

International Conference

Life and Humanity in Late Modern Transformation: Beyond East and West

When : 30-31 May 2013 (Thu-Fri)

Where : Seoul National University Museum

Hosted by : Center for Social Sciences (Seoul National University), Institute for Health and Social Affairs, and Korean Sociological Association

In cooperation with : Research Institute of Human Ecology (Seoul National University), Korean Family Studies Association, and Kyunghyang Shinmun

Sponsored by : Korea Foundation, and Seoul National University

국제학술대회

삶과 인류의 후기근대적 대전환: 동서양을 넘어

Life and Humanity in Late Modern Transformation: Beyond East and West

일시: 2013년 5월 30-31일 (목, 금)

장소: 서울대학교 박물관

주최: 서울대학교 사회과학연구원, 한국보건사회연구원, 한국사회학회

주관: 서울대학교 생활과학연구소, 한국가족학회, 경향신문

후원: 한국국제교류재단, 서울대학교

Invitation

In the 21st century, humanity has been faced with accelerated changes in the conditions of its social, ecological, biological, and economic survival. While this century is not likely to plunge soon into such politico-militarily caused instances of total destruction as the twentieth century's world wars, the seemingly characteristic changes in everyday social, economic, and technological life have generated critical cumulative effects by which individuals in all corners of the globe – and, perhaps in the end, humanity as a whole – are increasingly compelled to accept radical ruptures in the conditions and forms of life from previous generations. For instance, official demographic projections warn many nations of possible halving of their populations within several decades (and, of course, many other nations of sustained heavy population growth); Oxford University's Future of Humanity Institute has recently alluded to possibilities of humanity's existential ruin due to techno-scientific runaway in artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, biotechnology and artificial life, etc.; social institutions of reproduction such as marriage, sexuality, intimacy, and fertility are being fundamentally redefined; national states and societies are becoming increasingly irrelevant with the emergence of rapidly and structurally transnationalizing grassroots individuals, corporations, financial interests, etc.; labor market, welfare state, and family are all foreseen to undergo structural failures in increasing numbers of nations, leaving individuals fundamentally stripped of stable means of livelihood and protection. Given that these are manifest realities and/or trends, social sciences and other disciplines of social knowledge have remained rather helpless, if not hopeless, in comprehensively and systematically analyzing these phenomena through integrative and innovative theoretical frameworks.

In an effort to intellectually confront these challenging and perplexing contexts, Center for Social Sciences (Seoul National University), Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, and Korean Sociological Association are jointly hosting the International Conference on “Life and Humanity in Late Modern Transformation: Beyond East and West”, during 30-31 May 2013. This will be a very liberally (un)structured forum for intellectually debating the recent radical transformation of some of the most immediate but fundamental conditions of human life and, eventually, of humanity in general. The Conference offers six sessions, respectively covering “Post-body, population, and reproduction of humanity”; “Globalized forms and institutions of life”; “New (in)equalities of life and work”; “Individualization, intimacy, and (post-)family”; “Post-patriarchy, intergenerational relationship, and personal life”; and “Changing regimes of care and welfare”. Leading scholars from Asia, Europe, North America as well as South Korea will participate to create a highly cosmopolitan platform for sharing scholarly and social concerns for the 21st century.

We cordially and eagerly invite you to the Conference.

May 2013

Baik Chang Jae (Director, Center for Social Sciences, Seoul National University)

Tchoe Byong-Ho (President, Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs)

Chung Chin-Sung (President, Korean Sociological Association)

Chang Kyung-Sup (Chair, Conference Organizing Committee)

초대의 글

21 세기 인류는 사회적·생태적·생물학적·경제적 생존의 조건에 있어서 급격한 변화를 경험하고 있습니다. 20 세기 세계대전처럼 총체적 파괴를 야기하는 정치·군사적 갈등 상황으로 곧 치닫지는 않겠지만, 일상에서의 사회적·경제적·기술적인 삶의 변화들은 전 세계 모든 개인들에게 심각한 수준의 영향을 미치고 있습니다. 이 결과, 인류 전체는 전통적인 삶의 조건과 형식으로부터의 근본적인 단절을 받아들일 수밖에 없게 되었습니다. 옥스퍼드대학의 인류 미래연구소의 전망에 따르면, 최근의 인공지능, 나노테크놀로지, 생명과학, 인공생명 등 거침없는 과학기술의 발달이 인간 실존의 몰락을 초래할 수 있고, 결혼, 섹슈얼리티, 친밀성, 출산력 등 재생산과 관련된 사회제도들이 근본적으로 재정의되고 있으며, 민족국가와 사회는 급속히 초국가화되고 있는 개인, 기업, 금융적 이해 앞에서 점점 의미를 잃어가고 있으며, 갈수록 많은 국가에서 노동시장, 복지국가, 가족의 구조적 위기로 인해 개인들은 생활과 보호의 안정적인 수단을 근본적으로 박탈당하고 있습니다. 이 같은 명백한 현실과 추세에 직면하여, 사회과학 및 여타 학문들은 통합적이고 혁신적인 이론을 통해 총체적이고 체계적인 분석을 하는데 다소 무력했습니다.

도전적이고 난감한 이 상황을 학문적으로 직시하고자 하는 노력의 일환으로, 서울대학교 사회과학연구원, 한국보건사회연구원, 한국사회학회는 2013 년 5 월 30 일~31 일 『삶과 인류의 후기근대적 대전환: 동서양을 넘어』 라는 학술대회를 개최합니다. 이 학술대회는 인류의 가장 직접적이고 근원적인 삶의 조건, 나아가 인류 그 자체의 근본적인 변동에 대해 자유로이 토론하는 포럼입니다. 학술대회는 「포스트-바디, 인구, 인류의 재생산」, 「지구화된 삶의 양식과 제도」, 「삶과 일의 새로운 (불)평등」, 「개인화, 친밀성, (포스트)가족」, 「포스트-가부장제, 세대관계와 개인적 삶」, 「돌봄과 복지의 변화하는 레짐」 등 6 개 분과로 구성되어 있습니다. 아시아, 유럽, 북미 및 한국의 저명한 학자들이 참여하여 21 세기에 대한 학문적·사회적 문제의식을 공유하는 범세계주의적인 지적 향연의 장을 열 것입니다.

부디 학술대회에 참가하시어, 삶과 인류의 존재조건에 대해 깊이 있는 논의를 공유하시기를 바랍니다.

2013 년 5 월

백창재 (서울대학교 사회과학연구원 원장)

최병호 (한국보건사회연구원 원장)

정진성 (한국사회학회 회장)

장경섭 (국제학술대회 조직위원장)

Day 1 (30 May 2013): SNU Museum

Opening (10:00-10:20)

Opening speech: **Chung** Chin-Sung (President, Korean Sociological Association)

Welcome speech: **Baik** Chang Jae (Director, Center for Social Sciences, Seoul National Univ)

Tchoe Byong-Ho (President, the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs)

Congratulatory speech: **Yang** Seung-Mock (Dean, the College of Social Sciences, Seoul National Univ)

Session 1 (30 May 2013), 10:20~12:00: "Post-Body, Population, and Reproduction of Humanity"

Chair: Ha Jung-Hwa / Discussant: Rajni Palriwala

Bryan S. Turner (City Univ of New York): "The post-body: Demographic, economic and social dilemmas of the future"

Choe Jae Chun (Ewha Womans Univ): "An inadvertent global experiment in human evolution: Evolutionary consequences of full-scale racial mixing and gene substitution"

Lee Sam-Sik (Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs): "The national reproductive crisis: South Korea's fertility shock"

Lunch (12:10-13:10)

Session 2 (30 May 2013), 13:20~15:00: "Globalized Forms and Institutions of Life"

Chair: Eun Ki-Soo / Discussant: Stevi Jackson

Chang Kyung-Sup (SNU): "Particularistic multiculturalism: Citizenship contradictions of marriage cosmopolit(an)ization"

Seol Dong-Hoon (Chonbuk National Univ): "Long-distance fatherhood: Guest-worker fathers and 'wild goose' fathers in South Korea"

Shin Eui-Hang (SNU): "Globalization of higher education in China and Korea"

Tea Break (15:00- 15:10)

Session 3 (30 May 2013), 15:10~16:50: "New (In)equalities of Life and Work"

Chair: Chin Meejung / Discussant: Lynn Jamieson

Göran Therborn (Univ of Cambridge): "Stunted lives and early deaths: The new inequalities of life"

Raymond K H Chan (City Univ of Hong Kong): "Life course, Risks and social exclusion in Asia: Where are we now?"

Joo Yunjeong (SNU): "Post-industrial rearrangements of human competence: (Dis)ability and art"

Day 2 (31 May 2013): SNU Museum

Session 4 (31 May 2013), 10:10~11:50: "Individualization, Intimacy, and (Post-)Family"

Chair: Chang Kyung-Sup / Discussant: Goran Therborn

Lynn **Jamieson** (Edinburgh Univ): "Intimacy, individualism and the future of relationships"

Yunxiang **Yan** (UCLA): "Parent-driven divorce and individualization among Chinese Youth"

Chin Meejung (SNU): "Portrait of unmarried one-person households in early adulthood: Delayed transition or achieved individualization?"

Lunch (12:00~13:00)

Session 5 (31 May 2013), 13:10~14:50: "Post-Patriarchy, Intergenerational Relationship, and Personal Life"

Chair: Shin Eui-Hang / Discussant: Bryan S. Turner

Ha Jung-Hwa (SNU): "The effect of widowhood on parent-child relationships in Korea"

Eun Ki-Soo (SNU): "Pathways to post-patriarchal society: Global convergence of gender (non-)preference and East Asian particularities"

Stevi **Jackson** (York Univ): "Modernity/modernities and personal life: Reflections on some theoretical lacunae"

Tea Break (14:50- 15:00)

Session 6 (31 May 2013), 15:00-16:40: "Changing Regimes of Care and Welfare"

Chair: Sophia Seung-yoon Lee / Discussant: Raymond Chan

Rajni **Palriwala** (Univ of Delhi): "Rationality, instrumentality, and the affective: Crossings and blurrings in relations of care and intimacy"

Emiko **Ochiai** (Kyoto University): "Is Asia the future of Europe? Transformation of care regimes in Asia"

Sven **Hort** (SNU & Södertörn Univ): "Late modernity or a modern social (welfare) formation"

첫째날 (2013. 5. 30)

개회 (10:00-10:20)

개회사: 정진성 (한국사회학회 회장)

환영사: 백창재 (서울대학교 사회과학연구원 원장)

최병호 (한국보건사회연구원 원장)

축사: 양승목 (서울대학교 사회과학대학 학장)

주제 1 (10:20-12:00): 포스트-바디, 인구, 인류의 재생산

사회자: 하정화 / 토론자: Rajni Palriwala

Bryan S. Turner (City Univ. of New York): “포스트-바디: 미래의 인구, 경제, 사회적 딜레마”

최재천 (이화여대): “뜻하지 않은 전지구적 인간 진화 실험: 전면적인 인종 혼화와 유전자 치환의 진화적 귀결”

이삼식 (한국보건사회연구원): “국가적 재생산 위기: 한국의 출산력 충격”

점심 (12:10-13:10)

주제 2 (13:20-15:00): 지구화된 삶의 양식과 제도

사회자: 은기수 / 토론자: Stevi Jackson

장경섭 (서울대): “특수주의적 다문화주의: 혼인세계화의 시민권적 모순”

설동훈 (전북대): “원거리 아버지들: 외국인 이주노동자 아버지와 ‘기러기’ 아빠”

신의항 (서울대): “고등교육의 국제화: 중국과 한국의 비교연구”

휴식 (15:00- 15:10)

주제 3 (15:10-16:50): 삶과 일의 새로운 (불)평등

사회자: 진미정 / 토론자: Lynn Jamieson

Göran Therborn (Univ of Cambridge): “가로막힌 삶과 요절: 삶의 새로운 불평등”

Raymond Chan (City Univ of Hong Kong): “아시아의 생애주기 변화와 위험: 우리는 지금 어디에 와 있는가?”

주윤정 (서울대): “후기산업사회의 인간 ‘능력’의 재편성: 장애예술운동의 가능성”

들쨌날 (2013. 5. 31)

주제 4 (10:10~11:50): 개인화, 친밀성, (포스트)가족

사회자: 장경섭 / 토론자: Goran Therborn

Lynn Jamieson (Edinburgh Univ.): “친밀성, 개인화, 그리고 사적 관계의 미래”

Yunxiang Yan (UCLA): “개인화에 대한 달콤한 반발력: 현대 중국에서 부모 주도적 이혼의 증가”

진미정 (서울대): “청년층 비혼 1 인가구의 초상: 전이의 지연 혹은 개인화의 성취”

점심 (12:00~13:00)

주제 5 (13:10~14:50): 포스트-가부장제, 세대관계, 개인적 삶

사회자: 신의항 / 토론자: Bryan S. Turner

하정화 (서울대): “한국의 세대간 관계에 대한 배우자 사별의 영향”

은기수 (서울대): “포스트-가부장제 사회로의 경로: 성별 (비)선호의 전지구적 수렴과 동아시아의 특수성”

Stevi Jackson (York Univ): “근대성/복수의 근대성과 개인적 삶: 이론적 맹점에 대한 성찰”

휴식 (14:50- 15:00)

주제 6 (15:00-16:40): 돌봄과 복지의 변화하는 레짐

사회자: 이승윤 / 토론자: Raymond Chan

Rajni Palriwala (Univ of Delhi): “합리성, 도구성, 감정의 뒤엎힘: 돌봄과 친밀성에 대하여”

Emiko Ochiai (Kyoto University): “아시아는 유럽의 미래인가: 아시아 돌봄 레짐의 변동”

Sven Hort (서울대 & Södertörn Univ): “후기근대 혹은 근대 사회(복지) 형성”

Contents

<u>Participants</u>	1
<u>Abstracts</u>	7
<u>국문초록</u>	19
<u>Session 1 Post-Body, Population, and Reproduction of Humanity</u>	
The post-body: Demographic, economic and social dilemmas of the future Bryan S. Turner	33
An inadvertent global experiment in human evolution: Evolutionary consequences of full-scale racial mixing and gene substitution Choe Jae Chun	51
The national reproductive crisis: South Korea's fertility shock Lee Sam-Sik	53
<u>Session 2 Globalized Forms and Institutions of Life</u>	
Particularistic multiculturalism: Citizenship contradictions of marriage cosmopolit(an)ization Chang Kyung-Sup	63
Long-distance fatherhood: Guest-worker fathers and 'wild goose' fathers in South Korea Seol Dong-Hoon	65
Globalization of higher education in China and Korea Shn Eui-Hang	73
<u>Session 3 New (In)equalities of Life and Work</u>	
Stunted lives and early deaths: The new inequalities of life Göran Therborn	103
Life course, Risks and social exclusion in Asia: Where are we now? Raymond K H Chan	109
Post-industrial rearrangements of human competence: (Dis)ability and art Joo Yunjeong	121
<u>Session 4 Individualization, Intimacy, and (Post-)Family</u>	
Intimacy, individualism and the future of relationships Lynn Jamieson (Edinburgh Univ)	129
Parent-driven divorce and individualization among Chinese Youth Yunxiang Yan	139
Portrait of unmarried one-person households in early adulthood: Delayed transition or achieved individualization? Chin Meejung	153
<u>Session 5 Post-Patriarchy, Intergenerational Relationship</u>	
The effect of widowhood on parent-child relationships in Korea Ha Jung-Hwa	157
Pathways to post-patriarchal society: Global convergence of gender (non-)preference and East Asian particularities Eun Ki-Soo	163
Modernity/modernities and personal life: Reflections on some theoretical lacunae Stevi Jackson ..	171

Session 6 Changing Regimes of Care and Welfare

Rationality, instrumentality, and the affective: Crossings and blurrings in relations of care and intimacy
| Rajni **Palriwala** 177

Is Asia the future of Europe? Transformation of care regimes in Asia | Emiko **Ochiai** 183

Late modernity or a modern social (welfare) formation | Sven **Hort** 187

Participants

Chan, Raymond K. H. Raymond K H Chan is Associate Professor at the Department of Applied Social Studies, City University of Hong Kong, and Research Fellow, Social Policy Research Centre, National Taiwan University. He received his Master and PhD in Sociology from the University of Essex, UK. His current research interests are risk and social policy, comparative social policy, and family and labor policies. He co-edited the book *Risk and Public Policy in East Asia* (Ashgate, 2010) with Lillian L R Wang and Mutusko Takahashi. His articles have appeared in *Asian Journal of Social Science*, *Asian Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Asian Public Policy*, *Critical Social Policy*, *International Journal of Social Welfare*, *International Social Work*, *Journal of International and Comparative Social Welfare*, *Social Indicators Research*, *Social Policy & Administration*, and *Social Policy & Society*.

Chang, Kyung-Sup Chang Kyung-Sup is Professor of Sociology at Seoul National University, specialized in institutional sociology, comparative political economy, and social theory. He recently authored *South Korea under Compressed Modernity: Familial Political Economy in Transition* (Routledge, 2010/2011) and edited *Contested Citizenship in East Asia: Developmental Politics, National Unity, and Globalization* (with Bryan S. Turner, Routledge, 2012), *Developmental Politics in Transition: The Neoliberal Era and Beyond* (with Ben Fine and Linda Weiss, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), and *South Korea in Transition: Politics and Culture of Citizenship* (Routledge, 2013). He is currently preparing *Developmental Politics in South Korea and Beyond: From Developmental Liberalism to Neoliberalism* (for Palgrave Macmillan) and *Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social Theory* (with Bryan S. Turner, et al.).

Chin, Meejung Chin Meejung is Associate Professor of Child Development and Family Studies at Seoul National University. Her research interests are family demography, family policy, and North Korean refugee families. She authored four books on North Korean refugee families and published multiple articles on Korean families in major journals in Korea.

Choe, Jae Chun Choe Jae Chun received his PhD in evolutionary biology from Harvard University. Before returning to Korea in 1994, he worked at Harvard University as full-time lecturer, the University of Michigan as assistant professor, and Junior Fellow at the Michigan Society of Fellows. Between 1994 and 2006 he has been a professor of biological sciences at Seoul National University. In 2006 he moved to Ewha Womans University as University Chair Professor to establish a new graduate program in EcoScience and to serve as the Director of the University's Natural History Museum. His research addresses the questions of behavior, ecology, and cognitive evolution. He is currently an associate editor of *Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology* and on editorial board of *Evolutionary Psychology*, *Ecological Research*, *Journal of Ethology*, and *Journal of Insect Behavior*. He also served as the editor for the invertebrate social behavior section in the *Encyclopedia of Animal Behavior* (2011). In addition to publishing more than 100 research papers and 6 books in English, as a well-known popularizer of science in Korea, he has written over 30 popular science books in Korean and given numerous lectures for the general public. With Jane Goodall he has recently established The Biodiversity Foundation.

Eun, Ki-Soo Eun Ki-Soo is associate professor of sociology and Korean Studies at Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University. After earning his Ph.D. degree in sociology from University of Pennsylvania, he has conducted his research on family values, family history, low fertility, aging and life course studies. He has led a Comparative Asian Family Survey Project with the support from Kyoto University in Japan and Doha International Institute for Family Studies and Development in Qatar. Many Asian family studies scholars including Emiko Ochiai at Kyoto University, Japan have collaborated for the project. He has conducted family surveys in Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, India and Qatar with his colleagues for the last few years. He is also collaborating with Emiko Ochiai to publish volumes as Asian Intellectual Heritage Series.

Ha, Jung-Hwa Ha Jung-Hwa is an assistant professor at the Seoul National University (SNU) in Seoul, Korea. Her fields of interest include life course and aging, widowhood, social support, intergenerational relationships, and stress and coping. She teaches courses on death, loss, and grief across the life course and social work for older adults and persons with disabilities. Dr. Ha has received her undergraduate degree from Seoul National University and MA, MSW, and Ph.D. (Social Work and Sociology) from the University of Michigan. Prior to joining SNU, she worked as an assistant professor at the School of Social Service Administration in the University of Chicago and as a post-doctoral researcher at the Waisman Center in the University of Wisconsin - Madison.

Hort, Sven E. O. Sven E O Hort has recently joined Seoul National University, Korea. Since 2012, he is a faculty member of the Department of Social Welfare, College of Social Science. A native of Sweden, under his previous name *Sven E Olsson*, in 1990 he received his PhD from Stockholm University. He is an alumnus of the University of Lund (BA 1975). He has taught at several Swedish universities – Gothenburg, Linnaeus, Stockholm, Sodertorn (where he was acting Vice President) and Uppsala – as well as at the University of Bergen, Norway. Twice he has been a Fulbright Scholar in the US (UC-Berkeley and Mt Vernon College, Washington D C). He has lectured at numerous East Asian, European and North American universities. His main research topics are the global, macro-historical development of the welfare state (the reinvented Asian, the Nordic, Scandinavian or Swedish “Model” and their respective “places in the world”), and comparative urban policy – social exclusion, integration and welfare in the Baltic Sea area (including parts of East and Central Europe).

Jackson, Stevi Stevi Jackson is Professor of Women’s Studies and Director of the Centre for Women’s Studies at the University of York, UK. Her main research interests are: theorizing gender and sexuality (especially heterosexuality), theories of self and subjectivity, and modernity, gender and intimacy in Asia and Europe. She is the author of *Childhood and Sexuality* (Blackwell 1982), *Christine Delphy* (Sage 1996), *Heterosexuality in Question* (Sage 1999), co-author, with Sue Scott, of *Theorizing Sexuality* (Open University Press, 2010) and, with Momin Rahman, of *Gender and Sexuality: Sociological Approaches* (Polity 2010) She has co-edited a number of collections including, with Sue Scott, *Gender: A Sociological Reader* (Routledge 2002) and with Liu Jieyu and Woo Juhyun, *East Asian Sexualities: Intimacy, Modernity and New Sexual Cultures* (Zed 2008). She has also published numerous articles on sexuality and intimacy.

