a significant negative association with the intention of women at parity 1. Unlike many western countries where a part-time job is prevalent and accessible, in Hong Kong only 6% of women work in part-time positions, mainly concentrating in shop sales and elementary occupations characterized by low wage and high economic insecurity. Working part-time in Hong Kong means economic instability, rather than a work-life balance choice for mothers.

Model 4 shows another series of factors associated with the childbearing intentions of women at parity 2. Wives having a full-time job and gender inequality in the division of housework, both of which were insignificant in shaping the fertility intentions of women at parity 0 and parity 1, in fact do play a significant role in the decision to have a third child. Meanwhile,

the ideal parity has now become insignificant.

For the four models, women's age is a crucial factor in influencing the general childbearing intention, regardless of the actual parity. Also, factors identified in Model 1 which may influence the general fertility intention, such as being a Hong Kong permanent resident, household income, discussion with husband, and marital life satisfaction, in fact are only significantly associated with intention of having the first child only.

5) Reasons to give birth

Table 3-5 compares the reasons of the wife and the husband for those who have intention for having a(nother) child in the future across different parity levels. For wives who were at parity 0 and had intention to have a child, the top three reasons were ① "I like children" (36.5%), ② "Children can bring joy to daily life" (16.8%) and ③ "Children are the key to love" (11.6%). The top three reasons among the husband were ① "I like children" (30.8%), ② "To carry on the family line" (16.5%) and ③ "Children are the key to love" (12.1%). For women who were at parity 1 or 2, and had intention to have another child, the most cited reasons by both the wife and the husband were "I like children", "Let the children have a sibling", "To carry on the family line" and "Like to have a big family."

〈Table 3-5〉 Reasons to give birth of the wife and husband by actual parity

(unit: %)

	Wife's reason		Husband's reason	
actual parity =0 (N=91)	I like children	36.5	I like children	30.8
	Children can bring joy to daily life	16.8	To carry on the family line	16.5
	Children are our fruit of love	13.1	Children are our fruit of love	12.1
actual parity =1 (N=67)	I like children	33.3	Let the children have a partner	28.4
	Let the children have a partner	32.0	I like children	25.4
	Like to have a big family	6.7	To carry on the family line	13.4
actual parity =2 (N=15)	I like children	75.0	I like children	40.0
	Like to have a big family	10.0	To carry on the family line	20.0
	To carry on the family line	5.0	Let the children have a partner	13.3

Data: Sample of couple data under KAP 2012

These results indicate that reasons differentiate between wives and husbands, and across actual parity levels. The reason "To carry on the family line" is one of the top three among husband across all actual parity levels; in contrast, only wives who are at parity 2 and intended to have a third cited it as a main reason. And the reason "Children are the key to love" only shows on top among couples with parity 0, but not being found among other parities. This actually is supported by the finding in the Model and at parity 2 that high level of marital life satisfaction is associated with intention to have a first child. One common main reason for childbearing intention, is, "I like chil-

dren". If both couples say they like children they seem to be more likely to have more children.

6) Difficulties in childrearing

Table 3-6 showes the major difficulty in raising children for the wife and husband, across different parities.

〈Table 3-6〉 Top three major difficulties for raising children

(unit: %)

	Wife's difficulty		Husband's difficulty	
actual parity =0 (N=91)	increased economic burden	26.2	big responsibility	25.2
	big responsibility	24.8	increased economic burden	25.2
	children are rebellious and difficult to be taught nowadays	9.2	don't know how to communicate with children	10.1
actual parity =1 (N=67)	big responsibility	28.4	increased economic burden	89.0
	increased economic burden	23.8	big responsibility	59.3
	children are rebellious and difficult to be taught nowadays	10.5	no time to communicate with children	32.2
actual parity =2 (N=15)	increased economic burden	29.1	increased economic burden	30.5
	big responsibility	21.8	big responsibility	19.5
	children are rebellious and difficult to be taught nowadays	13.7	no time to communicate with children	11.3

Data: Sample of couple data under KAP 2012

Across all parities, the wives consistently cited the three leading concerns to be the barriers for having more babies, namely ① increased economic burden, ② big responsibility, and ③ children are rebellious and difficult to be taught nowadays. Common reasons with husbands across all parities are ① increased economic burden and ② big responsibility. But there is still some interesting differences between wives and husbands. The difficulty in communicating with children, either "no time" or "don't know how" is one of the top concerns among husbands. For those couples at parity 1 or 2, husbands having no time to communicate with children can be understood as heavy burden on wives in housework and care for children. Both parents are being exhausted by taking care of children. This also lends support to our findings in the regression Model 3 that women with 2 children who have full-time jobs and a heavy housework burden are less likely to intend to have another children.

4. Discussions and Conclusions

Based on the KAP surveys, our study have investigated the childbearing intention among Hong Kong married women and their spouses, and identified factors which may influence their intention, the motivation or reason for intention to give a(no-

ther) birth, and the difficulty perceived by couples in raising children.

The comparison in the profile of ideal parity based on the five waves of KAP surveys over 1992~2012 reveal a decline in desiring a 2-child family while an increase in desire for a one-child family. And the comparison in the profile of actual parity shows an increase in the proportion of childless and 1-child couples, and a decrease in 2-children couples.

Based on the sample of couple data for husbands and wives, we identified that the unrealized gap between ideal and actual parity is largest in women at parity 0; and these women also have higher intention to have a child in the future. Their gap may be narrowed but may not necessarily be filled, seen from the low childbearing intention of women who have one child already. For women at parity 1, the proportion of intention to have a second child or third is relatively small, about 47.8% have realized their ideal number of children and 51.4% have their actual parity smaller than ideal parity; but only about 19.2% expressed intention to have a second child. For women at parity 2, about 83% have given birth to children up to their ideal level; and only about 6% intend to have a third. A clear pattern has emerged that the intention to have a(nother) child varies with actual parity level. The women tend to make a compromise about the number of children even they have not achieved their ideal number. Thus a multi-group comparison

among parity-specific groups is very important to understand the factors influencing fertility intention at an individual level.

The series of logistic regressions to compare the intentions of women at parity 0, 1 and 2 showed that for women at parity 0, the marital life satisfaction, good communication with husband on childbearing decisions, the ideal parity, and their household income are significantly associated with their intention to have a first child. However, for women at parity 1, the factors of wives' working status-especially having a part-time job, and the ideal parity are associated with their intention to have a second one. Women with 1 child and having a part-time job are less likely to have a second child. The respondents in this case usually have relatively poor economic conditions. Due to heavy economic burden in raising children, women might have to take up some part-time jobs to contribute to family income, and often struggle to find a balance between family and work. For women at parity 2, the wives' working status-especially having a full-time job, and the housework burdens are significantly associated with their intention to have a third child. This indicates the difficulty in balancing a full-time job and housework and it could be the barrier to progression to third or higher parities. There is much room for improvement in creating a family-friendly working environment for working women in Hong Kong. Long working hours is the norm rather than an exception which is also very discouraging to family formation,

childrearing, and the family wellbeing.

Motivation to having children differs among parity-specific groups. Healthy and happy marriages may be an important factor and strong motivation to have the first child, both for husband and wife. The heavy economic burden in raising children is a big barrier, especially in transition from 1 child to 2 children. The experience in rearing the first child has an important influence on the decision to have another one or not. Husbands across all parities have some difficulty in communicating with children, which to some extent may increase the childcare burden on wives, especially for mothers with 2 children and a full time job. Some parental education and training in raising children might be helpful to improving communication in family. The factors, motivations, and barriers to childbearing differ across parity levels and are related to making pronatalist policies for Hong Kong women.

As far as the concern of fertility aspiration, having only one child seems to become the norm among the married women, despite the traditional desire for a two-child family. Marriage delay results in limited time for contraception and is indeed an important factor contributing to the unfulfilled parity size. At the same time, expensive housing price, long working hours, and unstable working conditions have also shown to be related to marriage delay in Hong Kong. Unless the Hong Kong Government is willing to provide support for these young people

who aspire to get married, any effort to encourage Hong Kong women to have a third child seems to be mission impossible. Even though they like children it is often too late for them to realize their ideal number of children. Furthermore, the responsibility of raising children has become ever greater due to high pressure in Hong Kong's education system.

Hong Kong has to adapt to a low fertility society with a rapidly ageing population and a shrinking workforce. Hence it is important to come up with innovative methods, by which Hong Kong as a whole society can cope with these demographic challenges. The present labor productivity needs to increase by at least 3% per year in order to make up for the workforce shortfall in the coming decades. Investing in workforce skills, promoting fertility and encouraging replacement migration are important to make sure Hong Kong can survive and realize a sustainable and socioeconomic development in the future.

4 Determinants of Fertility Intentions among Young Adults in Japan

1. Introduction
2. Research Hypotheses and Method
3. Results
4. Discussions and Conclusions

4 Determinants of Fertility Intentions among Young Adults in Japan[9)]

1. Introduction

1) Background of the study

According to the Japanese Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, as of Dec. 1, 2014, Japan's total population decreased by 212,000 compared to the previous year. The Japanese fertility rate has been below replacement levels since 1974, and reached a record low of 1.26 in 2005. After 2005, it has fluctuated between 1.3 and 1.5, showing no clear signs of recovery. This means that population decline in Japan seems certain to continue in the near future (Atoh 2001).

The matter of "lowest-low fertility" has become the subject of intense policy interest in East Asian countries, including Japan and Korea. Given the similarities of population change and family culture among these countries, comparing the determinants of fertility and marriage behaviors of young cohorts of these countries will likely produce important implications for future family policies in East Asia (Suzuki 2003).

A wealth of demographic and sociological research has been

9) This chapter was written by Rokuro Tabuchi (Department of Sociology, Sophia University, Tokyo, Japan).

conducted on fertility and marriage behavior in Japan (Fukuda 2004). There is ample evidence to show that fertility decline in Japan has occurred primarily as a result of the rise in the proportion of people who have never married. However, the determinants of fertility intentions of married and never-married young adults are less documented. In particular, there has been little research to date on the fertility intentions of young cohort based on the analysis of longitudinal data. This study thus tries to shed light on the issue of fertility among young adults in Japan, focusing on the determinants of their fertility intentions.

2) Fertility decline and fertility intentions in Japan

Much research evidence has been accumulated on the determinants of fertility behavior of young adults in Japan. Previous research has shown that Japanese fertility decline after the 1970s has mainly been driven by the increase in the proportion of non-married women of reproductive age (Iwasawa 2014). Compelling research evidence suggests that worsening economic conditions in Japan have increasingly deprived many individuals, especially young males with low socioeconomic status, of the opportunity to get married and have a child (Matsuda 2013). Other researchers, following the lead of a second demographic transition theory, draw our attention to the relevance of value change related with marriage and fertility

behavior (Atoh 2001; Fukuda 2004).

Admitting that recent fertility decline in Japan is mainly the result of changing marriage behavior, there are several reasons to focus on the change in reproductive behaviors as well. First, there is some evidence that the completed fertility of Japanese women is in decline in the past decade. According to the result of the Japanese National Fertility Survey (hereafter JNFS) conducted by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, the number of children born to women that have been married for 15 to 19 years has long been stable at around 2.2 children per woman, but it began to decline in the 2000s, and fell below the 2.0 level (1.96) for the first time, in the 2010 survey (Figure 4-1). Since the non-marital fertility rate is very low in Japan, the decline in marital fertility casts a dark shadow on Japan's future of population decline.

[Figure 4-1] Change of marital fertility in Japan



Data: Japanese National Fertility Survey (1962~2010)

Second, not only the completed fertility but the ideal number of children among Japanese married couples appears to be decreasing as well. Figure 4-2 shows the change in distribution of the ideal number of children, as answered by married women aged 20 to 39, from the 1987 and 2010 JNFS. Some 60% of women said that more than three was ideal in 1987, but less than half (44%) said the same in 2010. This suggests that researchers should focus on the factors that make it difficult for young adults to desire more children.

[Figure 4-2] Change in ideal number of children in Japan



Data: Japanese National Fertility Survey in 1987 and 2010

Third, a significant change has also been observed on the fertility intentions of never-married men and women. According to JNFS, which include questions for young never-married respondents about their desired fertility, while only 3% of never-married women aged 18 to 34 answered that they

do not want to have a child, this figure rose to 10% in the 2010 survey (Figure 4-3). Even among never-married people of younger respondents, the signs can be observed of their tendency to shy away from having a child.

[Figure 4-3] Change in fertility intentions of never-married young adults in Japan



Data: Japanese National Fertility Survey in 1987 and 2010

Given the current demographic conditions, more empirical research is needed that investigates what factors determine the fertility intentions of young men and women. As yet, however, there has been little research evidence on the fertility intentions of Japanese young men and women based on panel data.

A considerable amount of research exists on the determinants of fertility intentions based on cross-sectional survey data. Some researchers have focused on family values or gender ideology as determinants of fertility intentions. More tradi-

tional family values are expected to increase the intention of having an additional child. For example, Fukuda (2004), using the data of the National Family Research of Japan (NFRJ) 1998, showed that wives with more traditional values (i.e. traditional intergenerational and marital attitudes) are more likely to have a first child at a younger age. Using the data from the first wave of GGP (Gender and Generation Project) survey in Japan (conducted in 2004), Fukuda (2011) found that wives working less than 35 hours per week (i.e. working part-time) are more likely to have lower fertility intentions than those working more than 35 hours. Since fertility intentions are closely linked to socio-economic factors and value-related factors in theoretical and empirical terms (Atoh 2001), investigating the determinants of fertility intentions is an important research objective.

Some of the previous research has documented the correlates of fertility intentions of young cohort in Japan based on panel surveys (Yamaguchi 2005). Murakami (2014), based on the analysis of a panel survey conducted by the University of Tokyo Institute of Social Science, demonstrated that socio-economic factors affect the fertility intentions of young married men and women. According to the fixed-effects model, a change in a husband's income was positively associated with the fertility intentions of men, but not of women. Using the longitudinal dataset of the GGP survey (conducted in 2004 and 2007), Nishioka & Hoshi (2011) showed that wives whose hus-

bands participated in housework more actively were more likely to increase their fertility intentions during the three years.

While the findings of Nishioka & Hoshi (2011) is insightful, their study was based on an analysis of two waves of the survey with the limited time interval of only three years. It is not clear whether a similar result would be obtained using more waves of the survey with a longer time interval. Moreover, since previous research on fertility intentions in Japan focused only on married couples, little is yet known on the determinants of the fertility intentions of the never married. Thus, the current study tries to shed light on those under-studied dimensions of fertility intentions among young married and never-married adults in Japan.

2. Research Hypotheses and Method

1) The current study and research hypotheses

This study tries to make several contributions to the previous literature. First, by examining and comparing the determinants of fertility intentions of married and never-married adults, it tries to make clear the differences and similarities of the fertility behavior of young people of different life stages and life-course pathways. Though the theoretical underpinnings of fertility intentions of the never-married has not been fully ex-

plored in previous research, socio-economic factors and value-related factors of the never married are expected to be linked with their marital behavior, thus affecting fertility.

Second, using a panel of 10 years and employing structural equation modeling, this study tries to investigate more closely causal relationships between independent variables and fertility intentions. Since previous studies on fertility intentions in Japan have not taken advantage of the analytical potential of panel data, this study is likely to be a unique contribution.

Third, by comparing the effects of independent variables of different theoretical underpinnings, this research tries to examine which variables are the more important determinants of fertility intentions of young adults.

Based on the examination of previous studies on fertility in Japan, and using a panel data of young married and never-married adults, this study addresses attempts to test the following hypotheses.

① *Work-life balance* : The greater work-life balance of married and never-married young adults is positively associated with stronger fertility intentions. A wealth of research suggests that promoting greater work-life balance among male and female workers of childbearing age is a key to increasing fertility (Yamaguchi 2009).

② *Socio-economic resources* : Married and never-married

young adults with greater socio-economic resources have stronger fertility intentions. Previous research in Japan indicates that young never-married men with greater economic resources have better chances of finding a marriage partner (Matsuda 2013). For married couples, those where the husband has a higher level of income are expected to show increases in the fertility intentions of both men and women. Stable employment status (of respondents, and of wives for married respondents) is expected to increase fertility intention as well. A higher educational level is expected to be associated with a stronger fertility intention.

③ *Intergenerational support* : Married and never-married young adults with greater likelihood of support from parents (in law) have stronger fertility intentions. Although previous research findings are inconsistent (Murakami 2014), greater economic or instrumental support from parents and parents-in-law (for married people) is expected to decrease the cost of having an additional child, thus increasing fertility intentions.

④ *Life course factors* : Married and never-married young adults with more conventional life course experiences have stronger fertility intentions. Previous studies indicate that experiencing 'non-normal' life courses (such as irregular employment patterns in the early phase of work careers) will decrease the possibility of marriage for never-married men. In addition,

deviant life course experiences will likely foster more unconventional family values, thus decreasing the fertility intentions of married and never-married men and women.

⑤ *Gender ideology* : Married and never-married young adults with more egalitarian gender ideologies have weaker fertility intentions. As previous research suggests, those with more egalitarian gender ideologies are expected to find it more difficult to strike a balance between having an additional child and realizing gender equality among couples, thus decreasing the fertility intentions of married men and women. In the same vein, never-married adults with a more egalitarian gender ideology are expected to fare poorly in finding a marriage partner.

2) Method

① Data

The data used in the subsequent analyses come from the Japanese GGP (Generations and Gender Programme) survey, which is a longitudinal survey conducted every three years beginning in 2004 (2004, 2007, 2010, and 2013). Wave 1 surveyed 9,047 individuals aged 18-69, and two panels were supplemented in 2007 and 2013 because of sample attrition in the later waves.[10)]

10) Most of the research materials can be obtained from the website

② Variables

A dependent variable of the current study is fertility intention. As a measure of fertility intention, respondents of childbearing age were asked in each wave: "Do you want to have a(nother) child?" Possible responses were: "Yes, definitely," "Yes, probably," "Uncertain," "Probably not" and "Definitely not." These responses were coded from 5 to 1 so that higher values mean stronger fertility intentions.

A set of independent variables was used in the analysis to measure factors described in the above section. Work-life balance was measured based on the average work hours of respondents (and their spouses). Socio-economic resources measures included the annual income of respondents (and spouses), respondents' educational level (years of education), and the wife's employment status (measured as two dummy variables). For the analysis of never-married respondents, the respondents' employment status was used instead of the wife's employment status.

Intergenerational support was measured as the proximity to respondents' (or spouses') mother. A dummy variable was created to indicate that the respondent's mother or mother-in-law lives within an hour's distance. Life course experience was measured as the respondent's employment status of the first

(http://www.ggp-i.org/).

job (a dummy variable was used to indicate that the respondent was employed as a part-time or contract employee in their first job after finishing school).[11]

Gender ideology was measured on the basis of respondents' responses (five-item scales) to two statements: "It is much better for everyone if the man earns the main living and the woman takes care of the home and family," "When jobs are scarce, men should have the priority for a job than women." Cronbach's alphas were more than 0.7 in the multivariate analyses.

③ Analytical procedures

Because the dataset used is a panel survey, fixed-effects and random-effects regression models were applied as multivariate analyses to examine the causal relationships between several independent variables and fertility intentions. Analyzed subsamples were limited to a young cohort of respondents (women aged 18-44 and men aged 18-49 at the time surveyed). Analyses are conducted dividing the sample into the continuously married and never-married.

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11) Because the experience of the first job was not asked in Wave 1, the analysis that includes this variable has relatively smaller sample size due to sample attrition. Since the experience of starting the first job had occurred before Wave 1 for most of the respondents, in the random-effects models, the information obtained after Wave 2 was utilized as Wave 1 variable.

3. Results

1) Fertility Intention of Married Couples

① Descriptive results

Tables 4-1 through 4-3 show the descriptive results of the fertility intentions of respondents in Wave 1 (married and never-married respondents were put together).

〈Table 4-1〉 Fertility intention of childless respondents, by gender and age

(unit: %)

		yes, definitely	yes, probably	uncertain	probably not	definitely not	Total (N)
Women	18~29	57.8	31.3	6.3	1.6	3.1	100 (33)
	30~39	36.5	25.7	25.7	6.8	5.4	100 (85)
	40~49	8.0	14.0	50.0	20.0	8.0	100 (60)
Men	18~29	75.8	15.2	6.1	3.0	0.0	100 (64)
	30~39	44.7	34.1	17.7	2.4	1.2	100 (74)
	40~49	20.0	21.7	36.7	10.0	11.7	100 (50)

Data: Japanese Generations and Gender Programme Survey in 2004

〈Table 4-2〉 Fertility intention of respondents with one child, by gender and age

(unit: %)

		yes, definitely	yes, probably	uncertain	probably not	definitely not	Total (N)
Women	18~29	41.8	32.9	15.2	8.9	1.3	100 (79)
	30~39	24.9	35.7	21.1	11.9	6.5	100 (185)
	40~49	3.4	13.6	32.2	21.2	29.7	100 (118)
Men	18~29	60.0	27.5	7.5	0.0	5.0	100 (40)
	30~39	32.9	43.2	16.4	3.4	4.1	100 (146)
	40~49	12.8	15.6	30.3	22.9	18.4	100 (108)

Data: Japanese Generations and Gender Programme Survey in 2004

〈Table 4-3〉 Fertility intention of respondents with two or more children, by gender and age

(unit: %)

		yes, definitely	yes, probably	uncertain	probably not	definitely not	Total (N)
Women	18~29	36.6	32.6	20.0	7.6	3.2	100 (681)
	30~39	6.7	14.5	28.1	24.6	26.2	100 (688)
	40~49	0.8	2.4	14.2	20.3	62.3	100 (787)
Men	18~29	23.0	36.4	27.6	9.3	3.7	100 (591)
	30~39	8.0	21.3	37.6	20.2	12.9	100 (535)
	40~49	2.5	4.5	28.0	24.7	40.2	100 (639)

Data: Japanese Generations and Gender Programme Survey in 2004

Men and women of older age groups have lower fertility intentions. However, among childless respondents, men and women have relatively stronger fertility intentions even in their forties than those with one or more children. Childless women and women with one child were more uncertain than male counterparts about their fertility intentions. On the other hand, among respondents with two or more children, men were more uncertain about their intentions than women. Though not totally comparable, this result is consistent with larger survey such as JNFS which revealed that married women of older age cohort are more likely to have smaller desired fertility.

② Fertility intentions and childbearing

Previous research shows that fertility intention predicts subsequent childbearing of married men and women (Yamaguchi 2005; Murakami 2014). Before analyzing the determinants of

fertility intentions of married men and women, I begin with descriptive results from cross tabulation of fertility intentions and childbearing. Figure 4-4 shows the relationships between fertility intention of married women surveyed in wave 1 and subsequent childbearing behavior during the waves.[12)]

[Figure 4-4] Fertility intentions and subsequent childbirth



Data: Japanese Generations and Gender Programme Survey in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2013

Whereas around 80% of women who intended a further birth positively ("yes, definitely") actually had one (or more) child within 9 years, less than 20% of women who had a relatively negative fertility intention ("probably not") did so. The result clearly shows that the fertility intention of married women is closely associated with subsequent childbirths.[13)]

12) The analytic sample of this figure was restricted to those women ages 20-39 years, married and had 0 to 2 children in Wave 1.
13) Supplementary analysis (not shown here) revealed the same tendency for married men as well.

③ Determinants of fertility intentions of married men and women

To examine the hypotheses about the determinants of fertility intentions, multivariate analyses were conducted. Table 4-4 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analyses.

〈Table 4-4〉 Descriptive statistics for the analysis of fertility intentions of married women and men (random effects model)

	Women (N=2,406)		Men (N=2,392)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Fertility intention	2.647	1.378	2.593	1.275
Age	36.535	5.196	39.771	6.331
Number of children	1.909	0.986	1.927	0.979
Wife's work hours	3.092	1.628	3.117	1.665
Husband's work hours	5.491	1.243	5.365	1.206
Education (years)	13.493	1.519	13.837	1.987
Wife's income	2.559	1.735	6.632	2.130
Husband's income	6.512	2.181	2.697	1.975
Wife's employment status: Full-time	0.435	0.496	0.955	0.208
Wife's employment status: Part-time	0.433	0.496	0.036	0.187
First job not full time	0.156	0.363	0.104	0.305
Mother/mother-in-law living nearby	0.849	0.358	0.832	0.374
Number of siblings	1.488	0.828	1.481	0.861
Husband's share of housework	17.186	2.946	6.501	2.320
Gender ideology	6.261	1.683	5.717	1.596

Data: Japanese Generations and Gender Programme Survey in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2013

Table 4-5 shows the result of fixed-effects and random-effects models that estimated fertility intentions of the married. Regressions were run separately for women and men. The fixed-effects model, which includes only time-variant variables, reveals that older women were more likely to have weak-

er fertility intention than younger women (p<.001). In addition, women with a larger number of children had weaker fertility intention, after controlling for age (p<.001). These results are consistent with the descriptive results examined above.

〈Table 4-5〉 Determinants of fertility intention of married women and men

	Women		Men	
	Fixed -effects	Random -effects	Fixed -effects	Random -effects
Age	-0.093***	-0.105***	-0.084***	-0.082***
Number of children	-0.695***	-0.545***	-0.728***	-0.554***
Wife's work hours	0.016	0.021	-0.009	-0.027#
Husband's work hours	-0.003	0.019	0.009	0.027
R's education (in years)	-	0.103***	-	0.023#
Wife's income	-0.021	0.006	0.020	0.033***
Husband's income	0.035	-0.028*	-0.005	-0.008
Wife's employment status				
Not employed(=ref.)				
Full-time	0.192#	-0.063	-0.088	-0.102
Part-time	0.062	-0.157*	-0.221	-0.072
R's first job (not full-time dummy)	-	-0.031	-	0.036
Mother(-in-law) living nearby	-0.246	0.034	0.061	-0.044
Number of siblings		0.009		0.041
Husband's share of housework	0.020	-0.004	-0.010	0.001
Gender ideology	-0.039*	-0.019	0.009	0.008
Constant	-	6.403	-	6.549
N persons	1631	1304	1596	1201
N observations	2743	2406	2800	2392
R squared	0.430	0.447	0.414	0.414

***p < .001, **p<.01, *p<.05, #p<.10; ref.=reference group.
Data: Japanese Generations and Gender Programme Survey in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2013

Most of the coefficients of other independent variables in the fixed-effects model were insignificant, except the Husband's share of housework and Gender ideology. Contrary to expect-

ation, the wife and husband's work hours were both insignificant, which suggests that the work-life balance of the couple has rather a modest association with fertility intention compared to the other factors examined here. The wife and husband's income were also insignificant.[14] The wife's employment status is significant, and wives working full time have stronger fertility intentions than non-working wives.

Although not significant at a 10% level, those women whose husbands did a larger share of housework had a relatively stronger fertility intention ($p=.102$).[15] This is consistent with the findings of Nishioka & Hoshi (2011), which were based on the first two waves of the same survey. Besides, women with egalitarian gender ideology had weaker fertility intention ($p<.05$). This was also expected from our hypothesis, while the direction of causal relationship between the two variables is not clear from this model because it might be the case that women with stronger fertility intention tended to have less egalitarian gender ideology.

The second column of the left side shows the result from the random-effects model. Since random-effects models tend to overestimate the effects of time-variant variables (Yamaguchi 2009), only the coefficients of time-invariant variables are ex-

14) Iwama (2008) and Yamaguchi (2009) revealed that the effect of income (wife's, husband's and household income) is different according to the parity (current number of children).

15) In a different model which deleted some of the insignificant independent variables, husband's share of housework was significant at the 10% level.

amined here. Married women with higher level of education had stronger fertility intention. This is contrary to the expectation of our hypothesis, and not consistent with previous findings that revealed no significant effect of married women's education upon their fertility intention (Iwama 2008; Yamaguchi 2009). Other time-invariant independent variables were insignificant.[16)]

Next, according to the fixed-effects model of married men (right side of the table), the results were rather similar with those of women. Older men, and men with more children had weaker fertility intentions. However, the two variables that are significant for married women (i.e. Husband's share of housework and Gender ideology) were insignificant for married men. The result of the random-effects model for married men was also similar with that of women, which shows that men with higher educational level had stronger fertility intentions.

2) Fertility Intentions of the Never-married

① Fertility intentions and marriage

Recent research indicates that marriage and fertility in-

16) Using the dataset from British Household Panel Survey, Berrington (2004) revealed that women with intermediate educational level were the most likely to have stronger fertility intentions among childless women in their thirties.

tentions are jointly/simultaneously determined among Japanese never-married young adults (Takaishi 2015). Considering that the extramarital fertility rate is extremely low in Japan, it is no surprise that those with a stronger marriage intention have a stronger fertility intention at the same time (and vice versa) among never-married young adults (Murakami 2014).

It was shown in the last section that fertility intention predicts subsequent childbearing among married people. Out question here is whether fertility intention of never-married men and women predicts subsequent marriage. Figure 4-5 shows the bivariate relationship between fertility intention and the experience of subsequent marriage after the respondents stated fertility intention.[17] The figure shows that men and women with a positive fertility intention are more likely to experience marriage in subsequent years. In particular, almost 40% of women who answered 'yes' had been married in the 9 years after their fertility intention was measured, compared to 20% of those women who had had uncertain or negative fertility intentions. This trend is not so striking among never-married men, but similar patterns can be observed. This result suggests that fertility intention of never-married men and women affects subsequent marriage (and thus fertility) behavior.

17) The analytic samples of this figure were never-married women aged 20-39 and never-married men aged 20-44 in each wave in which their fertility intention was stated. The samples were pooled to increase the sample size.

[Figure 4-5] Fertility intentions and subsequent marriage



Data: Japanese Generations and Gender Programme Survey in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2013

② Determinants of fertility intentions of never-married men and women

To identify determinants of fertility intentions of the never-married, multivariate analyses were conducted. The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analyses are included in Table 4-6. Subsequently, Table 4-7 presents the result of the fixed-effects and random-effects models estimating fertility intention of the never-married.

Age was significant at a 1% level, showing that older never-married women had a weaker fertility intention. This is consistent with previous findings from other surveys that older never-married men and women have a weaker marriage intention.

〈Table 4-6〉 Descriptive statistics for the analysis of fertility intentions of never-married women and men (random effects model)

	Women (N=1,493)		Men (N=1,523)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Fertility intention	3.916	1.049	3.671	1.014
Age	27.671	6.229	29.022	7.263
Work hours	3.958	1.625	4.408	1.869
Education (years)	14.040	1.641	13.986	1.948
Income	3.334	1.525	3.811	1.924
Employment status: Full-time	0.512	0.500	0.636	0.481
Employment status: Part-time	0.367	0.482	0.242	0.428
First job not full time	0.330	0.470	0.281	0.450
Mother/mother-in-law living nearby	0.883	0.321	0.833	0.373
Number of siblings	1.486	0.785	1.438	0.833
Gender ideology	6.423	1.828	5.896	1.703

Data: Japanese Generations and Gender Programme Survey in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2013

〈Table 4-7〉 Determinants of fertility intention of never-married women and men

	Women		Men	
	Fixed -effects	Random -effects	Fixed -effects	Random -effects
Age	-0.021**	-0.044***	0.001	-0.020***
Work hours	0.028	0.055**	0.028	0.014
Education(inyears)		0.089***		0.026
Income	0.015	0.046*	-0.016	0.013
Wife's employment status Not employed(=ref.)				
Full-time	0.178	0.095	0.287*	0.290**
Part-time	0.080	0.079	0.194	0.168#
R's first job (not full-time dummy)	-	-0.079	-	0.037
Mother(-in-law) living nearby	-0.080	-0.013	0.010	-0.227**
Number of siblings	-	-0.003	-	0.053
Gender ideology	-0.063***	-0.071***	0.007	-0.012
Constant	-	3.966	-	3.738
N persons	1081	764	1233	841
N observations	1823	1493	1931	1523
R squared	0.089	0.138	0.029	0.042

***p < .001, **p<.01, *p<.05, #p<.10

Data: Japanese Generations and Gender Programme Survey in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2013

Most of the other time-variant independent variables were insignificant, except Gender ideology. As expected from the hypothesis, never-married women with more egalitarian gender ideology had a weaker fertility intention. Though this is consistent with the result from the analysis of married women, here again, we should be cautious in inferring the causal direction.

The results of the random-effects model for never-married women are shown in the second column of the left side of the table. Education was significant at a 0.1% level, and never-married women with a higher educational level had a stronger fertility intention. Other time-invariant variables were insignificant.

The right side of the table presents the results for never-married men. In contrast to the results for women, the coefficient of age was insignificant in the fixed-effects model for never-married men. This suggests that the bivariate association observed between age groups and fertility intentions among never-married men overestimate the effect of age on fertility intention.

With regard to socio-economic variables, although the income variable was insignificant, men's employment status was significant at a 5% level. Never-married men employed full time had a stronger fertility intention. This result is consistent with previous research findings in Japan that revealed never-married men with higher economic status have a stronger marriage intention. Other time-variant variables including Gender ideol-

ogy were insignificant for never-married men. In the random-effects model for men (the last column of Table 4-7), time-invariant factors were insignificant.

4. Discussions and Conclusions

The primary goal of this study was to examine the determinants of married and never-married young adults in contemporary Japan. Several important findings were obtained from the analysis.

First, as expected, stronger fertility intentions led to a higher probability of having a child in the time span of about 10 years. Those who had uncertain or relatively negative fertility intentions were far less likely to experience childbirth than those with positive intentions. This result speaks to the importance of investigating the determinants of fertility intention in the study of fertility among young cohorts (Buchanan & Rotkirch 2013).

Second, the analysis of married respondents revealed that younger respondents, and respondents with less children had stronger fertility intentions. This means that as young adults age, they are more likely to have weaker fertility intentions. This suggests that policies that make it easier for younger married adults to have stronger fertility intentions are more effective as a counter-measure of low fertility. Policies targeting younger adults may possibly be more effective in fostering fer-

tility intentions.

Third, analysis revealed that respondents with a higher educational level had stronger fertility intentions. This is consistent with previous research that suggests greater socio-economic resources have a positive effect on fertility intentions for respondents of older ages. However, it might be the case that the effect of educational level is confounded with other value factors not involved in the models. Further analysis is necessary to make clear the mechanisms in which education affects the fertility intentions of young married and never-married adults.

Fourth, analyses revealed that married and never-married women with a more egalitarian gender ideology had weaker fertility intentions. This is consistent with previous research, and suggests that it is necessary to focus attention on family and gender related values to affect the fertility intentions of young women. As previous research has shown, most Japanese men are still reluctant to participate in housework even among younger cohorts. This makes it very difficult for young women to strike a balance between their work career and childbearing, thus postponing the timing of marriage and childbirth. It is suggested that more effective policies are needed that promote gender equality in families in order to foster social conditions where childbearing does not hinder the self-fulfillment of young women.

Last, further research is needed to deepen the body of

knowledge on the causal relationships between many socio-economic factors and fertility intentions. In particular, institutional and community related factors (such as the availability of quality child care, availability of parental leave, neighborhood environment) should be examined to explore effective policies targeting low fertility.

5

Intergenerational Solidarity of Adult Child–Parent and Social Class in Urban Areas of China

1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Paradigm and Literature Review
3. Data and Method
4. Results
5. Discussions and Conclusions

5 Intergenerational Solidarity and Adult Child-Parent and Social Class in Urban Area of China[18)]

1. Introduction

While the aging society is coming, how to care for the elderly has become a widely discussed subject. In traditional society, it was the responsibility of extended family to take care of children and the elderly. Both the growth of labor markets and an increase in geographic mobility, the results of industrialization and urbanization, have lowered the cost of defaulting on the implicit contract of taking care of children and the elderly. Because policymakers in both northwestern Europe and the United States feared that adult children would take less responsibility in taking care of their elderly parents, the collective provision of public old-age insurance was designed to transfer the cost of caring for the elderly by family (Folber 1994).

China is an aging society now. Official statistics show that the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) decreased to less than 2.0 in 1993. According to the National Health and Family Planning Commission and China Population and Development Center (2013, p. 104), the birth rate dropped to less than 15‰ in 1999. Also, by 2000, those aged 65 or more accounted for 7% of the

18) This chapter was written by Chunhua Ma (Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China).

population (National Bureau of Statistics 2012, p. 102). It is estimated by demographers that by 2030 the percentage of those aged 60 or more will reach 25% (Cai & Wang 2005), and the percentage of those aged 65 or more will reach 14% (Zhang 2002).

In recent years, the focus is on constructing a social security system and developing social policies that provide economic security, health care and recreation services for the elderly. Public investment in the elderly is increasing gradually. But compared to those of other countries, the pension system and social service system for the elderly could not meet with the requirements of the elderly. Currently, most elderly parents are still cared for by their family. The census of 2010 shows that support from family members is a very important economic resource for those people aged 60 or more. In rural areas, 81.84% of people aged 80 or more depend on their family members. These results are consistent with research done by Croll in other Asian countries (Croll 2006).

While social welfare could not provide enough support for the elderly, the family intergenerational contract is more important than the social contract for individual well-being (Lin 2014). In traditional Chinese society, the intergenerational contract is the intergenerational balance model named the "reciprocal model" by Fei: parents take care of young children and adult children take care of their older parents in turn (Fei

1983). It is argued that the intergenerational model is a transfer from balance to unbalance (He 2009), which results in a deterioration of the later life of the elderly in rural areas (Guo 2001). But while it is argued that intergenerational relations are unbalanced now, adult children frequently interact and exchange assistance with the elderly. The strength of obligation and positive regard across generations was little diminished by geographic separation (Liu 2012). Confucian culture, the base of traditional intergenerational relations, still plays an important role in intergenerational solidarity (Yang & Li 2009). Thus, this research aims to know whether intergenerational solidarity is still strong or really in decline, with a focus on the quality of the intergenerational relationship in urban areas of China, and with consideration of the latent forms of cohesion in assessing the strength and structure of intergenerational family ties.

Because of economic reform and development, modern industrial and occupational structures have been established. The income gap is being widened as well. Therefore, the social structure that existed before reform, "two classes, one stratum," has been disintegrating while the social hierarchical structure based on economic status is being established (Lu 2010; Li 2002). While the social class structure gets established and strengthened, great impact on individual income, social attitude, life opportunity, life style and consumption ensues (Wright 2004; Weeden & Grusky 2005). It is argued that inter-

generational family solidarity is constructed by social class in America (Timonen.et.al. 2013). Then could social class predict the strengthening and the structure of intergenerational relations in current China? Is intergenerational support across social class different?

2. Theoretical Paradigm and Literature Review

1) Theoretical paradigm of family intergenerational relationship: Intergenerational solidarity

The intergenerational relationship has both a private and public dimension (Timonen.et.al. 2013). In the 1950s and 1960s, concerns about family solidarity were rooted in two hypotheses (Katz.et.al. 2004). The first is the isolated nuclear family hypothesis. It assumes that loss of functions since modernization made families transform from an extended form to an unclear one, with the result that both horizontal and vertical lines beyond that nuclear unit lost importance and consequently weakened (Parsons 1955). The second is the threats to the family from individualism. It assumes that individualism destroys the moral character, called moral risk, which might have impacts on the foundation of societal and family solidarity (Wolfe 1989). But these two assumptions are not supported by empirical studies. Though intergenerational relations are influ-

enced by modernization, ties between generations are not necessarily weak. It is possible that family solidarity is still strong but seeks other expressions when circumstances change (Daatland & Herlofson 2003). In other words, most adult children lived together with their parents in the past which meant that family solidarity was strong. Though most generations don't live together at present, they keep an emotional closeness through the internet and telephone. It is another kind of intergenerational solidarity.

Then how to assess and measure intergenerational relations? Based on Durkheim's theory about mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity, exchange theory, and the social psychology of group dynamics, the paradigm of solidarity in intergenerational relationships has been constructed (Katz.et.al. 2004). Nye & Rushing (1969) proposed a conceptual framework, which included six dimensions of family cohesion: associational, affectual, consensual, functional, normative and goal integration. Bengtson & Schrader (1982) redefined these components and proposed an intergenerational solidarity model as a multidimensional construct with six dimensions of solidarity: affectual, associational, functional, consensual, normative and structural solidarity. The former four dimensions are regarded as latent forms of solidarity, and the other two dimensions are regarded as manifested forms (Silverstein & Bengtson 1997).

- Affectual Solidarity: Feelings of emotional closeness, affirmation and intimacy between intergenerational family members
- Associational Solidarity: The type and frequency of social contact and shared activities between intergenerational family members
- Consensual Solidarity: Actual or perceived agreements in opinions, values, orientations and lifestyles between intergenerational family members
- Functional Solidarity (assistance): The giving and receiving of instrumental and financial assistance and support between intergenerational family members
- Normative Solidarity: Strength of obligation felt toward to parents, as well as norms about the importance of familiastic values
- Structural Solidarity: The "opportunity structure" which could constrain or enhance cross-generational interactions reflecting geographic proximity between family members

Subsequent research demonstrated that each of the multiple dimensions of solidarity is distinct and dialectic: ① integration and isolation (associational) ② intimacy and distant (affectual) ③ dependency and autonomy (functional) ④ agreement and dissent (consensual) ⑤ familism and individualism (normative) ⑥ opportunities and barriers for interaction (structural) (Bengtson.et.al. 2002). The solidarity model has been divided

into two general dimensions in the following studies: structural-behavioral (associational, functional and structural) and cognitive-affective (affectual, consensual and normative) (Bengtson & Roberts 1991; Silverstein & Bengtson 1997). The intergenerational model focuses on family cohesion which is taken as an important part of family relations. And it is an effective paradigm to characterize the behavioral and emotional dimensions of interaction, cohesion, sentiment and support between parents and children (Bengtson 2001).

The paradigm of solidarity in intergenerational relationships constructed by Bengtson and his colleagues has been used widely by family researchers to study the relations between adult children and their parents in cross-national contexts (Katz.et.al. 2004). Silverstein & Bengtson (1997) investigated the structure of intergenerational cohesion and used latent class to develop a typology of intergenerational solidarity: tight-knit, sociable, obligatory, intimate but distant and detached. But some scholars have criticized the intergenerational solidarity framework for providing little insight concerning conflict within family relationships (Connidind & McMullin 2002) could not indicate how the relations "are" (Luscher 2002). As a result, the family solidarity model has been transformed into the family solidarity-conflict model. Parrott & Bengtson (1999) also revised the solidarity model and argued that conflict is a normal aspect of family life and it will influence family members' willingness

to assist other members. Solidarity coexists with conflict in family life, and conflict is helpful to improve the quality of relationships.

Due to postmodern theory, the family solidarity-conflict model has been challenged by the new concept of "intergenerational ambivalence," which suggests that intergenerational relations may generate contradiction among family generations (Luscher 2004). It argues that contemporary society is characterized by rapid social change and individuals are uncertain about their roles in the family, especially those associated with intergenerational relations. Because of the contradictions at the level of the macrosocial structure in terms of roles and norms, the individual always feels the contraction at the psychological-subjective level in terms of cognition, emotion and motivation (Luscher 2000). For example, adult children and their parents in American families are also confused about the contradictory norms of "independence and responsibility" and do not know which norm they should follow (Aldous 1995).

Bengston and his colleagues respond to the new model in studying the intergenerational model and clarify the solidarity model further. They argue that the concepts (solidarity, conflict, ambivalence) are not competing, antagonistic approaches to studying intergenerational relationships. It is not a clash of paradigms, and each of these concepts is useful in understanding and explaining the relations of generations. But they stress that the solidarity is more basic in understanding inter-

generational relationships because the solidarity is obviously the first stage of family relationships and then comes conflict and ambivalence. They clarify two misunderstandings about the solidarity model. Firstly, the solidarity model is not based only on the positive aspects of family relationships because each of the multiple dimensions of solidarity is distinct and dialectic. It suggests the solidarity model views family life both in positive and negative ways. Secondly, the solidarity model, as a multi-dimensional framework, doesn't minimize the diversity of family experiences. The six dimensions of solidarity are synergistically related to one another, and may be arrayed in a variety of constellations, some dimensions reflecting positive whereas others negative (Bengtson.et.al. 2002). The intergenerational solidarity paradigm has guided the study of intergenerational relations for more than three decades and has proven to have substantial explanatory power (Katz.et.al. 2004 ; Silverstein & Bengtson 1997; Wenger 1989). In this research, the solidarity model with six dimensions is used to analyze the intergenerational relationships in urban areas of China.

2) Literature Review

① Intergenerational relationships in Chinese families

In Chinese traditional society, the vertical intergenerational

relationship (especially the father-son relationship), regulated by Confucianism, was the most important among family relationships. The older generation controlled estate and resource allocation, and the interests across generations were consistent, which ensured the long-term intergenerational contract (reciprocal model) could be achieved (Liu 2012, pp.2~3). Industrialization and urbanization changed the family structure and family relations.

According to the modernization theory of the family, family relations have become more equal and horizontal family relationships (conjugal relations) have taken the place of intergenerational relationships due to modernization. This assumption is supported by a great deal of research in China (Yang & Shen 2000; Xu 2001; Zhang.et.al. 1999). But some scholars argue that vertical and horizontal relations are all important at present, and they have different positions across generations and families (Kang 2009; Shen 2010).

While scholars stress that the intergenerational relationship is still important in Chinese families, they also suggest the quality of family relations across generations has changed. The power in intergenerational relationships has changed from the older to younger generation, and resources have flowed to the younger generation (Shen 2010). This situation is distinct in rural areas of China (Liu 2012), where the younger generations even exploit older generations (He 2009). In urban areas, older

parents provide not only financial but also instrumental support for adult children while receiving little emotional support from their adult children (Che 1990; Liu 2012; Kang 2009). Because the elderly in rural areas could not receive support from either the state or their adult children, they could hardly maintain themselves in later life (Guo 2001; Yan 2006; Chen 2009; He 2009).

Though the multidimensional solidarity model of intergenerational relationships has been used widely by family researchers in different contexts, few scholars in China use the model to study family relations across generations. Most studies focus on one dimension of solidarity, such as co-residence between generations (structural solidarity), emotional, financial and instrumental support between generations (functional solidarity), etc. Family planning and the one-child program have existed since the end of the 1970s, and it was estimated that there were about 110 million only-child families in 2008 (Wang 2009). If a husband and wife were both raised in only-child families, the possibility of them living together with older parents would be reduced, based on empirical study (Feng 2006). Many family generations in rural areas are divided geographically owing to the large-scale rural-urban migration that has taken place since the end of the 1980s. Without support from the state, family members have to depend on each other to get resources and support. The strength of intergenerational

solidarity is still strong in China now (Ma.et.al. 2011).

There are some studies based on the intergenerational solidarity model. Through exploring the co-residence between generations and mutual support between generations in East Asian society, Lin & Yi (2013) find contemporary intergenerational relations reveal both continuity and change. The dominant patriarchal culture also expresses itself in the continuing influence of filial norms on intergenerational relations, and the main flow of support between generations is still from adult children to parents. Except for the consensus solidarity dimension, Shi analyzed family solidarity in urban areas of Guangzhou from the other five solidarity dimensions. She found that intergenerational relations are still close, and that adult child-parent relations is manifested by their functional interdependency (Shi 2015).

② The factors influencing intergenerational relationship

Which factors impact intergenerational relations? The family scholars provide their consideration and explanation. Firstly, some scholars believe that the traditional intergenerational relationship was based on the patriarchal power taken by the older generation who controlled the resources and estate of the family. While the older generation was deprived because of social transformation, the younger generation controlled the resource and estate of the family (Liu 2012; Chen 2009).

Secondly, some scholars think the filial piety norms are a foundation of the traditional intergenerational relationship. Individualism and economic rationality brought by social and economic transformation defeated the filial piety norm and then resulted in an unbalance between generations (Meng 2008; Kang 2009). Thirdly, the scholars focus on the impact of the state on intergenerational relationships. It is argued that national power has a negative impact on traditional family relationships. While the property system has changed, the older generation has no resource to exchange with the younger. And a series of political movements destroyed the traditional family system and traditional culture (Guo 2001).

Few scholars in China pay attention to the relations between intergenerational solidarity and social class. After devising a fourfold typology of later-life families, Dykstra & Fokkema (2011) analyze the relationship between family types and socioeconomics, employing measures of education and household income, and conclude that higher income older households engage in fewer intergenerational support exchanges while high socioeconomic status increases the likelihood of individualism in later life families. But Ward thinks that socioeconomic status has little bearing on family or social intergenerational attitudes (Ward 2011). Szydlik advocates the life-course approach to understanding intergenerational solidarity and the place of social stratification in these processes (Szydlik 2012). Timonen and

his colleagues discuss the relationship between social class and intergenerational solidarities in public and private spheres. They conclude that intergenerational solidarity at the family level is strongly influenced by socioeconomic status, and is also shaped by the public sphere that generates different expectations and solidarity levels regarding state support for different age groups, again largely dependent on socioeconomic status (Timonen.et.al. 2013).

3. Data and Method

This research analyzes the intergenerational relationship from the view of adult children, and discusses intergenerational solidarity in five dimensions. It also emphasizes that adult children should have independent economic sources which enable them to provide actual financial support to their parents.

1) Analytical strategies and framework

① Latent Class Analysis (LCA)

Intergenerational solidarity is a multidimensional concept that cannot be measured by a single indictor. Therefore, it requires several dimensions to be assessed, which can lead to the development of typology (Bengston.et.al. 2002). Many scholars

have developed typologies to analyze the quality and structure of the intergenerational relationship (Hogan.et.al. 1993; Silverstein.et.al. 1993; Dykstra & Fokkema 2011; Lin 2014).

Hogan, Eggebeen and Clog were pioneers in employing the typology approach to analyzing the exchange between generations in American families. They distinguished four types: high exchanger, low exchanger, provider and receiver (Hogan.et.al. 1993). Silverstein & Bengtson (1997) established five types of intergenerational relation in America: Tight-knit, sociable, obligatory, intimate and distant, and detached. Lin constructs four types of intergenerational relationship in Taiwan: reciprocal, emotional, fostering and low exchange (Lin 2014).

All these scholars develop typology of intergenerational relationships using the latent class model. LCA is a statistical method that allows researchers to test whether a set of unobserved, or latent, classes, accounts for the association among cross-classified categorical variables. A key assumption of LCA is that the covariation among measured variables could be accounted for by the latent class model. In this research, we will use LCA to develop the typology of not only the intergenerational relationship but also social class. We think that only one variable among education, income and occupational status could not determine social class in urban areas of China. As a result, we will use the three variables as manifested variables and construct the latent variable social class.

② Analytical framework

Figure 5-1 summarizes the analytical framework of this research.

[Figure 5-1] Analytic Framework



Notes: IR: Intergenerational Relation; LV: Latent variable; SES: Socioeconomic status; IA: Instrumental assistance; FA: Financial assistance.

As indicated, we will use LCA to develop the typology of the intergenerational relationship based on five dimensions of intergenerational solidarity. After constructing the typology of social class, we will analyze the factors affecting intergenerational relationships, paying particular attention to the impact of social class, using the regression model.

2) Sample and Data

The data for this research are drawn from the Survey on Family Structure and Family Relations in Five Cities, which was conducted by the Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in 2008. The cities were selected based on the level of economic development, cultural diversity and location. 40 communities were selected within the sample framework randomly in each city, and then 20 households were selected randomly based on the map in each community. Finally, the survey includes 4,013 respondents aged 18 and older.

A total of 2,709 respondents had at least one living parent. Those adult children provided information about patterns of intergenerational exchange and their relations with parents. The survey used face-to-face interviews to gather detailed information on the respondent's family and socioeconomic status.

3) Constructing variable

① Measurement model of intergenerational types

Adult children in five cities were asked a series of questions about the nature of their relationship with their surviving biological parent. These questions reflected five of six dimensions

of intergenerational solidarity, and were thus used to build the blocks of typology of the intergenerational relationship. The consensus solidarity is not included in the typology because it was not measured in the survey.

Eight dichotomous indicators are used to represent the dimensions of intergenerational solidarity of the analysis: emotional closeness, contact frequency, geographic distance, agreement on filial piety, providing instrumental assistance, receiving instrumental assistance, providing financial assistance and receiving financial assistance. The functional solidarity is measured as a bidirectional flow of assistance because the exchanges of instrumental and financial assistance between parent-child have been proved by many researches (Liu 2012; Ma,et.al. 2011). In order to capture more widely the presence of functional assistance between generations, the measures of functional solidarity in the article are inclusive. For instrumental assistance, daily housekeeping and babysitting when the children has new baby are all included. For financial assistance, providing money based on month/quarter/year and occasions are all included.

In order to reduce the sparseness in the cross-classification table, four indicators (closeness, contact, proximity and filial piety) have been collapsed from polytomous scales into dichotomous scores. The other four indicators (receiving and providing instrumental assistance, and receiving and providing finan-

cial assistance) are measured with dichotomous response categories in the survey. The eight observed indicators of the dimensions of intergenerational solidarity and their distribution are manifested in Table 5-1.

〈Table 5-1〉 Distribution of items measuring dimensions of intergenerational solidarity

		%	N
Emotional Closeness	Close	73.1	1,979
	Somewhat or not close	26.9	729
Contact Frequency	At least once a week	74.2	2,008
	Less than once a week	25.8	700
Geographic distance	Live within one city at least	68.9	1,866
	Live beyond one city	31.1	842
Filial piety obligation	Agree	80.6	2,183
	Somewhat not	19.4	525
Functional solidarity			
Provides instrumental assistance	Yes	79.4	1,684
	No	20.6	438
Provide financial assistance	Yes	71.8	1,524
	No	28.2	598
Receive instrumental assistance	Yes	72.4	1,720
	No	27.6	657
Receive financial assistance	Yes	67.5	1,605
	No	32.5	772

Data: The survey on family structure and Family relations in five cities of China in 2008

② Measurement model of social class

In general, social class is measured separately by educational level, income level and occupation. But it is also funded by many researchers these indicators cannot measure the social

class effectively in China. As a result, we used educational level, income level and occupation as observed indicators to construct a latent variable and build the blocks of typology of social class in urban areas of China.

Five indicators are used to represent the dimensions of social class in the analysis: educational level, income level, occupation, quality of unit and position within the unit. In order to reduce the sparseness in the cross-classification table, the educational level has been collapsed from polytomous scales into one with three scores. Income level is an interval variable and there are huge differences between the income levels of the five cities. In order to classify income level into a nominal scale and show the position of respondents based on income level within the city, relative income level is used in the analysis. In China, the occupation content itself could not measure the occupational level of the respondents, and it should be combined with two indicators, quality of the unit and position within the unit (Li 2002). The three indicators relevant to occupation are recoded and the scores have been reduced. The five observed indicators of the dimensions of social class and their distribution are manifested in Table 5-2.

〈Table 5-2〉 Distribution of items measuring dimensions of socioeconomic status

		%	N
Relative income	Lower than local average income	46.7	1,049
	Higher than local average income but lower than 1.5 times local average income	24.4	547
	Higher than 1.5 times local average income	28.9	649
Educational level	College and up	32.8	888
	Senior middle school and similar	38.1	1,030
	Junior middle school and down	29.1	788
Occupation	Business owner/ manager/ civil servant	8.0	217
	Professional	16.3	440
	Official staff/individual business/commercial servants	34.2	924
	Industrial worker	23.1	623
	Others (peasant/no job etc.)	18.3	494
Quality of unit	Governmental and party agencies/ institutions	17.9	390
	Enterprises	59.7	1,302
	Self-employed	22.4	488
Position within unit	Owner/ stakeholder/ executive	13.9	303
	Middle and lower manager	17.1	373
	Professional	19.5	427
	Staff/ worker	49.5	1,082

Data: The survey on family structure and Family relations in five cities of China in 2008

③ Other independent variables

Besides social class, it is expected that there are other important sources of diversity in adult child-parent relations. We focus on age, gender and marital status because it has been suggested by many researches that these factors structure family life in important ways (Silverstein & Bengtson 1997). The indicator "city" in the survey was regarded as a macro level factor, including cultural diversity and economic developmental level difference, which has very strong implications for the intergenerational relationship (Ma.et.al. 2011; Shi 2015).