She is currently working, with Ho Sik Ying (University of Hong Kong), on a project comparing women's experiences of social change in Britain and Hong Kong and writing a book based on this research provisionally entitled *Women Doing Intimacy: Gender, Family and Modernity in Hong Kong and Britain*, which is to be published in Palgrave Macmillan's 'Studies in Family and Intimate Life' series.

Jamieson, Lynn Lynn Jamieson is a Professor of Sociology at the University of Edinburgh, a director of the Scottish consortium Centre for Research on Families and Relationships, an associate of the UK Centre for Population Change, an editor of the Palgrave Macmillan Families and Intimate Life series and associate editor of the journal Families Relationships and Societies. The 'Western' ethnocentricity of 'intimacy' is addressed in her article 'Intimacy as a Concept: explaining social change in the context of globalisation or another form of ethnocentricism?' Sociological Research Online 2011. See also 2012 with Milne 'Children's and young people's relationships, relational processes and social change: reading across worlds' Children's Geographies 10, 3, 265–278. A new edition of her book Intimacy will be published next year. Her most recent book (forthcoming September) with Simpson is Living Alone: Globalization, Belonging and Identity Palgrave. Other recent writing includes: 'Personal Relationships, Intimacy and the Self in a Mediated and Global Digital Age'(2013) in Orton-Johnson and Prior (eds.) Digital Sociology Palgrave. CRFR is always interested in developing international collaborations and, among other things, Lynn is currently interested in new work on the part families and personal relationships play in interaction with climate change and global environmental threats.

Joo, Yunjeong Joo Yunjeong is a visiting researcher at the Institute for Social Development and Policy Research, Seoul National University. She received her PhD in 2012, with a dissertation titled as "Benevolent entitlement: Massage rights of the blind in Korea" from Dept of Sociology, SNU. She edited a book *Able art: art of communication and difference* (Sahoe Pyeongron, 2007), and published articles: "Charity or Benevolence: Blind Massagers in colonial Korea", "Exclusion from normalcy: Stigma and life politics of Hansen's disease victims in Sorok leprosarium". She is also engaged with policy making and activism for disability and art. Her current research interests centre on postcolonial socio-legal history of minority groups, subaltern legality, human rights and citizenship, and disability and art.

Lee, Sam-Sik Lee Sam-Sik is Senior Research Fellow at Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs

Ochiai, Emiko Emiko Ochiai is Professor of Sociology, Kyoto University, Japan

Palriwala, Rajni Rajni Palriwala is Professor at the Department of Sociology, University of Delhi. Her research falls within the broad area of gender relations, covering care, citizenship, and the state, kinship and marriage, dowry, women and work, women's movements and feminist politics, cross-cultural studies, and methodology. In the course of this research, she has undertaken fieldwork in various parts of rural and urban India and in Leiden, The Netherlands. Other than edited books and articles in journals and books on these themes, her publications include *Planning Families, Planning Gender: The adverse child sex ratio in selected districts* (with Mary E. John, Ravinder Kaur, Saraswati Raju, Alpana Sagar, Books for Change, 2008),

Care, culture and citizenship: Revisiting the politics of welfare in the Netherlands (with C. Risseuw and K. Ganesh, Het Spinhuis, 2005), and *Changing kinship, family, and gender relations in South Asia: Processes, trends and issues* (Vena, Leiden, 1994). A jointly edited book on changing marriage in south Asia should be out soon. She is currently working on a manuscript on *The political and social economy of care in India* bringing together themes of gender, work, cultural practices, intimacy and emotion, and state policy.

Seol, Dong-Hoon Seol Dong-Hoon Seol is Professor of Sociology, Chonbuk National University. Currently, he is the editor of the *Korean Journal of Sociology* (*Hanguk Sahoehak*), the official journal of the Korean Sociological Association, and the *Korea Journal of International Migration* (*Hanguk Yiminhak*), the official journal of the Korea International Migration Studies Association. He received his B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. in Sociology in Seoul National University. And he worked as postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Demographic Studies, Duke University in 1997-1999. He taught and did research at Seoul National University, Duke University, University of Hawaii at Manoa, and University of California at San Diego. Dr. Seol was registered in *Who's Who in the World* in 2011. He received the *Distinguished Academics Awards for North East Asia Research* from the NEAR Foundation in 2010, and was given the *Distinguished Faculty Award for Research* from Chonbuk National University in 2011. He has published lots of articles, books and government-sponsored reports. He is the author of *Foreign Workers in Korean Society 1987-1999* (1999), *Global Capitalism and International Labor Migration* (2000), *Sociology: An Introduction* (2009), and *Analysis of Social Survey* (2012). He has published in several fields of inquiry, including international migration, the sociology of labor market, economic globalization, and peace studies. His work has appeared in a variety of journals, including the *International Migration Review*, *Ethnicities*, *Citizenship Studies*, *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, *Journal of Population Research*, *Asia-Pacific Forum*, *Asian Journal of Women's Studies*, *Korea Observer*, and the *Korean Journal of Sociology*.

Shin, Eui Hang Shin Eui Hang is Invited Professor, College of Liberal Studies, Seoul, National University, Seoul, Korea and Distinguished Professor Emeritus in the Department of Sociology, University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina. He received a BA in Sociology from Seoul National University in 1964, MA in Demography from University of Pennsylvania in 1968, and Ph.D in Demography from University of Pennsylvania in 1971. His areas of interest are the political demography of Korea and international higher education. His publications include: "Some Observations on the Development of Massive Open Online Courses in Higher Education: The Case of MIT's OpenCourseWare and MITx," *Korean Journal of General Education* 6 (3) (September 2012): 165-189 (in Korean); "The Internationalization of Higher Education in China," *Korean Journal of General Education* 7 (1) (February 2013): 169-212 (in Korean); "The Interplay of Economy and Ethnicity: The Case of the Textile and Apparel Industry and Korean Immigrant Communities." 2008. Pp. 313-345, in Eui Young Yu, Editor, *Korean American Economy and Community in the 21st Century*. Los Angeles, CA: Korean American Economic Development Center.; "State, Society, and Economic Development in a Sport Life Cycle: The Case of Boxing in Korea," *East Asia: An International Quarterly* 24 (1) (Spring 2007):1-23; "An Analysis of Social Inequality between Korean American Population and Other Racial and Ethnic Groups in the U.S," Pp. 323-350, in *Korean Experience in North America*, vol.1, edited by the Korean National Historical Research, Seoul, Korea

(2007); "Election Democracy, Populism, and Generational Politics: The Case of the April 15, 2004 General Election in South Korea." *East Asia: An International Quarterly* 22 (1), (Spring 2005): 51-81; "Presidential Elections, Internet Politics, and Citizens' Organizations in Korea." *Development and Society* 34 (1), (June 2005): 25-48. "An Analysis of Social Network Structures in the Korean Film Industry." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 4 (2), (May-August 2004): 285-300, with Sangyub Park; "Culture, Gender Roles, and Sport: The Case of Korean Players on the LPGA Tour." *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* 28 (3) (August 2004): 223-244, with Edward Nam; "The Role of NGOs in Political Elections in Korea: The Case of the Citizens' Alliance for the 2000 General Election." *Asian Survey* 43 (July/August 2003): 697-715.

Therborn, Göran Göran Therborn is Professor emeritus of sociology at the University of Cambridge, UK, now living in Sweden while still attached to Cambridge University. Previously co-Director of the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences. He has taught at several universities of Europe and the Americas, and in Asia courses at the Azad University of Tehran and the Koryo University of Seoul. He has a wide range of publications, which have appeared in about 25 languages (including Korean), on social and political theory, Marxist and other, on social and labour market policy, on labour movements and on the middle class, on democracy, modernity, inequality, on children's rights and on family-sex-gender relations, on cities and their iconography of power, on Swedish, European, and world history. His most recent books include: *Between Sex and Power - Family in the World, 1900-2000* (London, Routledge, 2004), *Asia and Europe in Globalization: Continents, Regions, Nations* (co-editor and co-author), Leiden, Brill), *From Marxism to Postmarxism?* (London, Verso, 2008), *The World. A Beginner's Guide* (Cambridge, Polity, 2010), *The Killing Fields of Inequality* (Cambridge, Polity, autumn 2013). His current main project is a global historical study of *Cities of Power*, i.e. of how cities, and capital cities in particular, represent power, from which there are already several publications, collective as well as individual. Among the former are special sections of the *International Review of Sociology* (2006:2), on Eastern Europe, and of *City* (13:1, 2009) on Southeast Asian capitals, and a book on *African Capital Cities* (Cape Town, HSEC Press, 2011). Among individual articles, the latest is *The Power of Cities, and the Cities of Power: "Global Cities", World Power, and the G20 Capital Cities* forthcoming in K. Fujita (ed.), *Cities and Crisis*. *New Critical Urban Theory*, London, Sage, 2013)

Turner, Bryan S. Bryan S. Turner's current academic posts include Presidential Professor of Sociology and Director of the Religion Committee at The Graduate Center at the City University of New York, and Professor of Social and Political Thought at the University of Western Sydney. Professor Turner completed his PhD at the University of Leeds in 1970. He has published and researched on such topics as citizenship and human rights, the sociology of the body, globalisation and classical social theory, the sociology of religion, medical sociology and the sociology of ageing. *Body and Society* is now in its third edition (2008). He is the founding editor of the *Journal of Classical Sociology* (with John O'Neill) and *Citizenship Studies*. Turner has held professorial positions at the following universities: Essex, Flinders, Utrecht, Deakin, Cambridge and the National University of Singapore. He was the Alona Evans Distinguished Visiting Professor at Wellesley College USA (2009-10). Turner was awarded a Doctor of Letters at both Flinders University and the University of Cambridge. He was president of the Australian

Sociological Association (1995-1996). His principal research interest is Islam and the Shari'a in the West, and global religious reform movements. His most recent publication is *The Religious and the Political* (Cambridge, 2013).

Yan, Yunxiang Yunxiang Yan is professor of anthropology and director of the Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, Los Angeles. He earned his B.A. in Chinese Literature from Peking University in 1982 and Ph.D. in Social Anthropology from Harvard University in 1993. He is the author of *The Flow of Gifts: Reciprocity and Social Networks in a Chinese Village* (Stanford University Press, 1996), *Private Life under Socialism: Love, Intimacy, and Family Change in a Chinese Village, 1949-1999* (Stanford University Press, 2003), and *The Individualization of Chinese Society* (Berg publishers, 2009). His research interests include family and kinship, social change, the individual and individualization, and the impact of cultural globalization. Among other projects, he is currently writing a book on individualization and moral changes in post-Mao China.

Abstracts

Day 1 (30 May 2013, Thursday)

Session 1 (30 May 2013, 10:00~11:50): Post-Body, Population, and Reproduction of Humanity

Bryan S. Turner (City Univ of New York): “The post-body: Demographic, economic and social dilemmas of the future”

Choe Jae Chun (Ewha Womans Univ): “An inadvertent sweeping experiment in human evolution: Genetic consequences of full-scale racial mixing and gene substitution”

Lee Sam-Sik (Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs): “The national reproductive crisis: South Korea’s fertility shock”

The Post-Body: demographic, economic and social dilemmas of the future

Bryan S. Turner (City University of New York)

We are all familiar with the idea that as a result of improvements in the standard of living there has been a significant improvement in the life expectancy of people in the developed world. In this lecture, I focus on a related development – the so-called ‘life extension project’. This program promises through extensive technological intervention to maximize both therapy (to remove suffering) and enhancement (to improve our capabilities) resulting in an indefinite prolongation of life. Radical bio-gerontology promises not only that humans will live well beyond 120 years, but they can do so without illness and disease. The utopian dream of radical post-humanism is that death is not inevitable. Hypothetically the outcome of the life extension project is the post-body. The ‘natural body’ is replaced by a synthetic body – an assemblage of human organs supplemented with computers, nanotechnological machines, artificial organs, and a brain enhanced by drugs and medical technologies. In short, the ‘human’ will be ontologically transformed. In the future society there will be both humans and post-humans.

Sociologically speaking what will this post-human society look like? Firstly, it will be radically unequal, because life-extension technologies will be expensive. Declining life expectancy in many African societies will be matched by radical life enhancement in Korea and Japan. With low migration and low fertility, East Asia will require massive technological development. Secondly, because of low total fertility rates (in Asia around 1.2), there will be few children and many aged adults. If the economies of the developed world move towards high-technology production and structural unemployment, there will be considerable inter-generational conflict. Individuals with post-bodies at the age of 120 may have one child around the age of 90, but no grand children. The result will be the post-family – few children, serial monogamy, and the deeply-aged in gated communities. Clearly filial piety is irrelevant to this social structure. If existing generations survive until they are on average 120 years, they will be the last generations with pensions, employment histories, and assets. Thirdly, we can anticipate that men may be more isolated than women. Will deep old age involve new forms of loneliness, depression, isolation and alienation? Will we require a ‘happiness pill’ to cope with the boredom of indefinite existence? Will we require geriatric storage systems or retirement cities in the third

world to store the surplus geriatric populations of Europe and Asia? If life extension projects can give us health and old age, then the employment issue could be solved by technology and indefinite employment. Or are we moving towards the jobless economy where machines do all the work – the future predicted by Marx but without revolutions? Fourthly, what ideological and religious changes might we anticipate? If suffering and death can be technologically eliminated, will traditional religions simply disappear? What meaning can the Christian Cross have in a world without constant pain, disease and death? The Buddhist idea of suffering will be obsolete. Can Heaven have any significance for people with a life expectancy of 150 years and more? We will move from theologies of unhappiness (life is painful and short) to theologies of happiness (with medical solutions to pain, discomfort and boredom). The outcome is the Entertainment Society. Notions relating to the life cycle, human sexuality, reproduction, generational justice, ageing and family life will all require radical rethinking.

These scenarios can easily be dismissed as examples of science fiction involving utopian aspirations only for the elite. However when Dr Christiaan Barnard performed the first heart transplant in 1967, it was dismissed as an expensive gimmick. Some four decades later, we now have stem-cell research, routine organ transplants, nanotechnology, foetal surgery, sex selection, IVF, cryonics and much more. The technological imperative to understanding the causes of human ageing is unstoppable. We need to prepare for the consequences.

An inadvertent sweeping experiment in human evolution: Genetic consequences of full-scale racial mixing and gene substitution

Choe Jae Chun (Ewha Womans University)

Evolution occurs at the regional level. The migratory capacity of living organisms is limited, and two species, though they may be very similar, will find it difficult to mix their genes if they live geographically apart from one another. Two groups that have evolved independently for long periods may eventually come into contact but differ so significantly that mating becomes impossible, and in some cases they may differentiate into separate species. We humans, too, have married and reproduced within our own countries. But recently there has been an unprecedented frequency and mixing of unlike genes. Never before in human history has such large-scale genetic hybridization taken place. On the other hand, advances in molecular genetics are making it possible to substitute diseased or inferior genes with normal or superior ones. This paper attempts to analyze from a genetic perspective the impacts such inadvertent, huge-scale “experiments” may have on human evolution. Gene substitution and mixing among racial types may genetically result in much healthier changes at the individual and state level, but may also bring negative results that could be fatal to groups and humankind as a whole. What an interesting genetic contradiction it is!

Session 2 (30 May 2013, 13:10~15:00): Globalized Forms and Institutions of Life

Chang Kyung-Sup (SNU): “Particularistic multiculturalism: Citizenship contradictions of marriage cosmopolit(an)ization”

Seol Dong-Hoon (Chonbuk National Univ): “Long-distance fatherhood: Guest-worker fathers and ‘wild goose’ fathers”

Shin Eui-Hang (SNU): “Globalization of higher education in China and Korea”

Particularistic multiculturalism: Citizenship contradictions of marriage cosmopolit(an)ization in South Korea

Chang Kyung-Sup (Seoul National University)

In a great paradox, South Korea’s multiculturalism drive as social and political reaction to the rapid increase of transnational marriages has borne a fundamentally *particularistic nature* in that it divides (1) between foreign brides and foreign workers, (2) between foreign brides and their Korean families, and (3) between foreign brides and ordinary native South Koreans. First, foreign guest-workers have been frustrated not only by the exploitative terms of their production labor but also by their *official exclusion* from the multiculturalism support policy. Second, while the material and social status of foreign brides is basically determined by that of their Korean family members – most of whom are unfortunately poor and often old – the inability and unwillingness of the South Korean government and society to help improve the latter’s fate significantly have necessitated devising an exclusively designed policy for serving often superficially the former as culturally foreign subjects. Third, the mass arrival and permanent presence of foreign brides (and the increase of their mixed-blood children) have triggered not only a paternalistic social atmosphere for helping relieve their difficulties in South Korean life but also a cultural and political aspiration of South Koreans for reinventing themselves as a multicultural or cosmopolitan subject – multicultural in terms of their coexistence with foreign bodies with permanently frozen and repeatedly staged cultural differences. The particularistic quality of South Korea’s showy multiculturalism should not be simply taken as a structural limit to the country’s cosmopolitan status but more as a strategic platform for a sort of *managed* cosmopolitanism or cosmopolit(an)ization.

Long-distance fatherhood: Guest-worker fathers and ‘wild goose’ fathers in South Korea

Seol Dong-Hoon (Chonbuk National University)

There are two kind of separated families, living apart for the sake of work or education. Guest-worker fathers from Asian countries including China, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan, and Bangladesh are working in Korea without their family. And, ‘wild goose’ fathers or *kirogi appa* are also working in Korea to finance their wife and children stay and education in overseas countries including the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, China, or so. For the families, both of them are making a life-changing decision and commitment that can have positive as well as negative aspects. In this paper, I am going to conduct case studies of the family, Korean citizens’ attitudes or public opinions towards them, and policy responses of the Korean government.

The Internationalization of higher education in China and Korea

Shin Eui Hang (College of Liberal Studies, Seoul National University)

The patterns of the international mobility of students have been linked to the soft power of both country of destination and country of origin. It was estimated that, globally, nearly 4.1 million students were studying outside of their home country in 2012. In the recent years, China and Korea have emerged as two of the top three countries that send the largest number of students to the United States and other destinations. In the rapidly expanding knowledge-based economy the international higher education has become a cultural commodity that impacts the global competitiveness and national economy for the countries involved.

The international education is Australia's third largest "export industry," generating nearly \$14 billion in 2011, down from about \$18 billion in 2009. In the United Kingdom the international education services are valued at \$22.8 billion in 2009, the 5th largest service export from the country, and international students and their dependents contributed approximately \$21.8 billion to the U.S. economy during the 2011-12 academic year. From the perspectives of the developing countries that send a large number of students to these highly developed countries may not only have to bear the costs of the international education but also have to cope with the possible effects of the sustained outmigration of student population on the development of their countries' higher education systems.

In this study I conduct a comparative and historical analysis of six different aspects of the internationalization of higher education in China and Korea. First, I examine the trends and variations in the international migration of student population to and from China and Korea since 2000. The volume of inflows of foreign students by the academic level of study (undergraduate/graduate) and country of origin will be reviewed. I will also analyze the changing patterns of outflows of Chinese and Korean students by the academic level and country of destination. Secondly, I will investigate the growth of the international branch campuses in China and Korea. Thirdly, I will examine the impact of the massive open online courses that have been developed by the elite universities in the United States on the higher education markets in China and Korea. Fourthly, I will review the overseas language instruction programs supported by the governments of the two countries including the Confucius Institute of China and Korean Cultural Office and the Sejong Institute of Korea. Fifthly, I will look at the composition of the faculty members in the selected institutions of higher education in China and Korea by the country of origin of their doctorate/terminal degrees. Lastly, I will analyze the current conditions of using English as a language of instruction in the classrooms at colleges and universities in China and Korea. The sociopolitical implications of these dimensions of internationalization of higher education are investigated in the context of the dynamic interactions between the educational imperialism and state's policies of protecting the domestic higher education markets.

Session 3 (30 May 2013, 15:10~17:00) New (In)equalities of Life and Work

Göran **Therborn** (Univ of Cambridge): "Stunted lives and early deaths: The new inequalities of life"

Raymond **Chan** (City Univ of Hong Kong): "Changing life course and risks in Asia: Where are we now?"

Joo Yunjeong (SNU): "Post-industrial rearrangements of human competence: (Dis)ability and art"

Stunted lives and early deaths: The new inequalities of life

Göran Therborn (University of Cambridge):

In pre-modern times the coexistence of rich and poor, and of rulers, noblemen, free subjects, and slaves was not regarded and discussed as inequality, but as differences, like differences between men and women, young and old. Only from the Enlightenment and the late 18th century Atlantic revolutions was it perceived as inequality, i.e., as violations of a norm of (some elementary thisworldly) human equality.

In modern times, until recently, the fact that the length of human lives varies and that some humans are sickly and others not, was, by and large, seen as different draws from the human lottery. In public discourse and in mainstream conventional politics this is still usually the case. However, a new rapprochement of bio-medical and social sciences is piling up empirical evidence and is beginning to discern chains of causality for it, that these differences of life and health expectancy are man-made inequalities.

This paper, drawing upon a book in publication, *The Killing Fields of Inequality*, will present some data on growing vital inequality in the world, with a special attention to its growth in developed societies and from changing family patterns. The paper is also part of an effort to push for a multidimensional conception of inequality, relating social science and egalitarian politics to epidemiology, social medicine and development psychology as well as to recent moral and social philosophy.

Changing life course and risks in Asia: Where are we now?

Raymond K. H. Chan (City University of Hong Kong)

Life course is an ordered pattern of life with assumed roles and functions in each of the stage (e.g., childhood for learning; adulthood for working and caring; aging for withdrawal and cared). Researchers have argued that the life course is standardized and institutionalized by various forces: economic structures, employment and employment policies, welfare state provisions (especially on children and retirees). It is assumed that such type of life course, with tasks completed at an earlier stage, and a smooth transition from stage to stage will result in lower (or no) risk.

It has been argued that such standardized and traditional life course has been challenged and undergoing a 'de-' process. Life course is no longer in a simple linear manner. Greater variations can be found within the same age cohorts and among different generations; as a result of a number of changes within individual, family, work, macro-economic structure, as well as welfare retrenchment / restructuring. The changes are also resulted from increasing pursuit for individual biography. New life courses in the new context contribute to different types of risks spreading to different types of targets. Compared to the previous assumption that risks are primarily poverty concentrated in the childhood and elderly, new social risks add the concerns on caring, balancing family and care duties and maintaining employment, across various life course stages. Increasing concerns have been paid to the transitional periods. Social policy no longer confine in tacking poverty for children and elderly facing predictable risks; but addressing the increasing uncertainty spreading to different life course stages.