4. Results

1) Typology of intergenerational relationship in urban areas of China

In identifying types of intergenerational relationships, we use LCA in an exploratory fashion with no priori assumptions about the number or nature of the classes (Qiu 2008). The software Latent Gold 4.5 is taken to analyze the data. The "best" model is selected based on the goodness-of-fit indicators: the likelihood ration chi-square test statistics (L^2), Baysian informal criterion (BIC) statistic and the dissimilarity index (DI). The L^2 tests statistically significant discrepancies between a theoretical model and the observed data, the BIC statistic is useful when selecting the best fitting model among reasonable but competing models, especially when the sample size is large, and the DI signifies the percentage of cases misallocated by the theoretical model. Entropy indicates how well one can predict class memberships based on the observed variables. The closer the value of Entropy is to 1 the better the prediction.

A summary of the goodness-of-fit statistics for six models is shown in Table 5-3 for relations between adult children and parents. The first model is the one-class model or independence model, which assumes that there are no associations among eight manifest indicators. It is evident that the model fits the data poorly, based on the L^2, BIC and DI sta-

tistics, the lower the value the better the model. And the BIC statistic is the most important criteria to select a model. As a result, while the six-class model appears to be superior to the five-class model based only on the L^2 statistics, the much lower BIC statistic of the five-class model suggests that this model is preferable. The DI statistic for the five-class model shows reasonable misclassification rates of 11.2% for relations with parents. Therefore, we accept the five-class model as the best model fitting the data.

〈Table 5-3〉 Latent class models of intergenerational relations using eight dichotomous indicators of solidarity

	L^2	df	p-value	BIC(LL)	DI	Entropy
One-class model	1118.942	247	0.000	19398.46	0.2667	—
Two-class model	579.8684	238	0.000	18928.32	0.1628	0.5396
Three-class model	464.0759	229	0.000	18881.46	0.1461	0.5341
Four-class model	373.9993	220	0.000	18860.32	0.1376	0.7299
Five-class model	290.7089	211	0.000	18845.97	0.1120	0.6702
Six-class model	242.9063	202	0.026	18867.10	0.1006	0.6050

Data: The survey on family structure and Family relations in five cities of China in 2008

In order to label the latent classes, it is necessary to check the conditional probabilities associated with the observed indicators within each class in Table 5-4.

〈Table 5-4〉 Conditional probabilities for latent five-class model of adult child-parent relations

	Tight -knit	Intimate but distant	Obligatory	Sociable	Detached
Emotional Closeness					
Close	0.8046*	0.9016*	0.2509	0.9053*	0.311
Somewhat or not close	0.1954	0.0984	0.7491*	0.0947	0.689*
Contact					
At least once a week	0.9235*	0.6854*	0.2681	0.8816*	0.1967
Less than once a week	0.0765	0.3146	0.7319*	0.1184	0.8033*
Geographic distance					
Live within one city at least	0.9974*	0.0375	0.6253*	0.7334*	0.3941
Live beyond one city	0.0026	0.9625*	0.3747	0.2666	0.6059*
Filial piety obligation					
Agree	0.8389*	0.8620*	0.4853	0.8247*	0.7994*
Somewhat not	0.1611	0.1380	0.5147	0.1753	0.2006
Functional solidarity					
Provides instrumental assistance					
Yes	0.9555*	0.7489*	0.7721*	0.0992	0.4613
No	0.0445	0.2511	0.2279	0.9008*	0.5387
Provide financial assistance					
Yes	0.7175*	0.9155*	0.8729*	0.1757	0.6429*
No	0.2825	0.0845	0.1271	0.8243*	0.3571
Receive instrumental assistance					
Yes	0.8038*	0.7068*	0.9355*	0.5855	0.3638
No	0.1962	0.2932	0.0645	0.4145	0.6362*
Receive financial assistance					
Yes	0.3281	0.2998	0.6037*	0.312	0.1000
No	0.6719*	0.7002*	0.3963	0.688*	0.9000*

*Conditional probabilities 〉.6

Data: The survey on family structure and Family relations in five cities of China in 2008

Using a pattern of these probabilities, the labels of classes have been assigned; characteristics of these classes are concluded in Table 5-5. The five types, which are similar to those proposed by Silverstein & Bengtson (1997) when they studied intergenerational relationships in American families, are founded for the adult child-parent relationship in the urban areas of China. But there are some differences between the definitions of these classes.

〈Table 5-5〉 Latent classes of intergenerational relations

	%	N	Definition
Intimate and reciprocal	60.01	1,273	Adult children are engaged with their parents based on seven indicators of solidarity but not based on receiving financial support from their parents.
Intimate but distant	15.94	338	Adult children are engaged with their parents on emotional closeness, frequency of contact, obligation to parents, receiving and providing instrumental assistance and providing financial assistance but not based on geographic proximity and receiving financial assistance.
Utilitarian	7.59	161	Adult children are engaged with their parents on geographical proximity, providing assistance and receiving assistance but not based on emotional closeness, frequency of contact and obligation to parents. Only the adult children of this class are engaged in receiving financial assistance from parents.
Emotional	6.08	129	Adult children are engaged with their parents based on emotional closeness, geographic proximity, frequency of contact and obligation to their parents but not based on providing assistance and receiving assistance.
Detached	10.37	220	Adult children are not engaged with their parents on six indicators of solidarity but based on obligation to parents and providing financial assistance.

Data: The survey on family structure and Family relations in five cities of China in 2008

The intimate and reciprocal class has the characteristics of the Chinese traditional intergenerational relationship, "reciprocal model" (Fei 1983). Adult children provide all resources and support to meet the needs of parents, and the parent provides as much support to the adult child as possible. Due to those adult children living in urban areas, few receive financial assistance

from their parents. More than half of respondents (60.01%) are members of this class. The members of the detached class are on the other side of the intergenerational relationship spectrum, where the strength of intergenerational solidarity is weakest. This class is most emblematic of the isolated nuclear family, which is economically independent and lives in a home segregated from those of both pairs of parents (Parsons 1943). Adult children only provide financial assistance for their parents based on the accepted obligation to support their parents.

Relationships in the other three classes are connected on some but not all dimensions of intergenerational solidarity, representing "sundry" forms of child-parent relations in the urban areas of China. For members of the intimate but distant class, adult children don't live with their parents in the same city due to study or work, and are connected to other dimensions of solidarity. The research showed that they regard each other as members of the family but not relatives (Ma.et.al. 2011). The Emotional type of intergenerational relations is functionally independent, in spite of being otherwise integrated, which may be the result of lack of need or preference for intergenerational autonomy (Silverstein & Bengtson 1997). This kind of relationship is relatively rare among adult child-parent relations. It is where there is the most striking contrast between utilitarian and emotional type. The former relationship is functionally dependent between the adult children and their parents and is

structurally connected but lacks strong positive sentiment. The utilitarian type of intergenerational relationship is constructed based on exchanges.

2) Typology of social class in urban areas of China

In identifying types of social class, we also use LCA in an exploratory fashion with no priori assumptions about the number or nature of the classes (Qiu 2008). The "best" model is selected based on the goodness-of-fit indicators, such as L^2, BIC and DI. A summary of the goodness-of-fit statistics for six models is shown in Table 5-6 for social class. While the six-class and five-class model appears to be superior to the four-class model based only on the L^2 statistics, the much lower BIC statistic of the four-class model suggests that this model is preferable. The DI statistic for the five-class model shows reasonable misclassification rates of 19.15% for social class. As a result, the four-class model is regarded as the best model fitting the data.

〈Table 5-6〉 Latent class models of social class using five dichotomous indicators

	L^2	df	p-value	BIC(LL)	DI	Entropy
One-class model	4766.127	526	0.0000	20112.55	0.6005	-
Two-class model	2354.747	512	0.0000	17805.89	0.4362	0.8955
Three-class model	1260.097	498	0.0000	16815.97	0.2909	0.9150
Four-class model	603.850	484	0.0002	16264.45	0.1915	0.9305
Five-class model	504.269	470	0.1300	16269.59	0.1670	0.8959
Six-class model	412.125	456	0.9300	16282.18	0.1435	0.8633

Data: The survey on family structure and Family relations in five cities of China in 2008

In order to label the latent classes, it is necessary to check the conditional probabilities associated with the observed indicators within each class in Table 5-7. Using a pattern of these probabilities, the labels of classes have been assigned and characteristics of these classes have been concluded in Table 5-8. There are four types of social class in the urban areas of China. Due to sampling error and the difficulties to enter the community and talk to the members of the upper class, the upper class is not included in the typology of social class. But it should be noted that this doesn't necessarily indicate an absence of upper class in the urban areas of China at present.

〈Table 5-7〉 Conditional probabilities for latent four-class model of social class

	Lower class	Lower middle class	Middle class	Upper middle class
Relative income				
Lower than local average income	0.6210*	0.3565	0.1459	0.2073
Higher than local average income but lower than 1.5 times local average income	0.2691	0.2655	0.2928	0.2322
Higher than 1.5 times local average income	0.1099	0.3780	0.5612*	0.5606*
Educational level				
College and up	0.1026	0.2112	0.6641*	0.6964*
Senior middle school and similar	0.4797	0.4172	0.2830	0.2303
Junior middle school and down	0.4177	0.3716	0.0529	0.0733
Occupation				
Business owner/manager/civil servant	0.0001	0.0284	0.4391	0.0231
Professional	0.0025	0.0059	0.0674	0.9626*
Official staff/individual business/ commercial servants	0.2930	0.9653*	0.4850	0.0141
Industrial worker	0.7044*	0.0004	0.0004	0.0003
Others (peasant/no job etc.)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0082	0.0000
Quality of unit				
Governmental and party agencies/institutions	0.0585	0.0003	0.3450	0.4699
Enterprises	0.8799*	0.0009	0.6521*	0.4816
Self-employed	0.0616	0.9988*	0.0029	0.0485

	Lower class	Lower middle class	Middle class	Upper middle class
Position within unit				
Owner/stakeholder/executive	0.0000	0.6997*	0.0723	0.0058
Middle and lower manager	0.0173	0.0526	0.7116*	0.0084
Professional	0.0099	0.0085	0.0020	0.9844*
Staff/worker	0.9727*	0.2392	0.2141	0.0014

*Conditional probabilities 〉.6
Data: The survey on family structure and Family relations in five cities of China in 2008

Not surprisingly, the lower class is the most prevalent among social classes. The members of this class have a lower educational level, lower income level and poor occupational status. Most of them are workers of enterprises. The lower middle class consists of self-employed businessmen. While they have a lower educational level, their income might be higher than the average income of the city they live now. The middle and upper middle class have similar characteristics of education and income, and the main difference is occupational status. Members of the former class are middle and lower managers in enterprises and officials in governmental and party agencies/ institutes. Most in the upper middle class are professionals.

〈Table 5-8〉 Latent classes of social class

	%	N	Definition
Lower class	42.47	753	Their incomes are lower than local average income in 2007, educational levels are lower than college, and they are workers of enterprises.
Lower middle class	18.27	324	Their incomes are higher than local average income in 2007, educational levels are lower than college, and they are self-employed in service industry.

	%	N	Definition
Middle class	20.02	355	Their incomes are higher than 1.5 times local average income, educational levels are higher than college, and they are official servants in governmental agencies or middle/lower managers in enterprises.
Upper middle class	19.24	341	Their incomes are higher than 1.5 times local average income, educational levels are higher than college, and they are professionals in governmental agencies or enterprises.

Data: The survey on family structure and Family relations in five cities of China in 2008

3) Differentiating among types of intergenerational relations in urban areas of China

In this section, we examine whether social class, city and characteristics of adult children are associated with the five latent classes characterizing the adult child-parent relationship. We use binary logistic regression to examine how socio-demographic characteristics are associated with the probability of membership in each of five latent classes.

While the analysis focuses on the effects of social class on the structure of adult child-parent relations, other factors, which have been proved to influence intergenerational relations, such as gender, age, and marital status, are also controlled in multivariate equations. The cities were selected based on economic level, cultural diversity and location in the survey. As a result, the city is regarded as the macro-level variable, which indicates the economic level and cultural background of respondents,

proven association with the intergenerational relationship (Ma.et.al. 2011; Shi 2015).

The equation in Table 5-9 shows parameter estimates predicting the types of relationships that adult children have with their parents. We turn firstly to the effect of the child's social class. Except for the detached class, the other latent classes are influenced by the social class. The lower middle class and the upper middle class are less likely than the lower class to have an intimate and reciprocal relationship with their parents and are more likely than the lower class to have an intimate but distant relationship. The lower middle class is more likely than the lower class to have utilitarian relations, and the upper middle class is less likely than the lower class to have emotional relations.

Turning to the effects of a child's gender, sons are more likely than daughters to have a utilitarian relationship with their parents. The other latent classes are not influenced by gender statistically. The 35 and younger generation is less likely than the 51 and older generation to have intimate and reciprocal relations with their parents and are more likely than the 51 and older generation to have intimate but distant and emotional relations. There are no statistical differences between the 36-50 age group and 51 and older group across the latent classes of intergenerational relations. It seems the aging of a child changes the quality of adult child-parent relations and results in a return to traditional intergenerational relations. A

child's marital status is also related to the type of intergenerational relationship. The striking results are that married and divorced/widowed children are much more likely than unmarried children to have intimate and reciprocal relations with their parents. It is argued that the Chinese government provides little support for families and their members (Ma 2013). Subsequently, married children have to depend on parents to provide instrumental and financial support, and most parents in their older life have to depend on their children to take care of them (Ma.et.al. 2001). Intimate and reciprocal relations are helpful for both generations. The child's marital status exerts great impact on the traditional intergenerational relationship. Unmarried children are more likely to have an intimate but distant relationship with their parents.

Consistent with our expectation, the city is associated with the type of adult child-parent relations. Adult children in Zhengzhou and Lanzhou are less likely than those in Ha'erbin to have intimate and reciprocal relations with their parents, and more likely than those in Ha'erbin to have intimate but distant relations with their parents. The adult children of all the other four cities, especially those of Guangzhou and Hangzhou, are much more likely than those in Ha'erbin to have utilitarian relations with their parents. Adult children in Guangzhou are less likely than those in Ha'erbin to have intimate but distant and emotional relations with their parents. This suggests that

intergenerational contact and exchange may be based more on altruistic motives than on utilitarian or emotional ones. Compared with the other three cities, there is a considerable portion of the adult child-parent relationship based more on utilitarian motives, which may be the result of the high levels of economic development in these two cities.

〈Table 5-9〉 Regression equations predicting probability that adult child-parent relationship are characterized by each of five latent classes

Independent Variable	Intimate and reciprocal	Intimate but distant	Utilitarian	Emotional	Detached
Socio-Economic Status					
Lower class (=ref.)					
Lower middle class	.513***	1.937**	1.772*	.995	1.358
Middle class	1.055	1.371	.840	.964	.774
Upper middle class	.719*	2.830***	.721	.481*	.774
Age					
35 or younger	.457***	2.402***	.733	2.234*	1.572
36~50	1.085	1.009	.813	1.198	.891
50 or older (=ref.)					
Marital Status					
Unmarried (=ref.)					
Married	6.567*	.323*	.962	.867	.531
Divorce/Widowed	13.386**	.073*	.368	.671	.600
Gender					
Female (=ref.)					
Male	.968	1.008	1.485*	.761	.968
City					
Ha'erbin (=ref.)					
Guangzhou	.793	.505**	13.234**	.324**	1.208
Hangzhou	.729	.651	10.651**	1.325	.786
Zhengzhou	.617**	1.622*	2.947	.880	1.131
Lanzhou	.685*	1.591*	1.926	1.136	.975
Constant	.474	.277*	.014***	.071*	.176*
df	12	12	12	12	12
N	1576	1576	1576	1576	1576
-2 log likehood	1984.236	1242.803	759.473	656.419	942.061

*** p 〈.001; ** means p 〈 .01; * p 〈 .05; ref.=reference group.
Data: The survey on family structure and Family relations in five cities of China in 2008

5. Discussions and Conclusions

In this article, inspired by the intergenerational solidarity model and latent class analysis, we develop a multidimensional typology of the adult child-parent relationship in urban areas of China, define the five empirically generated types, explore relations between types and social class and examine other individual and social-structural factors that differentiate types.

Our research shows that the strength of intergenerational solidarity is still strong in the families of Chinese urban areas because more than half of respondents are members of the intimate and reciprocal type. It suggests that generations have close and intimate relations, and most of them are engaged in not only extensive exchange but also contact and emotional support. Adult children serve as important elements in the kin matrix of parents. This may be the result of a weak social security system in China, which places considerable reliance on the family as a source of security. Meanwhile, intergenerational relations are multiple. Five types have been defined: intimate and reciprocal, intimate but distant, utilitarian, emotional and detached. They represent the constellations of intergenerational relationship, with the full array of the solidarity dimensions.

Our findings portray that social class differentiates the types of intergenerational relationship. In the lower class, intimate and reciprocal relations are more popular while the intimate but distant are less popular. The utilitarian relationship is dis-

tinct in the lower middle class, and intimate but distant type is prominent in the upper middle class. Surprisingly, the middle class is similar to the lower class in the intergenerational relationship. The characteristics of intergenerational relations in those social classes should be noted while developing policies to support family.

There are also other important sources of heterogeneity in the distribution of types with respect to age, marital status and city. The survey did not distinguish the gender of parents, and thus we couldn't know how the parent's gender structures intergenerational relationships. But it seems the gender of the adult child has little impact on relations across generations though gender differences are apparent in sons' and daughters' distinct motivations for contact with their parents (Bengtson. et.al.2002).

There are many limitations in the study. Actually, the consensus solidarity is a very important dimension of intergenerational solidarity. Lack of relevant items in the survey, this dimension is not included in the analysis. At the same time, there is no data on the conflict of intergenerational relationships, so it is impossible to incorporate conflict into the measurement model. If solidarity and conflict could be measured and assessed together, the complexity of intergenerational relationships in China would be described completely.

6 Single Parent Family in Thailand: Putting it in Empowering Context

1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Paradigm and Literature Review
3. Data and Method
4. Results
5. Discussions and Conclusions

6 Single Parent Family in Thailand: Putting it in Empowering Context [19]

1. Introduction

Thai society has never lagged far behind the currents of change resulting from globalization. The rapid advance of information technology has truly made the world a borderless society in terms of communication. This trend is interacting with socio-economic and political evolution, including how society views gender. Younger members of Thai society are usually the first to absorb these winds of change and, in so doing, gradually become transformed. However, there may be some unintended consequences of these adaptations, not all of which are positive.

The "family" is the most basic unit of society, which encompasses the individual and helps shape her/him into adulthood. Thus, Thai society should be mindful about the evolution of the family of tomorrow since even small ripples among a multitude of families can create a social tsunami. While macro-society is increasing the protections for life's necessities for the masses, each individual has a certain amount of independence to shape

19) This chapter was written by Sureeporn Punpuing (Institute for Population and Social Research, Mahidol University, Thailand) and Kamolpun Punpuing (Institute of Technology for Persons with Disabilities and Elderlies, National Electronics and Computer Technology Center, Thailand).

their life and future. This self-determination is an especially critical aspect for today's youth. Yet each child has the basic expectation to be cared for by their parents, so as to help them develop appropriately as they transition into adulthood.

The single-parent family (SPF) in Thailand has been the focus of more attention in recent years particularly because of statistical evidence of the rapidly increasing prevalence of divorce, female-headed families, teenage pregnancy, skipped-generation families, and extended families, all in a short time period. Western countries experienced similar trends, but several decades ahead of Thailand. Family poverty, recourse to welfare, negative impacts and rights of children are the main issues of concern regarding the outcome of this socio-demographic phenomenon.

The argument in this study is based on the standpoint that the SPF is one type of family, not an abnormal or imperfect kind. The challenges and needs which occur have some unique characteristics of their own as they are different from other types of families, such as a blended family, a skipped-generation family, a one-person household, or a family of persons of the same sex.

This study aims to present the situation of the sole-parent family in Thailand, explore possible factors that lead to it, investigate aspects of being a SPF and adoption of coping mechanisms through interaction among SPFs across economic, so-

cial and cultural dimensions. It discusses challenges or problems which occur in the SPF, which may be the same as what other types of families face. Each type of family has unique issues to deal with in life. Family members are human beings and country nationals who have the right to enjoy services and live with human dignity. This chapter has positioned itself as another voice of SPFs in Thai society. The interaction among SPFs and other economic, social as well as cultural units is dynamic and lively. The SPF is not a problem to be solved, but an active player in adapting and finding ways to create well-being and a meaningful life for its members.

2. Theoretical Paradigm and Literature Review

Analysis on the SPF is based on the 'identity concept.' This study applied the identity concept, from a postmodern perspective, as a social process of creating meaning and truth. In dealing with a particular situation, persons could create multiple individual identities, which could also link with a social identity that suits a particular context. The astatic identity of an individual implies a process in which individuals negotiate, raise questions or reject forced social positions. The process to create a dynamic identity is a kind of lively resistance (Fuengfusakul 2003).

The trend of the SPF is being explored in relationship to

changing demographics and socio-economic factors at the macro level. The demographic changes mainly relate to the level of fertility, socio-economic development associated with the level of female participation in the labour force, women's education, marriage patterns and behaviour. The impact on SPFs that are derived from social, cultural and health aspects can be both positive and negative for the members of the SPF. The SPF can play an active role in coping with problems through collaboration with government services and SPF networks.

In Thai society, there have been studies on SPF issues for more than 30 years. Most studies in the early period focused on the negative impact from being in a SPF. Later, in the past 15 years, there have been more articles showing the active participation of single parents, even in small groups, in coming out to stand in the open and find positive meaning in their life, despite the problems and challenges they face. The methods of adaptation, which the SPF uses, have also changed as the demographic, socio-economic and technological environment evolves.

There have been a number of studies on the leading causes of SPFs related to death of a spouse, divorce, separation, abandonment by one member of the couple, family violence, unwanted pregnancy or being a minor wife/mistress (Polkaew 2001; Sanitwong Na Ayuthaya 2005; AddSkul 2015). Other factors related to SPFs include changing population composition,

particularly the declining total fertility rate, and socio-economic improvement, especially increasing women's economic independence and status (Punpuing & Punpuing 2015).

Some sole parents are in a poor psychological state and are prone to commit violence, and this poses a high risk that their children might not get appropriate support and development. Poor mental and physical health from stressful crises and a deep unresolved emotional state can be prolonged later in life (Sanitwong Na Ayuthaya 2005; Suntarachun 2006). Children in SPFs are likely to have more emotional problems which lead them to use drugs or engage in deviant behavior (Kaewkamkhet.et.al. 2014; Pitikultung 2009). Parents in SPFs face extra hardship in child rearing; children from SPFs were found to have lower levels of development, lack of female or male role models, and difficulty adjusting when parents either enter into new relationships or remarry. Often, members of the SPF have to move out from their current home and need help finding new accommodation. In Thailand, a common option for a divorced parent is to return to their parent's home with their child(ren). This can help the single parent save by sharing accommodation with his or her own parents, and probably receiving childcare support from them too (Polkaew 2001; AddSkul 2015). Also, sole mothers in particular have to deal with unsupportive cultural values and beliefs about a divorced woman and a problem child. The SPF is also likely to have cas-

es of intergenerational transmission of single parenthood (Jirawattananon 2002).

The situation of the SPF in Thailand is similar to those reported in some Western countries. Many research studies confirm, with statistical evidence, that the SPF is associated with family poverty. Whenever a family has to rely on a single provider, a common consequence is increased poverty of the household, and a worse economic status of the child(ren). Moreover, a study in the US found that disabled children are more likely to live in a SPF than other family types, which is 24 % versus 17 % respectively (Cohen & Petrescu-Prahova 2006). Having a special-needs child normally increases family expenditure and the need for greater knowledge about childcare in complex cases (Amato 2005: Weinraub & Wolf 1983).

3. Data and Method

This study is based on an analysis of secondary sources of data, related research and other documents. The secondary sources of data include data at the national level collected by the National Statistical Office of Thailand, such as the national population and housing census, and labour force survey conducted at a different point in time. Qualitative data were collected using in-depth interviews with five key informants who are active members of SPF associations or community SPF

groups, and eight single parents. The data from the interviews is kept strictly confidential and cannot be traced back to the respondents.

4. Results

1) Changes in demographic, socio-economic and family types

The single-parent family (SPF) is a demographic phenomenon that is increasingly prevalent around the world. Significant change in Thai family structure became more visible at the end of the 20th Century when more couples chose to live together prior to marriage. This has resulted in a higher age at first marriage, continuing fertility decline of the population as a whole, and an increase in childless couples and the never-married. These trends have been occurring in the midst of increasing rates of separation, divorce and remarriage, often by individuals who have a child from a previous marriage or cohabiting relationship. A consequence of improving health and extended aging of the society is that an increased number of older persons find themselves living alone. This trend is mirrored by the increasing number of single youth who live alone. As Thai society and its economy become more industrialized and urban-centered, relationships within the traditional, extended Thai family are changing as well, often with an unpredictable

impact on the welfare of family members.

The success of the national family planning program along with rapid socio-economic development have combined to reduce the number of children a Thai woman has, on average, during her reproductive lifetime (total fertility rate). This decline, from 6.3 in 1964 to 1.5 in 2013 is one of the fastest on record (IPSR 2014).

The National Population and Housing Census of 2010 found that Thai women and men were marrying at a later age: the average age of the first marriage for women was 23.7 years and, for men, 28.3 years. This represents an increase from 50 years ago (in 1960) when the corresponding ages were 22.1 and 25.0 years (NSO, National Population and Housing Censuses, 1960 and 2010). It is noteworthy that the average age of the first marriage increased three years for males. As the age of marriage increased, the number of children a couple had declined over the same period. During the 40-year period from 1970 to 2010, the percent of married couples with no children increased from 1.8% to 8.8% (NSO, National Population and Housing Censuses, 1970 and 2010). One of the reasons for these trends in fertility is the increased opportunity for women to be employed outside the home. Another is the greater parity between working female and male income. The 1990 and 2013 rounds the National Labor Force Survey conducted by the NSO found that between 87% and 94% of Thai women worked

full-time outside the household (NSO, Labour Force Survey, 1990 and 2013). In addition, the steadily increasingly level of female educational attainment, and differential by gender, translates into more women remaining single longer. The 1960 National Population and Housing Census found that males aged 20-24 years had greater educational attainment than their female counterparts (e.g. 1.6% of males and 1.1% of females had a bachelor's degree). On the contrary, by 2010, the corresponding percentages were 16.5% of males and 27.1% of females in the 20-24 year age group (NSO, National Population and Housing Censuses, 1960 and 2010). This indicated a wider gap in education level, in which females have a higher educational level than males.

While there is concern about the low and declining number of children being born, and increased number of never-married Thais, the numbers of adolescent pregnancy and teen childbirth is increasing. These trends reflect a decline in Thai household size, which has gone from 5.2 in 1980 to 3.3 in 2010, and the increasing diversity of Thai family formation. Figure 6-1 shows that during the last 4 censuses, the proportion of nuclear families has declined, while the proportion of extended, and single household families has increased. The decline of the nuclear family is partly related to the declining number of children in a family (family size), while the children who remain need to look after their parents. Therefore chil-

dren, particularly those from a one-child family, are less likely to establish a nuclear family after marriage. This is related to the Buddhist belief that the essentials for a good life are truth, kindness and honour that children give to their parents (Biswas 2008).

[Figure 6-1] Thai family trend classified by type of family, 1980~2010



Source: NSO, National Population and Housing Census, 1980~2010.

2) Single Parent Family

According to Punpuing.et.al. (2007), the single parent family (SPF) was defined as a family unit in which either the father or mother lives with their child(ren), or a single parent and other relatives. The parents who live separately may be widowed, divorced or never-married, and the child or children refer to

those aged under 18 years or, if still a full-time college student, aged 25 or less. The status of this family unit is no longer referred to as a SPF if the child(ren) is aged over 18 years, or if the parent remarries or enters a cohabiting relationship with a domestic partner (Punpuing.et.al. 2007).