Study of life course and risks are still limited in East Asia. On the whole, Asian societies are undergoing a similar process as in the West: destabilization of family and relationship, changing

female roles and functions, decreasing fertility rate, increasing uncertainty in work, and changing welfare policies (with greater emphasis on social investment). However, differences can still be identified between the West and the East Asia. For example, welfare provision in East Asia is relatively small, retirement and pension system still in development, with strong familial culture exhibits restriction on individuals (especially females). Hence, the institutionalization effect could be moderated, and the life course can still be, to certain extent, standardized and traditionalized. While there is better welfare provision, we do not have a strong sense of social citizenship and entitlement; and hence, 're-'institutionalization path could be very different. While unemployment was recognized as an issue, the unemployment level could not be compared with those facing the Western societies.

Hence, researchers in this topic in East Asia have to address several questions: How standardized / traditional the life course we are and how much such life course has been 'de-' in recent decades? How far the life course is being institutionalized by the welfare provision? What kinds of new social risk have been generated in the 'de-' process? While not possible to give a definite answer to these questions, this paper aims to discuss the applicability of the concepts of life course and risks in Asia, in view of the different social and economic contexts.

Postindustrial rearrangement of human competence: (Dis)ability and art

Joo Yunjeong (Seoul National University)

The human competence is undergoing radical rearrangement triggered by the postindustrial social changes. The competence of the disabled, with the spread of the idea of normalcy and possessive individualism, was designated as incompetent and incapacitated during the industrial time, due to their lack of ability to fit into the standardized labor forms and the idea of normalcy. However, with the advent of postindustrial society, where service industries and creative industries are on the rise, there seems a possibility of the rearrangement of human competence not bound to the idea of normalcy/abnormalcy or standardized labor. In art sectors, there are rich expressions of the disabled through various art forms, building their disability as a different aesthetics of human expression and a certain form of life also creating new ways of social relations. In this paper, I will elucidate the art activity and life of people with developmental disability in the U.S.A, Japan and South Korea, which transforms the concept of competence of the disabled and normalcy. Their activity is organized by Creative Growth (U.S.A), Able Art (Japan), and Rawside (South Korea).

Day 2 (31 May 2013, Friday)

Session 4 (31 May 2013, 10:00~11:50): "Individualization, Intimacy, and (Post-)Family"

Lynn **Jamieson** (Edinburgh Univ): "Intimacy, individualization, and the future of personal relationships"

Yunxiang **Yan** (UCLA): "A sweet counter-force to individualization: The return of parental power in the life of Chinese youth and its theoretical implications"

Chin Meejung (SNU): “Portrait of one-person households in early adulthood: Delayed transition or achieved individualization?”

Intimacy, individualisation and the future of personal relationships

Lynn Jamieson (Edinburgh University)

Some European commentators have suggested that different parts of the world are experiencing a similar turn toward more intense intimacy in personal relationships associated with processes of individualisation. This view has been taken up by scholars of many different parts of the globe and sometimes given a critical twist. Scholars of China and South Korea have suggested processes of social change involving individualisation without ‘Western’ style individualism. In Europe and North America, there are also persistent contrasting claims of waning significance and intimacy of face-to-face relationships given the growth of digitally mediated connections between people and the commercialisation of growing aspects of relationships. Theorists of social change make contrasting claims about the significance of personal relationships, alternatively suggesting, either that they play an important role in effecting social change, or that they are relatively insignificant, a victim of or compensatory diversion from the main drivers of change located at a macro, perhaps global, level. For example, in response to the major challenges of the twenty-first century, climate change, global recession and the like, personal relationships seem to be an irrelevance rather than key agents of change. Is this so? What is the likely future of face-to-face personal relationships? What are the potential gains from thinking about the future of personal relationships in dialogue from different parts of the world? How do personal relationships feature in everyday thinking about the future? What are they likely to contribute to the future of our cultural life, our social fabric and the wellbeing of our planet? What can we know about this with and without researchers walking alongside people and getting up close and personal?

A Sweet counterforce to individualization: The Rise of parents-driven divorce in contemporary China

Yunxiang Yan (University of California, Los Angeles)

A new development in Chinese society today is that parents increasingly exert influence and power in the life of youth in important decision-makings, such as education, job search, mate choice, marriage and post-marital residence. To live a life of one’s own, still a shining ideal in the minds of Chinese youth, seems to be silently drifting away from them in real life as they cannot thrive without parental support in the extremely competitive society. By examining the new phenomenon of parents-driven divorce among the post-1980 youth, I argue that the lack of re-embedding mechanisms in an increasingly risky society, the dominance of materialism and consumerism in social life, and the crisis of social trust and the remaining centrality of personal trust are the major factors contributing to the return of parental power and the extra challenge of living a life of one’s own. The Chinese case also raises a number of questions for a better understanding of the global trend of individualization and its local variations.

Portrait of unmarried one-person household in early adulthood: Delayed transition or achieved individualization?

Chin Meejung (Seoul National University)

The sharp increase in one-person households of all ages is one of the most significant changes in Korean families. One-person households account for 23.9% of all households (Korean National Statistics, 2011). Among them, young adults in their 20s and 30s account for 37.5%. In the traditional life course, young adults may live apart from their parents only for education- or employment-related reasons. When they get married and form a family, they make a transition to a two-person or three-person household shortly. The one-person household in young adulthood, therefore, has been considered as a temporary arrangement of living at the time of transition. Without acceptable reasons, young people do not leave their family. As the age at first marriage increase however, living in a one-person household seems prolonged and complex. Young people leave their parents' home before marriage and start a life as one-person household. The experiences and meanings of living in one-person household may differ by gender and socio-economic circumstances of the young adults.

In this paper, I portrayed the lives of one-person households in young adulthood based on in-depth interviews of thirteen never married men and women in their 30s. I looked into how they began and lived their lives as a one-person household, how they perceived their status, and how they viewed their future. The results of the interviews provide a mixed picture. On one hand, the young people in one-person households seemed to live an independent life, emphasizing private occupancy of time and space. They did not sacrifice their privacy even for economic reasons. They preferred moving to a smaller/poorer housing unit to living with friends or siblings when they had financial issues. It is important for them to live an individualized life. They scheduled their own life course events without consulting their parents, chose social relations who supported their lives, and tried to be economically independent from their parents. However, on the other hand, only a few were able to be completely independent from their parents. They often relied on their parents when they had financial problems (e.g., for house rent or for living cost when they were out of job etc.). Furthermore, they seemed to maintain a traditional ideation of the family. Men postponed their marriage until they became financially ready and women expected their spouse to be in a higher status socially or economically than themselves.

These portraits of one-person households in adulthood support the idea of 'individualization without individualism' as Chang and Song (2010) described of Korean families. While the young adults seek an individualized life forming a new stage of life course, it does not necessarily reflect ideational change from familialism to individualism. Chang and Song (2010) called this tendency 'risk-averse individualization', which means a social tendency whereby individuals extend individualized stages of life to minimize family-related risks of modern life. Those who live in a one-person household delay their transition to a family because they believe they do not have enough resources to form a family. In this sense, one-person household in early adulthood is both a voluntary and involuntary state.

Session 5 (31 May 2013, 13:10~15:00): “Post-Patriarchy, Intergenerational Relationship, and Personal Life”

Ha Jung-Hwa (SNU): “The effect of widowhood on intergenerational relationships in Korea”

Eun Ki-Soo (SNU): “Pathways to post-patriarchal society: Global convergence of gender (non-)preference and East Asian particularities”

Stevi Jackson (York Univ): “Modernity/modernities and personal life: Reflections on some theoretical lacunae”

The Effect of widowhood on intergenerational relationships in Korea

Ha Jung-Hwa(Seoul National University)

Although previous research based on data from the US suggests that parents’ widowhood is associated with increased emotional support from children, little is known about the impact of late-life widowhood on intergenerational relationships in other cultures. Using data of Korean elders, this paper examines: (1) the effect of widowhood on both positive and negative aspects of parent-child relationship and (2) whether these effects are moderated by older adults’ expectations about children’s filial responsibilities and geographic proximity to children. Analyses are based on data from the Survey on the Quality of Life of the Elderly (2003), a stratified multi-stage probability sample of older adults living in the cities of Seoul and Chuncheon in Korea. Compared to married older adults, widowed persons reported lower levels of positive and higher levels of negative interactions with children. Older adults’ notion about filial responsibilities did not have a significant moderating effect, whereas geographic proximity was a significant moderator. Findings suggest that widowhood may bring strain in intergenerational relationships in Korea more so than in the US. Working with older adults and their children to reduce negative feelings and forging constructive relationship in adaptation to widowhood may enhance bereaved older adults’ well-being in this cultural milieu.

Pathways to post-patriarchal society: Global convergence of gender (non-)preference and East Asian particularities

Eun Ki-Soo (Seoul National University)

Patriarchy was the major form of family and social order in most traditional East and West. Son preference as a component of patriarchy was prevalent across almost all societies in the past. Modernization and changes of mode of economic production has decreased the significance of males, and sons within a family in many societies. Patriarchy and son preference has lost their power in modern era. Son preference has been increasingly replaced by gender indifference and gender balance preference which values balancing sex composition of children. In some East Asian societies where males still dominate public and private spheres, son preference has maintained the major type of gender preference. Son preference in East Asia, when it comes to lose its influence, seems to be replaced by gender indifference and gender balance preference as in West. Surprisingly, however, it is recently observed that daughter preference begins to replace son preference in Korea. This study tries to understand the significance of increasing daughter preference in the context of fundamental changes of family in Korea, especially since the economic crisis in 1997

Modernity/modernities and personal life: reflections on some theoretical lacunae

Stevi Jackson (York University)

This paper represents an attempt to address some of the issues raised by thinking about social change, personal life and gender relations in both European and Asian contexts. Much of the agenda of western research and theory on modernity and intimacy has been shaped by responses to, and especially critiques of, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim's work on individualization and Giddens' 'transformation of intimacy' thesis. Productive as these critiques have been, they have remained Eurocentric – with some notable exceptions (e.g. Evans 2010; Jamieson 2011). There are, however, other bodies of work on modernity that are addressing the issue of Eurocentrism, including debates on multiple modernities and cosmopolitan sociology (here used as a shorthand terms for a variety of positions), but which rarely deal centrally with gender or intimate life. Some East Asian scholars have also taken up western theories of modernity and variously modified or challenged them (e.g. Chang 2010; Chang and Song 2010; Tanabe and Tokita Tanabe 2004; Yan 2009), here often paying due attention to gender relations but with little acknowledgement of western feminist critiques of modernity theorists. In addition much feminist research on the gendered consequences of modernity in Asia has been conducted, but most of this is disconnected from other debates on modernity and informed by other theoretical traditions, such as cultural and postcolonial theory. There are, then, a number of relevant discussions ongoing, but in separate intellectual arenas so that connections between them are not always made. I intend to pull out some strands of these arguments, not to provide answers but to raise questions about how we imagine and theorise modernity, gender and intimacy from our differing locations. In so doing I will suggest that it is not only important to challenge the Eurocentrism of western scholarship but to think critically about the way that western theory travels: what travels and what does not, how it is engaged with and modified and whether it is possible to do theory differently. If we take seriously calls to provincialize not only 'the West' but the European tradition of social theory and work towards the kind of 'connected sociologies' called for by Bhabra (2010) how would this impact on the ways in which we think about the gendered consequences of social change?

Session 6 (31 May 2013, 15:10-17:00): "Changing Regimes of Care and Welfare"

Rajni **Palriwala** (Univ of Delhi): "Rationality, instrumentality, and the affective: Crossings and blurrings in relations of care and intimacy" no abstract

Emiko **Ochiai** (Kyoto University): "Is Asia the future of Europe? Transformation of care regimes in Asia" no abstract, no short bio

Sven **Hort** (SNU & Södertörn Univ): "Late modernity or a modern social (welfare) formation"

Rationality, instrumentality, and the affective: Crossings and blurrings in relations of care and intimacy

Rajni Palriwala (University of Delhi)

With generalised commodity production, the spread and deepening of capitalism, and aspirations to associated modernity (tied to European Enlightenment), the dichotomy of the market and the home and of reason and emotion have been taken as social fact and valorised. Both reason and emotion, it is asserted, are the better for being kept apart. This dichotomy has paralleled an ideal of the self and of the citizen as an autonomous, self-sufficient individual. Philosophical and sociological discourses seemed to suggest that the individual - for the health of the self, reason, and emotion - can or should ensure the compartmentalisation of instrumentality and the expressive, of self-interest and altruism in different spheres and relations, even as they must both be present in the life of that individual.

Yet, if we look at parallel distinctions of theoretical and practical reason or view emotion as both meaning and feeling, the maintenance of this dichotomy can be questioned. This can be demonstrated if we look at social relations and practice in those spheres of life designated as the rational - the economic or policy-making. Further, even within the frame that maintains the appropriateness of the dichotomy, emotion untempered by reason may be seen and experienced as dependency creating, a disabling obsession, or as giving rise to the terrorist. Hierarchies of emotion may be constructed based on purity of feeling or the reasonableness of feeling. The crossings, blurrings, and mutual creation of meaning between reason and emotion is perhaps most evident in those spheres of life designated as proper arenas for emotion, if not passion, in contemporary times - the intimate, the familial, the social. Comparisons across cultures, classes, genders, and other lines of stratification indicate that the intertwinings of the instrumental and the affective vary in form, articulation and acceptability. These variations are not just individual and contingent, but may be seen in terms of structures of feeling (to use Raymond William's concept).

In looking at love and care as meaning and feeling, expressed in various practices of words and labour, we can see the traces of the embedding of these structures of feeling as well as of the normative distinctions between the rational and affective in political economy. Thus, it has been argued that in a context wherein commodified labour is dominant but unpaid care work remains significant, the dichotomy between the instrumental and the expressive can ensure the performance of the latter as a labour of love.

In this presentation, I will narrate ethnographic and empirical examples of the interpenetration of what may be designated as the instrumental and emotion in social practice, to question the validity of the dichotomy of reason and emotion. As a first step in ongoing work the ethnocentrism and class and gender biases in the construction of this dichotomy emerge. The simple descriptive question one could be addressing here is: Which is the sociological normal and the socially normal within a society and culture and across societies and culture? The separation of the instrumental and the affective, or their imbrication in each other?

Late Modernity or a modern social (welfare) formation?

Sven Hort (SNU & Södertörn Univ)

It is often argued that European welfare states and Asian developmental states are the most successful state forms in recent history. What about their futures? Are they converging towards modern developmental welfare states? In the world of today there is an abundance of uncertainty – permanent volatility versus stability and sustainability – and it is definitely pertinent to ask: Which is the Epoch, and who is the Human Individual? What kind of development are “we”

witnessing at the moment? Where are societies and states heading in the present era of global human and social development? Towards something that can be labelled modern social welfare formations, or are they closer to more basic human survival units, even warfare states? Are these units building, consolidating and developing (re-building?) existing human welfare schemes and systems? Furthermore, are these countries going in the same direction, towards a singular (social welfare) modernity along a civilizing process, or are they cases of chronologically parallel trajectories going in different and divergent directions? Do they belong to the same “world”, or are they worlds apart? Is there an East Asian welfare regime on its way; is Korea one of its prime examples? Is Scandinavia re-building its welfare states under “compressed modernity”, and what kinds of differences and similarities are there between Asian and European patterns? The welfare state is a European invention although it has spread to other parts of the world, not least East Asia and more recently throughout South and Southeast Asia. However, in the last two or three decades the idea of the egalitarian and democratic welfare state has been foreign to the dominant mode of global thinking about the organisation of society and state. The global consensus approach has regarded state intervention in the market economy – heavy taxes, generous welfare benefits, increased public responsibility including anti-corruptive measures – as fundamentally flawed and against the long-term viability of a free and open society. This is also where the most recent globalisation theories have met the most prevalent theories in comparative welfare state research without taking into account other types of secular and non-secular thoughts.

첫째날 2013.5.20 목요일

주제 1 (10:20-12:00): 포스트-바디, 인구, 인류의 재생산

Bryan S. Turner (City Univ. of New York): “포스트-바디: 미래의 인구, 경제, 사회적 딜레마”

최재천 (이화여대): “뜻하지 않은 전지구적 인간 진화 실험: 전면적인 인종 혼화와 유전자 치환의 진화적 귀결”

이삼식 (한국보건사회연구원): “국가적 재생산 위기: 한국의 출산력 충격”

Bryan S. Turner (City Univ. of New York): “포스트-바디: 미래의 인구, 경제, 사회적 딜레마”

생활수준이 향상된 결과 선진국 국민들의 기대 수명이 현저히 증가했다는 생각에는 우리 모두 익숙하다. 이 강연에서 나는 연관된 발전, 이른바 ‘생명연장기획’에 초점을 맞춘다. 이 프로그램은 (고통을 제거하는) 치료법과 (우리의 역량을 향상시키는) 증진법을 공히 극대화하는 폭넓은 기술적 개입을 통해 생명의 무기한 연장을 약속한다. 급진적인 생물학적 노인학은 인간이 120 세 이상 살 수 있을 것이라고 약속할 뿐만 아니라, 병과 질환 없이 그럴 수 있다고 약속한다. 급진적인 포스트-인간주의의 유토피아적 꿈은 죽음이 불가피하지 않다는 것이다. 가설적으로 말하자면, 생명연장기획의 결과는 포스트-바디다. ‘자연적 신체’를 대체하는 것은 합성적 신체인데, 이는 약물과 의학 기술로 개선된 뇌, 인공장기, 나노기술로 만든 기계와 컴퓨터로 보철한 인간장기의 집합체다. 요컨대 ‘인간’은 존재론적으로 탈바꿈할 것이다. 미래 사회에는 인간과 포스트-인간이 공히 존재하게 될 것이다.

사회학적으로 말하자면 이 포스트-인간 사회는 어떤 모습을 띠게 될까? 첫째, 발본적으로 불평등할 것인데, 생명연장 기술에는 돈이 많이 들 것이기 때문이다. 다수의 아프리카 사회에서 나타나는 기대 수명 감소는 한국과 일본의 발본적인 생명 증진과 짝을 이룰 것이다. 이주와 출산이 낮기 때문에 동아시아에는 대규모 기술 발전이 필요할 것이다. 둘째, 전체 출산율이 낮기 때문에(아시아의 경우 1.2 남짓이다), 아동의 수는 적어지고 고령자의 수는 많아질 것이다. 만약 선진 세계의 경제들이 고도기술을 요하는 생산과 구조적 실업을 향해 간다면, 현저한 세대간 갈등이 나타날 것이다. 90 세 내외의 자녀가 한 명 정도 있지만

손자는 없는, 포스트-바디를 지닌 120 세의 개인들. 그 결과는 포스트-가족, 곧 자녀는 거의 없고, 연속단혼(單婚) 경향의 초고령자가 출입통제 주거단지(gated community)에 사는 모습이 될 것이다. 효 사상이 이 사회 구조와 무관하다는 것은 분명하다. 만약 현존하는 세대들이 평균 120 세까지 생존한다면, 이들은 연금과 근무 경력, 자산을 보유한 마지막 세대가 될 것이다. 셋째, 여성보다 남성의 고립 정도가 더 심할 것임을 예상할 수 있다. 초고령은 새로운 형태의 고독과 우울, 고립과 소외를 수반할 것인가? 기한 없는 실존의 권태를 극복하기 위한 ‘행복약’이 필요할까? 유럽과 아시아의 잉여 노인인구를 수용하기 위해 제 3 세계에 노인수용체계나 은퇴도시가 필요할까? 생명연장기획이 우리에게 건강과 고령을 줄 수 있다면, 고용 문제는 기술과 무기한 고용으로 해결될 수 있을 것이다. 그게 아니라면 우리가 지금 향하는 곳은 기계가 모든 일을 하는 고용 없는 경제—맑스가 예견한, 그러나 혁명 없이 달성되는 미래—인가? 넷째, 어떤 이데올로기적이고 종교적인 변화를 예상할 수 있을까? 고통과 죽음이 기술적으로 제거된다면, 전통적인 종교들은 그저 사라지고 말 것인가? 거듭되는 고통과 질병, 죽음이 없는 세계에서 기독교의 십자가가 어떤 의미를 가질 수 있을까? 번뇌라는 불교의 관념은 쓸모가 없어질 것이다. 150 세 이상의 기대 수명을 가진 사람들에게 천국이 어떤 의의를 가질 수 있을까? 우리는 (인생은 고통스럽고 짧다는) 불행의 신학들에서 (고통과 불편, 권태에 대한 의학적 해법을 동반한) 행복의 신학들로 옮겨갈 것이다. 그 결과는 오락의 사회다. 생애주기, 인간적 성욕, 재생산, 세대적 정의, 노화, 가족 생활과 관련된 통념들 일체를 발본적으로 다시 사고해야 할 것이다.

이상의 각본을 들어 엘리트들에게나 호소력이 있는 유토피아적 염원을 담은 공상과학의 예에 불과한 것으로 쉽사리 일축할 수도 있다. 그러나 크리스티안 바너드 박사가 1967 년 최초의 심장이식수술을 했을 때, 사람들은 이 수술을 값비싼 술수일 뿐이라 일축했었다. 40 여 년이 지난 지금 우리가 마주하고 있는 것은 줄기세포연구, 일상적인 장기이식, 나노기술, 태아수술, 성선택, 체외수정, 냉동보존술, 기타 등등이다. 인간 노화의 원인을 이해하려는 기술 명법(technological imperative)은 멈추어지지 않는다. 우리에게 필요한 것은 그 결과에 대비하는 것이다.