Thailand is experiencing an increase in the number of SPFs, as are many other countries around the world. With limitations of data at the national level in Thailand, the number of SPFs in this study refers to families with a father or mother living alone with his/her child(ren) aged under 18 years, where the single parents marital status is widowed, divorced or separated. Figure 6-2 indicates the increased number of SPFs from 569,988 in 1987 to 880,763 in 2013 (NSO, Labour Force Survey 1987~2013).

[Figure 6-2] Number of single-parent family, 1987~2013



Source: NSO, Labour Force Survey, 1987~2013.

In 2013, the average SPF size was 2.76 (NSO, Labour Force Survey, 2013), which means there were about 2.4 million children and single parents living in SPFs. Previous studies by Mohsuwan.et.al. (2004) and Sanga (2004) estimated that SPFs account for 7% to 8% of all family units.

3) Occurrence of the SPF

A SPF can be created by the dissolution of a marriage (death of a spouse, separation, divorce, or abandonment). In Thailand, looking just at the registration data, it can be seen that the number of divorces is increasing over time, while registered marriages have decreased, though this figure has been plateauing in more recent years. The number of registered marriages has fluctuated somewhat, ranging from 290,000 to 360,000 during the 2002 to 2014 period, while the number of registered divorces increased steadily over time, totaling about 78,000 in 2002 and reaching 112,000 in 2014 (Figure 6-3).

In addition, possibly as a result of natural disaster and insecure circumstances in the four southernmost provinces of Thailand, out-of-wedlock or unwanted pregnancy, spousal abandonment, fleeing spouses due to abuse, wives who are minors, the taking of another's child to raise, or childbearing through modern birth technology, can all give rise to a SPF (Chuto.et.al. 2002).

[Figure 6-3] Number of married and divorced couples, 2002~2014



Source: Ministry of Interior, Department of Provincial Administration, 2002~2014.

During the last 23 years, the proportion of women aged 15~19 that gave birth increased from 40 percent in 1990 to 50 percent in 2013 (Figure 6-4). Furthermore, in 2012, a total of 133,176 births occurred to mothers aged 10~19, or 17 percent of the total 801,737 births for that year. In 2003, the number of births to mothers aged 10~19 was 95,879 and, when tallied over the decade from 2003-12, more than one million births occurred to mothers in that under-20 age group (Ministry of Public Health (MOPH), Bureau of Policy and Strategy, Office of the Permanent Secretary, 2003-12). The 8th Regional Health Center reported that of the 2,900 mothers under 20 years giving birth in 2012, 68 percent were full-time school students. This could lead to a high chance of being a single-parent family.

[Figure 6-4] Delivery rate (per 1,000) in women aged 15~19, 1990~2013



Sources: 1990~2012: UNFPA (2014); 2013: Ministry of Public Health (2014).

4) SPF in a complex context

Generally, research on the SPF has focused on a particular single situation, for example, the family of a person who has separated after cohabitation or a marriage, experienced an unwanted pregnancy, the death of spouse, or has adopted a child. Data from in-depth interviews with the manager and members of non-governmental organizations and sole parents found that the patterns of families are complex. One SPF can face many constraints from multiple difficult situations in the same or near period of time.

For example, a community SPF project manager observed the following: *"We work with SPFs in the rural community but we found other family types mixed within the primary family."* In

another example, a SPF resulted from an unmarried teenage pregnancy. After the father of the pregnancy left, the mother sent the child to the grandparents to be raised, creating a skipped-generation family. There was a case of a low-income female-headed family looking after a child with cognitive disability. There are a few sole-parent families, who have to take care of both their children as well as their own elderly, sick or disabled father/mother in the same house. Some SPFs had family members with HIV/AIDS, or who were stateless and/or homeless persons. These situations represent just some of the complex challenges which SPFs face.

The SPFs with disabled members are on the increase. A blind sole mother talked about her family's money management experience: *"I had a baby with a blind man when I was a teenager. He abandoned me, saying he was not ready to form his own family. I moved out of the home with my brother to stay in Ubonrat District, Khon Kaen Province. I have my own home now and am raising my daughter alone in the house. I learned traditional Thai massage and used that knowledge to earn income, based on the advice of the Thailand National Association of the Blind. I have to send my daughter to a private school because her school finishes just after I end my work. My income is still not enough, so I borrow (money) from a person I know. I continue to work and gradually pay off the debt."*

Another case is of a woman with one son who decided to separate from her spouse because of his recurring psychiatric symptoms. *"He (her husband) scolded me every night if I returned home after sunset… I just know that he was taking drugs for his psychiatric illness."* This unplanned separation is having an adverse impact on raising her son. *"I have to work hard and asked my aunt to look after my five year-old son. Six months ago a doctor said he (my son) learned to speak later than normal. Sometimes, when an adult goes to work, they would leave the child with the television most of the time."*

Increasing awareness of these complex family situations in rural areas can help stimulate awareness of stakeholders to promote a holistic approach to assistance and integrated implementation. During interviews and informal conversations during the data collection process, the issue of family violence, family poverty, negative traditional gender roles and low levels of family participation in the community were mentioned as factors that can worsen the situation. Figure 6-5 presents the multiple issues and relationships of other kinds of families, which overlap with the SPF.

Before the start of a pilot intervention project to initiate activities and networking among groups of sole-parent families in provinces outside Bangkok, the research team had hardly heard the voice of the SPF. Adherence to the traditional female-male roles is still strong in Thai society. Females are expected to take

[Figure 6-5] Issues and relationships among different kinds of families and SPF



care of household chores, the children and their husband. Women who were divorcees are considered an embarrassment or are blamed as having done something wrong to ruin the marriage. As a result, many divorced women choose to hide away from community activities. Single women resulting from a spouse's death are more socially accepted.

Local administration organizations around Thailand emphasize a community participation approach, and support tasks to create a family strengthen plan by community participation. If the negative traditional norms regarding the role and condition of women are not recognized and dealt with, it is possible that this participation will lack the real spirit of all members of the community. Some women who are in hiding will be reluctant to join in the community activities.

5) SPF Identity in a changing world

Being a sole parent shapes a person's identity. Most of the time, the SPF is generally presented as a negative identity. The majority of research findings and governmental welfare schemes for SPF portray the SPF as an unwanted kind of family and composed of troublesome persons. Aspects of the SPF were often presented which compare unfavorably with the two-parent family, frequently suggesting that the SPF was inferior.

The real, negative impacts are very significant for society, and the SPF needs to be recognized as worthwhile and in need of protection in order to alleviate those impacts. However, emphasizing only the negative side becomes a form of labeling, and may later manifest into a social belief. In real life, there are many groups of SPF. Some experience intense difficulties, while others experience few difficulties, depending on the context they are in.

For example, during the national assembly on the 'Single-Parent Family' in Bangkok, March 22-23, 2015, a single mother working with a community SPF club expressed the positive notion that the SPF can also produce feelings of self-worth and success in life, and she wanted others not to think that SPFs are a problem or burden on society:

"A SPF is not a problem family. Most of the time women can manage on their own, perhaps believing that we can rely

on ourselves economically. Our parents are there to help. To make the decision to separate is the solution of the family. It is about how to help them to be on their own. I want society to change its attitude towards SPFs so that children born in a divorced family are not seen as the cause of social problems."

In the past decade, there have been more studies, media, articles, blog posts and websites communicating a positive image of single mothers as brave women and strong fighters. Becoming a sole parent is a process a family goes through. There is the stage before marriage life ends – such as from conflict or the death of spouse, the stage of making the decision to be a sole parent, and the stage of becoming a sole parent. In the final stage, a sole parent has to adjust to many aspects of living: money, housing, family structure and so on. While services from government and non-government family programs provide necessary basic support, the Thai extended family is a crucial social support (Jirawattananon 2002). Invariably in Thai tradition, members of the extended family consist not only of parents and children, but also relatives, including the parents or in-law's siblings and relatives, and these people are willing to support each other both in kind and sometimes in cash. For example, after becoming a divorcee, or widow, the single parent and his/her children may move back to their extended family, where they always get emotional and physical support from family members. Extended family members normally help

look after young children while single parents work.

On the other hand, adult children growing up in SPFs are starting to open up and share their inspiring experiences, as well as success stories about their careers and relationships. They overcame painful situations and learned that they had choices in life (Kripke 2015).

For example, a 14 year-old girl of the SPF pointed out that:

> *"Being in the SPF or completed family is not different, if the child does their duty, they will be a good person. ..The problems were caused by the adults, therefore, the adults need to solve that problem by doing the best in taking care of their child. ..In this ICT world, the child has easy access to ICT, and if the adults ignore it, the child may be easily persuaded to do bad things. The child must not keep the feeling of inferiority that lead to incontrollable behavior, but we need to do our best..to be the best child…give moral support to our parents and support our family." (Thai Health 2009)*

The establishment of self-help and sole parents groups has helped many Thai sole parents disclose themselves in public. This helps researchers, social workers, and other professionals have more of an opportunity to delve into specific issues with them. Storytelling from some single mothers has been powerful, creating a feeling of responsibility and pride within the

storytellers themselves as they go on in their lives. Some periods of their sole parent life were very difficult; yet they managed it with heart and effort, always looking forward to a better future for their children and family. For example, a single mother stated that:

> *"I met my first husband fourteen years ago and became a single mother when I was five months pregnant. The man's family didn't like me and I raised my son by myself. After two years, I met my second husband. We had two children. He always went out to party with friends and used drugs heavily. Eventually, he disappeared. I moved out from my husband's house and rented a house for the four of us. I did any kind of work I could find: Construction work, waitressing, or house cleaning in order to get money for my children. Luckily, neighbors and relatives always gave us help and referrals for jobs. Last year, I received welfare assistance and accommodation from the government. I really want scholarships and support for my children's education. Even though life is harsh, I am happy when thinking about my children. When I see their faces, all my tiredness is gone. I will do my best and never give up."*

Because the image of the divorced sole mother is still considered embarrassing and unsatisfactory, a sole mother has adopted other identities to create a new space in the community to

gain social acceptance and, later on, advocate for SPFs.

"Ten years ago, I decided to come back to Surin Province, my home town, because my parents were getting old. They were 75 and 74 years old. My mother had an eye operation, and vision in one eye is impaired. I was shocked when I arrived back home. My daughter had started her first year at a university and the family was 400,000 baht (about 12,900 $US) in debt. I had to learn new skills in farming. But I was good at it, and my vegetable farming system was awarded as a "good farming model" by the the government…. I am not afraid of negative gossip around the neighborhood anymore because my life is successful… Now I am one of the leaders of the sole parent group."

Traditional Thai gender role norms, in some part, contribute to the feeling that a SPF is inferior. Creating positive identities of the SPF is one coping strategy that family members use to resist negative feelings and prejudice from society. This is an important component for empowerment within the self. Thus, it is important to communicate creatively and in more positive ways to members of an SPF so that they, and society, can see some of the benefits of the SPF. One such approach is the creation of a network of SPFs to promote a positive identity, self-esteem, confidence, courage, creative energy, and maturity in confronting and overcoming challenges that a SPF faces.

The promotion of one or another family type is an implicit rejection of the diversity of family compositions. Numerous cultural media promote the concept that a 'good family' is one in which both parents and children live together in the same household (Punpuing.et.al. 2007). This message conflicts with today's reality that there are many different types of family units that do not resemble this so-called cultural "ideal." First, there needs to be acceptance that new types of families are here to stay. Next, the goal should be to maximize the happiness of those families in different contexts. Identification of the factors which give rise to these family types should help to inform conceptual thinking and policies going forward (International Labor Organization and the Task Force for Collaboration between the UN and Thailand 2013).

6) Role of Civil Society and the Community

Support for the SPF originated in terms of informal mechanisms, primarily by other relatives and extended family members. Over the past decade, professionals from the field of social development, family psychology, and NGOs developed models of social welfare and services tailored to the status and needs of the SPF. This intellectual leadership gave rise to the Family Network Foundation which has the principal role to organize and connect members of SPFs so that they can help themselves by providing emotional support, child-care sharing

duties, help in adjusting to the roles of mother and father in the modern family era, education about family law, and promoting family income generation.

Members of SPFs and social development workers attest that forming this support group network is an essential component of assistance for SPFs in today's socio-cultural climate. As a united force, they can go hand in hand to withstand prejudice and stigma, and help each other to adapt, flourish and prosper with confidence (Bunpracha 2015).

But this is not enough. The institution of the SPF also requires help from outside the family sector and at different processes of becoming the SPF. As mentioned earlier as Jirawattananon (2002) found, there are 3 phases of becoming a SPF, which are before the marriage has ended, a period after the marriage has ended and a phase of adaptation to the single parent family. Each process of becoming a SPF, of course, needs different types of civil or community support. In addition to the increased complexity of the family unit in Thai society today, these varied types are increasing in number as well. The challenges they face differ across a range of economic dimensions and urban-rural contexts. Thus, the programs for SPFs will need to be expanded throughout the country and to peripheral areas.

From 2007 to the present, Civil Society groups and family specialists have been working together to advocate for im-

proved policy by assembling data on SPFs to help inform assistance programs. These data are used to evaluate progress and outcomes, and help define recommendations. The National Assembly on the Family called for the expansion of assistance to non-municipal communities to reach more SPFs in the provinces. A pilot project was launched to provide family counseling, and was implemented by the MOPH. Following the 2009 Resolution on the Assembly on the Family, the pilot program was expanded to many areas around the country, with support from Civil Society and family assistance specialists. This program created community-based networks of SPFs, in collaboration with local administrative organizations and Centers for Family Development. This approach has been identified as a core strategy for further expansion and development (Tayansilpa 2012; Ministry of Social Development and Human Security, Bureau of Women's Affairs and the Family 2013).

5. Discussions and Conclusions

1) Summary

In traditional Thai society, a broken family through divorce or premarital pregnancy was viewed as an unfavorable situation for raising a child, and which would lead to problems among adolescents. Even today, the SPF is still seen as mis-

fortune or a lack of adaptation among family members. In this regard, the SPF has not been linked with macro issues related to the economy, society and culture. It is undeniable that SPFs and their children experience the threat of poverty, because there is usually only one income earner for the household. Members of SPFs are often the past or present victims of domestic abuse. Society has an obligation to ensure the optimal development for its children and youth to prepare them for adulthood and marriage, to prevent risk behavior, and to ensure that the rights of children and youth are protected.

In Thailand today, the challenges faced by SPFs are concealed from mainstream society. Superficially, those challenges are not easily seen as being a clear problem given that SPFs have family support. SPFs usually obtain social support from the extended family, particularly from parents or relatives. This family value is a kind of social capital that helps alleviate problems in the periods of greatest need. It is inevitable though, that this form of social capital may possibly decline more rapidly as the society changes. Thus, there will need to be new forms of assistance to help strengthen family security, given the increasing number of SPFs projected for the coming decades.

No time should be lost in bringing the issue of the SPF out into the open and recognized as a significant institution of Thai society in the 21st Century. The SPF must be seen as a source of production and positive contribution to society and not as an

embarrassment or drain of resources. To fully appreciate and integrate the SPF into mainstream society, Thailand needs to have a good understanding of the diversity and evolution of the modern family unit. Only then, will the SPF be viewed, justly, as a valuable component of the society and culture in its own right, and with equal opportunity for self-determination and acceptance.

2) Policy Implications

At present, there is still no formal category of public social welfare for SPFs in Thailand. Most of the assistance for needy SPFs is classified under support for lower-income persons, children, and emergency shelter for victims of domestic abuse. In the health sector, there is support for SPFs in terms of family rehabilitation and counseling. Typical clients for this service are families of drug addicts or the mentally ill, or cases of unwanted pregnancy. Governmental services on education, housing, employment, and social security have no specific category for the SPF (Limpanich 2015).

Social policies on SPFs among countries in the world, including Thailand, are usually seen as a measure to prevent social problems from expanding in the context of evolving norms and trends. The government cannot afford to ignore this issue or rely on past policy to address the consequences of rapid social change. Priority areas for urgent policy implementation include

the following:

- Create the category of "SPF" as its own target population for social welfare and assistance among the relevant agencies, as an indication of determination to achieve solutions and mobilize staff to understand the challenges in greater depth, allocate resources and monitor implementation;
- Implement an integrated approach to social welfare, even though a specific target group is identified, so that the problems and needs are seen in a holistic framework of inter-related factors. This will involve the collaboration of numerous agencies such as social assistance offices, agencies which support social networking in the community (MSDHS), groups which provide counseling and rehabilitation for families (MOPH), educational institutions (Ministry of Education), agencies which promote occupational development and income generation, NGOs, local administrative organizations, offices which assist victims of domestic abuse, and legal assistance staff of the Ministry of Justice and Royal Thai Police;
- Promote solidarity for self-help support groups and networking for SPFs for the mutual benefit of members in terms of socio-economic status, positive self-image, and empowerment of SPF members to have confidence and

self-esteem;

- Build capacity for social workers and social development staff of local administrative organizations through short-term, in-service training using existing curricula such as that produced by the Association for Family Studies of Thailand;
- Conduct public information campaigns to create a more positive and dynamic image of the SPF, and increase public awareness of the diversity of family formation in modern society;
- Collect precise and complete statistical data on SPFs.

7

Family Change in Vietnam: Characteristics and Policy Implications

1. Socioeconomic Context of the Family Changes
2. Characteristics of Family Changes
3. Impact of the Changes on Vietnames Families
4. Discussions and Conclusions

7 Family Changes in Vietnam: Characteristics and Policy Implications[20)]

1. Socioeconomic Context of the Family Changes

In December 1986, the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam introduced a new policy entitled "Doi Moi" (Renovation). Doi Moi has been an important platform for change to take place in all economic and social sectors of the country. The past 30 years of Doi Moi observed significant economic and social change which supported changes to traditional patterns of marriage and family in Vietnam. As a number of strategies of economic and social development were implemented from 1986 to 2010, Vietnam's economy recorded positive and relatively stable growth rates. In the less than three decades since the start of the development, Vietnam has built up an impressive record of economic growth that has been not only rapid but also equitable and stable. GDP growth per capita has averaged around 5.5 percent per year since 1990, yielding a three-and-a-half-fold increase in average incomes (World Bank 2013).

The average annual GDP growth rate was around 7.26% in the period from 2001 to 2010 and currently remains stable at a

20) This chapter was written by Dang Nguyen Anh (Institute of Sociology, Vietnam Academy of Social Science, Hanoi, Vietnam).

level of about 6% (Vietnam Communist Party 2011). At these levels, Vietnam has moved from being grouped with the world's poorest countries to those enjoying low-to-average income levels. Along with rapid and stable economic growth rates, Vietnam's convergence with the rest of the world since the launch of the reforms has been nothing short of spectacular (Figure 7-1).

[Figure 7-1] Vietnam's long-term growth performance



Source: World Bank (2014)

In 2015 Vietnam is an unrecognizably transformed, dynamic middle-income economy. As a consequence of high, shared growth, social outcomes have improved dramatically across the

board. The poverty rate is near single digits (compared to over 50 percent in the early 1990s) and extreme poverty (measured by a daily income of US$1.25) has been nearly eliminated. Not only are income levels higher, the Vietnamese population is better educated and has a higher life expectancy than most countries at a similar per capita income level.

Along with the economic sphere, Vietnam has paid special attention to and prioritized resources for social development and has realised encouraging achievements in this area. The number of people who were provided with jobs grew by 1.5 million annually, though urban unemployment remained at 5-6% (General Statistics Office 2014). Public health care became a focus; the health care network was strengthened and upgraded, preventive health activities were also enhanced. Besides sustained universal primary education, significant results were achieved in the implementation of universal secondary school education. The scale of vocational training and tertiary education grew in scale by nearly 20% per year (Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs 2013). Access to basic infrastructure has also improved substantially. Electricity is now available to almost all households, compared to less than half in 1993. Access to clean water and modern sanitation has risen from less than 50 % of all households to over 75 % (General Statistics Office 2015).

Life for the majority of people, especially women, children

and people in the areas inhabited by ethnic minorities has improved. Vietnam was recognized as one of the leading countries in hunger alleviation, poverty reduction and implementation of the millennium development goals (MDGs). The average life expectancy of Vietnamese people increased from 72.8 years in 2009 to 73.2 years in 2014. The Human Development Index (HDI) of Vietnam was 0.733 in 2008 (ranked 105 among 177 countries and territories) and was 0.728 in 2011 (ranked 128 among 187 countries and territories) (UNDP 2013).

Factors related to the education system, economic changes, urbanization, and legal reform played a prominent role in changing the marriage system and family values in Vietnam. Data from the National Population Censuses conducted in 1989, 1999 and 2009 indicate that the proportion of the adult population that had gone to school increased gradually. In 2009, the literacy rate for the population aged 10 or older was 94%, compared to 88.2% in 1989 and 91.1% in 1999. The difference in education levels between men and women decreased gradually, especially with regard to young people. In 2009, the literacy rate for men was 96% and for women, 92%. In general, gender inequality in basic education has almost been erased. Literacy rates in urban areas are higher than in rural areas, however recently the urban-rural difference has become very low, 96.9% in urban areas and 92% in rural areas (Vietnam Central Census Steering Committee 2010). Higher education

created an atmosphere facilitating the spread of new ideas about marriage and the family, especially the idea of the "love marriage," among young people.

The priority given to industrialization and modernization in Vietnam occurred in order to create more jobs and to contribute greatly to social equality. As a result, Vietnam has dramatically changed, especially its labour structure. Economic development opened up non-agricultural employment opportunities for people, especially women, and significantly increased the economic independence of children from their parents. It helped young men and women to prove their self-reliance in matters such as deciding their own marriages. Data from the 1999 Population Census also showed a positive picture of women's participation in economic activities, i.e. 67.8% of women aged 15 years and above participated in economic activities (Vietnam Central Census Steering Committee 2000). The 2009 Population Census results showed that 76.5% of the population aged 15 or older participated in the labour force, 81.8% for males and 71.4% for females. The labour force participation rate for rural areas is fourteen percentage points higher than for urban areas (80.6% vs. 67.1%) (Vietnam Central Census Steering Committee 2010)

Urbanization has taken place speedily in Vietnam. Over the past decades, Vietnam has undergone an extensive urban transformation. According to General Statistical Office (2014),

the proportion of the population that is urban had increased from 23.7% (1999) to 29.6% (2009) and to 33.1% (2014). According to the recently approved government Decision regarding the Vision of Urban Development to 2050, the urban population in Vietnam will reach 38% of the national population by 2015 and 45% by 2020 (Socialist Republic of the Vietnam Government 2009). Given the economic benefits that cities can provide, it is not surprising that urbanization and economic growth go hand in hand. Vietnam switches from slow economic development to rapid economic development and also from slow urbanization to rapid urbanization (Figure 7-2).

[Figure 7-2] Urbanization and the transition from slow to fast growth



Source: Socialist Republic of the Vietnam Government (2009)

The urban population has grown 3.4% annually and per capita GDP has grown 4.9% annually. In 1986, Vietnam had fewer than 13 million urban residents; by official measures, Vietnam now has 30 million urban residents, and urban areas now contribute over half of national GDP.

Differences in living standards, education, employment etc. between urban and rural areas have created a lifestyle for urban inhabitants that is different from the rural lifestyle (Nguyen 2015). The popularity of the nuclear family, slackening kinship relations, diversity of economic activities outside the family, and higher education levels in urban areas influence urban inhabitants' ways of thinking about marriage and family. The role of love in marriage has become increasingly significant, especially for young people.

One can see that the process of socioeconomic development has brought with it many achievements and driven drastic changes. Obviously these changes have had a strong influence on the family - a strong and long-standing social institution. The Vietnamese family is the basic component of society that has undergone major changes in many aspects. In many ways, the Vietnamese family is shifting from traditional to modern, involving changes in structural forms, functions, relationships between family members and the role of women in the family and the community, etc. Family change is one of the causes leading to the occurrence of complex problems. The question

is how to address these issues and make the Vietnamese family become "one of the important factors determining the solid development of society, the success of industrialization and modernization" as envisioned by the Vietnamese State.

2. Characteristics of Family Changes

1) The transformation of family forms

It has been said that the traditional Vietnamese family was formed from the local native culture. Accordingly, a popular structure of the family is the extended family consisting of several generations living together linked by blood relations and usually regulated by "the breadwinner." In the process of development, the advantage of the traditional family is to promote close relationships among family members; to preserve the cultural traditions and customs, the order and discipline, and ethnics of family, etc. However, the traditional family is one of the factors preventing individuals from developing and it seems no longer to be a good pattern. The gradual disappearance of traditional families and the establishment of new family forms have become indispensable.

Results from the 2006 Family Life Survey in Vietnam showed that the two-generation family (including parents and children) – the nuclear family - was quite popular in Vietnam (63.4%).

The more-than-three-generation-family, which is the extended family, was decreasing. Small-sized households were more common in urban areas than in rural areas and in better-off families as opposed to poorer ones (Vietnam Family Life Survey 2008). The proportion of three-generation households was higher in urban areas, particularly in the major cities. The cause of this change can be identified and explained as follows.

First, forms of the nuclear family seem to have many advantages over other forms of families (extended family, single-parent family, single-mother or single-father family, etc.). It is organized as an independent unit and is able to adapt quickly to social transformation with the following characteristics:

- Less dependent on family members and relatives. After marriage, newly-married couples build their own family by themselves rather than live with their extended families.
- The focus of the family is not the relationship with the extended family, but the relationship between the two spouses.
- Every member in a nuclear family is relatively independent and thus has more chance to develop and pursue personal freedom.

Secondly, Vietnamese society is very dynamic. It provides open mechanisms for a wife or husband in the nuclear family to choose their own career to meet the demands of the labour

market without pressure from their families.

Finally, the tendency of young people migrating to the city for work has delayed marriage and encouraged the settling down in major cities. They are reluctant to return to the countryside and resume work as farmers. The rapid urbanization process in Vietnam has promoted investment, created employment and better economic opportunities as pulling factors for young migrants.

2) The transformation of family functions

The family has four main functions: reproduction, education, economy and care. Due to the interaction between traditional and modern elements, there is a significant difference between changes in family forms and functions of the Vietnamese family.

First, with regard to the reproductive function, most Vietnamese people think that children still play an important role in the family although the desired number of children is generally small. The 2006 Family Life Survey revealed that the proportion of people who agreed that couples need to have many children is fairly low today (18.6% of the elderly, 6.6% of people between the ages of 18~20, and 2.8% of teenagers); the concept "the family is required to have a son" is most supported (nearly 37% people aged 18 - 60), in which a group of the poor want to have sons more than the rich (45.5 % of the lowest in-

come quintile compared to 26% of the highest income quintile). The main reasons why sons are required are “to continue the family roots" (85.7%), "to depend on when they are old" (54.2%) and "to have someone to do difficult work" (23.4%). However, approximately 63% of people aged 18 to 60 say that having a son is not necessary. The results show that most people consider children, boys or girls, to be important, but follow the population policy (Vietnam Family Life Survey 2008).

In addition, social structure and viewpoints on reproduction and sexual relations have also changed due to the freedom of unmarried pregnancies and out-of-wedlock births due to the advance of medicines. Similarly freedom in sexual relations can be realized as the availability and accessibility of contraceptives to avoid pregnancy and access other services related to sexuality. Nowadays, having sex does not mean having a child or reproduction. Satisfaction in one’s sexual life has become one of the main factors influencing the level of satisfaction in marriage.

Second, the function of education has been strengthened more than ever and becomes a heavy responsibility of the family. During the process of industrialization, the economy demands skilled workers; therefore, the role of education in the family is vital. The severe competitiveness among qualified workers leads to the fact that parents pay more attention to their child’s education. The concerns about child education are

various depending on the region and ethnic group. Urban parents are more interested in education than rural parents. Parents from the Northwestern region, especially the H'mong ethnic group, show less concern than those in other areas. Besides, well-educated and high-income parents tend to be more concerned with their child's education and the studying of children aged from 7 to 14 more so than that of children aged 15 - 17.