최재천 (이화여대): “뜻하지 않은 전지구적 인간 진화 실험: 전면적인 인종 혼화와 유전자 치환의 진화적 귀결”

진화는 거의 예외 없이 국지적으로 벌어진다. 생물의 이동 능력에는 한계가 있기 마련이라 아무리 동일한 종이라도 지리적으로 격리되어 있으면 서로 유전자를 섞기 어렵다. 오랜 기간 동안 격리되어 독립적으로 진화한 두 집단은 나중에 만나더라도 교배가 불가능할 정도로 달라져 때론 서로 다른 종으로 분화할 수 있다. 우리 인간도 예전에는 핀란드 사람들은

대체로 핀란드 사람끼리, 필리핀 사람들은 필리핀 사람끼리, 그리고 한국 사람들은 한국 사람끼리 결혼해서 자식 낳고 살았다. 그러나 근래 들어 전례 없이 다양하고 빈번한 인종간의 혼화가 일어나고 있다. 인류 역사에 이 같은 대규모의 유전적 혼화는 일찍이 없었다. 분자유전학의 발달로 질병을 일으키거나 열등한 유전자를 정상적이거나 우수한 유전자로 치환할 수 있는 시대가 눈 앞에 다가왔다. 이 엄청난 규모의 뜻하지 않았던 ‘실험’이 인간의 진화에 어떤 영향을 미칠지 유전적 관점에서 분석해보고자 한다. 유전자 치환과 인종간의 혼화로 개인 또는 국가 수준에서는 유전적으로 훨씬 건강한 변화가 일어날 수 있지만 집단 또는 인류 전체에는 치명적으로 불리한 결과를 빚을 수 있다. 매우 흥미로운 유전적 모순이 아닐 수 없다.

주제 2 (13:20-15:00): 지구화된 삶의 양식과 제도

장경섭 (서울대): “특수주의적 다문화주의: 혼인세계화의 시민권적 모순”

설동훈 (전북대): “원거리 아버지들: 외국인 이주노동자 아버지와 ‘기러기’ 아빠”

신의항 (서울대): “고등교육의 국제화: 중국과 한국의 비교연구”

장경섭 (서울대): 특수주의적 다문화주의: 혼인세계화의 시민권적 모순

한국인 남성과 아시아 여성 간 국제결혼이 말 그대로 폭발적으로 증가한 것은 한국이 범세계적 실존과 변화라는 완전히 새로운 시대로 진입하고 있음을 알리고 있는 것 같다. 이러한 근본적으로 새로운 세기의 현상은 한국의 다양한 지역들을 명백한 다종족 실체들로 변형시키고 있다. 중앙정부와 지방정부는 포괄적인 “다문화가족 지원” 정책을 신속하게 시작했고, 다양한 시민 그룹과 미디어, 심지어 기업들도 나름의 다문화주의 이니셔티브를 가지고 정부 정책에 호응해왔다. 기묘하게도, 이렇듯 겉보기에는 코스모폴리탄적인 움직임들은 비판적인 학자들과 인권옹호자들, 분리된 외국인 이주노동자들 그리고 많은 외국인신부들로부터 심각한 비판을 받아왔다. 무엇보다도 많은 외국인신부들은 그들의 인권옹호자들과 함께 한국이 “(자신들을) 다문화라고 부르는 것을 멈춰”달라고까지 요구했다. 왜냐하면 다문화주의에 대한 정부와 사회의 접근들 속에서 자신들이 자주 소외감이나 심지어 당혹스러움을 느끼기 때문이다. 심각한 역설 속에서 한국의 다문화주의 흐름은 (1) 외국인신부와 외국인 노동자, (2) 외국인신부와 그들이 속한 한국인 가족, (3) 외국인 신부와 한국인들을 분리한다는 점에서 근본적으로 특수주의적인 특징을 가지고 있다. 첫째, 외국인 이주노동자들은 생산 노동의 착

취적 조건들뿐 아니라 다문화주의 지원 정책에서의 공식적 배제(여러 불이익 중에서도 한국에 정착하거나 가족과 함께 생활할 권리를 법적으로 영구히 부정당하는 것을 포함하여)에 의해 좌절감을 느껴왔다. 둘째, 외국인신부의 물질적·사회적 지위는 기본적으로 (대개 매우 빈곤하고 나이가 많은) 그들의 가족구성원들의 지위에 의해 결정되는데, 한국 정부와 사회는 그들 가족의 운명을 의미 있게 향상시키는 데 있어 무능력하거나 그러한 의지는 없는 채 피상적으로 외국인신부들을 문화적으로 외래적인 주체들로 대우하는 배타적인 정책을 고안해왔다. 셋째, 외국인신부들이 많이 유입되고 영구적으로 정착하면서 (그리고 그들의 혼혈 자녀들이 증가하면서) 그들이 한국 생활에서 겪는 어려움을 경감시켜주는 것에 대한 온정주의적인 사회적 정서뿐 아니라 한국인들이 자신들을 다문화적 혹은 범세계적 주체로 재창조하려는 문화적·정치적 열망이 생겨났다. 여기에서 다문화적이라는 것은 문화적 차이들은 영원히 동결되고 반복적으로 상연되는 가운데 자신들이 외국인들과 공존하고 있다는 것이다. 한국 사회의 다문화주의 열풍 아래 이 모든 분리들은 외국인신부들에게 부여된 혹은 이들이 쟁취한 시민권과 정체성의 본질을 결정적으로 그리고 특징적으로 정의해왔다. 한국의 걸치레 다문화주의의 특수주의적 성격은 단순히 국가의 범세계적 지위에 대한 구조적 한계가 아니라 일종의 관리되는 범세계주의 혹은 범세계주의화를 위한 전략적 방침으로 간주되어야 한다. 실제로 일어나고 있는 지구화의 이러한 국면은 21세기의 사회학, 특히 국가와 세계, 종족, 젠더, 계급들 사이에서 새로이 형성되는 구조적 관계들에 대해 다양한 이론적·방법론적 함의를 제시한다.

설동훈(전북대): 원거리 아버지들: 한국의 외국인 이주노동자 아버지와 “기러기” 아빠

노동 혹은 교육을 위해 떨어져 사는, 두 가지 종류의 분거가족이 있다. 중국, 베트남, 인도네시아, 필리핀, 태국, 스리랑카, 우즈베키스탄, 방글라데시 등과 같은 아시아 국가 출신의 외국인 이주노동자 아버지들이 한국에서 가족 없이 일하고 있다. 그리고 “기러기” 아빠들 역시 미국, 캐나다, 호주, 뉴질랜드, 중국 등 외국에서 머물며 공부하고 있는 아내와 자녀들을 재정적으로 지원하기 위해 한국에서 일하고 있다. 둘 다 가족들을 위해 삶을 변화시키는 결정을 하고 헌신하고 있는데 여기에는 긍정적인 측면도, 부정적인 측면도 있을 수 있다. 이 글에서는 이들 가족, 이들에 대한 한국인들의 태도 혹은 여론, 그리고 한국 정부의 정책적 대응에 대한 사례 연구를 진행한다.

신의항(서울대): 고등교육의 국제화: 중국과 한국의 비교연구

학생들의 국제적 이동 패턴은 목적국과 출신국의 소프트파워와 연관되어 왔다. 2012년에는

전지구적으로 약 410만 명의 학생들이 외국에서 공부하고 있는 것으로 추산되었다. 최근에는 중국과 한국이 미국과 다른 목적국들에 가장 많은 수의 학생들을 보내는 3개국 가운데 두 국가로 등장했다. 지식기반 경제가 급속히 팽창하면서 국제적 고등교육은 관련국들의 지구적 경쟁력과 국가 경제에 영향을 미치는 문화적 상품이 되었다. 국제교육은 호주에서 세 번째로 큰 “수출 산업”이며, 2009년 약 180억 달러, 2012년 약 140억 달러를 벌어들였다. 2009년 영국에서 국제교육서비스는 228억 달러에 달했고, 다섯 번째로 큰 서비스 수출품이었다. 그리고 유학생들과 이에 딸린 사람들이 2011-12학년도 미국 경제에 미친 경제효과는 약 218억 달러였다. 개발도상국의 관점에서는 이러한 고도선진국들에 많은 수의 학생들을 보내면 국제교육의 비용을 감당해야 할 뿐 아니라 학생들의 지속적인 유출이 본국의 고등교육체계 발전에 미칠 수 있는 효과들에도 대처해야 한다.

이 연구에서는 중국과 한국에서 고등교육의 국제화가 갖는 여섯 가지 측면에 대해 비교적이고 역사적으로 분석한다. 첫째, 2000년 이후 학생들이 중국과 한국으로/부터 국제적으로 이주하는 경향과 변동을 조사한다. 학력 수준(대학/대학원)과 출신국에 따른 유학생들의 유입 규모를 검토하고, 학력 수준과 목적국에 따른 중국과 한국 학생들의 유출의 변화 패턴을 분석한다. 둘째, 중국과 한국에서의 해외대학 분교의 증가를 조사한다. 셋째, 중국과 한국에서 미국 우수대학들이 고등교육 시장을 위해 개발한 대량의 오픈 온라인과정이 미친 영향을 조사한다. 넷째, 중국의 공자학당, 한국의 한국문화원과 세종학당 등 두 국가의 정부 지원을 받는 해외 언어 연수 프로그램을 검토한다. 다섯째, 중국과 한국에서 고등교육기관을 선택하여 교수진 구성을 박사학위 또는 최종학위를 취득한 국가에 따라 조사한다. 마지막으로, 중국과 한국의 대학에서 강의실 내 교수언어로 영어를 사용하는 현 상태를 분석한다. 고등교육의 국제화의 이러한 측면들이 갖는 사회정치적 함의들은 교육 제국주의와 국내 고등교육 시장 보호를 위한 국가 정책 간 역동적인 상호작용이라는 맥락 속에서 연구된다.

주제 3 (15:10-16:50): 삶과 일의 새로운 (불)평등

Göran Therborn (Univ of Cambridge): “가로막힌 삶과 요절: 삶의 새로운 불평등”

Raymond Chan (City Univ of Hong Kong): “아시아의 생애주기 변화와 위험: 우리는 지금 어디에 와 있는가?”

주윤정 (서울대): “후기산업사회의 인간 ‘능력’의 재편성: 장애예술운동의 가능성”

Göran Therborn (Univ of Cambridge): “가로막힌 삶과 요절: 삶의 새로운 불평등”

전근대 시대에 부자와 빈자, 그리고 통치자, 귀족, 자유민과 노예가 공존하는 것은 불평등이 아닌 차이, 즉 남성과 여성, 청년과 노인의 차이 등으로 간주되고 논의되었다. 계몽주의 시대와 18세기 대서양 혁명 이후에서야 이는 불평등으로, 곧 초보적/현세적인 인간 평등이라는 규범에 대한 침해로 지각되었다.

근대에 들어 최근까지, 인간 수명이 다양하다는 사실, 어떤 사람들은 아프고 다른 사람들은 그렇지 않다는 사실은, 대체로 인간의 타고난 운에서 비롯된 차이로 여겨졌다. 공적 담론과 관습적인 주류 정치에서는 보통 여전히 그렇게 보고 있다. 그러나 생명과학과 사회과학이 새롭게 접근한 결과, 이 같은 기대 수명과 건강의 차이가 인간이 만든 불평등이라는 경험적 증거가 쌓여가고 있으며, 인과관계의 사슬이 명확해지고 있다.

이 논문에서는 『불평등의 킬링필드』라는 제목으로 출판된 책에 기반하여, 전지구적으로 나타나는 생명 관련 불평등의 확대에 관한 데이터를 일부 제시하되, 특히 선진 사회들에서 불평등의 확대가 나타난 점에 특별히 유의하는 한편, 가족 패턴의 변화와 연관시킬 것이다. 또 이 논문은 불평등에 대한 다면적 파악을 추구하려는 노력의 일환으로, 사회과학과 평등주의 정치를 역학(疫學)과 사회의학, 발달심리학은 물론 최근의 도덕·사회철학과 연관지을 것이다.

Raymond Chan (City Univ of Hong Kong): “아시아의 생애주기 변화와 위험: 우리는 지금 어디에 와 있는가?”

생애주기란 단계별로 맡은 바 역할과 기능(예컨대 아동기에는 학습, 성년기에는 일과 돌봄, 노년기에는 은퇴와 돌봄의 누리)이 있는 질서있는 삶의 패턴이다. 연구자들은 생애주기가 다양한 힘들—경제 구조, 고용 및 고용 정책, 특히 아동과 은퇴자에 대한 국가의 복지 제공—에 의해 표준화·구조화된다고 주장해 왔다. 이러한 생애주기 유형은, 초기 단계에 과업이 완수되고, 단계별 이행이 완만하게 이루어지면, 위험이 낮아질(또는 없어질) 것이라고 가정된다.

이런 표준화되고 전통적인 생애주기가 도전에 직면했고 ‘탈’(de-)의 과정을 겪고 있다는 주장이 제기되어 왔다. 생애주기는 더 이상 단순하고 선형적인 방식을 따르지 않는다. 동일한 연령 집단(cohort) 내에서, 그리고 서로 다른 세대 간에 변이가 더 크게 나타날 수 있다. 이는 개인, 가족, 일, 거시경제구조 내에서의 여러 변화들, 아울러 복지 삭감/개편의 산물이다. 또 개인화된 생애 이야기를 추구하는 흐름이 늘어난 것도 변화의 원인이다. 새로운 맥락에서의 새로운 생애주기는 서로 다른 유형의 표적에 대한 다른 유형의 위험확산에 일조한다. 종래의 위험개념이 주로 아동기와 노년기에 빈곤에 집중되어 있다는

전제를 따랐다면, 새로운 사회적 위험(new social risk)은 다양한 생애과정을 가로질러 발생하는 돌봄에 대한 우려와 그리고 가족, 돌봄의 의무와 고용 유지 사이에서 균형을 맞추는 것에 대한 우려를 추가한다. 이런 과도기적 기간에 대한 관심이 점차로 증가하고 있다. 사회정책은 예측가능한 위험에 노출되어 있는 아동과 노인 빈곤을 다루는 데 더 이상 국한되지 않으며, 서로 다른 생애주기 단계들로 확산되는 불확실성의 증가를 두고 고심한다. 생애주기와 위험에 대한 연구는 동아시아에서는 아직 제한적이다. 전반적으로 볼 때, 아시아 사회들은 서구에서와 비슷한 과정을 겪고 있다. 가족과 관계성의 불안정화, 여성 역할과 기능의 변화, 출산율의 저하, 일자리 불확실성의 증가, 그리고 (사회투자를 한층 강조하는) 사회정책의 변화 등이 그것이다. 그러나 서구와 동아시아 사이에서 차이점을 식별하는 것은 여전히 가능하다. 예컨대 동아시아의 복지 제공은 상대적으로 규모가 작고, 퇴직과 연금체계는 아직 발전 중이며, 강력한 가족주의적 문화가 개인들(특히 여성들)에 대한 제한을 가하고 있다. 이런 이유로 제도화의 효과는 조절될 수 있고, 생애주기는 여전히 어느 정도는 표준화되고 전통화될 수 있다. 더 나은 수준의 복지지원에도 불구하고, 우리에게서 사회적 시민권과 권리부여에 대한 강한 감각이 없다. 따라서 ‘재’제도화 경로는 꼭 달라질 수 있다. 실업이 쟁점으로 인정되기는 하지만, 실업의 수준은 서구 사회가 직면하고 있는 수준과 비할 바가 아니다.

이런 이유로 동아시아에서 이 주제를 다루는 연구자들은 몇 가지 질문을 고심하지 않으면 안 된다. 우리의 생애주기는 얼마나 표준화/전통적이며, 이런 생애주기는 근래 몇 십년간 얼마나 ‘탈’의 과정을 겪었는가? 복지 제공이 생애주기를 어느 정도까지 제도화하고 있는가? ‘탈’의 과정에서 어떤 종류의 새로운 사회적 위험이 발생되었는가? 이 질문들에 확고한 답변을 줄 수는 없지만, 이 논문에서는 서로 다른 사회적·경제적 맥락을 시야에 두고 생애주기와 위험의 개념들이 아시아에 적용가능한지를 논하고자 한다.

주윤희 (서울대): “후기산업사회의 인간 ‘능력’의 재편성: 장애예술운동의 가능성”

후기산업화 사회는 인간의 ‘능력’에 대한 인식을 근본적으로 변화시키고 있다. ‘능력’이란 개념은 산업화 시대에 도출이 되었는데, 표준화된 노동을 수행할 능력과 합리적 의사/행위 능력을 갖추지 못한 이들은 장애/무능력으로 범주화되었다. 이는 정상성과 소유적 개인주의의 확산과 관련이 있다. 하지만 후기산업사회의 도래와 더불어, 생산양식이 변화하고 창의적 산업이 강조가 되면서 또한 산업화 사회의 ‘능력’ 개념에도 변화가 등장하고 있다. 이런 상황에서 정상성/비정상성에 근거하지 않은 새로운 종류의 인간능력에 대한 실험과 창조가 풀뿌리 수준에서 이루어지고 있다. 특히 장애예술운동을 통해, 기존에 무능/장애로 인식되던 영역들이 새로운 미학과 감수성의 가능성으로 인식이 되고 있는

상황이다. 또한 이는 새로운 미학의 창출만이 아니라, 새로운 삶의 형식과 사회적 관계를 가능하게 하고 있다. 본 발표에서, 미국, 일본, 한국에서 이루어지고 있는 새로운 예술/사회 운동을 검토하고자 한다. 발달장애인들을 중심으로 한 예술 운동은 기존의 능력, 장애, 무능력의 개념을 변화하며, 새로운 삶의 형식과 사회적 관계의 가능성을 보여주고 있다. 대표적으로 미국의 크리에이티브 그로스, 일본의 에이블 아트, 한국의 로사이드의 활동에 대해 분석하고, 이런 활동의 후기산업사회의 인간능력의 재편과의 관계에 대해 논의하고자 한다.

둘째날 : 2013. 5. 31 금요일

주제 4 (10:10~11:50): 개인화, 친밀성, (포스트)가족

Lynn Jamieson (Edinburgh Univ.): “친밀성, 개인화, 그리고 사적 관계의 미래”

Yunxiang Yan (UCLA): “개인화에 대한 달콤한 반발력: 현대 중국에서 부모 주도적 이혼의 증가”

진미정 (서울대): “청년층 비혼 1인가구의 초상: 전이의 지연 혹은 개인화의 성취”

Lynn Jamieson (Edinburgh Univ.): “친밀성, 개인화, 그리고 사적 관계의 미래”

유럽 논평자 몇몇이 제안한 바, 세계의 서로 다른 지역들은 개인화 과정과 연결된 개인적 관계 면에서 더 강한 친밀성 쪽으로 향하는 유사한 전환을 경험하고 있다. 세계의 서로 다른 많은 지역의 학자들이 이 견해를 채택했으며, 때로 비판적으로 이를 비틀기도 했다. 중국과 남한의 학자들은 사회변동 과정이 ‘서구’ 스타일의 개인주의 없는 개인화를 수반한다고 제안한 바 있다. 유럽과 북미에서도, 사람들 사이의 연결이 디지털로 매개되는 일이 증가한다든지 점점 더 많은 관계의 측면들이 상업화된다는 점을 감안할 때, 대면관계의 중요성과 친밀성이 약해진다는 식의 상반된 주장이 끈질기게 제기된다. 사회변동을 연구하는 이론가들은 개인적 관계의 중요성에 관해 상반된 주장을 내놓는데, 개인적 관계가 사회변동을 가져오는 데 중요한 역할을 한다고 주장하기도 하고, 혹은 이들이 상대적으로 중요하지 않은데 이들은 거시적, 아마도 전지구적 수준의 변동의 주요 동인의 피해자일 뿐이거나 혹은 주의분산적인 측면이 있다고 주장한다. 예컨대 21 세기의 주요한 도전들, 말하자면 기후변화나 세계적 불황 등등에 대응함에 있어 개인적 관계는 변동의 핵심 요인이라고 보다는, 그것과는 무관해 보인다. 정말 그러한가? 대면적인 개인적

관계의 미래의 모습은 무엇인가? 세계의 다른 지역과의 대화 속에서 개인적 관계를 사유하여 얻게 되는 잠재적 이익은 무엇인가? 미래에 관한 일상적 사유에서 개인적 관계는 어떤 특징을 갖고 있는가? 개인적 관계는 우리의 문화적 삶과 사회구조, 그리고 우리 지구의 안녕의 미래에 무엇을 기여할 수 있는가? 사람들과 함께 걷고 친밀한 관계를 맺는 연구자와 더불어, 그리고 또한 이런 연구자들 없이 우리는 이 것에 대해 무엇을 알 수 있을까?

Yunxiang Yan (UCLA): “개인화에 대한 달콤한 반발력: 현대 중국에서 부모 주도적 이혼의 증가”

오늘날 중국 사회에서 새롭게 전개되고 있는 양상 중 하나로, (교육이나 구직, 배우자 선택, 결혼, 결혼 이후의 주거 등) 중요한 의사결정과 관련하여 부모들이 청년들의 삶에 대해 행사하는 영향력과 권력이 점점 더 커지고 있다는 점을 들 수 있다. 스스로의 인생을 산다는 것, 이는 중국 청년들의 가슴 속에서 빛나는 이상이지만, 극단적으로 경쟁적인 사회에서 부모의 도움 없이 청년들이 잘 해나갈 수 없게 되면서, 실제 삶에서 이 이상은 청년들의 손에서 조용히 빠져나가는 것 같다. 1980 년생 이후 청년들 사이에서 부모가 주도한 이혼이라는 새로운 현상을 검토한 후 내가 제시하는 주장은, 위험부담이 갈수록 커지는 사회에서 재-배태(re-embedment) 기제의 결여, 사회 생활에서 물질주의와 소비주의의 지배, 사회적 신뢰의 위기 및 개인적 신뢰가 여전히 점하는 중심성이 주요 요인으로 작용하여 부모 권력의 회귀와 스스로의 인생을 사는 것에 대한 추가적 도전으로 이어진다는 것이다. 또 중국의 사례는 개인화의 세계적 추세와 그 지역적 변이를 더 잘 이해할 수 있게 해 주는 질문 여럿을 제기한다.

진미정 (서울대): 청년층 비혼 1인가구의 초상: 전이의 지연 혹은 개인화의 성취

한국 가족의 가장 중요한 변화 가운데 하나는 모든 연령에서 1인 가구가 가파르게 증가하고 있다는 것이다. 1인 가구는 모든 가구 중 23.9%를 차지하며(통계청, 2011), 이 가운데 2~30대 청년들이 37.5%를 차지한다. 전통적인 생애과정에서는 청년들은 오직 교육, 또는 취업과 관련한 이유들로만 부모와 떨어져 살 수 있었다. 그들이 결혼을 하고 가족을 형성하면 곧바로 2인 가구 또는 3인 가구로 전이된다. 따라서 청년기 1인 가구는 전이기 일시적인 생활 형태로 여겨져 왔다. 받아들일 수 있는 이유들 없이는 청년들은 가족을 떠나지 않는다. 그러나 초혼 연령이 높아지면서 1인 가구 생활은 장기화되고 복잡해지는 것 같다. 청년들은 결혼

전에 부모 집을 떠나 1인 가구로서의 삶을 시작한다. 1인 가구 생활의 경험과 의미는 청년들의 성별과 사회경제적 상황에 따라 다를 것이다.

이 글에서는 30대 비혼 남녀 13명에 대한 심층면접에 기초하여 청년기 1인 가구의 삶을 조명한다. 그들이 어떻게 1인 가구의 삶을 시작하고 살게 되었는지, 자신의 지위를 어떻게 인식하고 있는지, 그리고 어떻게 자신의 미래를 생각하고 있는지를 살펴본다. 인터뷰 결과는 혼합된 양상을 보여준다. 한편으로 1인 가구의 청년들은 시공간의 사적인 점유를 강조하면서 독립적인 삶을 살아가는 것처럼 보인다. 그들은 경제적인 이유들 때문이더라도 사생활을 희생하지 않는다. 재정적인 문제가 있을 때에는 더 작은/더 빈곤한 거주 단위로 옮겨 친구나 형제자매와 함께 사는 것을 선호한다. 그들에게는 개인화된 삶을 사는 것이 중요하다. 그들은 부모와 상의하지 않은 채 자신의 생애과정의 사건들을 계획하고, 자신들의 삶을 지지할 사회적 관계들을 선택하며, 부모로부터 경제적으로 독립적이기 위해 노력한다. 그러나 다른 한편으로 오직 일부만이 부모로부터 완전하게 독립할 수 있다. (집세 또는 실직 상태일 때의 생활비 등) 재정적 어려움이 있을 때면 대개 부모에게 의존한다. 또한 가족에 대한 전통적인 관념을 유지하고 있는 것처럼 보인다. 남성들은 재정적으로 준비가 될 때까지 결혼을 연기하고, 여성들은 배우자가 자신보다 사회적으로 또는 경제적으로 더 높은 지위에 있기를 기대한다.

성인기 1인 가구의 이러한 초상들은 장경섭과 송미영(2010)이 한국의 가족에 대해 서술한 ‘개인주의 없는 개인화’ 개념을 지지하고 있다. 청년들은 생애과정의 새로운 단계를 형성하는 개인화된 삶을 추구하지만, 그것이 반드시 가족주의에서 개인주의로의 관념적 변화를 반영하지는 않는다. 장경섭과 송미영(2010)은 이러한 경향을 ‘위험-회피적 개인화’라고 명명했는데, 이는 개인들이 현재의 삶의 가족-관련 위험들을 최소화하기 위해 삶의 개인화된 단계들을 연장하는 사회적 경향을 의미한다. 1인 가구로 생활하는 사람들은 자신이 가족을 형성할 자원들을 충분히 갖고 있지 않다고 생각하기 때문에 가족으로의 전이를 연기하고 있다. 이러한 점에서 청년기 1인 가구는 자발적이면서도 비자발적인 상태이다.

주제 5 (13:10~14:50): 포스트-가부장제, 세대관계, 개인적 삶

하정화 (서울대): 배우자 사별이 한국 노인의 성인 자녀와의 관계에 미치는 영향

은기수 (서울대): “포스트-가부장제 사회로의 경로: 성별 (비)선호의 전지구적 수렴과 동아시아의 특수성”

Stevi Jackson (York Univ): “근대성/복수의 근대성과 개인적 삶: 이론적 맹점에 대한 성찰”

하정화 (서울대): 배우자 사별이 한국 노인의 성인 자녀와의 관계에 미치는 영향

미국의 데이터에 근거한 선행연구는 부모의 사별이 자녀로부터의 정서적 지지 증가와 연관된다는 점을 보여주지만, 다른 문화들에서 삶의 후반기에서의 배우자 사별이 세대간 관계에 미치는 영향에 대해서는 거의 알려진 것이 없다. 이 글에서는 한국의 노인들에 관한 데이터를 이용하여 (1) 배우자 사별이 부모-자녀 관계의 긍정적·부정적 측면에 미치는 효과, (2) 이러한 효과들이 자녀의 효도 책임에 대한 노인들의 기대와 자녀들과의 지리적 근접성에 의해 조절되는지 여부를 검토한다. 분석은 “노인의 삶의 질 조사”(2003) 데이터(서울과 춘천에 거주하는 노인들에 대한 층화다단계확률샘플링)에 기초하고 있다. 기혼 노인들에 비해 사별한 노인들은 자녀들과의 긍정적 상호작용에서는 낮은 수준을, 부정적 상호작용에서는 높은 수준을 나타냈다. 효도 책임에 대한 노인들의 인식은 의미 있는 조절 효과를 갖지 않는 반면, 지리적 근접성은 의미 있는 조절 요인이었다. 분석 결과에 따르면 사별은 미국에서보다 한국에서 세대간 관계에서의 긴장을 보다 더 야기할 수 있다. 이러한 문화적 환경 속에서는 배우자 사별에 적응하는 데 있어 노인과 그 자녀들이 부정적인 감정을 줄이도록 노력하고 건설적인 관계를 형성하는 것이 사별한 노인의 안녕을 향상시킬 것이다.

은기수 (서울대): “포스트-가부장제 사회로의 경로: 성별 (비)선호의 전지구적 수렴과 동아시아의 특수성”

가부장제는 전통적인 동서양 국가들 대부분에서 가족과 사회질서의 주요한 형태였다. 과거에는 가부장제의 한 구성요소로서 남아선호가 거의 모든 사회들에 만연했다. 많은 사회들에서 근대화화 와 경제적 생산양식의 변화는 남성, 그리고 가족 내 남아의 중요성을 감소시켰다. 가부장제와 남아선호는 근대 들어 그 힘을 잃었다. 남아선호는 자녀들의 성 구성의 균형을 가치 있게 여기는 성별 무관심과 성별 균형 선호로 빠르게 대체되어 왔다. 여전히 남성들이 공적 영역과 사적 영역을 지배하고 있는 몇몇 동아시아 사회들에서는 남아선호가 성별 선호의 주요한 타입으로 유지되어 왔다. 동아시아에서 남아선호는 그 영향력을 잃어가면서 서구에서처럼 성별 무관심과 성별 균형 선호로 대체되고 있는 것 같다. 그런데 놀랍게도 한국에서는 최근 여아선호가 남아선호를 대체하기 시작한 것이 발견된다. 이 연구에서는 한국에서 특히 1997년 경제 위기 이후 가족이 근본적으로 변화하는 상황에서 여아선호 증가가 갖는 의미를 이해해 보고자 한다.

Stevi Jackson (York Univ): “근대성/복수의 근대성과 개인적 삶: 이론적 맹점에 대한 성찰”

이 글에서는 유럽과 아시아 맥락에서 사회 변화, 개인적 삶, 젠더 관계를 고찰할 때 제기되는 몇몇 쟁점들을 다루고자 한다. 근대성과 친밀성에 대한 서구의 연구와 이론이 제시하는 대부분의 의제는 개인화에 대한 벡과 벡-게른스하임의 작업과 기든스의 ‘친밀성의 변동’ 테제에 대한 대응, 특히 이에 대한 비판에 의해 형성되어 왔다. 이러한 비판들은 생산적이었지만 몇몇 주목할 만한 사례(Evans, 2010; Jamieson, 2011 등)를 제외하고는 여전히 유럽중심적이다. 그러나 근대성에 대해 유럽중심주의 이슈를 다루는 다른 연구들이 있다. 여기에는 (다양한 입장들에 대한 간략한 용어로) 다중적 근대성들과 범세계적 사회학에 대한 논쟁들이 포함되는데, 여기에서도 젠더 혹은 친밀한 삶은 중심으로 다루어지지 않고 있다. 몇몇 동아시아 학자들 역시 서구의 근대성 이론들을 연구하고 다양한 방식으로 수정하거나 도전해왔는데(Chang(2010), Chang and Song(2010), Tanabe and Tokita Tanabe(2004), Yan(2009) 등), 젠더 관계에 주목하기는 했으나 근대성 이론가들에 대한 서구 페미니스트 비판들에 대한 인식은 거의 없었다. 덧붙여 아시아에서 근대성의 젠더화된 결과들에 대해 많은 페미니스트 연구가 수행되었으나, 대부분 근대성에 대한 다른 논쟁들과 연결되어 있지 않으며 문화이론과 포스트식민이론 같은 다른 이론적 전통들의 영향을 받고 있다. 이에 따라 상당수의 관련 논의들이 진행되고 있지만, 서로 분리된 학문분과들에서 이루어지고 있으며, 따라서 이들 간 연관이 언제나 만들어지고 있지는 않다. 이 글에서는 이러한 논의들 가운데 일부를 이끌어내고자 하는데, 이는 우리의 서로 다른 위치들로부터 어떻게 근대성과 젠더, 친밀성을 상상하고 이론화할 것인가에 대해 답변하기 위해서가 아니라 질문을 던지기 위해서이다. 이를 통해 서구 학계의 유럽중심주의에 도전하는 것뿐 아니라 서구 이론이 유통되는 경로에 대해 비판적으로 고찰하는 것 역시 중요하다는 점을 제안하고자 한다. 어떤 이론이 유통되고 또 유통되지 않는가. 그것은 어떻게 관련되고 수정되는가. 또한 다른 식으로 이론화하는 것이 가능한가. ‘연결된 사회학들’(Bhambra, 2010)을 위해 ‘서구’뿐 아니라 사회 이론과 연구의 유럽적 전통을 지방화하고자 한다면 이는 사회 변화의 젠더화된 결과들에 대해 생각하는 방식들에 어떠한 영향을 미칠 것인가?

주제 6 (15:00-16:40): 돌봄과 복지의 변화하는 레짐

Rajni Palriwala (Univ of Delhi): “합리성, 도구성, 감정의 뒤엎힘: 돌봄과 친밀성에 대하여”

Emiko Ochiai (Kyoto University): “아시아는 유럽의 미래인가: 아시아 돌봄 레짐의 변동”

Sven Hort (서울대 & Södertörn Univ): “후기근대 혹은 근대 사회(복지) 형성”

Rajni Palriwala (Univ of Delhi): “합리성, 도구성, 감정의 뒤얽힘: 돌봄과 친밀성에 대하여”

일반화된 상품 생산, 자본주의의 확산과 심화, 이와 맞물린 근대(유럽 계몽주의와 연결된)에 대한 열망과 함께, 시장과 가정, 이성과 감정의 이분법은 사회적 사실로 받아들여지고 그 가치를 부여받았다. 이성과 감정은 분리되어 있는 편이 서로에게 더 좋다고 주장되었다. 이러한 이분법은 자율적이고 자기충족적인 개인으로서의 시민과 자아라는 이상에 대응하는 것이었다. 철학적·사회학적 담론들은 개인이 이성, 감정의 건강을 위해, 도구성과 표현적인 것, 자기이해와 이타주의를, 각각이 자기 개인의 삶 속에서는 모두 현존함이 분명할지라도, 이들을 구획화 할 수 있거나 구획해야 한다고 시사해온 듯하다.

그러나 이론 이성과 실천 이성의 평행적인 구별을 눈여겨 보거나, 정서라는 것이 감정의 요소와 의미의 요소를 갖고 있다고 생각한다면 이분법을 유지하는데에 대해 의문이 제기될 수 있다. (경제나 정책 결정 등) 합리적이라고 지칭된 삶의 영역들에서 나타나는 사회적 관계들과 관행들을 보면 이 점이 입증될 수 있다. 더욱이, 이 이분법의 적절성을 견지하는 틀 내에서조차, 이성으로써 조절되지 않는 감정은 의존성을 유발하는 것이자 장애를 일으키는 강박이자, 또는 테러리스트를 낳는 것으로 간주되고 경험될 수 있다. 감정의 위계제는 감정의 순수성이나 감정의 합리성에 기초하여 구성될 수 있다.

이성과 감정 간의 교차와 뒤얽힘, 상호의미의 창출이 가장 분명한 삶의 영역은 아마 현대에, 정념까지는 아니더라도, 감정 본연의 무대로 지칭되는 곳, 즉 친밀하고 가족적이며 사회적인 영역일 것이다. 문화와 계급, 성별, 그리고 다른 단층선을 가로질러 비교를 해 보면, 도구적인 것과 정서적인 것의 뒤얽힘이 그 형태와 접합, 수용가능성 면에서 다양하다는 사실이 나타난다. 이 변이들은 그저 개인적이고 우연적인 것이 아니며, 레이몬드 윌리엄스의 개념인 감정의 구조라는 견지에서 살펴볼 수 있다.

사랑과 돌봄을, 단어와 노동의 다양한 관행에서 표현되는 의미와 감정으로 바라볼 때, 이 감정의 구조들, 뿐만 아니라 정치경제에서 합리적인 것과 정서적인 것 사이의 규범적 구별이 배태된 흔적이 드러난다. 상품화된 노동이 지배적이지만 무임금 돌봄노동이 유의미하게 존속하는 맥락에서는, 도구적인 것과 표현적인 것의 이분법은 후자가 사랑의 노동으로 수행되는 것이라고 확인해주는 것이라는 주장이 제기되었다.

이 발표에서 나는 도구성과 감정으로 지칭될 수 있는 것이 사회적 실천 속에서 상호침투하는 민속지적이고 경험적인 예들을 논의하며, 이성과 감정의 이분법이 갖는 타당성을 문제삼고자 한다. 진행 중 작업의 첫 번째 단계로 이 이분법의 구성 안에 있는 종족중심주의와 계급적·성별적 편향이 드러날 것이다. 여기서 제기할 수 있는 단순한 기술(記述)적 질문은 이것이다. 한 사회와 문화 안에서의, 그리고 사회들과 문화들을

가로지르는 사회학적 정상과 사회적 정상은 어떤 것인가? 도구적인 것과 정서적인 것의 분리인가, 아니면 이들의 상호중첩인가?

Sven Hort (서울대 & Södertörn Univ): “후기근대 혹은 근대 사회(복지) 형성”

최근 역사에서 가장 성공적인 국가형태가 유럽 복지국가와 아시아 발전국가라는 주장이 제기되곤 한다. 이들의 미래는 어떻게 될 것인가? 이 국가들은 근대적인 발전복지국가로 수렴되고 있는가? 오늘날의 세계에서는 (영속적 휘발성 대 안정성과 지속가능성 등) 불확실성이 넘쳐나며, 다음과 같이 묻는 것이 아주 적절하다. 이 시대는 어떤 시대이며, 인간 개인은 누구인가? 이 순간 ‘우리’가 목격하고 있는 발전의 종류는 무엇인가? 현 시대의 세계적인 인간적·사회적 발전에서 사회들과 국가들이 향하는 곳은 어디인가? 근대적 사회복지구성체라고 이름붙일 수 있는 무언가 쪽인가, 아니면 더 기본적인 인간 생존 단위들, 심지어 전쟁국가들 쪽에 더 가까운가? 이 단위들은 현존하는 인간적 복지 제도와 체계를 건설하고 강화하며 발전(재건)시키고 있는가? 나아가 이 나라들은 같은 방향, 곧 문명화 과정을 따르는 단일한 (사회복지) 근대성을 향해 가고 있는가, 아니면 서로 다르고 분기하는 방향으로 가는 연대기적으로 평행한 궤적의 사례들인가? 이 나라들은 동일한 ‘세계’에 속하는가, 아니면 동떨어진 세계들인가? 진행 중인 동아시아 복지 체제가 존재하는가, 이 때 한국은 그 주요 사례 중 하나인가? 스칸디나비아는 자신의 복지국가를 ‘압축근대성’ 하에서 재건하고 있는가, 그리고 아시아의 패턴과 유럽의 패턴 사이에 어떤 종류의 차이들과 유사성들이 있는가?

복지국가는 유럽이 발명한 것이지만 세계의 다른 지역, 특히 동아시아와 최근에는 남아시아 및 동남아시아로 확산되었다. 하지만 지난 2~30 년 동안, 사회와 국가의 조직에 관한 전지구적 수준의 지배적 사유양식에서는 평등주의적이고 민주적인 복지국가라는 관념은 이질적이었다. 전지구적 컨센서스 접근법은 시장경제에 대한 국가개입(높은 세금, 관대한 복지혜택, 부패방지수단을 비롯한 공적 책임성의 증가 등)이 근본적으로 결함이 있으며, 장기적으로는 자유롭고 열린 사회의 가능성을 저해하는 것이라 생각해왔다. 바로 여기에서 가장 최근의 세계화 이론들이 다른 유형의 세속적/비세속적 사상들을 고려하지 않으며, 비교복지 국가연구에서의 가장 지배적인 연구와 만나고 있다.

The Post-body –demographic, economic and social dilemmas of the future

Bryan S. Turner
The Graduate Center
City University of New York

Abstract

We are all familiar with the idea that as a result of improvements in the standard of living there has been a significant improvement in the life expectancy of people in the developed world. In this lecture, I focus on a related development – the so-called ‘life extension project’. This program promises through extensive technological intervention to maximize both therapy (to remove suffering) and enhancement (to improve our capabilities) resulting in an indefinite prolongation of life. Radical bio-gerontology promises not only that humans will live well beyond 120 years, but they can do so without illness and disease. The utopian dream of radical post-humanism is that death is not inevitable. Hypothetically the outcome of the life extension project is the post-body. The ‘natural body’ is replaced by a synthetic body – an assemblage of human organs supplemented with computers, nanotechnological machines, artificial organs, and a brain enhanced by drugs and medical technologies. In short, the ‘human’ will be ontologically transformed. In the future society there will be both humans and post-humans.

Sociologically speaking what will this post-human society look like? Firstly, it will be radically unequal, because life-extension technologies will be expensive. Declining life expectancy in many African societies will be matched by radical life enhancement in Korea and Japan. With low migration and low fertility, East Asia will require massive technological development. Secondly, because of low total fertility rates (in Asia around 1.2), there will be few children and many aged adults. If the economies of the developed world move towards high-technology production and structural unemployment, there will be considerable inter-generational conflict. Individuals with post-bodies at the age of 120 may have one child around the age of 90, but no grand children. The result will be the post-family – few children, serial monogamy, and the deeply-aged in gated communities. Clearly filial piety is irrelevant to this social structure. If existing generations survive until they are on average 120 years, they will be the last generations with pensions, employment histories, and assets. Thirdly, we can anticipate that men may be more isolated than women. Will deep old age involve new forms of loneliness, depression, isolation and alienation? Will we require a ‘happiness pill’ to cope with the boredom of indefinite existence? Will we require geriatric storage systems or retirement cities in the third world to store the surplus geriatric populations of Europe and Asia? If life extension projects can give us health and old age, then the employment issue could be solved by technology and indefinite employment. Or are we moving towards the jobless economy where machines do all the work – the future predicted by Marx but without revolutions? Fourthly, what ideological and religious changes might we anticipate? If suffering and death can be technologically eliminated, will traditional religions simply disappear? What meaning can the Christian Cross have in a world without constant pain, disease and death? The Buddhist idea of suffering will be obsolete. Can Heaven have any significance for people with a life expectancy of 150 years and more? We

will move from theologies of unhappiness (life is painful and short) to theologies of happiness (with medical solutions to pain, discomfort and boredom). The outcome is the Entertainment Society. Notions relating to the life cycle, human sexuality, reproduction, generational justice, ageing and family life will all require radical rethinking.

These scenarios can easily be dismissed as examples of science fiction involving utopian aspirations only for the elite. However when Dr Christiaan Barnard performed the first heart transplant in 1967, it was dismissed as an expensive gimmick. Some four decades later, we now have stem-cell research, routine organ transplants, nanotechnology, foetal surgery, sex selection, IVF, cryonics and much more. The technological imperative to understanding the causes of human ageing is unstoppable. We need to prepare for the consequences.

Introduction: the somatic society

In the modern world, wherever one turns the body and bodies appear to be problematic for political, moral and cultural reasons. In this list of problems I include, almost at random, ageing, infertility, same-sex marriage, attempts to declare circumcision an abuse of children, stem-cell research, cosmetic surgery, sexual-re-assignment surgery and so forth. To this mundane list, we can add fears about epidemics if not pandemics – HIV/AIDS, SARS, ‘bird flu’ (H1N1), Nile River virus and many more. In today’s lecture, I want to think about a different but related range of issues or disruptions concerning the sharp decline in human fertility in advanced societies combined with a rapid greying of populations. In response, there are new strategies for ageing including the growth of techniques for the prolongation of life (the life extension project) and various governmental responses to low fertility. While in many societies the working class is shrinking because of these demographic changes, there is rising unemployment, especially among low and semi-skilled young men. This contradiction (shrinking working class and youth unemployment) is produced by two widespread changes in the modern economy. The first is that technical improvements and greater efficiency (computers and robots in industrial production) reduced the demand for labour in factory production. The second is that the slow-down in the global economy has led many societies, especially in Europe, to adopt austerity strategies, which is depressing the demand for labour. Many governments however believe that their long-term economic growth will require significant inward labour migration to offset an ageing and shrinking workforce. We can anticipate that unemployed, underemployed and generally marginalized semi-skilled youth will be attracted to extremist political parties. We can anticipate a rise in racism and xenophobia combined with significant social unrest. This pattern – demographic change, economic slow-down and social unrest – has gripped southern Europe – Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece.