When social changes take place so fast, there are also problems in bringing up children and educating them. The nuclear family is able to pass little knowledge from generation to generation. Although the young are still supported by their parents, they do not always agree upon how to bring up children. They believe that applying the advance of medicine into bringing up children is better than the experience of the elderly.

Third, regarding the economic function of the family, rapid industrialization and urbanization have made family and work separate from each other considerably in space, in which the production functions of the family also decline or disappear while consumer functions are strengthened. This can lead to the family lifestyle which is determined by the job or income of family members. The level of consumption has a direct impact on the level of living satisfaction of the family. As for families in rural areas, production and consumption functions are not clearly separated, but if the society takes production for ex-

change, the self-supplied production of the family will decrease.

The tendency of individualizing family income sources reduces the role of the family as an economic unit in the area of production. The economic functions of the family are clearly expressed in their consumption activities rather than their income-earning activities.

Fourth, the function of care and emotion is gradually recognized. While western spouses can get divorced or separated once they no longer love each other, the family in Vietnam is not like that. Caring for the family may be more important than caring for oneself. Most are still inclined towards the "family mode," i.e. the husband lives with the expectation of serving as breadwinner rather than having a focus on love and sexual relations. The wife finds her role of excellent domestic management and the role of the mother-in-law. However, there are growing opinions that in young generations, the relationship between the two spouses is more important than the relationship between parents and children.

It is common in Vietnam for younger married generations to visit their parents. Parents and children support one another. Results from the 2006 Family Life Survey showed that over 90% of the elderly stated that they support their children with at least one of the following: help making money, business assistance, capital, property, experience-together in making household-decisions, treating and caring for children. Many older

people also complain that sons/daughters can take better material care of parents, but they now devote little time to that. About 37.5% of the elderly said that they often share their feelings with their spouse; 24.8% talk to sons/daughters and 12.5% talk to friends and neighbours (Vietnamese Family Life Survey 2008).

3) The conversion of the family period

The family period considers that the family as well as the individual will continue to survive with repeated births and deaths as the premise and the idea of turning points: important experiences that families face from marriage until death. The normal family period consists of getting married, giving birth, stopping giving birth, raising children until the children are mature (leaving the family), finishing raising children and getting old and dying.

The first change in the family period is revealed through marriage. The results of the nation-wide survey on the family in Vietnam show that the average marriage age has tended to increase in recent years and child marriage has tended to decrease (Table 7-1). The age of marriage in urban areas is higher than in rural areas (Table 7-2); workers with jobs of high profession often get married later than people who do simple jobs, the gap in the age of marriage between the two groups is 2.9

years for males and 3.4 years for females.

〈Table 7-1〉 The average age of the first marriage by gender and the proportion of married people by gender and age groups, 1989~2006

Year	Male				Female				SMAM draft SMAM (Male-Female)
	SMAM (year)	% had got married			SMAM (year)	% had got married			
		15~19	20~24	45~49		15~19	20~24	45~49	
1989	24.5	4.5	36.6	98.6	23.2	11.4	57.5	96.7	1.3
1999*	25.3	2.2	32.3	98.8	22.7	9.2	54.6	94.2	2.5
1999**	25.4	2.5	30.4	98.5	22.8	9.3	54.3	94.2	2.6
2000	25.7	1.8	28.0	98.5	22.9	7.2	51.9	93.4	2.8
2001	25.7	1.9	28.5	98.6	22.8	8.0	52.6	93.4	2.9
2002	26.0	1.6	24.9	98.2	22.8	7.0	48.3	91.7	3.1
2003	26.2	1.6	23.4	98.5	23.1	6.6	46.2	93.1	3.1
2004	26.7	1.4	20.1	98.0	23.4	6.4	42.7	93.4	3.3
2005	26.8	1.5	19.4	98.2	23.5	6.2	42.1	93.4	3.3
2006	26.6	1.6	21.1	98.0	23.2	6.1	45.4	93.7	3.4

Notes: SMAM = Singulate Mean Age at first Marriage;* Data of sampling survey; ** Data thorough investigation
Source: General Statistics Office (2009)

〈Table 7-2〉 The average ages for the first marriage by gender and their differences by gender and regions, 2006

Regional and place of residence	SMAM		SMAM draft
	Male	Female	SMAM (Male - Female)
Nationwide	**26.6**	**23.2**	**3.4**
Urban	**28.4**	**24.7**	**3.7**
Rural	**25.9**	**22.6**	**3.3**
The Red River Delta	26.3	22.5	3.7
Northeast	25.1	22.2	2.9
Northwest	23.9	21.2	2.7
North Central	26.5	23.4	3.2
Coastal South Central	27.8	24	3.7
Highland	26.0	22.6	3.3
Souththeast	28.2	24.7	3.6
Mekong Delta	26.4	23.2	3.2

Note: SMAM = Singulate Mean Age at first Marriage
Source: General Statistics Office (2009)

Concerns about children become an important factor of marital life in Vietnam. After marriage, it becomes important for the family to have a baby. For women, it is well known that giving birth can bring about better status rather than being a childless wife. Having the first child is a wonderful thing for the family but it is also stressful, a burden on finances and a challenge for young couples.

A prominent phenomenon of the conversion of the family period is to shorten the time of reproduction. The duration from first birth to last birth is shortened. Thus, the amount of time bringing up children in the whole period of marriage for women also decreases gradually.

On the other hand, shortening the birth time makes it easy for married women to have jobs. With better living standards, the whole family depends entirely on the husband's income, which is extremely difficult in industrialization; therefore, the rate of women at work is on the increase.

The longer average longevity makes the time of marriage longer and has resulted in the appearance of the situation of older couples without having to raise children. This conversion will influence the husband and wife relationship, at the same time, there will be women with serious stress or difficulty in the middle years due to menopause and the loss of the mother role.

4) Changes in the desired number of children

In the last decades, the fertility rate in Vietnam has gradually decreased (Vietnam Central Census Steering Committee 2000, 2010). The TFR fell sharply from 2.33 children per woman in 1999 to 2.03 children per woman in 2009. Also since 2006, Vietnam's TFR has declined continuously to below the fertility replacement level. There is a fundamental difference between urban and rural fertility rates. In 2009, the TFR was 1.81 children per woman in urban areas, much lower than the 2.14 children per women in rural areas (Vietnam Central Census Steering Committee 2010). Elderly parents are less dependent on children in urban areas than in rural areas so urban residents are less likely to give birth in order that they can "rely on their children in their old age".

In contrast to the clear trend toward having fewer children, a considerable part of the population still supports the idea that "a family should have a son(s)". Results from the 2006 Family Life survey reveal that nearly 37% of respondents aged 18-60 supported this idea. The proportions of women, rural residents and people in the Central Region, the Mekong Delta, Northwest and Southeast and ethnic people of H'mong, Dao and Khmer, supporting this idea were higher compared to those of other groups. Poorer population groups needed boys more than rich population groups: 45.5% in the lowest income group com-

pared to 26% in the highest income group (Vietnam Family Life Survey 2008). This explains why low-income groups commonly have many children when they could not apply technologies for foetal sex selection. This son preference has resulted in a gender imbalance at birth as people wanting sons have used modern medical technologies for foetal sex selection.

According to the most recent 2014 Intercensal Population Survey, the sex imbalance ratio at birth was 112 boys per 100 girls in Vietnam (General Statistics Office 2015). This level is quite high, indicating the son preference in Vietnam. The reason to have a son was mainly "to continue the family line" (85.7%). In addition, a significant proportion of respondents said sons would offer "a refuge in their old age" (54.2%) and would "do large work, heavy work" (23.4%) (Ministry of Culture, Sport, and Tourism 2008). Rural people emphasized the reason to have a son for "a refuge in their old age" more than urban residents, probably because they enjoyed fewer social services and worse access to health care when they became older.

5) Changes in the role of women in the family

In modern society, the position of women in general has been assured on the basis of gender equality because of the women's rights movement. Women increasingly play an important role in production, reproduction, decision-making, community activities and family welfare. At the same time,

members of the family and social services also take steps to share the burden of family with women, contributing to create opportunities for women to promote their potential abilities.

- *Household headship*: In the modern Vietnamese family, opinions on the household head vary. The head of the family may be a wife or husband or both, which depends on the quality, characteristics and their contribution to the family. The rate of female headship raises overtime as a result of increasing female independence. It can be seen that the position of women is gradually becoming recognized.

- *Ownership of property*: In the old days, a husband is often the name holder of much large property. This is derived from the traditional patriarchal structure of Vietnamese society (except some ethnic groups who have a matriarchal structure). Being the owners of assets in the family, the husband has the right to make decisions in the family. However, an increasing number of women are the owners of property in the family today.
- *Spousal division of labour*: In the traditional family, a woman/wife is regarded as a housewife. She can do all the things in the family (house chores, taking care of family members). A man is subject to doing business and to working far from home. The assigned work has so far tended to be more equal in today's families, especially in

urban areas, groups of the rich and highly educated. In households, both the man and woman go to work; housework is often shared by husbands, etc.

6) Demographic changes

Vietnam is facing a far-reaching evolution in the structure of its population. Over the last two decades, Vietnam has cashed in on its "demographic dividend" — the economic growth boost generated by a bulge in the share of the population that is of working age. The dividend is however nearly spent: the working age share peaked in 2013 and is now in decline.

By UN projections, the absolute number of people of working age will start to fall shortly after 2035. More importantly, in 2015 Vietnam reached a turning point in the size of its old age population and will now become one of the most rapidly aging societies in the world. The share of the population that is over 65 will rise from 6.7 percent in 2015 to 14.4 percent in 2035 (Figure 7-3), transforming it from a young to an "aged" society by UN definitions. The number of Vietnamese over 65 will grow from 6.3 million today to 15.5 million. At present, Vietnam is at a demographic turning point. This demographic change has a number of consequences. First, the decline in the working age population will mean that a key driver of Vietnam's rapid per capita growth will diminish, making human capital deepen and

other sources of productivity growth even more vital for sustaining robust growth. Second, the country will face serious fiscal challenges driven by the increasing burden on the pension and health systems. Third, institutional arrangements for the provision of care to the elderly population will quickly become a major concern and this issue will be examined in the next section.

[Figure 7-3] Population shares by age group



Source: United Nations (2015). World Population Prospects, Revision (medium variant).

A common measure of the age structure of a population is the old age dependency ratio (OADR) - the number of people over age 65 for every 100 people aged 15~64. The OADR has been roughly constant for decades, but it will climb steeply from 9.6 to 21.8 between 2015 and 2035 (about twenty years

from now) and continue to rise in the following decades (Figure 7-4). Expanding social insurance coverage is both vital and challenging in light of the society's rapid aging.

[Figure 7-4] Increase in Old-Age Dependency Ratio, 1975~2075



Source: United Nations (2015). World Population Prospects, Revision (medium variant).

3. Impact of the Changes on Vietnamese Families

1) Positive impact

Vietnam's socioeconomic development and its integration with international business have brought many changes to Vietnamese families. These changes have had a great impact on the structure, functions and relationships among family members. Further, the role of women in the family create conditions for Vietnamese families to develop better and to become more dynamic, able to adjust to the displacement caused

by economic-social conditions and able to integrate with other cultures and the achievements of civilized humanity.

Those conversions are part of a process of conserving, transmitting and promoting traditional values while consuming selected values and improving the elite in the modern family. Typically, traditional family values have been preserved such as via true love, loyalty, connubial sentiment, the immensely kind and generous heart of parents, the filial love of children for parents, compliance and love among brothers and sisters at home. At the same time, the Vietnamese family also receives a number of the positive values of the modern family such as respecting individual freedom, democracy in all relations and equality between men and women. So, the Vietnamese family owns both the traditional and the modern characteristics of family, as well as democracy, equality, freedom, individual rights, etc. that are appropriate to the progress of humankind.

2) Negative impact

Apart from these positive changes, the Vietnamese family also faces a lot of challenges. The rapid growth of the economic sector to some extent has ruined family values and the morality of the Vietnamese traditional family. Daily meals are rarely warm and crowded affairs full of family members, because of rushed lives and business tension. A life with many convenient

and high-tech facilities has created an isolated "oasis" in the family, which means that every family member has become more and more isolated from the next. In addition, selfish and material lifestyles and individualism also pose the risk of spoiling many positive traditional values of the family.

Loosened relationships among family members are cause for conflict and domestic violence in the family as well as social evil outside of it (drugs, prostitution, gambling, alcoholism, and adultery). These negative effects have penetrated several families and caused the fading of positive traditional cultural values of family, leaving behind bad consequences for society. The downfall of kind behavior, disregard for morality and ethics, family breakdown, pre-marital sex and increased abortion, have become factors attacking the well-being of the Vietnamese family today.

In addition, other factors affecting the family include the lessening influence of parents over children because children can earn money and hence gain independence from their parents. Little time for children and the elderly would be the result of women working outside the home in order to contribute to family income. It is the impact of education on the norms of filial piety that generates conflict between generations. Caring for the elderly creates many new challenges, while domestic violence becomes widespread, impacting negatively women and children.

For social insurance as well as health care, the extremely rapid aging of the population will drive profound changes. Vietnam is at an inflection point, as large numbers of people leave the work force and the old age population swells. Current coverage of contributory pensions in Vietnam remains low as the pension system faces the common problem of middle income countries of a "missing middle" in terms of coverage: the top 20 % are in formal pension schemes and a small bottom segment is covered by targeted social pensions, but the majority of the population do not have any pension until age 80.

As Vietnamese society ages rapidly, the demand for formal aged and long-term care (ALTC) that goes beyond traditional family support will grow rapidly. There is significant demand for ALTC in different forms, ranging from low-level social support to support in self-care activities of daily living. While there is a need for greater public support for ALTC, it is equally clear that the state cannot "do it all" and the expressed preferences of older people are to receive care in the home or the community ("aging in place"). In this situation, the family and its members need to take care of the elderly. They provide a bridge from social services to care in the health system at higher levels of need.

4. Discussions and Conclusions

After more than 30 years of Doi Moi, along with dramatic changes in the economic and social sectors, the characteristics of the family have undergone many changes in Vietnam. The institution of family is being changed. Although marriage is still widely prevalent in Vietnam, a trend to opt for a single life has appeared in parts of the population. This trend is more evident in young people and more modern population groups such as those with higher educations and those living in urban areas. In recent years, the number of divorce cases has increased. People have become more and more open to this issue. Divorcees are no longer under pressure in life after divorce so they can decide on marriage more easily. Groups with lower levels of education and people who pay little attention to their parents' opinions when getting married often exhibit higher divorce rates. In addition, life conflicts, issues related to having children and lack of fidelity in marriage are important reasons cited for divorce.

There are typical changes that have taken place in the traditional family in Vietnam: ① Nuclear families have become popular, and this trend is common when the speed of industrialization-modernization is increasing in Vietnam; ② Many functions of the family have changed. Families leave the whole job of educating children to schools; while the economic function of families is shifting from production to consumption; ③

Relations among family members have loosened, no longer are they tight, they may even be isolated; ④ The role and position of women in the family and society are improved, but at the cost of the family's well-being.

Family changes have led to many complicated problems and conflicts between views on traditional and modern values and between old and young generations in Vietnamese society today. To resolve conflict and "build prosperous family, equality, progress, and happiness" (Vietnam Communist Party 2011), relevant policies and strategies must be put in place to ensure the stability of the family. In addition, we need to focus on certain policy issues such as having the best solutions to enhance family resilience; supporting the household economy, educating and improving individual intellect; encouraging family reunion; building strong attachments to family members; further reducing poverty; formulating family policies, disseminating knowledge about gender equity in the family and the society as a whole; strengthening morality in our new modern society and ensuring the rights of every individual in the family.

8 Population and Development in Singapore

1. Introduction
2. National Development and Population Policies in Singapore
3. National Development and Population Indicators
4. Reaping the Demographic Dividend amidst Rapid Demographic Transition
5. Future Policy Directions and Discussions

8 Population and Development in Singapore[21)]

1. Introduction

Since gaining full independence fifty years ago in 1965, population planning has been a central element in Singapore's national development policies, considering its starting point as a city-state with an ethnically diverse population of different religions and different languages, a limited land area and no natural resources. Singapore's economic and population planning policies have had to focus, first on mopping up the high level of unemployment in the early years, and then on the rapid development of its human capital to serve the economy's needs for more and better qualified workers, whilst managing social issues such as the dependency burden and the integration of large numbers of migrants in a nascent society trying to establish a sense of its national identity.

This chapter considers the central role of Singapore's population policies (mainly involving fertility and immigration) in the context of the strategic objectives of national development, and is organised as follows. Firstly, an account is provided of

21) This chapter was written by Yap Mui Teng and Christopher Gee Kok Aun (Institute of Policy Studies, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore).

the stages of economic development over the past fifty years[22] since achieving full independence, with the significant population policies introduced at various stages highlighted and their interrelationship with economic and social development policies explored. Second, the country's progression through the various stages of demographic transition (from high birth and death rates to low birth and death rates) is described along with relevant development indicators. The final section discusses the challenges for the future arising from Singapore's continued demographic trends.

2. National Development and Population Policies in Singapore

The available data show that in 1965, Singapore's per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at current market prices was just US$516, lower than the world average[23] and not dissimilar to Panama's. Unemployment was at 14%, half the population was illiterate (World Bank 2009) and the total fertility rate (TFR) was at 4.6 births per woman. At this time, there were nearly 60,000 babies born annually in Singapore. According to Tan & Chern

22) The Peoples' Action Party (PAP) first came to power in 1959, before Singapore became fully independent in 1965. The PAP has governed Singapore ever since.

23) World average GDP per capita in 1965 was US$ 590, whilst Panama's GDP per capita in that year was US$500 (World Bank 2015).

(2002), the Kandang Kerbau Maternity Hospital, the main public maternity hospital of the period, was the world's largest maternity hospital in terms of the number of deliveries. The Housing and Development Board (HDB), a statutory body established to spearhead public housing development, noted in 1966 that there were 300,000 people living in squatter settlements in the suburbs and 250,000 in squalid shophouses in the Central Area (city centre), representing one in four of Singapore's population at that time (Housing and Development Board 1966). Over and above the challenge of economic survival, Singapore's political leaders had to build a nation from a diverse, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual population, most of whom were immigrants or descendants of immigrants. This resulted in a significant emphasis on social policies crafted with the aim of promoting stability, particularly in housing, healthcare and education.

1) Tight control of population: fewer births, fewer immigrants in the early days

The separation from its natural hinterland of Peninsular Malaysia (or Malaya) at independence in 1965 meant that an economic strategy reliant on import-substitution industrialisation predicated upon a larger combined domestic market had to be revised, with the focus shifting to export-oriented manufacturing (Pang & Lim 2015) in order to absorb surplus labour

due to high birth rates and in-migration. The sudden attainment of independence, coupled with high rates of unemployment forced the new nation's government to craft an extensive national development programme that included an active policy of attracting foreign investment to help develop the manufacturing sector, as well as introducing measures on regulating birth rates, defining residency and citizenship criteria, and controlling in-migration (Yap & Gee 2015). The British government's decision in 1967 to withdraw its military presence east of the Suez[24] by the following year added to the sense of urgency for the government to embark on a strategy focused on boosting economic growth.

The adoption of an export-oriented manufacturing model was not dissimilar with the economic development strategies of other rapidly industrialising countries in Asia such as Korea and Taiwan, with an added imperative that Singapore's small and limited domestic market was in itself insufficient to provide good jobs for the population (Lee 1979). Foreign direct investment was attracted via a mix of tax incentives, subsidised infrastructure and labour policies (Choy 2012). In-migration was limited through the introduction of a system of national registration for Singapore citizens and a system of work permits for non-citizen workers soon after independence. As Lee noted,

24) British military expenditure contributed about 15% of Singapore's Gross National Product at that point and generated direct and indirect employment for 40,000 Singaporeans (Goh 1977).

the registration process for citizens significantly restricted the ability of foreigners to move into the country for employment purposes, as only registered citizens were allowed to apply for jobs without a permit issued by the then Ministry of Labour (Lee 1979, p. 236). This system of work permits created a direct link between the size of the foreign labour force and the state of the economy, as it was the employer's responsibility to apply for work permits.

Maintaining tight control over the number of births was also a major objective at that time, with an anti-natalist framework around the government's population policies even though the total fertility rate was already declining. As the then executive secretary of the Singapore Family Planning and Population Board, Margaret Loh, noted in 1973: "We in Singapore have no choice … [the] sooner the population growth rate is controlled, the more each Singaporean will benefit from the economic and social progress being made in our country" (The Straits Times 1973). Echoing this sentiment a year later, the Minister for Health Chua Sian Chin remarked in a speech at the Toa Payoh Library in 1974: "(t)he target of the Singapore Family Planning and Population Programme is to achieve a Gross Reproduction Rate of around 1.0 or an average of 2 children per family by 1980. Even if this target is achieved, Singapore will only attain zero population growth and the population stops growing in 50 to 60 years' time after 1980. By then, the population in Singapore

will have reached 5 to 7 million" (Chua 1974, pp.3~4). He was concerned that the objective of zero population growth would be difficult to achieve as the fertility rate was already rather low (though still above the replacement level) then, but he argued, "in our overcrowded Singapore, we have no other choice."[25)]

Established in 1966, the National Family Planning and Population Programme was a wide-ranging fertility reduction programme that had five core aspects (Wan & Loh 1979): ① access to contraception, ② liberalisation of sterilisation and abortion, ③ intensive and extensive family planning education efforts, ④ incentives and disincentives and ⑤ the manipulation of socio-economic determinants of fertility such as improving literacy and education amongst women and encouraging female labour force participation. The initial message of the Programme was "Plan your family", and later qualified further to "Plan Wisely for a Small, Healthy and Happy Family" (Chua 1972). In 1972 a "two-child family norm" was adopted with the goal of reducing fertility to the replacement level and thereafter to maintain it at that level indefinitely so as to achieve the government's goal of zero population growth (Yap 2001). A high-profile public education campaign was also launched with the notable "Stop at Two" and "Two is Enough" slogans which

25) In the event, replacement level TFR was actually achieved in 1975 and went below the replacement level in 1977.

were used extensively between 1972 and 1987 (Wong & Yeoh 2003). The Programme was administered by the Singapore Family Planning and Population Board (a statutory body established under the Ministry of Health), which was formed to oversee the task of controlling growth in the population (Wan & Saw 1974). The Board provided family planning services, including contraceptive services, home visits and family planning education through a network of family planning and maternal and child health clinics. Sterilisation was legalised in 1970 with the Voluntary Sterilisation Act and further liberalised in 1975, facilitating on-demand sterilisation which was made available at an affordable cost at government hospitals. It also became available at private hospitals. Abortions were also legalised in 1970, and the framework around abortions was also liberalised in 1975 (although abortion was not considered a contraceptive method).

The government also introduced an extensive package of social policies that included a range of disincentives and indirect incentives with the goal of encouraging acceptance of smaller family sizes and discouraging large families. The disincentives for having a large family included restrictions on maternity leave, to begin with for the first three, and then for the first two children born; progressively higher accouchement charges for births of higher birth order; a restriction of income-tax reliefs to the first three children born; priority in the allocation of

public flats to families with fewer children; and priority in primary school registration to children from families of three or fewer children. Incentives were offered to encourage voluntary sterilisation, and included paid maternity leave for female civil servants who underwent sterilisation after their third or higher order birth, seven days of unrecorded full pay leave for civil servants after sterilisation, the waiving of delivery charges in government-subsidised wards if parents accepted sterilisation, and priority in primary school registration for children whose parents were sterilised before age 40 after having no more than two children. Although no child was denied a place in school nor family deprived of public housing due to a fertility decision (Yap 2001), the measures aimed at promoting small families were successful in making reductions in third and higher births, the most important determinant of Singapore's fertility decline in the 1970s (Anderson.et.al. 1977).

The family planning programme probably accelerated the decline in the TFR such that the replacement level was achieved in 1975 (instead of the targeted date of 1980, as announced earlier) and continued to fall below the replacement level from 1977. This decline was achieved in the context of rapid economic and social development which included improvements in healthcare, education and labour force participation (particularly for women), and a changing family ideology facilitated by the public housing programme.

2) Expanding the labour force, relaxing immigration

As a strategy for survival, the Singapore government decided to embark on an industrialisation programme instead of relying on its role as an importing and re-exporting hub (entrepot trade) and service centre. To this end, it relied on a strategy of attracting foreign investments and multi-national companies that set up businesses. The manufacturing sector's expansion from 1967 onwards steadily absorbed the country's surplus labour and provided many jobs for those born in the post-war period when fertility rates were high (Singapore experienced an extended post-World War II baby boom that lasted from 1947~1964). As a result of the industrialisation policy, employment in the manufacturing sector increased three and a half times from 1967 to 1973, with the largest source of employment growth coming from the electronics and textiles industries (Lee 2007). To ensure the success of this export-oriented industrialisation strategy which relied in large part on low wages and labour discipline, the government significantly increased its role in the labour market with the introduction of laws covering employment and industrial action which standardised terms and conditions of employment and set limits on benefits, as well as establishing procedures for labour negotiation and collective bargaining that gave employers considerable bargaining power over their workers (Pang & Lim 2015). Labour disputes were eliminated with little sign of or-

ganised labour unrest from 1978 onwards (Tan & Bhaskaran 2015). In 1972, the government established the National Wages Council (NWC), a tripartite advisory body with representatives from the government, employers and workers, with the primary objective of formulating annual wage guidelines. According to Pang & Lim (2015), the guidelines established by the NWC succeeded in dampening wage pressures in the economy, and ensured that Singapore remained a competitive location for labour-intensive manufacturing. This attracted multi-national companies in search of low-wage workers, which resulted in more demand for labour (Toh & Low 1990, p. 264).

In return, Singaporean workers were provided with subsidised housing, healthcare and universal education. The proportion of the resident population living in public housing rose over two decades from 23% in 1965 to 81% by 1985, with the number of Housing and Development Board dwelling units rising more than ten-fold over that time frame (Housing and Development Board 2014; Fernandez 2010). The physician to population ratio improved from one in 2,053 persons in 1965 to one in 797 by 1990, whilst the number of hospitals increased from 16 in 1965 to 21 by 1990, with 25% of primary health care and 80% of hospital care provided in 1990 by government or restructured (government-owned) institutions (Seow & Lee, 1994). Education, which prior to self-government in 1959 was largely provided by community groups with varying mediums of

instruction and curricula, was standardised, with teacher remuneration paid for by the government, English made the common language of instruction and many schools built (Ministry of Education 2007).

The success of the export-oriented, manufacturing-led economic development strategy boosted the employment market such that in order to sustain competitiveness, immigration rules were relaxed in 1972 to allow employers to bring in foreign workers, with the government initially viewing this measure as a temporary solution to manpower shortages (Pang & Lim 2015). It is worthwhile noting that there was also already some concern at this time that employment growth was propelled mainly by labour-intensive and low-skilled manufacturing jobs, with the then Finance Minister Dr Goh Keng Swee noting in his Budget speech of 1970 that "the electronic components we make in Singapore probably require less skill than that required by barbers or cooks, consisting mostly of repetitive manual operations" (Goh 1970). He went on to emphasise the necessity for the country to upgrade the skills of its workforce "at all levels – from research scientists, engineers, technicians, skilled craftsmen – to standards beyond anything we have achieved until now." In addition, he recognised that the country's high economic growth rates would require the inflow of more highly skilled labour than the domestic workforce was then able to supply, saying in that same speech: "the demand

for engineers, and management and technical personnel will be of a different order of magnitude from what we have been accustomed to. This, then, will be the principal difficulty which we have to overcome … supply(ing) investors with skilled personnel of all grades, without which modern industry cannot operate. Since it takes four years for an engineering student to graduate and several more years before he acquires sufficient experience to be able to work effectively in an organisation, clearly we cannot depend on local supply to meet the demand in these fields … It is therefore necessary, as a matter of high priority, that we should relax our immigration and work permit restrictions on the inflow of personnel belonging to the categories I have described … It would be a clear advantage to liberalise the conditions under which such people can come into Singapore, acquire permanent residence and eventual citizenship." Pang (1979) noted that Singapore also gains other advantages beyond the sourcing of scarce skilled labour: It avoids having to pay the "high cost of rearing and educating migrant workers, but it reaps the productive output of the migrants' prime working years".

The government's position on the less-skilled and unskilled foreign workers was different though. These foreign workers were (and continue to be) not allowed to establish roots by way of marriage or by having children in the country and had to leave upon termination of their work contract. In 1982, the

government announced that it would achieve a wholly Singaporean work force by 1991 and "a deadline of 1984 was set to phase out all workers from non-traditional sources in the service industries" (Hui 2002). This was not to be, however, and in 1985, an Economic Committee set up by the Ministry of Trade and Industry proposed that Singapore should "allow a revolving pool of foreign workers on short-term permits [as] … our industries will require foreign workers to overcome temporary shortages, and to work in jobs where it has proven difficult to employ Singaporeans" (Economic Committee 1986). Foreign workers (especially the lower-skilled) provide flexibility to the labour market as they may be more readily sourced in a tight labour market, as compared to domestic labour that may require many years of forward planning to train and nurture. In a downturn, the foreign workers may be more easily repatriated. Foreigners with skills lacking in the domestic market would be permitted over time to acquire permanent residency and take up citizenship.

3) Transiting below replacement level fertility to ultra-low fertility

By the late 1970s, most of the targets of the National Family Planning and Population Programme were achieved, some well ahead of plan. The number of births in 1977 was 31% below the levels recorded just twelve years earlier at the time of in-

dependence (despite a larger population of women of child-bearing age). The Family Planning and Population Board stopped developing five-year plans after 1980 (at the end of the 3rd Five-Year Plan) as fertility levels continued to decline below the replacement level, and the shift away from a hard anti-natalist stance began, with the move in 1984 to a eugenic approach towards population planning and control designed to influence the qualitative character of the population (Saw 2012). Given a pattern of fertility in which better-educated women were less likely to get married or produce as many children as less well-educated women, and a belief that this would over time tend to lower the quality of the population, the then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew recommended amending the anti-natalist policy "so that our better-educated women will have more children to be adequately represented in the next generation" (Lee 1983). Education and housing priority benefits, as well as tax reliefs were provided to university-educated women and their higher-order children in a set of measures announced in Parliament in March 1984 (which became popularly known as the "Graduate Mother Scheme"), whilst the Social Development Unit (SDU) was established as a department within the Ministry of Finance to provide match-making services to single university graduate officers within the government as well as in some government-linked companies. The reach of the SDU was subsequently extended beyond government offi-

cers to university graduates in the private sector as well, and a year later the Social Development Service (SDS) was also established to promote marriages amongst non-graduates. The Graduate Mother scheme was abandoned in 1985 on account of the controversy it raised and in view of the small number of children who were likely to benefit from the measures (Yap 2001), although the SDU and SDS programmes continued until they were merged in 2009 and renamed the Social Development Network under the auspices of the then Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports (now the Ministry of Social and Family Development). The SDN now acts as a co-ordinator and facilitating agency for dating services provided by the private sector, and serves to educate the public on singlehood issues.

After a decade of below replacement level fertility, in 1987 the government began its transition to a pro-natalist population policy by announcing a series of measures which encouraged Singaporeans who could afford it to have families of three or more children. Support for marriage that had begun with the formation of the SDU and SDS remained integral to the new population policy, but this was now also backed by a package of financial and other incentives for child-rearing, including tax rebates for the third and fourth child and income tax relief for up to four children. Incentives to minimise the conflict between women's work in the formal economy and

child-rearing in the form of a childcare subsidy were introduced, as was a concessionary foreign maid levy for eligible families, paid childcare leave. The earlier incentives that promoted the two-child family concept were modified, such as the priority in allocation of housing and primary school registration went to families with three rather than two children (Yap 1995). A sense of the significant demographic challenge that had emerged was made clear in the then First Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong's speech in August 1986 where he noted the country's "changing demographic profile – its size, composition and age distribution" which lead to a "human resource problem" (Goh 1986). He went on to highlight three main concerns resulting from this changed demographic outlook: ① the lack of young workers and productivity growth, ② the tax burden on smaller cohorts of the young providing for an increasingly older population and ③ a lack of national servicemen to protect the nation.

After a short-lived recovery in the TFR after this initial change in 1988 (coupled with the fact that 1988 was an auspicious Dragon year and recovery from the mid-1980s recession), continued declines in fertility through the 1990s and 2000s (Singapore's TFR reached an ultra-low level of below 1.3 births per woman in 2003) led to further pro-natalist measures being introduced in a series of Marriage and Parenthood Packages in 2001, 2004, 2008 and 2013 (Figure 8-1).

[Figure 8-1] Singapore's Total Fertility Rate and family planning policies/ measures



Sources: 1957~1979 data from Saw, S.H. (2005), 1980~2013 data from Singapore Department of Statistics (2014).

The first Marriage and Parenthood Package announced in 2001 introduced the Baby Bonus, comprising a two-tier payment involving an outright cash gift component and a co-saving component matched dollar-for-dollar by the government (subject to a cap) given to second and third children payable over six years to be used for childcare or child development purposes, as well as paid maternity leave for the third child. Other incentives, including paid childcare leave of up to 6 days in a year for each parent, the co-funding of the use of Assisted Reproductive Technology, and paternity and shared parental leave were introduced in subsequent packages in 2004, 2008 and 2013 whilst existing incentives such as the Baby Bonus and maternity leave entitlements have since been significantly en-

hanced, with the total annual budget for marriage and parenthood initiatives from the government amounting to $2 billion.

In the Prime Minister's National Day Rally speech in August 2015, additional enhancements to the government's marriage and parenthood initiatives were announced, with the Baby Bonus Cash Gift extended to all children regardless of birth order (previously limited to the first four children) and the quantum of the Cash Gift raised across the board by $2,000 per child to take effect from 1 January 2016. The medical savings plan grant for newborns was increased by $1,000, and government-paid paternity leave extended by an additional week (to 2 weeks) on a voluntary basis, although this would be provided for all government employees with retrospective effect from 1 January 2015. In addition, a Proximity Housing Grant was unveiled to help eligible Singaporeans buy public housing in the resale market with or near their parents or their married child to enable mutual care and support. Whilst this grant is applicable to eligible adult citizens of all generations, it is clear that the grant is to encourage families to live closer together to facilitate the provision of care, both for young children as well as the elderly of the family.

4) Immigration as a flexible manpower policy tool

By the 1980s it had become clear to the government that the

economy's dependence on unskilled foreign workers could not continue increasing indefinitely without giving rise to high social and economic costs such as providing housing, transportation, social services and recreational facilities for a large foreign worker population (Pang & Lim, 1982). As mentioned, in 1981 the government first announced a policy to phase out unskilled foreign workers by 1991, and in the following year, introduced a foreign worker levy with the amount pegged at a level that was just above the employers' contribution rate to the Central Provident Fund (a mandatory retirement savings scheme for resident workers; see Low.et.al. 1989). The idea behind the introduction of this levy was that the levy would introduce a price mechanism to regulate the demand for foreign workers and allocate the supply accordingly (Yap & Gee 2015). In addition, administrative measures were introduced to limit the number of industries that could employ foreign workers, with a ratio of foreign to local workers established for specific industries. Whilst macro-economic exigencies have forced the government to apply these foreign manpower administrative measures flexibly in cognisance of the state of the economy and the labour market in aggregate, they have remained an essential part of the government's manpower planning toolkit to this day.

Robust economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s was combined with substantial volatility, starting amidst the economic

restructuring that followed the mid-1980s recession, and punctuated by the Asian Financial crisis. Increasing labour costs resulting from a maturing economy, and competition from developing countries with lower labour and land costs as well as from developed countries with better technology and human capital were the major economic challenges the country faced (Thangavelu 2009). Faced with these competitive threats and shortening economic cycles, the government reinforced its position on immigration, believing that the country needed to supplement the domestic work force through immigration, which could serve the purpose of topping up shortfalls in domestic labour supply from the shrinking number of births, as well as provide a flexible source of labour that could be managed as demand from the economy ebbed and flowed. In July 1989 a more open immigration policy was announced, lowering the eligibility for permanent residence to the holders of 5 GCE 'O' Levels who earned a monthly income of $1,500 and had at least 5 years work experience. For business investors and entrepreneurs, the value of their proposed investments was also lowered to less than $1 million. At the time of the announcement, no mention was made of the total number of permanent residents that would be admitted, but 25,000 applicants were specifically allowed from Hong Kong (Ministry of Home Affairs 1989).

Data on immigration flows before 2001 are not publicly

available, whilst data for most of the 2000s is available ad hoc (National Population and Talent Division 2006, 2010 and 2012). Between 1980 and 2013, the total population increased at a compound annual growth rate of 2.5%, whilst the resident population (boosted with naturalisation and foreigners acquiring permanent residency) grew at the slower annual rate of 1.6%. Estimates of the extent of immigration flows can be seen in Figure 8-2 below, which utilises an indirect method to deduce the effect of net migration by looking at the difference between total population growth and growth due to natural increase.

[Figure 8-2] Singapore total and resident population growth and estimated net migration



Source: Singapore Department of Statistics (2014)

The difference in these two lines shows the net in-migration in this period exceeded growth through natural increase, with the exception of the period in the mid 1980s and the 2003 re-

cessionary periods. The rate of increase in immigrant flows rose especially in the period 2005 to 2012, with average annual increases of 48,000 in the resident population, as compared with growth through natural increase of about 19,000 each year in that period.

5) Immigration as a social and political issue

The decline in fertility through the 1990s to ultra-low levels in the 2000s combined with increased in-migration led to a declining proportion of citizens to the total population. Whereas in 1970 the citizen population accounted for 90.4% of the total population of about 2.1 million, with permanent resident foreigners 3.6% and non-permanent foreigners 2.9%, by 2010 the citizen population had declined to 63.6% of the total, with permanent residents and non-permanent resident foreigners making up 10.7% and 25.7% respectively (Saw 2012). According to the Census of Population 2010 (Singapore Department of Statistics 2010), 22.7% of the resident population (both citizens and permanent residents) were foreign-born, which in turn suggests that only 55.3% of Singapore's total population of 5.1 million in 2010 was local-born.

The increased inflow of immigrants in the late 2000s and the rapid shift in population composition gave rise to heightened anxiety amongst the local-born population in terms of crowdedness, competition for jobs and clash of cultures with new-

comers, leading to the government to acknowledge that policy responses to the economic volatility of the 2000s had meant that "the growth in foreign workforce, total population, infrastructure and housing were not aligned" (National Population and Talent Division 2013a). Rises in the cost of living, attributed in part to the influx of foreigners became a major political issue that was hotly-debated in the General Election of May 2011 (Institute of Policy Studies 2011; Tan 2011). The government responded to what it viewed as a "historic setback" (Janadas Devan, as quoted in Institute of Policy Studies 2011) in the General Election of 2011 by further increasing its pro-natalist measures (most notably the Marriage & Parenthood Package 2013 (Ministry of Social and Family Development 2013), which introduced paternity and shared parental leave), as well as announcing a more tightly calibrated immigration policy in a Population White Paper (National Population and Talent Division 2013b). This document set out the demographic challenges facing the country through 2030: as a result of ultra-low fertility and higher life expectancy, the citizen population and work force would age rapidly and begin declining from 2020 onwards. Amongst other things, the White Paper proposed a significant shift in immigration policy, with a substantial decrease in the rate of workforce and population growth compared to previous decades (annual workforce growth of 1~2% compared with the average 3.3% per annum

recorded in the three decades from 1980 to 2010). The White Paper included a projection of Singapore's total population of between 6.5 to 6.9 million in 2030, which was to be used in the government's long-range planning for infrastructure development purposes. Nevertheless, segments of the population remained critical of the policy directions spelled out for the population in the White Paper, with several public demonstrations held in the months following its publication (Yahoo Singapore 2013; Siong 2014).

By the middle of 2014, total population growth slowed to 1.3% with resident population growth steady at 0.7%, whilst the rate of growth in the foreign workforce had decelerated sharply from 5.0% in 2013 to 3.1% in 2014. At the end of 2014 and into 2015 the economy remained in a situation of full employment, with record high labour force participation rates amongst resident women and older men aged 55 to 64 years at 58.6% and 68.4% respectively (Chuang 2015).

3. National Development and Population Indicators

Singapore's economic growth since independence in 1965 is a significant hallmark of the success of its national development policies. From a GDP per capita slightly below the world average in 1965 (US$516), economic output per capita has risen 109-times to rank amongst developed countries such as the

United States, the Netherlands and Sweden (Figure 8-3).

[Figure 8-3] GDP per capita: World average, Singapore, Japan, Korea and Hong Kong SAR

(unit: current US$)



Source: World Bank (2015)

This growth has come amidst a backdrop of robust global economic growth in the second half of the 20th century, allied with important trends such as significant advancements in technology and innovation as well as free trade and globalisation.

The pace of socioeconomic change was also unprecedented, with the birth rates and TFR dropping sharply, and other indicators of human and social capital development improving within the lifetime of a single generation. Advances in educational attainment (for both men and women, but most significantly for the latter) led to increases in labour force participation, especially for women in higher-status employment (see Table 8-1 below).

〈Table 8-1〉 Trends in Singapore's Human Capital Development

	Mean Years of Schooling* (years old)		Labour-force Participation Rate** (%)		Professional, Managerial, Technical Workers*** (%)		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	M-F
1980	5.6	3.7	81.5	44.3	20.1	13.9	6.2
1985	6.5	4.9	79.9	44.9	24.8	16.3	8.5
1990	7.3	5.9	79.0	53.0	27.4	19.5	7.9
1995	8.4	7.2	78.4	50.1	41.6	27.0	14.6
2000	9.2	8.1	81.1	55.5	37.8	32.6	5.2
2005	9.9	8.8	78.2	56.6	39.0	34.9	4.1
2010	10.6	9.7	76.5	56.5	54.1	49.3	4.8
2014	11.1	10.1	75.9	58.6	54.5	51.3	3.2

Notes: * Among resident non-students aged 25 years old or older; ** Of resident population aged 15 years old or older; *** Of employee residents aged 15 years old or older.

Sources: 1980~2005: Singapore Department of Statistics (2006); 2010~2014: Singapore Department of Statistics (2014), Ministry of Manpower (2015).

The proportion of university graduates amongst the economically-active resident population has risen to 32%, with the number of female university graduates doubling in the ten years to 2014 (Figure 8-4).

With investments in public housing and improved sanitation and health, a shift in the nature of employment away from manual labour to office work and the advances in education described above, life expectancy for Singaporeans at birth has risen from 62 years in 1957 to 82.5 years in 2013 (Figure 8-5). The leading causes of death have shifted away from communicable diseases such as tuberculosis and pneumonia (the top two causes of death in 1948 in Singapore) to non-communicable

diseases such as cancer and ischaemic disease by 1990 (Seow & Lee 1994).

[Figure 8-4] University degree-holding economically active residents aged 15 years and over ('000s)



Source: Ministry of Manpower (2015)

[Figure 8-5] Singapore: Life expectancy at birth, males and females

(unit: years)



Source: Singapore Department of Statistics (2014).

Declines in the mortality rate, together with sharp falls in the TFR have led to a rapidly changing age structure of the population. The median age of the population has climbed steadily from 19.5 years in 1970 to 39.3 years in 2014, and whilst the young-age dependency ratio (the number of children under the age of 15 for every hundred residents aged 15~64 years) has fallen to a record low 21.5, the old-age dependency ratio (those aged 65 years and over for every hundred residents aged 15~64) has steadily risen over the last five decades (Table 8-2).

〈Table 8-2〉 Total age, young-age and old-age dependency ratios, 1970~2014

Year	Total Population (thousands)	Resident Population (thousands)	Age Dependency Ratio (%)		
			Total Age Dependency Ratio (a+b)	Young-Age Dependency Ratio* (a)	Old-Age Dependency Ratio** (b)
1970	2,074.5	2,013.6	73.9	68.1	5.9
1980	2,413.9	2,282.1	48.2	41.0	7.3
1985	2,736.0	2,482.6	43.3	35.5	7.8
1990	3,047.1	2,735.9	40.8	32.3	8.5
1995	3,524.5	3,013.5	41.6	32.3	9.2
2000	4,027.9	3,273.4	41.1	30.9	10.1
2005	4,265.8	3,467.8	39.1	27.9	11.2
2010	5,076.7	3,771.7	35.7	23.5	12.2
2011	5,183.7	3,789.3	35.3	22.7	12.6
2012	5,312.4	3,818.2	35.7	22.3	13.5
2013	5,399.2	3,844.8	36.1	21.8	14.3
2014	5,469.7	3,870.7	36.7	21.5	15.2

Notes: Age-dependency ratios for 1970 based on the total population, while ratios from 1980 onwards are based on the resident population; * Number of residents aged under 15 per hundred residents aged between 15 and 64 years old; ** Number of residents aged 65 or older per hundred residents aged between 15 and 64 years old.

Sources: 1970: Singapore Department of Statistics (1970); 1980~2014: Singapore Department of Statistics (2014).

The age-pyramids in Figure 8-6 illustrate these changes in the age structure of the Singapore population from 1970 to 2015, with the feminisation trend amongst the elderly also apparent.

[Figure 8-6] Age pyramids, 1970~2015



Note: Resident population for all years except 1970, which is for the total population.
Sources: 1970~2010: Singapore Department of Statistics 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010; 2015: Institute of Policy Studies (2011), Population Projections 2005~2050, Scenario 2.

4. Reaping the Demographic Dividend amidst Rapid Demographic Transition

The year 2012 can be identified as a significant demographic milestone, with the first of Singapore's post-war Baby Boomers (those born between 1947 and 1965) turning 65 years of age in that year. It also marks the point at which the decline in the young-age dependency ratio no longer offsets the rise in the old-age dependency ratio (see Table 8-2 above), and can thus be seen as denoting the end of the period during which Singapore was able to reap the demographic dividend from having an increasing proportion of the population in their working ages. This was in turn supplemented, particularly from the 1980s onwards with the intake of foreign workers on short-term contracts as well as immigrants (who are mostly in the working age groups). The economic impact of this expansion of the working age population can be seen in the significant contribution of this factor of production to Singapore's GDP growth: between 1980 and 2010, about half of Singapore's GDP growth can be attributable to growth in the workforce, according to the government's calculations (National Population and Talent Division 2013b).

Growth and development have in turn reinforced social trends and the country's population dynamics, in particular with the greater economic and employment opportunities afforded to a larger pool of better-educated women. This has elevated the social status of women, altered the value of the

family and of children, and led to aspirations of ever-higher standards of living, as Singapore has moved rapidly through the various phases of demographic transition. Note that this progression through demographic transition occurred within the context of a strong family planning programme which had, at various points in Singapore's history, materialistic and highly interventionistic motivations and objectives as described earlier in this paper. Thus Singapore conforms well with the outcomes as may be predicted by the Second Demographic Transition theory (see amongst others, Van de Kaa, 2002) where greater access to education and enhanced educational attainment intensifies human capital formation and alters aspirations and priorities in such a way as to raise the rates of singlehood, and to delay marriage and family formation (see Figures 8-7 to 8-9).

[Figure 8-7] Proportion single, resident females aged 45~49 years 1970~2013



Note: Data for 2013 is for citizen females only.
Sources: 1970~2010: Singapore Department of Statistics 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010; 2013: National Population and Talent Division (2014).

[Figure 8-8] Resident female age-specific marriage rates, 1980~2013

(unit: per thousand)



Source: Singapore Department of Statistics (2014).

[Figure 8-9] Resident female age-specific fertility rates, 1980~2013

(unit: per thousand)



Source: Singapore Department of Statistics (2014).

Alternative causes of the fertility decline have been suggested as resulting from the conflict amongst well-educated women whose career aspirations come into conflict with traditional gender role expectations about motherhood and household production (Sobotka 2011; McDonald 2013), or from gender inequality in parenting responsibilities or other structural impediments and constraints to marriage and family formation (Yap 2009). Although the country's labour policies encourage married women to remain in the work force, few women in practice return to work once they have left it to raise children. There is therefore the absence of an M-shaped female labour force participation curve evident in other developed or East Asian countries (Figure 8-10).

[Figure 8-10] Female employment rates in 2011

(unit: %)



Source: Shin.et.al. (2013)

5. Future Policy Directions and Discussions

Singapore's national development priorities at independence were spelled out by the Health Minister Yong Nyuk Lin[26] who set out an order of priorities for the use of public funds as follows: ① security and defence, ② creation of job opportunities, ③ housing, ④ education and ⑤ health. After national security, the availability of good jobs and the economic growth necessary to ensure a sustainable employment market for its people was the most important imperative that led the Singapore government to adopt an economic model of "extensive growth", which has been extremely successful in sustaining full employment, and raising GDP per capita (Pang & Lim 2015). This model has also been described as a form of "productivist welfare capitalism" that is also observed in other East Asian economies (Holliday 2000), that prioritises human capital investments as a means to facilitate economic development. This principle can be seen in the quotation from Dr Margaret Loh (The Straits Times 1973) where she explicitly links control over the rate of population growth to the economic and social progress of the nation. Population planning and other social policies are thus integral to national development, but are subordinate to the national priorities of the economy and ensuring

26) From a speech at the World Health Organization (WHO) meeting on November 1967 (Lim 1998).

jobs for the people.

□ The country's rapid progress through the various phases of demographic transition with a decline below replacement levels to ultra-low fertility and greater longevity amongst its resident population has resulted in an ageing, shrinking working-age population. The social and political strains that emerged following the late 2000s intake of immigrants have called into question whether a strategy of replacement migration can be a sustainable solution to the issues that may arise given the ageing and shrinking of the citizen population. However the prospect of a sharply rising old-age dependency burden as Singapore's Baby Boomers retire has focused the policy-makers' minds and it is now becoming clear that the next phase of national development will need to adopt three key thrusts: ① raising the birth rate amongst the citizen population, ② developing a dynamic workforce through productivity initiatives and carefully calibrated immigration policies and ③ initiatives to assist the nation's seniors to age successfully.

1) Raising the birth rate

The government's pro-natalist policy measures from 1987, as set out in the series of ever-increasingly extensive suite of mar-

riage and parenthood packages (especially from 2001 onwards) have as yet been unable to counter the social, cultural and economic forces that have propelled fertility to ultra-low levels. Nevertheless, as the only lasting solution to sustain a strong Singaporean core to the population, efforts to encourage citizens to get married (earlier) and have children continue to be high on the government's agenda. The recently announced Jubilee Marriage and Parenthood Package (Ministry of Social and Family Development 2015) provides additional incentives to encourage couples to have more children, and this is likely to remain an area where policy remains pro-active especially in facilitating whole-of-society initiatives to help the people reconcile conflicting aspirations and expectations. This may take the form of additional measures on the work-life balance front, providing additional resources for childcare and easing the re-entry of new mothers back into the workforce.

2) A dynamic, flexible and productive workforce

The Population White Paper 2013 (National Population and Talent Division 2013b) describes several focal areas to support a more dynamic, flexible and productive workforce: ① assisting businesses to restructure and boost productivity, ② enhancing and reinvesting in the human capital formation of Singaporeans through education, with an emphasis on the lifelong upgrading of skills, ③ developing greater diversity of em-

ployment options, especially for older workers and mothers and ④ crafting a foreign manpower policy that effectively complements the domestic supply of labour.

Amongst other programmes, the government has introduced a $2 billion National Productivity Fund which supports pro-business initiatives such as the Productivity and Innovation Credit and the enhanced Capability Development Scheme. A SkillsFuture scheme was launched in 2014, an initiative that has at its heart the development of an integrated system of education and training that is sensitive to changes in the employment market and the need to foster a culture of lifelong learning. The re-employment age will be raised from 65 to 67 years by 2017, whilst incentives have been offered to employers to promote flexible work arrangements for employees. Lastly, whilst foreign workforce growth has been moderated in recent years, the government continues to develop the policies by which the intake of foreign labour can be best calibrated, to ensure an effective balance in the demand and supply of labour without creating undue social strain from the perception of excessive competition for quality jobs from the domestic workforce.

3) From successful ageing to an ageless nation

The national effort to address the issues arising from an ageing and shrinking population can be seen in the establishment in 2007 of a Ministerial Committee on Ageing, which recently

(in August 2015) unveiled its Action Plan for Successful Ageing (Ministry of Health 2015). This Action Plan covers 60 initiatives in 12 domains: health and wellness, learning, volunteerism, employment, housing, transport, public spaces, respect and social inclusion, retirement adequacy, healthcare and aged care, protection for vulnerable seniors and research. The plan incorporates strategies to improve the physical, social and cultural environment to make Singapore more senior friendly, coupled with efforts to organise various aspects of society (including the healthcare system) to extend the healthy lifespan of Singaporeans, such as investing in preventive health programmes. Underpinning all of this is a desire to shift currently negative perceptions of ageing which associates the elderly with decline, disability and a loss of value, towards a mind-set that considers the process of getting older as no different to other physiological changes, during which all activities of normal living may be enjoyed. Perhaps when this is achieved, Singapore can then transit to be an "Ageless Nation."

9 Expansion of Childcare Policy in Korea

1. Introduction
2. Development of Childcare Policy in Korea
3. Results of the Expansion of Childcare Policy
4. Recent Debates and Discussions

9 Expansion of Childcare Policy in Korea[27)]

1. Introduction

Total fertility rates in Korea have declined rapidly during the period of economic development in the 1970~80s.' After the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998 the fertility rate in Korea dropped further (Lee 2006) and reached 1.19 in 2013. Korea now ranks as the country with the lowest fertility rate among OECD member countries (OECD Family Database 2015). Out of a concern about low fertility and population aging, the Korean government expanded its family policy program post 2006 under the umbrella of "Plan for Aging Society and Population (PASP)." Among the family policies that have been broadened over the last decade with the aim of increasing the fertility rate, the most salient policy would be related to childcare services.

The rapid increase in public expenditure on childcare and pre-school education demonstrates the recent expansion of childcare policy in Korea (Figure 9-1). Before 2004, the proportion of public expenditure on childcare and pre-school was 0.1% of GDP, the lowest among OECD member countries. However, since 2011, that proportion increased to 0.8% and

27) This chapter was written by Yoon-Jeong Shin (Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs).

surpassed the levels of Italy, Spain, Japan and Germany where TFRs were similar with Korea (OECD Family Database 2015). Meanwhile, the proportion of public expenditure on childcare and pre-school as a proportion of GDP was still lower than those of Northern European countries such as Sweden, Norway, and Finland, as well as France where the childcare policy is well developed (OECD 2006).

[Figure 9-1] Public expenditure on childcare and pre-school in percentage of GDP for selected OECD member countries, 2004~2011



Source: OECD Family Database (2015)

In the past the Korean government provided financial support to the childcare area mainly for children living in low-income households. Mothers who lived in poor households and worked long hours with low salary were mostly provided with a childcare subsidy (Suh.et.al. 2004). After the amendment of the "Childcare Act" in 2004, the income level of those eligible for

the childcare subsidy was raised. This is consistent with the era in which the progressive party of former President Roh Moo-Hyun took power from 2002 to 2006. It is a period when economic inequality and social divisions deepened in Korea after the shock of the Asian Financial Crisis. As a result "welfare issues" became "welfare politics." The universal characteristics of public support had been emphasized competitively not only by progressive but also conservative politicians during the election campaign. The expansion of Korean childcare policy can be understood in this context.

The successive conservative governments of "Lee Myung-Bak" and "Park Geun Hye," though differing in political ideology, supported a continuation of universal childcare services. From 2013, governments supported the full payment of childcare services for all children aged 0~5 years old enrolled in childcare centers and a childcare allowance for children not cared for in childcare facilities. Thus universal support of childcare was accomplished in the year of 2013.