Spain is an important example of these problematic circumstances. Economists have predicted that the unemployed will reach 6 million out of a population of 47 million in the first quarter of 2013. The unemployment rate is close to 27 percent, but for Spanish youth it is 55%. Some 640,000 jobless, unskilled Spanish workers below the age of 30 years are joining the long-term unemployed. Because unskilled male workers are the most significantly affected by the economic downturn since 2008, there is a real threat to the actual fabric of society (Buck, 2013).

Two demographic changes have significant consequences for modern societies. There is much anxiety in terms of sub-optimal reproduction, the burden of dependency, retirement of the Baby Boomers around 2030, Alzheimer's Disease, and so forth. There is another reason both to start and to conclude this lecture with a reference to population, namely that it pre-occupied much of the work of Michel Foucault (2007) relating to security, scarcity, discipline and population. For Foucault, population was the beginning of the techniques of governmentality, but it was also the condition that first produced sociology. The government of the body – the diet of individuals and the government of populations - is closely associated with political crises and social anxieties. In this respect, in my *Regulating Bodies* (Turner, 1992:11-13) I defined modern communities as 'somatic societies' by which I meant a society in which 'the body is the dominant means by which the tensions and crises of society are thematized; the body is the stuff of our ideological reflections on the nature of our unpredictable time. We live in a world that is out of joint'.

Thus a somatic society is one in which critical social and political concerns are transferred onto the human body such that bodily disruptions provide a vocabulary for thinking about political disruptions. In my early work I looked for historical illustrations in the psychiatric and medical fields with the rise and fall of onanism, hysteria, anorexia, obesity, eating disorders and so forth as areas of contention and controversy, the very ambiguity, confusion and fuzziness of which testified to the presence of social ambiguity, conflicting interests and contested world views. That was written in 1992. In the intervening 20 years, the sense of human crisis if not catastrophe has grown rather than diminished.

The study of the human body has consequently enjoyed significant growth and increasing attention culminating for example in 2009 with recognition by the American Sociological Association of 'the body and embodiment' as an area of professional growth and academic relevance.

This interest in the human body is an intellectual response to fundamental changes in the contemporary relationship between bodies, technology and society. Scientific advances in medicine and genetics, particular the new reproductive technologies, stem-cell research, cryonics, nanotechnology, and cloning techniques, have given the human body a problematic social and cultural status. The global market for the sale of organs has raised many legal and moral questions about the ownership and economic value of human bodies. However for many biogerontologists, ageing, disease and death no longer appear to be necessary, immutable facts about the human condition, but contingent and therefore malleable features of human existence. Many of these medical techniques – such as cryonics for freezing bodies – are still at an experimental stage and much of the literature in the field reads like science fiction rather than science. However we can anticipate that aspects of these technologies will eventually begin to influence our lives in dramatic ways. In 1967 Professor Christiaan Barnard performed the first heart transplant operation at the Grote Schuur Hospital. Similar experiments had previously been conducted on chimpanzees and in the majority of these early heart transplant operations, the patients typically died shortly afterwards. Despite his technical brilliance, Barnard's first patient died eighteen days after the operation from pneumonia. At the time, heart transplants were regarded as merely medical gimmickry and they were often condemned because they were seen to be expensive technology solutions for a limited number of patients in a world where the mass of humanity, especially in Africa, lived relatively short lives with depressingly high levels of

poverty and morbidity. Almost half a century later, organ transplants are routine low-risk procedures and medical science is now producing hearts and other organs that can be cultivated in the laboratory with modern genetic technologies. In the context of the modern longevity debate, a heart transplant can be regarded as simply one basic technique among many for extending life indefinitely.

The Body and the Sociology of Ageing

What social causes have made 'the sociology of the body' an area of academic investment and debate? Why 'the body' now? Many of these broad social concerns behind the turn to the body have been captured recently by Herve Juvin in *The Coming of the Body* (2010) which vividly describes the many challenges to society arising from the technological reshaping of the body. In my *Handbook of Body Studies* (2012) I identified four social movements which in particular have brought the body to social and political prominence: the women's movement and the quest for equality; the gay and lesbian movement for recognition; the disability movement and the quest for social rights; and more recently geriatric movements around health, retirement, pensions and longevity.

The sociology of disability and the disability movement have some similar features, and disability is closely connected with ageing (Ingstad and White 1995). Disability activists point out that the majority of us will in old age be classified as disabled. We are merely TAPs – Temporarily Able Persons. Often neglected by mainstream sociological theory, the notion of disability has become a prominent aspect of the sociology of the body because it raises in an acute form the underlying problem of the ontological status of the body. Disability has come to be analysed as socially constructed and defined, not as a limiting physical condition, but as the absence of social rights. The result has been a substantial critique of the 'disability business' (Albrecht, 1992) and the regimes of care and management that surround 'bodily alterations' (Seymour, 1989). Classical studies of the cultural meanings of the body and disability such as Henri-Jacques Stiker's *Corps infirmes et societes* (1982) have not received the attention that they deserve in the traditional sociology of health and illness. There has been an emerging critical literature on disability that has had an important effect on how the social sciences understand the body, because notions of disability, handicap and impairment are now thoroughly contested (Barnes, Mercer and Shakespeare 1999). These intellectual changes were to some extent indicated in disability studies by Zola's critical lecture on 'bringing bodies back in' (Zola, 1991). It is now recognised that the sociology of the body can make important contributions to the study of impairment and disability.

The implications of cloning and artificial reproduction for human rights are far reaching, and they have been addressed in academic debates about rights to reproduce. However, there is an emerging issue for the body and society that concerns the social consequences of medical science for ageing which can now be conceived in terms of a longevity project. In traditional societies, the relationship between resources (especially land and the food supply) and life expectancy was, more or less, regulated by a Malthusian logic. More recently, there has however been considerable speculation as to whether medical science could reverse the ageing process. Between the 1960s and 1980s the conventional view of mainstream biology was that normal cells had a 'replicative senescence', that is normal tissues can only divide a finite number of

times before entering a stage of quiescence. Biologists concluded by extrapolation that finite cell division meant the ageing of the whole organism was inevitable. These findings confirmed the traditional view that human life had an intrinsic and predetermined limit, and that it was the discourse of pathology that described how certain cells might out survive the otherwise inescapable senescence of cellular life.

Certain non-pathological cells (or stem cells) were capable of indefinite division, and hence were 'immortalised'. The cultivation of these cells as an experimental form of life has challenged existing assumptions about the boundaries between the normal and the pathological, and between life and death. Stem-cell research begins to define the arena within the body that has reserves of renewable tissue, and suggests that the limits of biological growth are not fixed or inflexible. The body has a surplus of stem cells capable of survival beyond the death of the organism. With these developments in bio-gerontology, the capacity of regenerative medicine to expand the limits of life becomes a plausible and profitable aspect of modern medicine. This interpretation of replication locates ageing as a shifting site between surplus and waste, between obsolescence and renewal, creating utopian visions of everlasting life on earth.

Three Dilemmas: demographic, economic and social

The historical debate about the political economy of populations – or in Foucault's terms the 'bio-politics of the population' - has been dominated by the legacy of Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) in his famous *Essay on the Principle of Population* in 1798. Malthus's *Essay on Population* rapidly became a mainstay of political economy, albeit heavily criticized by Karl Marx. Consequently Malthus and Marx are often coupled together, despite Marx's attempts to expunge any assumptions about population from his theories. Foucault in *Security, Territory, Population* (2007:77), only refers to Malthus once in the discussion of security and population, and treats Malthus, along with Marx and Ricardo, as the backbone of nineteenth-century political economy. Simplifying Malthus's argument, his demography offered human societies a stark choice. The first option is to enjoy unlimited sexual pleasures spawning large numbers of children, and thereby run the risk in the long run of famine, hardship and social unrest. The second option is to delay marriage, restrain sexual desire and curb the number of children per household, and thereby increase the prospects of relative security. Malthus's work was a sophisticated analysis, but he had to make certain assumptions about the availability of arable land, a stable labour force and the low level of technological available to farms.

Foucault in his discussion of population in *Security, Territory, Population* (2007) noted that the question of population arose when land had been deserted as a consequence of some catastrophe such as an epidemic or war. Malthus's concern was over too much population pressure on the land as a result of high fertility rates. The emerging anxiety of modern societies is that they have too few bodies as a result of low fertility and too many old bodies as a result of longevity. We may for the sake of convenience call this double dilemma the neo-Malthusian dilemma.

In many respects the so-called ‘demographic transition’ – the decline in fertility rates, the improvement in mortality rates and the corresponding ageing of the population – has been at the core of social change in the late twentieth century. All developed societies are now characterized by dramatically low (that is often sub-optimal) fertility rates, increasing life expectancy and ageing of the population. In retrospect it is now clear that declining total fertility rates (TFRs) have been the most important cause of the social transformations of the family and the status of women in the twentieth century and have been critical in improving women’s social participation as active citizens, not only in the formal economy, but in civil society.¹ In turn these changes in the family, reproduction and women’s status have important and direct consequences for citizenship in the twenty-first century. The causes of declining fertility rates are well known: the rise in female education, urban living, the decline of agricultural employment, family planning and contraception (Caldwell and Caldwell, 2005).

A replacement fertility of the population in the developed world is roughly 2.1 births per woman and globally it is approximately 2.33. The TFR for the United States in 2011 was 2.01 or below replacement, but its population continues to grow because of legal and illegal inward migration. In South Central Asia the TFR is 3.3, in Southeast Asia 2.7 and in East Asia 1.7. Some four decades ago the average TFR in East Asia was 6. In short, the replacement rate in East Asia is defined as sub-optimal. According to the CIA’s *The World Factbook*, in 2012 the TFRs for East Asia are as follows: Singapore 0.78; Hong Kong 1.09; Taiwan 1.1; Japan 1.39; and China 1.55. South Korea offers a parallel example of these developments. As a result of rapid economic development and urbanization, women were drawn into formal employment and out of the agricultural economy. By 2003, the TFR was down to 1.1. Social change has consequently been dramatic, especially in terms of urbanization.

It is well known that Japan’s demographic transition has been especially profound and its consequences are highly problematic. Japan has a rapidly ageing population and the ‘burden of dependency’ is extreme. The Japanese population over the age of 65 in 1988 was 11.0% but this is predicted to rise to 23.6% by 2021. The average life expectancy of Japanese women in 2008 was 85 years, but it is predicted that it will rise to 97 years by 2050. Other Asian countries are also experiencing an ageing problem. For example China’s economic ‘miracle’ has been associated with its so-called ‘demographic dividend’ but Chinese policy makers are worried by the decline in the working age population which shrank in 2012 by around 3.4 million persons. As the Chinese middle class has grown so has its TFR declined, but China’s one-child family policy of the 1970s has been a major factor in its fertility decline. Efforts to increase fertility in the region, for example in Singapore, through policy initiatives have not been successful (Thang, 2011).

¹ The TFR is defined by reference to a hypothetical or imaginary woman who has completed her reproductive life cycle (15-49 years of age). It is the average number of children that would be born to such a woman assuming she would experience the exact current age-specific fertility rate in her life time and assuming that she survived through her complete reproductive life. The replacement fertility rate for any given society is above 2 on the assumption that there is some inevitable mortality of young children. Many developed societies, without inward migration, are below the replacement rate and hence their replacement is ‘sub-optimal’.

Denmark's population is more or less equivalent to Singapore's demographic features are more or less in line with global trends. The comparison with Singapore is interesting given their relatively similar populations, but Singapore has a much lower birth rate and a much larger ambition to recruit through inward migration. Its population is relatively stable. In 1995 it stood at 5,233,000 and is predicted to reach 5,698,000 in 2025. In 2010 Denmark had a TRF of 1.85 (which is rather high by global standards) and life expectancy at 75 years was 10.9 years or approximately 86 years. Its inward migration has fallen from 29,000 in 1995 to a mere 9,000 in 2025. Despite its low inward migration figures, Denmark was involved in a global dispute about Islam in the famous Danish cartoon controversy.

Looking at the complex relationship between fertility, ageing, migration and social integration, I argue that there is an intriguing paradox between individual rights (such as individual rights to freedom of movement, namely mobility in search of employment and a better life), low fertility and social cohesion. Persistent low fertility rates present democratic governments with difficult choices. In the absence of adequate population replacement through optimal fertility, democratic governments and their economies are faced with an ageing work-force and rising health care and pension costs. Assuming policy interventions cannot rapidly improve fertility rates, there are various but limited policy options: abandon enforced retirement, cut or privatize pension benefits, encourage more women to enter the formal labour force, and relocate the elderly to foreign societies that have lower living costs. In my *Can we live forever?* (Turner, 2009) I humorously suggested that advanced societies might design storage vats for their elderly populations where they could go into hibernation while awaiting the medical cures that could restore them to some rejuvenation.

Many of these options are, for good reason, unpopular with the general public, when workers may be anticipating early retirement on adequate pensions. As we have seen with the 'austerity packages' in European societies in response to the economic and fiscal crisis of 2008, any reduction to existing social benefits is often the occasion of significant social opposition and protest. Democratic governments can expect to be punished in the ballot box for any reduction in the 'contributory rights' of their citizens. In more extreme circumstances, we can expect violent reactions to the negative effects of policies promoting economic austerity. In Greece, a number of bombs exploded in January 21, 2013 outside the homes and offices of various journalists who had publicly supported the austerity measures that had been imposed by the European Union. The erosion of social rights and rapid economic decline raise important questions about the need for new forms of 'governmentality'

The main alternatives to a decline in the working population are to promote technological improvements to increase labour efficiency, to depend on immigrant labour to supplement the declining indigenous population of young workers, or to outsource production. Japan, which has had restrictive policies on migration and naturalization, will have to depend on continuous technological innovation to sustain its economic position. It has had relatively modest inputs of fresh labour from China and South Korea (mostly in disguised forms such as student and tourist) and has also imported Brazilians of Japanese descent, but in my view this has not meant that Japan has become a multicultural society. Most developed societies will opt for a combination of

these strategies, namely technological innovation to improve productivity and promotion of inward labour migration. Unfortunately these strategies also have unintended consequences. The promotion of technological change often has the consequence of lowering the demand for labour in skilled areas. In general, computerization in production processes tends to reduce the demand for labour (Braverman, 1974). If these technological improvements lower the demand for skilled labour, it is often the middle classes that suffer from rapid technological change. Outsourcing also reduces the costs of production but also reduces the demand for local unskilled labour. Migrant labour often finds employment in these low-skilled, labour intensive areas of the economy such as domestic service. The majority of developed societies depend on migrants to fill gaps in the labour market. Where the demand for cheap labour is high, there will be almost inevitably a significant increase in illegal migration. This issue has become a significant political problem in the United States, where there are now millions of illegal, mainly Hispanic, migrants.

Under pressure from illegal migration, states often begin with a clear and exclusive constitutional definition of formal and legal citizenship, but over time they may acquire migrant workers that manage to accumulate documents resulting in the acquisition of citizenship that as a result dilutes constitutional commitments to exclusive national citizenship. Societies are therefore faced with an important question of balancing national labour needs with international labour flows.

The paradox of these options is that the demand for labour from the business elite to satisfy the economic needs of a society often conflicts with domestic politics. International labour migration through the globalization of economies inevitably results in increasing social diversity as mobile labour movements create diasporic, ethnically diverse communities. States have therefore to attend to the problems associated with multiculturalism. In societies which have been historically relatively coherent in ethnic and religious terms (such as Denmark), increasing social diversity often produces opposition. To take an obvious example, opposition to Muslim communities in many European societies has led to widespread Islamophobia and in some cases to serious social conflict (Helbling, 2012). The most violent reaction to Islam took place in Norway in 2012, but negative reaction has also been a characteristic political response in France, Germany and Britain. In so-called white-settler societies such as the old Commonwealth countries (Canada, New Zealand and Australia), there has been a more open acceptance of diversity, but even these societies have experienced significant episodes of anti-migrant sentiment. The United States has in the past seen powerful political movements against both Hispanic migration (especially illegal migration) and Muslim communities and culture, but the contemporary view of the business community is that America needs continuous supplies of fresh labour, especially skilled labour, if it is to continue to be the dominant world power in economic terms. In short, the economic demand for 'fresh' labour from overseas inevitably creates social diversity which in turn requires effective policies, broadly multiculturalism, to promote assimilation and integration. But growing social diversity often results in 'enclave societies' (Turner, 2007) producing a strong backlash that asserts the need for cultural coherence and national identity.

These developments have important consequences for conventional patterns of citizenship which have typically presupposed a relatively coherent and integrated society. The model of citizenship that was developed around the theories of T.H. Marshall (1950) took national cultural coherence for granted. In Marshall's post-war context, he could take for granted

Britain's relative ethnic and cultural homogeneity. However by 2012, the 'white British' population of London was down to 45%. It is widely recognized that the European models of citizenship of the twentieth century were exclusive institutions in which work, family formation and public service were rewarded by entitlements. The ageing of populations, dependence on migrant labour and growing social diversity have required significant rethinking of such assumptions giving rise to new concepts about 'flexible citizenship', 'semi-citizenship' and so forth.

All modern societies are confronted by a fundamental dilemma - how to sustain a youthful and employable population while at the same time managing diversity as a consequence of the need to import fresh labour in response to low fertility rates. Providing jobs for youth has to be matched by policies to fund ageing populations who will typically have inadequate pensions to support them over long years of retirement. In Europe the growth of right-wing movements and general xenophobia has created serious problems for democratic governments. While claims that immigrants increase social problems (through criminality) may be factually incorrect, electorates may find a scapegoat in migrant communities for economic decline. The notion that immigrants are 'stealing' the jobs of the local working class has an appeal for young, unemployed males. As yet there has been little evidence of inter-generational conflict, but this may be a social issue in the future. While we might argue that every advanced society with low fertility rates and an ageing problem will face this problem, each society will have specific issues in relation to its labour force, cultural composition, and political borders.

In the past, the benefits and entitlements of citizenship, at least from the perspective of contributory rights, depended heavily on life-long employment, the nuclear family and the gender division of labour. In the traditional model of citizenship, employment was not only the basis by which citizens contributed taxes in support of welfare benefits through the life cycle, it was also fundamental to their sense of personal worth. However, we are now in global term moving into a radically transformed global environment, both natural and social. To date, no developed society has solved the problems that are produced by the demographic transition – how to fund pensions, how to resolve issues about voluntary retirement, how to create meaningful employment for the young, how to secure affordable housing, how to provide adequate medical care without destroying the economy, how to sustain care for the elderly in the absence of familial support, and generally how to create meaningful lives for younger generations? In order to begin to address these problems, we will need to undertake a radical rethinking of citizenship.

Secularization: longevity and the post-body

So far I have been discussing what we might call the 'normal ageing process' that is the improvements in life expectancy resulting from reforms of the social and physical environment over the last century – improvements in the water supply, better diet, education, vaccination, the decline of infectious disease, and so forth. Now I want to consider a slightly different issue – the prospect of an accelerated extension of life through radical technological interventions, namely the life-extension project.

Puzzles surrounding health, longevity, death have pre-occupied the human mind throughout history, but the question – can we live forever?- has a decidedly contemporary resonance now that modern medicine holds out the actual possibility, rather than the merely fantastic promise, of longevity. Furthermore, contemporary medicine offers us longevity without disability and infirmity. In one sense, the issues surrounding aging are quite simple: can we be happy, healthy and chronologically old or is the inevitability of physical deterioration and death necessarily a depressing and destructive experience? Is death ultimately inescapable? A number of popular science books – *How to Live Forever or Die Trying* (Appleyard, 2007), *The Living End* (Brown, 2008) and *The Immortalists* (Friedman, 2007) – have recently explored the issues of life prolongation through the application of modern bio-technological inventions. The optimistic answer to the question about indefinite survival looks towards medical science and technology to secure survival without aging. Optimists are in search of a medical utopia that can not only prolong life indefinitely but eliminate its attendant discomforts and disabilities. The optimism is of course not new. Nikolai Fedorov (1828-1903) argued in *What Was Man Created For* (1990) that with the application of science human transcendence was possible. Death was not an inevitable outcome of human life but an avoidable evil. Thus the struggle against nature should have a primacy over the social struggle and he realised that to overcome the scarcity imposed by nature human beings would have to colonise space. By contrast there is a well established tradition of critical responses to the promises of medical science, challenging the view that humans can achieve almost complete control over their environment and rejecting the assumption that they could control their own biological evolution and destiny (Dubos, 1959). The pessimistic response to utopian thought argues that technology cannot ultimately solve the problems of old age and that in some circumstances technology actually compounds our difficulties. In the contemporary debate about aging, the optimists are represented by scientists such as the Cambridge bio-gerontologist Aubrey de Grey who in *Ending Aging* (2008) treats aging as an engineering problem, thereby advocating a plan to eradicate death from aging through SENS – Strategies for Engineered Negligible Senescence. The pessimistic view which he has dubbed the ‘pro-aging stance’ induces the populace to accept aging and its negative outcomes as both natural and unavoidable. The optimists argue that any commitment to the inevitability of death rests on implicit and often hidden religious assumptions about ‘nature’.

Of course the controversial but simple question – can we live forever? – has a variety of answers. We can in fact distinguish various possible forms of survival (Callahan, 2009). The first is basically the existing situation involving a relatively long life in historical terms but with all the disability and immobility that characteristically go with aging. This situation may be tolerable for the individual but costly for society with rising health-care costs. The second possibility might be an extension of life with relatively little disability and a quick death. In this case, medical science would have successfully overcome many geriatric diseases but without finally providing us immortality. From an individual point of view, this outcome is clearly desirable. We could also imagine simply decelerated aging which would mean slowing down the aging process and finally there might be arrested aging in which the aging process could be delayed or deferred for an indefinite period. The immediate medical goal of the Immortalists is a version of arrested aging in which the inconvenience of morbidity could be more or less eliminated and immortality could be delivered through extensive geriatric engineering. This final outcome is clearly problematic

because it is costly from an economic perspective, and it may also be disturbing for the individual, given a range of psychological problems that might follow life extension such as boredom, depression and despair. As a matter of fact significant improvements in life expectancy have already been taking place in the developed world throughout the twentieth century, and decelerated and compressed aging both look feasible in the twenty-first century. In the light of these medical options, the developed societies have urgently to develop radical social policies towards aging, because the consequences of the demographic transition or 'secular shift', in whatever form, are far-reaching and fundamental (Laslett, 1995).