The childcare policy of Korea has clear aims for nurturing future human capital, increasing the female labor force, and restoring the fertility rate (Committee of Population Aging and Future Society 2005). However, even after Korean childcare policy expanded toward universal support there has been little improvement in the intended goals that underlie it. There are clear signs that a greater number of children were cared for at

childcare centers: the enrolment rates of children for the class of 0~2 years old increased from 18.3% in 2004 to 66.1% in 2014. The expansion of childcare policy might reduce the burden of childcare for families with young children. However, during the period where childcare policy expanded, the total fertility rate of Korea remained under 1.3, which is an ultra low fertility level. Also, the female employment rate fluctuated at around 50% without showing signs of improvement. The provision of childcare services for children aged 0~2 years old regardless of the special needs of the family, such as the employment status of parents and the level of household income are questioned. The voucher schemes, which were designed to support the demand for childcare services, might have resulted in a rapid increase in the number of private childcare centers.

Though the government pledged to build more public childcare centers, the number of private childcare centers increased and dominated the childcare service market. The quality of private childcare has been a concern (Huyn 2004). Shocking to families with young children, these concerns have actually become realized as child abuse in some childcare centers (Yonhapnews TV 2015). Unequal financial support provided to public and private childcare facilities by the government has been cited as the main reason for the low quality of private childcare services (Suh.et.al. 2004).

Is the childcare policy of Korea going in the right direction?

Though there has been an expansion in childcare services, fertility rates and female employment rates have not improved. The policy of providing a universal childcare service for children aged 0~2 years old has been questioned as to its relevancy and effectiveness for the healthy development of children. The current paradigm of childcare services should be designed to meet the special needs of dual working parents. Under a universal ideology, the provision of childcare subsidies regardless of the income level of the household has been criticized.

This chapter overviews the recent development of childcare policy in Korea since 2004 and the outcomes that resulted. Recent debate and policy reforms on childcare policy are discussed. The unprecedented rapid development in Korean childcare policy and the current policy debates would provide useful implications for Asian countries facing similar problems of demographic transition as they consider their own childcare policy reforms.

2. Development of Childcare Policy in Korea

Childcare policy started in Korea when the government enacted the "Child Well Being Law" in 1961. Childcare centers were designated as child welfare facilities when enforcement of the ordinances of "Child Welfare Law" was amended in 1989. After "Childcare Law" was enacted in 1991, childcare policy

changed from "day care" to "childcare," which integrated "care" and "nurture" together. During the period of the 1980s and 1990s, childcare subsidies were provided mainly for children living in low-income families.

Korean childcare policy changed direction after 2004 when the "Childcare Act" was amended. The universal provision (or right to receive childcare services) and public responsibility for childcare, are emphasized through the amendment. The "Childcare Act" clearly states these purposes in article 1 such as to "... raise children as a healthy member of a society through protecting both the mind and body of the child and providing sound education and improving family welfare by helping the economic and social activities of parents..." (Childcare Act, article 1). In contrast to the previous act, which stated its purpose as caring for children whose parents were not able to take care of their children due to work, disease, or other reasons, the amended "Childcare Act" strengthened universal support for the care of children. In this regard it is widely considered that Korean childcare policy has been improved by the amendment (Suh & Lee 2014).

After the amendment, the development of childcare policy in Korea can be categorized by the characteristics of the political powers of the various eras. The periods are named after the former Presidents who were in power at given times. The “Roh Moo-Hyun government (2004~2007),” "Lee Myung-Bak govern-

ment (2008~2012)" and "Park Geun Hye government (2013~present)." The childcare policy of each period reflects the unique political ideology of the political party, however emphasis for universal support for childcare services remained constant.

Under the political power of the progressive party of the “Roh Moo-Hyun government” public childcare services and an improvement of the quality of childcare services were emphasized. These were the presidential campaign pledges of former president Roh Moo-Hyun. The authority responsible for childcare policy moved from the Ministry of Health and Welfare, which is the typical authority of childcare policy in Korea, to the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, childcare policy showed unprecedented expansion.

The childcare subsidy in Korea is composed of two parts – "Parental childcare subsidy" and "Basic childcare subsidy." When a child aged 0~2 years old is enrolled in a childcare center, the government provides the "Parental childcare subsidy" to the parent as a voucher. Also the "Basic childcare subsidy" is provided to private childcare centers based on the number of children enrolled in those centers.

The threshold of household income eligibility for the “Parental childcare subsidy” started to be relieved under the power of the “Roh Moo-Hyun government. It allowed a greater

number of households with higher incomes than before to receive the childcare subsidy. The amount of the "Parental childcare subsidy" which eligible households receive also expanded.

In order to improve the quality of private childcare services, the progressive government initiated a subsidy to childcare centers based on the head of enrolled children aged 0~2 years old (“Basic childcare subsidy”). The rationale of the introduction of "Basic childcare subsidy" is explained as follows (Suh.et.al. 2007). Childcare fees in Korea are limited to certain amounts and only vary by the age of children. Both public and private childcare centers are not allowed to receive from parents amounts over the limit of the fees regulated by government (Ministry of Health and Welfare, Guideline on Childcare Policy, each year). Under the regulation on the fixed childcare fee, public childcare centers receive more financial support from government such as personnel expenses and costs for the establishment of facilities, which are not provided to private childcare centers. There has been criticism that private childcare institutions find it hard to provide high quality childcare services due to the limit of the childcare fee and insufficient financial support from government.

〈Table 9-1〉 Support rates of "Parental childcare subsidy" for children aged 0~2 years old in Korea, 2004~2013

year	support rates of childcare fees (%)	threshold of household income
2004	100	below the poverty line
	60	120% of the poverty line
	40	150% of the poverty line
2005	100	below the poverty line
	80	120% of the poverty line
	60	50% of average household income[1)]
	30	60% of average household income
2006	100	below the poverty line
	100	120% of the poverty line
	70	50% of average household income
	40	70% of average household income
2007	100	below the poverty line
	100	120% of the poverty line
	80	50% of average household income
	50	70% of average household income
	20	100% of average household income
2008	100	below the poverty line
	100	120% of the poverty line
	80	50% of average household income
	60	70% of average household income
	30	100% average household income
2009~2010	100	the bottom 50% in the income distribution of households with children aged 0~5
	60	the bottom 60% in the income distribution of households with children aged 0~5
	30	the bottom 70% in the income distribution of households with children aged 0~5
2011	100	the bottom 70% in the income distribution of households with children aged 0~5
2012	100	All children

Note: 1) Average household income for workers living in urban area
Sources: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Guideline on Childcare Policy, each year

〈Table 9-2〉 Trends of the amounts of childcare subsidy for children aged 0~2 years old in Korea, 2005~2014

Year	Age of children (years)	Basic childcare subsidy (1,000 won)	Parental childcare subsidy (1,000 won)	Total amounts of childcare subsidy (1,000 won)
2005	0	150	299	449
	1	90	299	389
	2	60	247	307
2006	0	249	350	599
	1	104	308	412
	2	69	254	323
2007	0	292	361	653
	1	134	317	451
	2	86	262	348
2008	0	340	372	712
	1	164	327	491
	2	109	270	379
2009~2010	0	350	383	733
	1	169	337	506
	2	112	278	390
2011~2014	0	361	394	755
	1	174	347	521
	2	115	286	401

Sources: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Guideline on Childcare Policy, each year

〈Table 9-3〉 Trends of income level eligible for full coverage of childcare subsidy, 2004~2012

Year	Income level
2004~2005	below the poverty line
2006~2007	below the poverty line + 120% of the poverty line
2009	the bottom 50% in the income distribution of households with children aged 0~5
2011	the bottom 70% in the income distribution of households with children aged 0~5
2012	total

Sources: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Guideline on Childcare Policy, each year

In this regard the “Basic childcare subsidy” for private childcare facilities was arranged to solve the problem of unequal government support between public and private childcare centers and to improve the quality of private childcare centers.

The “Roh Moo-Hyun government” tried to build more public childcare centers, however the aim to double the number of public childcare centers was not achieved. As an effort to improve the quality of private childcare services, an "Evaluation and authentication scheme" was introduced to monitor the quality of private childcare services. For the better management of the administration of childcare services, an integrated computing network for childcare services was established.

In 2008, the conservative liberal political party – the "Lee Myung-Bak government" took power and an expansion of childcare support continued toward universal support. However childcare policy reflected a liberal market ideology: the “Childcare allowance” was introduced in 2009 emphasizing the traditional roles of mothers and provided extra funding for selected private childcare facilities under the name of "Public type childcare centers."

Authority of childcare policy was returned to the Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Family. Though the political aims of the "Lee Myung-Bak government" are different from the previous “Roh Moo-Hyun government,” efforts to expand childcare services continued. Universal coverage of childcare services for

children aged 0~2 years old was accomplished in 2012. All children aged 0~2 years old enrolled in childcare centers could receive a childcare subsidy from the government.

In addition to the subsidy for childcare service cash benefits for caring for children at home, the so-called “Childcare allowance” was introduced in 2009. Initially the "Childcare allowance" was provided to children aged 0~1 years old living in poor households who were not enrolled in childcare centers. It was expanded to children aged 0~2 years old and the amount of benefit also increased in 2011. Until 2011, the "Childcare allowance" was provided only for children who lived in poor households and had access difficulties due to a lack of childcare facilities around their home. The "Childcare allowance" of Korea is different from the childcare allowance in Northern European countries such as Finland, Norway, and Sweden where female employment rates are relatively high and the right of parental leave is well guaranteed (Thévenon 2011). In Northern European countries, a childcare allowance is normally provided after the period of parental leave until children enter pre-school when they are 1~3 years old. Thus the childcare allowance could be considered an extension of parental leave in Northern European countries (Ellingsaeter 2012; Sipilä.et.al. 2010). However, in Korea the "Childcare allowance" is thought of as just an alternative choice of childcare service since it is provided to all children aged 0~5 years old as long as

they are not cared for at childcare centers, regardless of the employment status of the parents.

〈Table 9-4〉 Expansion of childcare allowance in Korea, 2009~2013

Year	Age of children	Level of household income	Amounts (per month)
July, 2009	0~1 years old	120% of the poverty line	100,000 Won
2011	0~2 years old	120% of the poverty line	200,000 Won (0 year old) 150,000 Won (1 year old) 100,000 Won (2 years old)
2013	0~5 years old	all children	200,000 Won (0 year old) 150,000 Won (1 year old) 100,000 Won (2 years old) 100,000 Won (3 years old ~ preschool children)

Sources: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Guideline on Childcare Policy, each year

The "Lee Myung-Bak government" emphasized an improvement in the quality of private childcare centers through wider financial support to existing private childcare centers instead of building more public childcare centers. The government selected some private childcare centers under the name of "Public type childcare centers" requiring tighter regulation for quality of service compared with other private childcare centers and provided extra funding for those.

The current "Park Geun Hye government" is both a conservative and liberal government similar to the "Lee Myung-Bak government" but emphasizes complete responsibility of childcare and full coverage of childcare costs (Government Wide

2013). As a result, full coverage for childcare costs and universal support for childcare service was accomplished in 2013. Currently in Korea children aged 0~5 years old can be provided either full time childcare services if the children are enrolled in childcare centers or a childcare allowance if the children are not cared for at childcare facilities.

3. Results of the Expansion of Childcare Policy

1) Public expenditure on childcare service

The amount of government expenditure on childcare policy has increased substantially since 2004. The increase in government expenditure on childcare services was mostly due to the increase in support for demand, which includes the "Parental childcare subsidy," "Basic childcare subsidy," and "Childcare allowance." As a consequence, the proportion of expenditure on the support for demand in the total expenditure of childcare services increased rapidly (Figure 9-2).

The total amount of government spending on childcare policy was 404,997 million won in 2004 and the expenditure on support for demand was 152,444 million won. This reflects the 37.6% of total expenditure spent on supporting demand. In 2014 government expenditure on childcare policy increased to 5,273,819 million won and the support for demand was

4,548,347 won. The proportion of the expenditure on support for demand increased to 86.2% which is a huge proportion of total expenditure.

[Figure 9-2] Increase in the amounts of public expenditure on childcare policy by support on demand and support on supply, 2004~2014

(unit: million won)



Notes: Support on demand include "Parental childcare subsidy," "Basic childcare subsidy," and "Childcare allowance." Support on supply include working expenses, reinforcement of facilities, infrastructure, support for facilities, evaluation and other

Sources: Ministry of Health and Welfare, A summary on the budget and plan for management of funds belong to Ministry of Health and Welfare, each year

Expenditure on the supply of childcare services, which include working expenses, reinforcement of facilities, infrastructure, support for facilities, evaluation and other, increased from 252,553 million won in 2004 to 725,472 million won in 2014. However, the proportion of expenditure on the support for supply instead decreased from 62.4% in 2004 to 13.8% in

2014 (Figure 9-3).

[Figure 9-3] Proportion of public expenditure on childcare policy by support on demand and support on supply, 2004~2014



Notes: Support on demand include "Parental childcare subsidy," "Basic childcare subsidy," and "Childcare allowance." Support on supply include working expenses, reinforcement of facilities, infrastructure, support for facilities, evaluation and other

Sources: Ministry of Health and Welfare, A summary on the budget and plan for management of funds belong to Ministry of Health and Welfare, each year

The huge increase in public expenditure on childcare services lead the proportion of expenditure on service higher than cash or tax benefits for family. As we see in Figure 9-4, though Korea spent a lower amount of public expenditure on family benefits compared with other OECD member countries, Korea spent around 77% of public expenditure on family benefits for childcare services which was a much higher proportion than other OECD countries. In order for family policy to be effective, it is crucial for the provision of more harmonized support

of cash, services and time (OECD 2011). However Korea spends most of its public family expenditure on childcare services and needs more balanced expenditures on other areas of family policy.

[Figure 9-4] Public spending on family benefits in cash, service, and tax measures in per cent of GDP (2011)



Source: OECD Family Database (2015)

2) Supply of childcare centers and places

After the expansion of childcare policy the numbers of private childcare centers and home care centers increased enormously. In the year of 2004 the number of private and home care centers was already significantly higher than the number of childcare centers operated by public, cooperative,

and associative childcare centers. The proportion of private and home care centers was 45.4% and 39.3% respectively in 2004. The home care center in particular rapidly increased during this period, its proportion increasing to 53.3% in 2014. Even though the government pledged to increase public childcare centers, their numbers increased only from 1,349 in 2004 to 2,489 in 2014. The proportion of public childcare centers remained around 5% of the total number of childcare centers.

Though the number of facilities is higher for home care centers than private childcare centers, private childcare centers provide the most places compared with other types of childcare centers. This is because private childcare centers usually take care of more than 21 children while home care centers can handle between 5 and 20 children. The number of places that private childcare centers provided was 617,442 in 2004 and this number increased to 946,519 in 2014.

Private childcare centers provide around half the total places in this period. The number of places home care centers provided was 178,384 places in 2004, which increased to 419,352 in 2014. The proportion of places that were at home care centers increased from 16% in 2004 to 23.3% in 2014. The number of places at public childcare centers increased from 113,620 in 2004 to a mere 179,939 in 2014. The proportion of places at public childcare centers remained stagnant at around 10% during the period.

[Figure 9-5] Number of childcare facilities and their proportions by types, 2004~2014

Note: SWC (Social Welfare Corporation), CA (Corporation or Association), PCA (Parental Cooperative Association)
Sources: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Statistics on Childcare, each year

[Figure 9-6] Places on the childcare service at the childcare facilities and their proportion, 2004~2014



Note: SWC (Social Welfare Corporation), CA (Corporation or Association), PCA (Parental Cooperative Association)
Sources: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Statistics on Childcare, each year

The number of places in childcare centers per child aged 0~5 years old increased from 0.35 in 2004 to 0.66 in 2014 (Figure 9-7). Since children aged 3~5 years could be cared for at kindergarten the available places for children aged 0~5 years old would be larger if the number of places in kindergarten were included.

[Figure 9-7] Number of available places per a child (2004~2014)



Sources: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Statistics on Childcare, each year

3) Demand for childcare services

After the expansion of childcare services the number of children enrolled in childcare centers increased significantly. As Figure 9-8 shows the proportion of children aged 0~2 years old enrolled at childcare centers increased from 18.3% in 2004 to 66.1% in 2014.[28]. Among children aged 0~2 years old, only

around 4% were eligible for the childcare subsidy in 2004. 10 years later, all Korean children aged 0~2 years old were able to receive either full time childcare services or the childcare allowance.

[Figure 9-8] Trends of children enrolled in childcare facilities, 2004~2014



Sources: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Statistics on Childcare, each year

Most Korean children who are cared for at a childcare facility are cared for at a private or home care center (Figure 9-9). In 2004, among enrolled children, 54.5% were cared for at private childcare centers while 12.9% were cared for at home care centers. In 2014 53.2% were cared for at private childcare

28) The age of children is reported in the March of every year when children register at the childcare centers. However number of children enrolled in the childcare centers is reported in the December. Due to this discrepancy the proportion of enrolled children aged 0~2 years old might be overestimated since it might include children aged 3 years old.

centers and 25.1% at home care centers. The proportion of children cared for at home care centers doubled in 2014. The proportion of children cared for at public childcare centers has hovered around 10% during the periods.

[Figure 9-9] Number of children enrolled in the childcare facilities and their proportion by types, 2004~2014



Note: SWC (Social Welfare Corporation), CA (Corporation or Association), PCA (Parental Cooperative Association)
Sources: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Statistics on Childcare, each year

The expansion of childcare services might reduce the economic burden of childcare for households with young children. According to data from Korea National Childcare Survey, the average percentage of childcare cost to household income was 10.8% in 2004 and it decreased to 6.6% in 2012. Respondents who answered, "the cost of childcare is not a burden" increased from 7.6% in 2004 to 22.9% in 2012 (Ministry of Health and

Welfare, Statistics on Childcare, 2004, 2009). In 2012 among households who received the childcare subsidy, 94.8% answered that the subsidy is helpful in caring for their child.

4. Recent Debates and Discussions

Though signs that the Korean childcare policy might reduce the burden of childcare on parents with young children, universal childcare coverage in Korea raises concerns. First of all there has been little progress in the intended purpose of childcare policy such as increasing the fertility rate and improving female employment (Figure 9-10). During the period of rapid childcare policy expansion, total fertility rates in Korea remained less than 1.3, which is the lowest low level of fertility rate. In addition employment rates of females aged 30~39 fluctuated at around 50% and barely improved. Data from KNCS also showed that employment rates of mothers living in households with children aged 0~5 years were 33.2%, 35.8%, and 35.4% in 2004, 2009 and 2012 respectively. This indicates that provision of childcare services in isolation is not sufficient to solve the problem of low fertility and difficulties in balancing work and life. As OECD (2011) mentioned, a harmonized support program of cash, service, and time are necessary to improve both fertility and the female employment rate.

[Figure 9-10] Enrolment rate of children aged 0~2 years old, female employment rate, and TFR, 2004~2014



Note: Children enrolled in the class of 0~2 year old in the childcare facilities
Sources: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Statistics on Childcare, each year

Second, the increase in the number of children aged 0~2 years old enrolled at childcare centers raised concerns for the sound development of children. There is debate concerning the relative benefits of child development in terms of home versus childcare center attendance. Universal support for pre-school education for children aged 3~5 years old is generally agreed upon by specialists in the areas of academia and social policy (Kamerman 2000; OECD 2006). However, the roles of parent and public in taking care of children aged 0~2 years has been contested for the healthy development of children (Ute.et.al. 2005). Most European countries provide universal preschool education, however they have different regimes for taking care

of children aged 0~2 years (Michel & Mahon 2002).

For poor working families, childcare centers would be better places than home for caring for children because staff in childcare services can provide more cognitive and developmental stimulus than parents in poor families (Yoshikawa 1999; Blau & Grossberg 1990; Lyons-Roth.et.al. 1990). It is doubted if children living in middle-income families with a non-working mother are better cared for at childcare centers rather than home.

Third, universal Korean childcare services are criticized in that they do not consider the special needs of working parents. According to data from 2012 KNCS, among working mothers 72.2% care for their children aged 0~2 years old at childcare centers in day time and for non-working mothers it was 39.7%. As Yoo.et.al. (2014) strengthened current Korean policies have limitations in meeting the special childcare demands of dual working parents. For example the regular service hours of childcare facilities does not fit into the working hours of parents. Thus parents use additional childcare services such as grandparents or private child minders. Yoo, Bae & Kim (2014) also emphasized that Korean childcare services do not provide differentiated or carefully designed childcare services for working mothers. These studies indicate that Korean childcare policy has only expanded the number of eligible children and does not consider the special needs of working parents. It is a very urgent issue if the intensive Korean labor market is considered.

Fourth, the provision of childcare services for all households with children aged 0~2 years regardless of income level raises the issue of equity. Data from the Korea National Childcare Survey in 2012 shows that the number of people who answered that they were satisfied with the universal childcare policy (53.3% of the total sample) is higher than the number of people who answered that they were not satisfied with it (32.4% of the total sample). Among the people who were dissatisfied with universal childcare support, 68.2% said, "it lacks equality." There is little empirical evidence on how much the childcare support contributed to improving social equality. More empirical work needs to be conducted to evaluate how much the universal childcare service contributes to social equality in Korea.

In the face of criticism on childcare policy there is a new government initiative, which introduces a half time program in addition to the current full time childcare service. Childcare centers in Korea officially operate 12-hour days from 7:30 to 19:30 and provide full time services for all registered children regardless of the working status of parents. However most children are cared for at childcare centers for around 6~7 hours or 7~8 hours per a day on average reflecting that full time childcare services were underused (Figure 9-11). Especially providing a full time service for non-working mothers is criticized because non-working mothers mainly do not fully use the full time service.

[Figure 9-11] Proportion of children by average hours of cared at childcare facilities per day. 2012



Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Statistics on Childcare, 2012

In order to solve the problem, the Ministry of Health and Welfare announced as of September 14, 2015 that it has a plan to provide 6~8 hours of childcare service per a day for households with non-working mothers (Cheng Wa Dae Official Blog 2015). In the case of an emergency, an extra 15 hours of childcare service per a month would be provided. Full time childcare services, which are 12 hours per a day, would be provided for parents who work, seek jobs, are undertaking skills training for work, or study. Households with special needs such as disability, disease, pregnancy, having more than 3 children or a single mother, or families with grandparents and grandsons including poor families, can be provided full time childcare services.

The Ministry of Health and Welfare mentioned that the purpose of the new initiative is for the better development of children, improvement in the quality of childcare services, and strengthening the sustainability of childcare policy. The Government emphasized that childcare services should be provided to meet the needs of parents with the consideration of the situation of the household and actual demand for childcare services.

After the Government announcement of reform of childcare policy, public disputes have occurred. The main criticisms have been that it is hard to verify the working status of women since many women work in non-regular work. Since the working status of most women with regular jobs is easily verified, only affluent families might be more eligible for full time childcare services. This might be against the purpose of childcare services given that as a social policy, it should provide more opportunities for children living in poor households to receive childcare services.

In addition, Korean non-working mothers would feel relative deprivation compared with working mothers if the new initiatives were implemented. The amount of childcare allowance, which is provided for children who are not cared for at childcare centers, is considered excessively lower than the amounts of subsidy for childcare services. For example the childcare allowance is 200,000 Won per month for children aged less than

1 year old. However, parents will be provided childcare services valued 755,000 Won per month if their children are cared for at childcare centers. It is argued that the amount of childcare allowance should be increased to a level comparable with the amounts of the childcare subsidy.

It is considered that the recent initiative is a government effort to clarify the purpose of childcare services and improve the efficiency of childcare services. However, due to the "path-dependency" of Korean childcare services, which have expanded regardless of status or the work of parents and household income level, it is unclear if the new initiative will be implemented. The decision is expected be made at the end of this year.

10 Conclusions

1. Implication of the Results
2. Future Challenges

10 Conclusions

1. Implication of the Results

1) Family database in East Asian Regions

The quality check and review on OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database, which the series of this project has compiled, suggested that complement missing data and evaluation of the quality of data need to be conducted continuously in the following years. The OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database only provides around 50% of data among the total number of indicators in the OECD Family Database. The part of "Structure of Family (SF)" has a relatively higher amount of data (35~59% of the total indicators) but the part of "Public policies for families and children" shows a lower number of data (17~46%) compared to other parts. Collecting data for the part of SF is relatively easier than other parts because a lot of data in the SF are available from national census data of each country. Data in the part of PF is very weak because family policy in Asia such as parental leave, childcare service, and child allowance are not suitable for European family policy, so it is difficult to provide data for indicators related with family policy.

Standardized measurement guidelines have not been properly abided by in the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database. A significant amount of deviance from the OECD Family Database's streamlined conceptual definitions and scrupulous measurement guidelines are observed in non-OECD countries in the Asian countries. This leaves much room for improvement to come up with a better and more appropriate measurement on the part of each country involved in this project.

In addition to that a non-negligible amount of data in the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database turns out to be outdated and fails to have a clear-cut time frame and data sources. With outdated, unclear or unknown and varying time points to which the data is referring, a smooth harmonization and comparison across the countries can hardly be expected. Figures or numbers in the database tend to be fluctuating too much across the countries. Some sort of mistakes or errors might have occurred in the process of data collection, forwarding or processing, thus a close check into this and rectifications are necessary later on.

Some data in the database turn out to be relying too heavily on some small-scale or regionally confined and less creditworthy data. It needs to be replaced by more creditworthy and a truly "national sample" survey data. However the survey data, albeit from a national level, turns out to be used too much

in the absence of some official governmental statistics. Whenever macro-level government statistics are readily available they need to be used instead of some micro-level survey data. A rule of thumb indicates that public, macro ranges, international levels, up-to-date data are usually preferred to private, micro ranges, local levels, and out-of-date data.

Results of the cross-validation check reveals that discrepancies observed with respect to Korea between the OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database and the OECD Family Database depending on the data collection protocols and procedures. OECD Family Database does not have any official agencies or protocols in the local level that is in charge of data collection and forwarding and does not strictly impose its measurement guideline or promote personal commitment. OECD KOREA Policy Centre-KIHASA Family database, however, has different protocols and procedures in terms of what it has direct contact with local personnel on and offline at both domestic and international levels, and stricter guidelines for data collection and forwarding.

Since the OECD Family Database was constructed to reflect features of European family and related policy, the indicators in the database would not fully reflected in Asian family life. Adding additional indicators related with characteristics of Asian families and comparing between Asian countries and Western countries would expand knowledge on the issues of in

fertility and family and may help each country to derive useful policy implications faced with demographic challenges.

However there still remains fundamental barriers which hinders the comparison between Asian countries and European countries. As this study mentioned earlier, family policies in Asian countries are behind the European policies so it is hard to collect relevant data on it when the policy does not exist or is poorly implemented. Flexible work schedules are not popular in the Asian labor market and childcare service for 0~2 years old are not well established. In addition to that characteristics of information might be different for the same indicator though. For example the female employment rate in Thailand is around 85% comparable with the female employment rates of northern European countries, but the characteristics of employment are different in both countries since many Thai women work for informal sectors such as unpaid family agricultural jobs.

2) Studies of issues on each Asian country

Results from Hong-Kong indicate that having one child is becoming the norm among married women though the traditional culture is having two children. The factors, motivations, and barriers to child bearing and child rearing differ across parity levels. The heavy economic burden in raising children is the

major barrier especially in transition from 1 child to 2 children. Gender inequality in housework division depressed fertility intention of women at parity 2. The results imply that the formulation of any pro-natalist policies in Hong-Kong should consider these parity specific differences. It should be noted that the level of household income, discussion with husband, and satisfaction from marriage life, which are significant factors on fertility intention for the first child, are not influential factors on the intention of having the second children. Different from the European countries part-time work as well as full time work are negatively related with fertility intention. It indicates that work environments of Asian countries are different from Western countries Western labor market policy or policies on work and life balance should be adopted with careful reflection in the contexts of labor markets in Asian society.

The findings from the Japanese study shows that fertility intention has high predictive power not only for childbirths of married couples but also for marriage of non-married people. Younger women and men have stronger fertility intention thus policies targeting younger age groups may be more effective. Education and employment status are strong determinants of fertility intention among married and never married respondents. Improving job market opportunities for young people would be an important prerequisite for increasing fertility rates. Since gender ideology predicts fertility intention of married and nev-

er married women, promoting gender equality in families needs to be strengthened.