The Immortalist objective to give us both youthfulness and longevity is a utopian ambition. However, we need to take the ambition and the dream seriously. From a sociological perspective, Immortalism as a programme tells us a lot about the society in which we live, especially its subjective individualism, its obsession with technological solutions and its overwhelming confidence in scientific advance. The medical dream of a long and trouble-free life tells us a lot about the Baby Boomer generation, its continuing influence and its reluctance to leave the historical stage. The Immortalist programme also brings to our attention a range of exciting and imaginative aspects of medical technology and research which *may* in the long term have a radical impact on the human life cycle. For example, any discussion about the life extension project brings into view the possibility of a posthuman society (Fukuyama, 2002). However, there is a more challenging literature associated with the Transhumanist Association which claims that we are close to manufacturing posthuman beings who will be so radically transformed by medical sciences that they will be no longer unambiguously human according to our contemporary standards. Cybernetics and informatics will, alongside bio-medicine, produce enhanced beings that will be immortalised by such technological advances (Hayles, 1999). Although this debate may look like science fiction from the perspective of conventional medical sociology, these developments should, in my view, become an aspect of sociological research, because these technologies already impinge on our lives and they are re-shaping existing concepts of mind and body. As we will see in this chapter, the transhumanist agenda has in fact an elegant and persuasive philosophical defence (Bostrom, 2005) which deserves sociological scrutiny.

For example the potential applications of nanotechnology are significant. Eric Drexler (1986) in *Engines of Creation, The Coming Era of Nanotechnology and* (1992) *Nanosystems. Molecular Machinery, Manufacturing and Computation* proposes that nanocomputers would give surgery much greater precision and speed. Such machines could also be employed to help the immune system more accurately to identify and combat cancer cells. These nano-health machines could in principle be implanted to correct the failures of the aging body, thereby finally fulfilling what we might call the iatro-engineering dreams of Lindbergh. Drexler's machines could assist in the development of cryonics- freezing bodies for a future medical restoration of life- in which the resuscitation of frozen patients would require considerable corporeal reconstruction and repair. Finally Drexler demonstrated in *Nanosystems* that these assemblers are consistent with the known laws of chemistry and the possible medical applications of these developments were considered in some detail in Robert A. Freitas in his *Nanomedicine* (1999). It is assumed that the first assembler would be built within the next decade.

One might reasonably predict that some aspects of today's prolongation gimmickry – cryonics and nano-protein machines – will become routine procedures in the next fifty years. Some version of Aubrey de Grey's engineering solutions to the causes of aging – cell depletion, cell excess, mutations of the chromosome, mitochondrial mutations, cellular debris, cross-linking – may also become commonplace procedures for prolonging human life. Many of the other recommendations for delaying aging – cosmetic surgery, vitamin supplements, dietary regimes, exercise, a modest consumption of red wine and so forth – are already accepted without much public controversy. The more questionable 'solutions' such as massive calorie restriction that are recommended by some pathologists – possibly as a solution for diabetes – may also become standard practice but in some modified form (Mason, 2006). Even a more advanced and reliable version of cryonics might become part of mainstream medical technology. Some medical conditions such as single-gene disorders, Huntington's disease, cystic fibrosis, and sickle cell anaemia will be in the front row of targets for genetic interventions and other conditions will be rapidly added to the list of treatable problems.

While the Immortalists are persuasively optimistic, most governments are preparing for rising health costs to manage dementia and related diseases of old age. To sustain the optimism, advanced societies will require significant investments to manage the physical and mental disabilities of their ageing populations. Nicolas Sarkozy the former President of France, David Cameron in the United Kingdom and President Obama have launched initiatives to cope with the health problems that will be thrown up by the imminent retirement of the baby boomers in the next decade. Alzheimer's Disease International is predicting that the condition will be among the most serious and damaging conditions of the twenty-first century. It is estimated that in 2010 there were 36 million people world-wide suffering from dementia. These affected populations will increase to 66 million in 2030, and to 115 million in 2050 (Jack, 2012). These figures evoke at least two obvious responses. The first is that other things being equal the costs of elderly individuals with chronic illness will be a significant cost to the community, but they also suggest that health inequalities will be an increasing feature of social and economic inequality in the long term, especially because most western societies have adopted Thatcherite strategies to manage growing welfare costs. The responsibility for funding old age is being forced back on to families and away from the state, reminding us of the Thatcherite principle that there is no such thing as society only individuals and their families. The second is that the health care and the provision of medical services will continue to grow as major components of the modern economy.

Transhumance/posthumance

There is however the possibility of a more radical and challenging future which will be the unintended consequences of modern medical technology. Elsewhere (Turner, 2006), I have argued that our humanity is defined by our vulnerability which is simply a consequence of being a perishable organism that ages and is subject to inescapable morbidity and mortality. Vulnerability – from the Latin word for 'wound' – defines a shared human world of risk with which we can cope through a shared culture. Collective institutions – law, government, religion and family – are social mechanisms that offer some respite from our ontological vulnerability. Life-extension medicine promises to solve the problem of our vulnerability by paradoxically creating a posthuman world. The contemporary life-extension movement is driven by a profoundly individualist ideology that offers individual solutions but largely ignores many of the

social consequences – generational conflict, the exhaustion of basic resources, and massive regional inequalities. One might argue of course that our contemporary situation is in any case characterised by violence, inequality and scarcity and that medical technology is at least one solution to our vulnerability. However, a significant increase in the Immortals in a world of declining fertility rates and existing scarcities would result in a posthuman world in which the only long-term solution to scarcity would be either a radical reduction in the human population or the colonisation of outer space. In other words, the prolongevity movement has to offer some alternative to a Malthusian future. Given these economic assumptions about scarcity, pessimistic conclusions about the impact of life extension on resources, social capital and social harmony appear inevitable. However in the literature on transhumanism, there are a range of proposals that begin to address some of these issues. For example, transhumanist philosophy has produced a number of responses to the argument that longevity would create psychological malfunctioning. Because the Immortalist world-view is what we might call a ‘fix-it ideology’, their proposal is that we can live in a posthuman world provided we have the correct brain-enhancing anti-depressant drugs. A post-utopian existence could be tolerable with the appropriate pills. Such an argument assumes that human mental functions and psychology would not change significantly. However, a posthuman society will have individuals of greatly enhanced intelligence and it would be technological possible to upload the brain into an electronic medium such as an electronic chip. These posthuman uploads would not suffer from biological senescence and they would not be a significant drain on scarce resources. Uploading would also solve the problem of cryonic patients whose brains could be copied into a computerised system. These proposals are related to developments in artificial intelligence. Rodney Brooks (2002) a founding fellow of the American Association for Artificial Intelligence and director of the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at MIT argues that humans are simply ‘wetware’ organic machines that could be duplicated with metal and silicon, and hence prolongevity could be achieved through processes related to or resembling uploading and duplicating. The possibility of creating transhuman existence raises the possibility of a future society composed of humans who are subject to decay and extinction and posthuman beings that are equipped with superior intelligence and blessed with technological immortality (Kurzweil, 1999). Would such a world resemble the futuristic nightmare of Stanley Kubrick’s *2001: A Space Odyssey*?

A Sociological Summary

A global elite with access to rejuvenative medicine who will achieve enhanced longevity

Increasing social inequality as measured in biological terms

The development of hybrid post-human bodies

The disconnection between inherited moral and religious systems based on the Hobbesian assumption that life is nasty brutish and short

Diversity of social forms – same-sex marriage, male reproduction by medical technologies, inter-species sexual relations (see Peter Singer on animal rights)

Continuing intensification global movements of labour producing greater social diversity

Inter-generational conflicts over scarce resources that will be fought out over pensions, the minimum wage, gender equality, youth unemployment.

Urban terrorism, new wars, and the feral city

Environmental, economic, political and social crises resulting in catastrophe and the catastrophic imagination

Conclusion: statecraft and soulcraft

In order to conclude this discussion of the body and the postbody in modern social theory, I return to the classical world. I suspect that the interest in classical philosophy in Heidegger, Foucault and to some extent Bourdieu is not simply that this generation of European intellectuals was steeped in the classics. It may be connected with the uncertainties of our time – with our somatic society – in which we look backwards to the classical roots of European society when the ancient world was not troubled by global warming, nuclear waste, and environmental pollution. The perfection of the human body in classical art appears to be natural when contrasted with the hybrid post-body of late modernity. Although this return to roots may be both nostalgic and utopian, classical political philosophy offers many fruitful source for contemporary theory. I refer here to the distinction between statecraft and soulcraft (Dumas and Turner, forthcoming). A wise statesman would attend diligently to the craft of running the state, just as the virtuous individual would attend to the management of the soul. Both forms of craft involved a struggle against disorderly conduct within the polis. These two crafts or techniques are parallel forms of governmentality. Any polis must look to both a regulation of the public and a government of the soul. I have tried to illustrate these two requirements – the management of the polis and the care of the self – via two problems of modern society, namely low fertility and longevity. The security of the modern world in these terms requires the wise government of the public space in order to avoid xenophobic hatred of the other and attendance to the problems of the embodied self. In the context of the modern crisis, governments appear to be dysfunctional (for example the US government cannot develop a budget) and the individual is encouraged to search for immortality through the life extension project regardless of the consequences for society. In short, our anxieties about the body are a reflection of the failures of both statecraft and soul craft.

Bibliography

- Appleyard, B.. (2007) *How to Live Forever or Die Trying. On the New Immortality*. New York: Simon & Schuster .
- Albrecht, G. L. (1992) *The Disability Business*, London: Sage.
- Barnes,C., Mercer,G. and Shakespeare,T.(1999) *Exploring Disability:A Sociological Introduction*.Cambridge:Polity.
- Binstock, R.H. 2003. “The war on anti-aging medicine.” *The Gerontologist* 43 (1): 4-14.

- Binstock, R.H. 2004. "Anti-aging medicine and research: A realm of conflict and profound societal implications." *Journal of Gerontology: Biological Sciences* 59 (6): 523-533.
- Bostrom, Nick.2005. "In Defence of Posthuman Dignity." *Bioethics* 19 (3): 202-214.
- Brooks, Rodney A. 2002. *Flesh and Machines. How Robots will Change Us*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Boric, D. and Robb, J (eds) (2008) *Past Bodies. Body-centred research in archaeology*, Oxford: Oxbow Books.
- Braverman, Harry (1974) *Labour and Monopoly Capitalism: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century*, New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Brown, Guy. 2008. *The Living End. The Future of Death, Aging and Immortalit.*, London: Macmillan.
- Buck, Tobias (2013) ' Stuck on the sidelines' *The Financial Times*, April 25, p.5.
- Burchell, G., Gordon, C. and Miller,P. (eds) (1991)*The Foucault Effect. Studies in Governmentality*, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Callahan, David.1987. *Setting Limits. Medical goals in an aging society* . New York: Simon & Shuster.
- Caldwell, John C. and Caldwell, Bruce K. (2005) 'The causes of Asian fertility decline' *Asian Population Studies* 1(1):31-46.
- Callahan, David. 2009."Life Extension: rolling the technological dice." *Society* 46(3): 214-220.
- Cooper, M. 2006."Resuscitations: Stem cells and the crisis of Old age." *Body and Society* 12 (1): 1-23.
- De Grey, Aubrey (with Michael Rae).2008. *Ending Aging. The rejuvenation breakthroughs that could reverse human aging in our lifetime*. London: St.Martin's Press.
- Drexler, Eric.1986. *Engines of Creation, The Coming Era of Nanotechnology*. New York:Doubleday.Drexler, Eric.1992. *Nanosystems. Molecular Machinery, Manufacturing and Computation*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Dubos, Rene.1959. *Mirage of Health. Utopias, Progress and Biological Change*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Dumas, A. and Turner, B. S.(2006) 'Age and aging: the social world of Foucault and Bourdieu' in J. Powell and A.Wahidin (eds) *Foucault and Aging*, New York : Nova Science Publishers, pp. 145-155.
- Dumas, A. And Turner, B. S. (2007) 'The life-extension project: a sociological critique' *Health Sociological Review* 16:5-17.
- Fedorov, Nikolai.1990. *What Was Man Created For?* New York: Hyperion.
- Freitas, Robert A.1999. *Nanomedicine, Volume 1: Basic Capabilities*, Georgetown, Texas: Landes Bioscience.
- Friedman, David M.2008. *The Immortalists. Charles Lindbergh, Dr. Alex de Carrel, and their Daring Quest to Live Forever* New York: Harper Perennial.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 2002. *Our Posthuman Future. Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolutio*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Foucault, M. (1979) *The History of Sexuality. Volume One. An Introduction* London: Allen Lane.
- Foucault, M. (2005) *The Hermeneutics of the Self. Lectures at the College de France 1981 – 1982*, New York :Picador.
- Foucault, M. (2007) *Security, Territory, Population* , New York:Picador.

- Fukuyama, F. (2002) *Our Posthuman Future. Consequences of the Biotechnological Revolution*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux..
- Hayles, N. K. (1999) *How to Become Posthuman: virtual bodies in cybernetics, literature and informatics* . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ingstad, B. and Whyte, S.R. (eds) (1995) *Disability and Culture*.Berkeley,CA:University of California Press.
- Jack, Andrew (2012) 'The brain drain' *Financial Times* September 7, p. 7.
- Juvin, H. (2010) *The Coming of the Body*, London: Verso.
- Katz, S. (1996)*Disciplining Old Age .The Formation of Gerontological Knowledge*, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
- Kirkwood, Thomas.1999. *Time of Our Lives. The Science of Human Aging*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kirkwood, Thomas. 2001. "The End of Age" BBC Reith Lecture
URL :<http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reith2001/>
- Kurzweil, Ray.1999. *The Age of Spiritual Machines. When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence*. New York:Penguin Books.
- Kwon, T.H. (1993)'Exploring socio-cultural explanations of fertility transition in South Korea' in R. Leete and I. Alam (eds) *The Revolution in Asian Fertility: Dimensions, Causes and Implications*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 41-53.
- Marshall, T. H. (1992[1950] 'Citizenship and social class' in T. H. Marshall and Tom Bottomore *Citizenship and Social Class*, London: Pluto Press, pp.3-51..
- Moreira, Tiago and Palladino, Paolo. (2008)."Squaring the Curve: the Anatomic-Politics of Ageing, Life and Death." *Body&Society* 14(3):21-47.
- Sadiq, Kamal (2009) *Paper Citizens: How Illegal Immigrants Acquire Citizenship in Developing Countries*, New York: Oxford University Press
- Stiker,H-JJ (1982) *Corps infirmes et societes*. Paris: Aubier Montaigne.
- Thang, Leng Leng (2011)' Population aging, older workers and productivity issues: the case of Singapore' *Comparative Social Welfare* 27(1): 17-33.
- Turner, B. S. (1982) 'The government of the body: medical regimens and the rationalization of diet', *British Journal of Sociology* 33 : 254-269.
- Turner, B. S.(1984) *The Body & Society. Explorations in Social Theory*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Turner, B. S. (1992) *Regulating Bodies. Essay in Medical Sociology*, London :Routledge.
- Turner, B. S. (2006) *Vulnerability and Human Rights*, Pennsylvania University Press.
- Turner, Bryan S. (2007) 'Enclave society: towards a sociology of the immobility regime' *European Journal of Social Theory*, 10(2):287-303.
- Turner, B. S. (2007) 'Culture, technologies and bodies: the technological utopia of living forever' in Chris Shilling (ed) *Embodying Sociology:retrospect,progress and progress* Oxford: Blackwell,pp. 19-36.
- Turner, Bryan S. 2009. *Can We Live Forever? A Sociological and Moral Inquiry*. London: Anthem Press.
- Turner, Bryan S. (ed) (2012) *Routledge Handbook of Body Studies*, London: Routledge.
- Turner, B. S. and Zheng, Y. (eds) (2009) *The Body in Asia*, New York: Berghahn Books.
- Vincent, John .2003."What is at stake in the 'war on anti-ageing medicine' ". *Ageing and Society* 23: 675-684.

Vincent, John. 2006."Ageing Contested: Anti-ageing Science and the Cultural Construction of Old Age." *Sociology* 40(4):681-698.

Zola,I.(1982) *Missing Pieces.A chronicle of living with a disability*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

An inadvertent global experiment in human evolution: Evolutionary consequences of full-scale racial mixing and gene substitution

Jae Chun CHOE
Division of EcoScience
Ewha Womans University
Seoul, Korea

Evolution occurs at the regional level. The migratory capacity of living organisms is limited, and therefore not every individual is engaged in a species-wide reproductive event at the same time. The individuals within a geographically isolated region can usually mix their genes.

A possible exception may exist in the freshwater eels. Scientists, Japanese marine biologists in particular, have long believed or rather wanted to believe that all the adult Japanese eels ready to reproduce gather up at a single spawning area every year. Although a recent report in *Nature* on 1 February 2011 suggested that freshwater Japanese eels can spawn more than once during a spawning season, it is true that an enormous number of Japanese eels get together near the West Mariana Ridge where they may be engaged in a giant sexual orgy. The female eels may release their eggs in synchrony and then the male eels may also spray their sperm at once. If so, this is a case that is as close as to random mating in nature.

Other than this possible exception, most mating events occur at the regional level. For a very long time the Finnish people used to marry to one another and produce Finnish babies. So did the African pygmies of the sub-Saharan regions, Tibetans, Samoans, and so on. Recently, however, there has been an unprecedented frequency of racial mixing all over the world. Never before in human history has such large-scale genetic hybridization taken place. Korea is no exception. More than a half of all marriages in rural areas of Korea are inter-racial. This brings about enormous changes in the genetic make-ups of the Korean population and the long-term consequences have not been fully analyzed.

The Koreans have had a long belief that we have come from a pure blood line. This myth of single-race nation may have helped the Korean people be united against the hardships from the outside, but it is very difficult to provide any solid evidence to support such a myth. The Korean history is riddled with frequent invasions from neighboring nations, which must have made it difficult to maintain the blood line absolutely pure. To an ecologist myself, it seems particularly difficult for a country in a peninsula to fend off streams of migrations from the continent to islands and vice versa. Indeed, recent genomic analyses of Koreans have revealed that the Korean population is quite mixed in terms of genetic origins.

Many Koreans are concerned that the genetic mixing due to inter-racial marriages would degrade the genetic quality of the nation. Personally I do not sympathize with this concern, because the increase in genetic diversity has time and again been proved beneficial to the population. There is a chance that some favorable gene complexes may get destroyed by inter-racial mixing of genes, but the benefits of newly acquired genetic diversity easily outweigh the potential damages. For this reason, the late Stephen Jay Gould has gone so far as to say that evolution is in other words the diversification of genes.

Lately, however, I come to realize that there is a flip side of this coin. To a local population, e.g., the Korean population, it is overall highly beneficial to gain more diverse genes. But what

will happen to the human species as a whole? Quite interestingly, the human species as a whole is losing many unique genetic variations as the populations worldwide becomes homogenized. What a puzzling paradox it is!

An equally enigmatic paradox could occur with genetic substitution. Thanks to the Human Genome Project, we now can have the detailed information of one's own genetic make-up. Spending mere one hundred US dollars, we can now obtain the entire list of base pairs of one's own genome. In this era of individualized medicine we will soon be able to substitute inferior or disease-ridden genes with superiorly customized genes. I can easily imagine a scene in which a doctor discusses with the expecting parents a genetic operation of the fetus. I can also imagine a traffic jam in front of a medical clinic that has come up with a customized gene complex to extend one's life for tens of years. People will line up to have their genes substituted with "better" genes. One can easily imagine that this will aggravate the gap between the haves and the have-nots. Until the cost of such operations becomes affordable, only the rich people could enjoy the possible benefits of such operations.

In addition to this, I can also anticipate an inadvertent paradox from large-scaled gene substitutions. In a conformist society such as the Korean society, gene substitution could occur nationwide. If indeed every single Korean were to substitute an inferior gene with a superior customized one, the Korean population becomes a cloned population from the viewpoint of that particular gene. Every Korean individual is now a superior human being equipped with a superior gene. But what will happen to the entire population of supposedly superior Koreans? What will happen if a fatal virus specifically attacking that particular type of gene gets landed on the Korean peninsula? Theoretically speaking, it could wipe out the entire population of Koreans. This is another strangely-twisted genetic paradox.

For this paradox we have repeatedly observed the real cases. I am taking about the cases of avian influenza. Once a report is made by a suspecting farmer, the health department determines if it is highly pathogenic. If it is, then the health officials waste no time but to bury every single bird in a chicken coop. They do this because they know that nearly all chickens in the coop could develop full-blown symptoms of avian influenza within a day or two. Why can't we single out only the sick ones and kill them off? It is because we know all too well that the chickens we raise are almost like clones. In the process of artificially selecting for the chickens that could lay an egg a day, we have reduced the genetic diversity of house chickens to the level that we have created near-clones. Individual chickens have become superior egg-layers but they become genetically susceptible at the population level. We may end up repeating exactly the same kind of experiment, however inadvertent it will be.

At an individual level we may not realize the potential consequences of our actions. Insights from evolutionary biology may help us construct realistic scenarios for our future. Once we have better pictures for the future, we can be better prepared. Scenarios could be written by evolutionary biologists alone, but the strategies must be made in collaboration with social scientists. Conferences such as this are an ideal start.

The National Reproductive Crisis: South Korea's Fertility Shock

Sam-Sik Lee & Hyo-Jin Choi
Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs

1. Introduction

Population, as a group of individuals, is characterized by an organism which changes continuously. According to the population transition theory, along with the decline in fertility rate, the traditional stage of high fertility-high mortality is transferred to the stage of low fertility-low mortality at which the population growth almost stops. The population transition theory was established on the basis of the population phenomenon observed historically during the last one and two hundred years in the Western Europe. Thus, the population growth rate is considered as spontaneously modified in the process of urbanization and industrialization. The population transition has spread among some of Asian countries since the late 20 century.