Both studies suggest that in order to recover fertility in Asian countries efforts should be made to enhance fertility intention. However the mean personal ideal family size is decreasing in the 7 Asian regions, thus the prospects of fertility rates in Asia is a gloomy picture. Efforts need to be made not only to increase actual fertility rates but also intention of childbearing and more studies should be conducted to analyze the fertility intention in the Asian countries.

Changes in family of China, Thailand, and Vietnam reflect that the traditional forms of Asian family are transforming, and new types of families are emerging and modern relationship among family members are establishing. In the middle of conservative society people in Asian countries are struggling to accept and cope with the changes in family.

The results from China show that the strength of intergenerational solidarity is still strong in the families of Chinese urban areas. Generations have close and intimate relationships and most of them are engaged on not only extensive exchanges but also contact and emotional support. This maybe the results of a weak social security system. Since social class differentiate the types of intergenerational relationships those social classes should be noted in the process of developing policies on supporting families. It also needs to be noted that the hetero-

geneity in intergenerational support are discovered by different age, marital status, and residences of respondents. These contextual factors also should be reflected in designing family policy in China.

In the current Thai society the single parent family still is seen as a misfortune or a lack of adaptation among the single parent family members. However there are increasing movements that the single parent family is a valuable component of the society and culture and has its own right with equal opportunity for self-determination and acceptance. As policy implication this study suggested the following: Create the category of "Single parent family" as its own target population for social welfare and assistance, implement an integrated approach to social welfare, build capacity for social workers and social development staff of local administrative organizations, conduct public information campaigns to create a more positive and dynamic image of the single parent family, promote solidarity for self-help support groups and networking for single parent families, and collect precise and complete statistical data on them.

Studies on Vietnamese families shows that functions and structures of the family have been changing with respect to child educations, economic function of family which shifted from production to consumption, the emergence of nuclear families and living arrangements. The relations among family

members have become loosened, and are not controlled and even isolated. The family is getting smaller due to low fertility, migration, urbanization, and population aging. The family is even more fragile due to divorce, separation and domestic violence. In the contemporary Vietnamese society sentiment and caring functions of family may not be easily substituted or taken care of by other social institutions so it is questioned if the family institution on a legal basis should be maintained.

Current conflict and issues surrounding family in China, Thailand, and Vietnam looks to what Korea, Japan, and Singapore experienced in the past. It would be interesting to continuously investigate the family changes in these developing countries to see how the new family norms harmonize with traditional family norms and what other issues are emerging. Changes in family might follow what developed countries experienced in the past or the changes might diverge into different patterns.

In any case the current family policy in developing countries needs to be improved from the current basic social policy focusing on mainly needy people to become an inclusive social policy. This should be very challenging for developing countries since even the developing Asian countries such as Korea, Japan, and Singapore still have not established a sound family policy which confronts the family changes.

As a city-state, Singapore had great urgency felt for economic

development and also control of population growth. Population policy, which targets both fertility and migration together, intimately related to development policies in Singapore. Government concerns about population growth rate and quality of population as the country has no other natural resources except its people. Immigration has been one of the important parts of population policy as well as support to childbearing. After Singaporeans experienced conflicts and problems caused by immigration it realized a more calibrated immigration policy is needed as well as maintaining reasonable fertility rates of the domestic citizens. Currently the Singapore government is redirecting its population policy toward increasing fertility rates of domestic citizens, securing labor forces by improving productivity and well-designed immigration policies, and strengthening support for the elderly. The case of Singapore gives useful implications for other countries in terms of the fertility level of citizen should be maintained at a reasonable level and the immigration policy should carefully be adopted with consideration of its possible negative effect on the society such as cultural conflicts or burden on social security.

The Korean childcare subsidy has been expanded enormously, however there have been little improvements in the intended goals of the childcare policy such as fertility rate increase and female employment rate increase. Experiences of Korean childcare policy show that a balanced approach among

cash benefits, services, and time are necessary to derive effectiveness of family policy both on fertility rates and female employment rates. Support on demand rather than supply might cause an increase in demand for childcare service, also the number of private childcare centers if appropriate regulation controlling the demand and supply do not exist. Even if Korean childcare policies achieve a universal support, there are still debates on the equity between working mothers and non-working mothers, and government tries to improve efficiency of childcare policies. The recent initiatives to introduce half time service is one of the government efforts to improve efficiency, however it is unclear if the new initiative could be implemented due to the "path-dependency" toward universal support and many stakeholders with different interests surrounding the childcare services.

2. Future Challenges

The Asian Family database needs to be updated annually or at least every other year to deliver the most recent information on fertility, family, and family policy in East Asia. Specific suggestions and recommendations are the followings: Fill up the void or missing information in the database as much as possible; check more closely into the validity of a variety of available indicators; come up with a streamlined construction of precise

measurement indicators; find out more up-to-date and clear cut information; avoid extreme cases of data across the countries; have data from some truly national sample surveys instead of locally confined ones; have official governmental macro statistics instead of some micro or perceptual survey data; refer to the statistics from some world renowned institutions such as WHO, EU, ILO, World Bank, IMF, etc. instead of some local agencies or institutions. Try to make use of internationally coordinated survey datasets which include ISSP, EASS, CNES, WVS, ELFS as much as possible. They keep producing and disseminating lots of data relevant to the Asian Family database such as ideal number of children, work and life balance, life satisfaction, gender preferences, household division of labor, intergenerational support exchanges, and attitudes towards childbearing and marriage. This data is already made readily available via several prominent data archives of ICPSR, GESIS, Roper Center, CESSDA, ASEP, SSJDA, EASSDA, etc.

For the data on family policy, a research team could start to gather the data with a comparative compendium on policy rules on family policy measures such as cash support, family service and fiscal measures. Not only OECD Family Database but also Mutual Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC) or SSA's Social Security Programs. Throughout the World there are good references to collect family policy information in East Asia.

The next challenge of the Asian Family database is to be open to the public and expand its utilization simultaneously with collecting missing data and regular check for its quality. Compiling electric versions of data and opening the data on a public web-site would allow many people to use the data and conduct comparative work. "Fully-fledged" evaluation study should pay closer attention to the truly "cross-validation" of available indicators and employs of all different kinds of vehicles. More intimate contacts with local personnel in charge of data forwarding, online surfing and navigation of a whole batch of web-sites in domestic and international levels, books, journal articles, data archives are required.

In-depth work on data collection for a specific developing country such as China or Vietnam will not only help to have more data on the Asian family database but also contribute to improve family data for the developing country. In addition to that, adding more Asian countries in the Asian family database could be another challenge. Better networking of the data construction infrastructure by means of launching a more formal and sustainable network of coordination among the local representatives in the East Asia regions are needed.

Analysis on the fertility intention could be expanded by adding additional developed Asian countries such as Korea, and Singapore. Comparison of the results among the developed Asian countries would produce useful implications for the low

fertility problem in Asia. Applying better statistical methodology with more socioeconomic explanatory variables would produce stronger results. In addition to the quantitative study qualitative work such as an in-depth interview with potential mothers and fathers may give clues explaining the reason of low fertility in the Asian settings which cannot be found by quantitative work. Based on the works of the Asian family the "Regime of Family in Asia" are needed to be derived in the future. Asian families under Confucian culture look similar to each other but many differences underlying those similarities. Establishing a regime of Asian families could lead to a better understanding about the Asian family and may direct the future direction of family policy in Asia.

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Appendix

〈Appendix Table 1-1-1〉 Availability of OECD Family Database Indicators in East Asian Countries: Dimension 1, 'The Structure of Families (SF)' - Family & Chindren

Indicators	Korea	Japan	China	Singa-pore	Hong Kong	Thai-land	Viet Nam
SF1.1. Family Size & Composition							
Size of households - all households	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Size of households — Couples w/ children	O	O	X	X	X	X	X
Size of households — Single parent households	O	O	X	X	O	X	X
Types of households, latest year	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Proportion of single person households, 1970~2010	O	O	X	O	O	O	O
Proportion of sole parent households, 1970~2010	O	O	X	O	O	O	O
Proportion of couple or nuclear families, 1970~2010	O	O	X	O	O	O	O
Proportion of other private households, 1970~2010	O	O	X	O	O	O	O
SF1.2. Children in Families							
Household w/ children — Share of households w/ children in all households	O	O	O	O	X	X	X
Household w/ children—Share of couples w/ children in all Couple families	O	O	O	O	X	X	X
Household w/ children—Share of sole-parent families in all households w/ children	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Distribution of children aged 0-14 by household types	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
SF1.3. Further Information on Living Arrangements of Children							
Households by number of children	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Distribution of children aged 0-14 by living arrangements	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Indicators	Korea	Japan	China	Singa-pore	Hong Kong	Thai-land	Viet Nam
Living arrangements of young adolescents	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
SF1.4. Population by Age of Children and Youth Dependency Ratio							
Total population	O	X	X	O	O	O	X
Population by gender	O	X	X	O	O	O	X
Population distribution among children and young adults	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Trend in child population, selected OECD countries	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Trend in child population	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Youth-dependency ratio	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Population size by age group	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
SF 1.5. Living Conditions of Children							
Children living in overcrowded households	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Condition of household dwellings	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Proportion of children living in households w/ exclusive use of bath/shower and flushing toilet	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Quality of neighborhoods in which dwellings are situated	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

〈Appendix Table 1-1-2〉 Availability of OECD Family Database Indicators in East Asian Countries: Dimension 1, 'The Structure of Families (SF)' - Fertility

Indicators	Korea	Japan	China	Singa-pore	Hong Kong	Thai-land	Viet Nam
SF2.1. Fertility Rates							
TFR (Total Fertility Rates)	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Completed fertility rates — Cohorts of women born in 1950	O	O	O	O	O	O	X
Completed fertility rates — Cohorts of women born in 1965	O	O	O	O	O	O	X
Distribution (proportion) of live births by rank of children	O	X	O	O	O	X	X
Cross-country relationship between female employment rates and TFR	O	O	O	O	O	O	X
SF2.2. Ideal & Actual Number of Children							
Mean personal ideal number of children for males, mid 2000s	O	O	O	O	O	X	X
Mean personal ideal number of children for females, mid 2000s	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Mean ultimately intended family size, Women aged 25 to 39	X	X	O	O	O	X	X
Ideal and actual fertility rates, 2000 or around	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
The gap between general and personal ideal number of children, 2011	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
SF2.3. Age of Mothers at Childbirth							
Mean age of women at birth, 2012	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mean age of women at the first birth, 2012	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Adolescent fertility rates, 2012—Births per woman, 15~19 years old	O	X	O	O	O	X	X
Age-fertility profiles [fertility rates (births per woman) by 5-yr. age group]	O	O	O	O	O	O	O

Indicators	Korea	Japan	China	Singa-pore	Hong Kong	Thai-land	Viet Nam
SF2.4. Share of Births outside Marriage & Teenage Births							
Proportion of births out of wedlock, 2012	O	O	X	O	O	X	X
Changes in the proportion of births out of wedlock from 1970 to 2011	O	O	X	O	O	X	X
Cross-country relationship between the share of births out of wedlock and the fertility rate, 1970 & 2011	O	O	O	O	O	X	X
Adolescent fertility rates, 1970 and 2010	O	O	O	O	O	X	X
SF2.5. Childlessness							
Trends in childlessness among women by cohort	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Definitive childlessness (% of definitive women per cohort)	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Definitive childlessness and completed fertility rates of women born in 1965	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Percentage of women in households w/out children, 2011	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

〈Appendix Table 1-1-3〉 Availability of OECD Family Database Indicators in East Asian Countries: Dimension 1, 'The Structure of Families (SF)' - Marital & Partnership Status

Indicators	Korea	Japan	China	Singa-pore	Hong Kong	Thai-land	Viet Nam
SF3.1. Marriage & Divorce Rates							
Crude marriage rates	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Crude divorce rates	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
The decline in crude marriage rates between 1970 and 2009	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Proportion of first marriage	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Age at first marriage, latest year: Females	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Age at first marriage, latest year: Males	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Variation in the gender age gap at first marriage	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
The increase in crude divorce rates in all OECD countries from 1970 to 2008	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Mean duration of marriage to divorce, 1980 to 2008	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
SF3.2. Family Dissolution & Children							
Distribution of divorce by number of children involved, 2009 or latest year available	O	O	X	O	O	X	X
Proportion of divorced or separated adults w/ or w/out children, 2011	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Evaluation of the percentage of divorced or separated adults w/ children, 2011	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
SF3.3. Cohabitation Rate & Prevalence of Other Forms of Partnership							
Partnership and prevalence of cohabitation	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Partnership status and children, 2010	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Partners "living apart together," year 2001~2003	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Indicators	Korea	Japan	China	Singa-pore	Hong Kong	Thai-land	Viet Nam
SF3.4. Family Violence							
Prevalence of partner physical or sexual assault, women & men, around 2005	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Prevalence rates of intimate partner violence against women	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Prevalence rates of intimate partner violence against men	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Attitudes towards violence against women, around 2005	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Child death rates dues to negligence, maltreatment or physical assault, children 0~19 yrs. old, 2006~2008	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Legislation on domestic violence	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

〈Appendix Table 1-2-1〉 Availability of OECD Family Database Indicators in East Asian Countries: Dimension 2, 'The Labor Market Position of Families' (LMF) - Families, Children, and Employment Status

Indicators	Korea	Japan	China	Singa-pore	Hong Kong	Thai-land	Viet Nam
LMF1.1. Children in Families by Employment Status							
Proportion of children living in jobless families	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Children in couple households by parental employment status	O	O	O	X	X	X	X
Children in sole-parent households by parental employment status	O	O	O	X	O	X	X
LMF1.2. Maternal Employment							
Maternal employment rates compared to female employment rates	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Evolution of maternal employment rates as a ratio of female employment rates over time	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Maternal employment rates by age of youngest child	X	O	O	X	X	X	X
Maternal employment rates by number of children under 15	O	O	O	X	X	X	X
Employment and maternity rates for mothers w/ children under 3 yrs.	X	O	X	X	X	X	X
LMF1.3. Maternal Employment by Family Status							
Sole mothers and partnered mothers aged 15 to 62 in paid employment	O	O	O	X	O	X	X
Sole-parents in paid employment by year, sex, and age	O	O	O	X	O	X	X
LMF1.4. Employment Profiles over the Life-Course							
Age-employment profiles for men, 2011	O	O	O	O	O	O	X
Age-employment profiles for women, 2011	O	O	O	O	O	O	O

Indicators	Korea	Japan	China	Singa-pore	Hong Kong	Thai-land	Viet Nam
Employment/population ratio, 1990~2011	O	O	X	O	O	O	O
Age-unemployment profiles by gender (Unemployment rates by sex and five-yr. age group)	O	O	O	O	O	O	X
LMF1.5. Gender Pay Gaps for Full-Time Workers & Earning by Educational Attainment							
Gender gap in median earnings of full-time employees	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Gender pay gap in full-time earnings at the top and bottom of the earnings distribution	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Gender gap in average earnings of full-time employees	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Trends in gender wage gap in median earnings of full-time employees, 1980~2008	X	O	X	O	O	O	X
Time series of gender wage gap, 1985~2011 (latest year)	O	O	X	O	O	O	O
Average annual earnings of females as a percentage of males by level of educational attainment and age-cohort	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Average annual earnings of women as a percentage of men's earnings, by level of educational attainment of 25-64 years-olds, 2000~2010	O	X	O	O	X	O	X
Gender gap in 10th percentile earnings of full-time employees, 1970~2013	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Gender gap in 90th percentile earnings of full-time employees, 1970~2013	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Gender pay gap in average earnings for full-time employees vs. all employees	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
LMF1.6. Gender Differences in Employment Outcomes							
Incidence of part-time employment	O	O	O	O	O	O	O

Indicators	Korea	Japan	China	Singa-pore	Hong Kong	Thai-land	Viet Nam
Change in the percentage share of women's part-time employment rates, 2000 to 2012	O	O	O	O	O	O	X
Gender differences in full-time employment rates	O	O	X	O	O	O	O
Female employment rates	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Male employment rates	O	O	X	O	O	O	O
Incidence of temporary employment in dependent employment, 2012	O	O	O	X	O	X	X
Female employment rates and gender employment gaps by educational attainment	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Female employment is concentrated in a relatively limited number of occupations	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Proportion of women among staff w/ managerial responsibilities, 2009	O	X	O	O	X	X	O
Time series —employment gap	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Time series — part-time employment	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Time series — temporary employment	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Incidence of FTPT employment — common definition	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
LFS by sex and age	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Incidence of permanent employment	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

〈Appendix Table 1-2-2〉 Availability of OECD Family Database Indicators in East Asian Countries: Dimension 2, 'The Labor Market Position of Families' (LMF) - Workplace Hours & Time for Caring

Indicators	Korea	Japan	China	Singa-pore	Hong Kong	Thai-land	Viet Nam
LMF2.1. Usual Weekly Working Hours among Men and Women by Broad Hours Groups							
The distribution of working population by usual working hours per week, by gender	O	O	O	O	O	O	X
Time series working hours	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Change in % of working population working more than 40 hours a week, 1995~2011	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
LMF2.2. The Distribution of Working Hours among Couple Families & Adults in Couple Families Individually, by Broad Hours Groups, Presence of Children, & Age of Youngest Child							
Employment patterns among couple families w/ children aged 0-14, 2008	O	O	O	X	X	X	O
Change in the distribution of employment status among couple households from 1994 to 2008	X	X	O	X	X	X	X
Employment patterns among couple families by age of youngest child, 2011	O	O	O	X	X	X	X
Distribution of working hours among adults in couple families by gender, 2008	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Distribution of working hours among women/men in couple families by age of youngest child, 2008	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Distribution of working hours among women/men in couple families by number of children aged 0-14 years, 2008	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Change in percentage of the working population working more than 40 hours per week, 1995~2011	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Indicators	Korea	Japan	China	Singa-pore	Hong Kong	Thai-land	Viet Nam
Trends in employment patterns for couple parent families w/ a child under 6	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
LMF2.3. The Distribution of Working Hours among Single Persons by broad Hours Groups, Presence of Children, & Age of Youngest Child							
Employment patterns among sole-parent families w/ children aged 0~14	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Employment patterns among sole-parent families by age of youngest child	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Working hours patterns among sole-parent families, by age of youngest child, 2008	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Working hours patterns among adults in sole-parent families by number of children aged 0-14, 2007	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
LMF2.4. Family-Friendly Workplace Practices							
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
LMF2.5. Time Use for Work, Care, & Daily Household Chores							
Time allocated in main activities, by gender, 1999~2008	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Percentage of time dedicated to care work, by number of children under school age	O	O	O	X	X	X	X
Average weekly hours allocated to care activities	O	X	O	O	X	X	X
LMF2.6. Time Spent Traveling to and from Work							
Time spent commuting, by gender and the presence of children in the household	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Proportion of survey respondents reporting commuting times by gender and presence of children in the household	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Average time spent travelling to and from work (Minutes in a week day)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Indicators	Korea	Japan	China	Singa-pore	Hong Kong	Thai-land	Viet Nam
LMF2.7. Subjective Well-Being & Satisfaction w/ Work-Life Balance							
Life satisfaction among persons aged 15 and over (scale varies from 0 to 10)	O	O	O	O	X	X	X
Life satisfaction among children aged 11 to 15	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Life satisfaction by gender	O	X	O	O	X	X	X
Life satisfaction by employment status	O	X	X	O	X	X	X
Life satisfaction by satisfaction in work-life balance	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

〈Appendix Table 1-3-1〉 Availability of OECD Family Database Indicators in East Asian Countries, Dimension 3, 'Public Policies for Families and Children' (PF) - General Policies for Families w/ Children

Indicators	Korea	Japan	China	Singa-pore	Hong Kong	Thai-land	Viet Nam
PF1.1. Public Spending on Family Benefits							
Public spending on family benefits in cash, services, and tax measures, in percent of GDP, 2009	O	O	X	O	X	X	O
PF1.2. Public Spending on Education							
Public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP by level of education	O	O	O	O	O	O	X
Public expenditure on primary, secondary, and tertiary education, per student, 2009	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Public expenditure on education per student US$PPP, 2011	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
PF1.3. Family Cash Benefits							
Tax/benefit systems in many OECD countries provide incentives towards a more equal sharing of paid work, but not in Germany (average payments to government in % of gross household earnings)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Average payments to gov't in percent of gross household earnings distribution of couples w/ 2 children aged 6 and 11 w/ income equal to 133% and 200% of average worker earnings, 2010	O	O	X	X	O	O	O
Before childcare costs, work generally pays for secondary earners	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
PF1.5. Child Support (Maintenance) Systems							
Key characteristics of child support regimes	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Trends of sole-parents and of sole-parents receiving child maintenance payments in recent years	O	O	O	X	O	X	X

Indicators	Korea	Japan	China	Singa-pore	Hong Kong	Thai-land	Viet Nam
Levels of child maintenance payments	O	O	X	X	X	X	X
PF1.6. Public Spending by Age of Children							
Public social expenditure by age group, 2009	O	O	X	X	X	X	X
Cash benefits and tax breaks and childcare are important in per capita social expenditure on children in early childhood (0-5 years), 2009	O	O	X	X	X	X	X
Education dominates in middle childhood (6-11 years), 2009	O	O	X	X	X	X	X
Education dominates in late childhood (12-17 years), 2009	O	O	X	X	X	X	X
Age-spending profiles, 2003: Average social expenditure by child by intervention as a proportion of median working-age household income, 2003	O	O	X	X	X	X	X
PF1.7. Intergenerational Solidarity							
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PF1.8. Legal Age Threshold Regarding Transition from Childhood to Adulthood							
Age of majority, 2013: The age at which a person can be prosecuted by law as an adult	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Age of criminal responsibility, 2013	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Minimum age for marriage, 2013	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
School leaving age and employment age, 2013	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Minimum age to consume and purchase alcohol, 2013	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Minimum age to use and purchase tobacco, 2013	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Minimum age for sexual consent, 2013	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Indicators	Korea	Japan	China	Singa-pore	Hong Kong	Thai-land	Viet Nam
PF1.9. Aspects of Child Protection							
Intentional child mortality (deaths per 100,000)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Changes in child deaths due to intentional/accidental injury, early 1980s to latest figures	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Attitudes towards and prevalence of child corporal punishment	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Banning corporal punishment of children	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Proportion of children under state care	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

〈Appendix Table 1-3-2〉 Availability of OECD Family Database Indicators in East Asian Countries, Dimension 3, 'Public Policies for Families and Children' (PF) - Child-Related Leave

Indicators	Korea	Japan	China	Singa-pore	Hong Kong	Thai-land	Viet Nam
PF2.1. Key Characteristics of Parental Leave Systems							
Full-rate equivalent paid maternity, paternity, and parental leave, 2013	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Statutory maternity leave arrangements, 2014	X	X	O	O	O	O	O
Statutory paternity leave arrangements, 2014	X	X	O	O	O	O	O
Statutory parental leave arrangements, 2014	X	X	O	O	O	O	O
Paid child-related leave periods by duration the full-rate equivalent (FRE) of the leave period if paid at 100% of usual earnings, and the remaining "unpaid" weeks, 2013	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Spending on maternity and parental leave payments per child born, 2009	O	O	O	X	X	X	X
PF2.2. Use of Childbirth-Related Benefits, by Mothers & Fathers							
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PF2.3. Additional Leave Entitlements of Working Parents							
Statutory and collectively agreed annual leave, 2007	O	O	O	O	O	X	X
Additional leave entitlements of working parents, 2006/7	O	O	X	O	O	X	X
PF2.4. Parental Leave Replacement Rates							
Maternity leave payment rates	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Paternity leave payment rates	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Father-specific leave payment rates	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Parental leave payment rates six months after childbirth	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Indicators	Korea	Japan	China	Singa-pore	Hong Kong	Thai-land	Viet Nam
Net equivalent income over the period of maternity and paternity leaves	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Net equivalised income over the period of parental or home care leave	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
PF2.5. Trends in Leave Entitlements around Childbirth							
Length in weeks of parental leave	O	O	O	O	O	X	O
Length of paid leave available to mothers (in weeks)	X	X	O	O	O	X	O
Length of paid leave available to fathers (in weeks)	X	X	O	O	O	X	O
Length of employment – protected parental and extended leave available to mothers	X	X	O	O	O	X	O
Total duration of paid leave after childbirth	O	O	O	O	O	X	O

〈Appendix Table 1-3-3〉 Availability of OECD Family Database Indicators in East Asian Countries, Dimension 3, 'Public Policies for Families and Children' (PF) - Formal Care & Education for Very Young Children

Indicators	Korea	Japan	China	Singa-pore	Hong Kong	Thai-land	Viet Nam
PF3.1. Public Spending on Childcare & Early Education							
Public expenditure on childcare and early education services, per cent of GDP, 2009	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Public expenditure on childcare and pre-school, per child, 2008	O	O	O	O	O	O	X
Public expenditure on pre-school per child, 2008	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Employers' provision of childcare/ other domestic support	O	X	O	X	X	X	X
Public expenditure on childcare and pre-school, 1998~2009	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Public expenditure on childcare and pre-school—in % of GDP	O	O	O	O	O	X	X
PF3.2. Enrollment in Childcare & Pre-Schools							
Participation rate in childcare and pre-school services among children aged 0-5 years, 2010	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Full-time equivalent participation rates for children under 3 years of age, 2010	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Average enrollment rate of children under 3 years of age in formal childcare and pre-school, 1995~2011	O	O	O	O	X	X	X
Average enrollment rate of children aged 3-5 years of age in pre-school educational programmes, 2005~2010	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
PF3.3. Informal Childcare Arrangements							
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Indicators	Korea	Japan	China	Singa-pore	Hong Kong	Thai-land	Viet Nam
PF3.4. Childcare Support							
Childcare fees per two-year old attending accredited early-years care abd educational services, 2008	O	O	X	O	O	X	O
Net childcare costs for a dual earner family w/ full-time arrangements of 167% of the average wage, 2008	O	O	X	O	O	X	O
Net childcare costs for a sole-parent family w/ full-time earnings of 67% of the average wage, 2008	O	O	X	O	O	X	X

〈Appendix Table 1-3-4〉 Availability of OECD Family Database Indicators in East Asian Countries, Dimension 3, 'Public Policies for Families and Children' (PF) - Typology of Childcare Benefits & Net Parental Fees by Family Type & Income Level

Indicators	Korea	Japan	China	Singa-pore	Hong Kong	Thai-land	Viet Nam
PF4.1. Typology of Childcare & Early Education Services							
Typology of childcare	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
PF4.2. Quality of Childcare & Early Education Services							
Qualifications of certified childcare workers and main place of work	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Qualifications of pre-school teachers and main place of work	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Child-to-staff ratios in formal day-care services, average for 0-3 years olds	O	O	O	O	O	X	X
PF4.3. Out-of-School-Hours Care							
Percentage of children aged 5 to 11 enrolled in out-of-school-hours care services by single years of age, 2008	O	O	X	X	X	X	X
Key characteristics of out-of-school-hours care	O	O	O	O	O	O	O

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연구 2015-27	아시아 각국의 복지제도 비교연구: 소득보장체계를 중심으로	노대명
연구 2015-28	지방자치단체 복지정책평가센터 운영	강혜규
연구 2015-29	보건복지통계정보 통합 관리 및 운영	오미애
연구 2015-30-1	국민건강과 안전을 위한 아동안전전략 구축방안	김미숙
연구 2015-30-2	국민건강과 안전을 위한 식품안전전략 구축방안	김정선
연구 2015-31	2015년 전국 출산력 및 가족보건·복지실태조사	이삼식
연구 2015-32	2015년 한국복지패널 기초분석: 한국복지패널로 본 한국의 복지실태	노대명
연구 2015-33	2013 한국의료패널 기초분석보고서(Ⅱ)-만성질환, 임신·출산, 보건의식행태-	이수형
연구 2015-34	2014년 빈곤통계연보	정은희
연구 2015-35	2015년 소셜 빅데이터 기반 보건복지 이슈 동향 분석	송태민
연구 2015-36	의료기술 혁신과 의료보장체계의 지속성을 위한 국제동향과 정책과제	박실비아
연구 2015-37	보건분야 국제공동연구사업: 주요국 보건의료산업 육성정책 변화와 동향연구	김대중