Korea has experienced rapid economic growth that coincides with the rapid fertility decline over half a century. To our utter shock, Korea has undergone the lowest low fertility rates since 2000. This paper attempts to explain how the fertility rate has been modified by the modernization factors, such as urbanization and industrialization, ignited by a rapid economic growth in Korea.

2. Fertility Change as a Shock

The total fertility rate (TFR) in Korea was as high as 6.0 in 1960 but decreased to around the population replacement of 2.06 in 1983. TFR was stable between 1.5 and 1.8 with some irregularities during the period of 1984-1997. However, TFR declined sharply under 1.5 in 1998 immediately after the 1997 financial crisis. TFR declined furthermore up to 1.3 in 2001 and 1.08 in 2005. Thereafter, TFR has been up and down around 1.2.

The Korean TFR shows a unique trend in comparison with the other countries; Firstly, TFR dropped from very high level to very low level, revealing a big gap. As can be seen in Figure 2, most of OECD countries show rather steady trends in TFRs with over 50 years; TFRs declined relatively slowly and turned, mostly between the mid-1990s and the early 2000s, to increase more slowly with some exceptions.


Figure 1. Trends in TFR among OECD countries



Source: OECD(2010). Family Database.

Secondly, the TFR has declined too rapidly, almost completing the population transition over 50 years in Korea. The difference in TFR between 1960 and 2010 is 4.77 for Korea, which is the biggest after excluding for Mexico. However, TFR for Mexico has never been yet below 2.0. Turkey with the difference of 4.37 is ranked third but still higher than 2.0. The difference is between 2.0 and 3.0 for two countries and the difference between 1.0 and 2.0 is for eleven countries. The comparison for Chile, Estonia and Israel is not allowed due to lack of long time series data.

Figure 2. Difference in TFR between 1960 and 2010 for OECD countries



Source: OECD(2010). Family Database.

Thirdly, in Korea TFR has long lasted, chronically lowest low, under 1.3. Historically, only 9 countries among 34 OECD countries experienced the low fertility under 1.3 as measured by TFR, as of 2010. The duration under 1.3 of TFR is 12 years (2001~2012) for Korea, which is the longest among OECD countries. That for Italy (1993~2003) and Slovenia (1995~2005) is 11 years, respectively. That for Japan (2003~2005) is only 3 years and that for Germany (1996~2003) is only 4 years. 25 OECD countries, including France and Sweden, have never experienced the low fertility under 1.3.

Table 1. Duration lasted under TFR 1.3 for OECD countries, as of 2010.

Country	Duration under TFR 1.3	Period
Germany	4 years	1992~1995
Greece	8 years	1996~2003
Italy	11 years	1993~2003
Japan	3 years	2003~2005
Korea	12 years	2001~2012
Poland	4 years	2003~2006
Slovak Republic	8 years	2000~2007
Slovenia	11 years	1995~2005
Spain	10 years	1993~2002

Source: OECD(2010). Family Database.

3. Factors to Reproductive Crisis

A. Population growth, economic growth and policy

The population growth rate in the Korean peninsula was not so high as 1.46 percent per annum during 1925~1944 under the Japanese colonial period, due mainly to both high fertility and high mortality. During 1949~1955, the population growth rate per annum decreased to 1.07 percent in South Korea, for which there were many deaths during the Korean war from 1950 to 1953 after the Korean liberation in 1945. The baby-boom phenomenon, as started from 1955, pushed up the population growth rate, which was 3.01 percent per annum during 1955~1960.

The Korean government integrated the ante-natal policy into the First Five Years' Planning of Economic Development (1962~1966), confronting with the fact that the high population growth rate eroded the low economic growth rate which caused the vicious cycle of poverty and being recommended by World Population Program of United Nations. The family planning was introduced as a main tool for the ante-natal policy in 1962. The target of the Ten Years' Plan for Family Planning was to decrease the population growth rate per annum from 2.9 percent in 1960 to 2.0 percent in 1971 when the Second Five Years' Planning of Economic Development (1967~1971) was finished. In 1971 the Korean government adopted the 'two child policy' under

the slogan “breed well only two children regardless of boys or daughters” to reinforce the birth control. It was in 1973 that the Maternal and Child Health Law was enacted, allowing induced abortion for birth control with some conditions. The one child was strongly recommended by the slogan “the well-bred daughter is better than ten sons”.

Figure 3. Population Growth Rate and Economic Growth Rate for Korea



Source: The Bank of Korea, Korea National Statistical Office..

The government set up a target to further decrease the fertility rate to the replacement rate until 1988 in the Fifth Five Years' Planning of Economic Development (1982~1986). However, TFR was 2.8 in 1980 and hence the ante-natal policy was strengthened according to the notice from the President. In the Sixth Five Years' Planning of Economic Development (1987~1991), the government again set up a goal to decrease TFR from 2.05 in 1984 to 1.75 in 1995 but such a goal had been accomplished in 1985.

The population growth rate had been maintained far below the population replacement level since the mid-1980s, which is why the Korean government adopted a new population policy (1996~2003) in 1996, abolishing the ante-natal policy. However, the new population policy aimed at maintaining the below replacement level of fertility as part of the process of achieving sustainable socio-economic development, putting an emphasis on the qualitative aspects of population such as enhancement of family health and welfare, prevention of the imbalance of sex ratio at birth, reducing the incidence of induced abortions, tackling of sex-related problems of youths and adolescents, empowerment of women by expanding their employment opportunities and welfare services.

B. Conflicts of fertility behavior with rapid socio-economic change

(1) era of chaos

The rapid fertility decline had been influenced by the strong anti-natal policy since the early 1960s. The government abolished the anti-natal policy in 1996. The pro-natal policy, the Basic Plan on Aging Society and Population, has been adopted since 2006, of which the legal basis is the Basic Law on Aging Society as enacted in 2005. However, the influence of the anti-natal policy has lasted even nowadays. As a matter of fact, the perception toward a small family size has been rooted for many generations and the antinatalism has remained in many social systems. For example, many textbooks at elementary, middle and high schools included contents to emphasize one child or two children, implicitly and explicitly, the most of which were revised in 2007.

When the government started the pro-natal policy including publicity in the mid-2000s, the most of people were confused. Even now, some of people have distrust in abrupt change of the population policy. Due to such a chaos, the pro-natal policy seems to be less effective than expected.

(2) economic hardship

Korea experienced the financial crisis the late 1990s and the global financial crisis in the late 2000s, which have been intermingled with unemployment and job insecurity. Such a sluggish economy was contributing to delay in marriage and low fertility. Specifically, non-permanent employment status was introduced, for the first time with the financial crisis in the late 1990s, to which people have not still been accustomed. It is notable that trends in TFR seem to be inelastic in that it rather sharply decreases with hard economy but not increased as much with improvement in economy. It is because the fertility behavior is more likely to be fragile to withstand strong winds and external shocks due mainly to the lack of social safety net for rearing children and cannot be easily recovered with increase in uncertainty even after shocks. For Sweden, the decrease in TFR was small even with the economic crisis in the early 1990s but rebounded rapidly, after an economic recovery, from 1.54 in 2000 to 1.91 in 2008.

Education backgrounds, specifically of prestigious universities, have been considered to be crucial as a means to escape from unemployment, job insecurity and future uncertainty, for which around 80 percent of high school graduates go on to college nowadays, compared with about 50 percent three decades ago. It has caused prolonging of education duration, increase in cost for private education, delay in timing of economic independence, etc. which in turn have negative impacts on marriage and fertility.


(3) maladjustment to changing social environments

Social environments have rapidly and considerably changed along with rapid economic growth. There has been an increase in higher education for women; the percentage of women who are admitted to university exceeds 80 percent, above the percentage for men (Ministry of Education). The economic participation rate for women has increased with high proportion of women engaged in clerical and professional jobs. Most women seek full-time jobs and promotions at

work and take care of housework and childrearing at the same time. Generally, however working women quit jobs when they got married and became pregnant or started raising children. The working mothers' career interruption ratio when they have a first child is 47.7 percent in 2009 (National Survey on Marriage and Fertility, Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs). Career interruptions due to marriage and childcare are widespread. There are some reasons for this; (1) the family system has shifted from a single earner family to a dual earner family, but a *traditional gender roles* still prevail in Korea, (2) most of the Korean workplaces are not family friendly, and (3) the support by family members has been weakened along with increase in nuclear family and there has been a shortage of child related infrastructure.

In reality, men's roles in housework remain more or less the same. Working long hours has been taken for granted. According to the OECD, in 2011 the average annual working hours is 2,090 hours for Korea, which is the longest among OECD countries of which an average is 1,776 hours. For this reason, Korea men were least likely to participate in household chores or childcare. The Korea NSO's 'Time Use Survey' reveals that while men spent about 30 minute on doing household chores, women spent 3 hours more a day (in details, 3.3 hours for working women and 6.3 hours for non-working women).


Figure 4. Average annual working hours for OECD countries, 2011 i



Source: OECD(2010). Family Database.

The shortage of daycare center (especially, infant care) is a biggest problem in maintaining the family-work balance. Many women in their 30s have no choice but to drop out of the labor market, resulting in a typical "M-curve" of the female economically participation rates. As a result, both TFR and female employment rate in Korea are at low levels.

Figure 5. Female employment rates and total fertility rates of OECD countries



Source: OECD(2010). Family Database.

As balancing housework and economic activities emerges as a greater challenge to women, they tend to have children as late, and fewer, as possible and some even do not want any at all. Once they quit their jobs, they could hardly have a job of the same level as their previous job when they seek reemployment after their children are grown. This means a decrease in the household income, and often leads to avoidance of marriage and childbearing as recognized as opportunity cost. The higher educational background women have, the higher echelon of a job they have, such as administration, management, and professional work, and the less the wage difference they have relative to men—all pointing to more opportunity costs incurred from childbearing and childrearing.

Property bubbles in the early 2000s increased excessively the price of a house; the young people in marriageable ages cannot afford to prepare a house for marriage. Prolonging in life expectancy is raising concerns about the longer life in old ages, which cause increasingly the conflicts between child-rearing and preparing for the old age. Thus, unstable housing and burden on old-age security often deter the young couples from achieving both marriage in an appropriate ages and the desired number of children.

(4) change in values on marriage and child


Family values (including views on marriage and children) is changing due to changing social phenomena (economic crisis, job insecurity, increasing childcare costs, imbalance of work-family, etc.), emphasis on self-realization and quality of life, conflict between tradition and modern culture. For example, according to the National Survey on Fertility and Family Health (Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs), 23.4 percent of single men (20~44 years) and only 16.9 percent of single women (20~44 years) agreed with the statement that marriage is a must. To the questionnaire “having child is a must”, the percentage of currently married women saying “yea” decreased dramatically, 24.8 percent in 1997 to 10.2 percent in 2006.

This is because imbalance between work and life is led to increasing opportunity cost of having a child, in particular for women with the higher socio-economic status and levels of education. Although there has been an increase in income incurred from the economic growth, the opportunity cost of child, together with the burden of childcare costs, also has increased, put more values on ‘quality of child’ than ‘quantity of child’. It may be said that the lowest low fertility of Korea is a product of trade-off between *quality and quantity* of child, as pointed out in the Becker’s theory.

4. Risks from the Fertility Shock

A long continuation of a low fertility rate necessarily promotes population aging. Here, population aging has a three-fold meaning: The ratio of elderly people (people aged 65 or older) to the total population, aging of the working-age population, and aging of the elderly population. In the traditional sense, population aging refers to the ratio of senior citizens relative to the total population. The proportion of elderly people is estimated to grow from 10 percent in 2009 to 20 percent in 2026, to 30 percent in 2037, and to 40 percent in 2060 (Korea National Statistical Office, 2011). The speed of aging in Korea is faster than any other country in the world.

Figure 6. Prospects for population aging among selected countries



Source: United Nations (2011). Population Prospects.

All in all, the working-age population as supporters of elderly people will rapidly dwindle after 2016 owing to a reduction in the number of newborn infants. The decrease in the working-age population and the increase in the elderly population will work together to boost the old dependency ratio. Standing at a still moderate 12.7 in 2005, the ratio is expected to quickly rise to 70 by 2050, if the recent low fertility phenomenon lasts for a long time. A reduction in the working-age population following the low fertility trend will have direct effects on the quantity and quality of the labor force. Korea will face a shortfall of the workforce of 1.5 million by 2020 (KLI, 2006), Aging of the labor force following a low fertility period drags down productivity; the increase rate in labor productivity will decrease from 1.8% in 2000s to 1.1% in 2040s (KDI, 2006).

A rapid increase in the aged population will cost higher social security expenditures, while the shrunken pool of working-age population who should bear the costs will pose a major challenge to a sustainable social development and realization of welfare. A population aging increases the number of pensioners, whereas the reduced working-age population will bring down the relative increase rate of pension subscribers who pay for the pension. If the current national pension plan is maintained as it is now, the total pension payments will exceed the total pension income beginning in 2055, and even the reserves will be depleted by 2060 (National Pension Finance Projection Committee, 2008). Along with population aging, deficit of Public Health Insurance will increase from 9 billion won in 2011 to 37 billion won in 2030.

While low fertility rates and population aging have been quickly raising financial burdens for social security, including medical protection and pensions, economic growth has not been able to keep pace with it. Economic growth rate will fall from 4.7 percent during 1995~2011 to 1.0 percent during 2030~2060 (OECD, 2012). In turn, the social security finance is doomed to get worse.

5. Ways to Go

The paradigm of a high fertility age may be said to be capitalism and materialism. In respect to population, focus has been placed on such issues as sluggish economic growth, a worsening environment, food crisis, and poverty that accompany a population explosion. In an attempt to solve these problems, many countries have exerted many policy efforts and, internationally, family planning designed to suppress childbearing has been highlighted as a common agenda.

Because of low fertility rates and population aging, Korea is to face different difficult challenges from those in a high fertility era. We can see that many European countries have aided underdeveloped countries to help suppress childbirths and, at the same time, made painstaking and incessant policy efforts to maintain their population size and demographic structure stably at an appropriate level. Granted, immigration has long been introduced as a measure, but they have made stronger efforts to bring their fertility rates back. Such behaviors of these countries may reflect the fact that low fertility rates and population aging will be so much sacrificial to their overall economy and society. Indeed, today, the problems of high and low fertility rates are mixed together on the international scene, limiting problems of low fertility rates to national boundaries. Belonging to a different order from problems occurring in an era of high fertility, the era of low fertility also produces many problems. Excessive efforts to prevent high fertility rates may cause the problem of low fertility rates, while, with less reality, overly stretched efforts to prevent low fertility rates may promote high fertility rates. After all, it is most desirable to handle fertility rates at an appropriate level, nationally and internationally.

To make fertility rates converge to and long be maintained at, the appropriate level, can be achieved not naturally but by continued social and policy efforts. Fertility behaviors are closely intertwined with overall socio-economic phenomena. That is why efforts should first be made to bring about changes in the overall aspects of economy and society in fostering environments favorable to marriage, childbirth and child-rearing. The efforts should include balancing work and family, improvement in childcare leave system, expansion of flexible work-type, fostering

family friendly work environments, alleviating economic burden of child-rearing, support for safe and healthy pregnancy and childbirth, establishing diverse and high quality childcare infra, establishment of safe environments of child-rearing, etc. in an integrated manner. Nothing is, however, more important than recognizing that the current low fertility is not a transitory phenomenon and building a popular consensus that public interest and active responses are required to cure the symptoms unfavorable to the Korean families and individuals.

Particularistic Multiculturalism : Citizenship Contradictions of Marriage Cosmopolit(an)ization

Chang Kyung-Sup
Professor of Sociology
Seoul National University

The literally explosive growth of transnational marriages between Korean men and mostly Asian women seemingly signals that South Korea has entered a genuinely new epoch of cosmopolitan existence and change. This basically new-century phenomenon has drastically reconfigured diverse corners and peripheries of South Korea into manifestly multiethnic entities. The national and local governments have been quick in initiating a comprehensive policy of “multicultural family support” whereas various civil groups, media, and even business corporations have echoed the governmental drive with their own multiculturalism initiatives.

Curiously, such seemingly cosmopolitan moves have been subjected to deep criticism from critical intellectuals and advocates, segregated foreign guest-workers, and many foreign brides themselves. Above all, many foreign brides, along with their civil advocates, have even asked South Korea to “stop calling [them] multicultural” because they often feel alienated and even embarrassed under the governmental and social approaches to multiculturalism. In a great paradox, South Korea’s multiculturalism drive has borne a fundamentally *particularistic nature* in that it divides (1) between foreign brides and foreign workers, (2) between foreign brides and their Korean families, and (3) between foreign brides and ordinary native South Koreans.

First, foreign guest-workers have been frustrated not only by the exploitative terms of their production labor but also by their *official exclusion* from the multiculturalism support policy (involving, among other disadvantages, permanent legal denial of their right to settle down in South Korea or to live with their families).

Second, while the material and social status of foreign brides is basically determined by that of their Korean family members – most of whom are unfortunately poor and often old – the inability and unwillingness of the South Korean government and society to help improve the latter’s fate significantly have necessitated devising an exclusively designed policy for serving often superficially the former as culturally foreign subjects.

Third, the mass arrival and permanent presence of foreign brides (and the increase of their mixed-blood children) have triggered not only a paternalistic social atmosphere for helping relieve their difficulties in South Korean life but also a cultural and political aspiration of South Koreans for reinventing themselves as a multicultural or cosmopolitan subject – multicultural in terms of their coexistence with foreign bodies with permanently frozen and repeatedly staged cultural differences.

All these divides under South Korea’s societal multicultural spree have crucially and characteristically defined the nature of citizenship rights and identities conferred upon or fought for by foreign brides. The particularistic quality of South Korea’s showy multiculturalism should not be simply taken as a structural limit to the country’s cosmopolitan status but more as a strategic platform for a sort of *managed* cosmopolitanism or cosmopolit(an)ization. This instance

of an actually happening globalization offers a variety of theoretical and methodological implications for 21st century sociology, particularly in respect to the structural relationships newly forged among nation, world, ethnicity, gender, and class.

원거리 아버지들: 한국의 외국인 이주노동자 아버지와 “기러기” 아빠

Seol Dong-Hoon (Chonbuk National Univ):

설동훈 (전북대학교 사회학과 교수)

1. 서론

한국에는 자신의 취업 또는 자녀 교육 때문에 가족과 떨어져 사는, 두 종류의 분산가족이 있다. 첫째 유형은 중국, 베트남, 인도네시아, 필리핀, 태국, 스리랑카, 우즈베키스탄, 방글라데시 등 여러 아시아나라 출신의 외국인 이주노동자 아버지들이다. 그들은 대부분 출신국에 아내와 자녀들을 남겨두고 단신으로 한국으로 이주하여 직장 생활을 하고 있다. 둘째 유형은 외국으로 아내와 자녀를 유학 이민 보내고 한국에 홀로 남아 생활하는 “기러기” 아빠들이다. 그들은 미국, 캐나다, 호주, 뉴질랜드, 중국 등 외국에서 머물며 공부하고 있는 아내와 자녀들을 재정적으로 지원하기 위해 한국에서 일하고 있다. 둘 다 가족들을 위해 삶을 변화시키는 결정을 하고 헌신하고 있는데 여기에는 긍정적인 측면도, 부정적인 측면도 있을 수 있다. 이 글에서는 이들 가족에서 이루어지는 부자관계, 이들에 대한 한국인들의 여론, 한국 정부의 정책적 대응을 살펴볼 것이다.

2. 원거리 아버지들: 개념

1) 전지구적 분산 가족의 출현

국경을 넘는 이주 현상이 활발해지면서 가족 단위의 이주뿐 아니라 단신 이주도 늘고 있다. 가족 구성원의 일부가 취업, 학업, 결혼 등의 사유로 다른 나라로 이주하여 살게 됨에 따라, 전지구적 범위에 걸친 분산가족(scattered family)이 출현하였다.

가족은 ‘한 집(家屋)에 한정된 친족 공동체’, 즉 ‘같이 먹고(同爨) 자고(同居) 쓰는(同財) 혈연집단’이고, 흔히 그 성원을 식구(食口)로 표현한다. 가족구성원이 여러 나라에 흩어져 사는 가족은 전통적 의미의 가족과는 많이 다르다. 사람들의 생애주기(life cycle)에 따라 출산이민·교육이민·취업이민·은퇴이민 등이 차례로 전개되어 다양한 유형의 ‘분산가족’이 생겨나고 있다. ‘주말부부’ 또는 ‘주말가족’ 현상의 국제판이라고 할 수 있는 전지구적 분산가족의 증가 현상은 사회의 기초 공동체인 가족의 형태와 의미가 변화하고 있음을 단적으로 보여준다. 초국적 기업(transnational corporations)이 기업 세계에서 경쟁력을 가지는 것은 확실하지만, 초국적 가족이 전통적 가족보다 더욱 인간적 삶을 보장할 것인지 여부는 알 수 없다. 그렇지

만 그것이 한국뿐 아니라 전 세계 각국에 출현한 새로운 현상인 것은 분명하다. 사회과학자들은 그러한 현상을 장거리 사랑(Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2011), 초국적 가족(*transnational family*; Bryceson and Vuorela 2002; Mazzucato and Schans 2011), 전지구적 가구 분산(*global householding*; Douglass 2006) 등의 개념을 사용하여 설명하고 있다.

2) 아버지 역할(fatherhood)과 전지구적 분산가족

아시아 여러 나라 사회에서는 공업화 과정에서 유교에 바탕을 둔 가부장제가 붕괴하였다. 엄부자친(嚴父慈親)은 교과서 속에서만 있는 이야기일 뿐이다. 가족 내 아버지의 사회적 역할은 상실되었고, 오로지 소득획득자로서의 경제적 위치만 남아 있을 뿐이다. 아버지는 자녀에게 무의미하게 존재하거나, 심지어 자녀 교육에서 빠져 있어야 한다는 인식이 확산되어 있다(김혜준, 2011). 아시아 각국 사회에서 어머니와 자녀 관계는 많이 연구되어 왔으나, 아버지와 자녀 관계는 상대적으로 소홀히 연구된 편이다. 특히, 자녀들과 떨어져 장기간 생활해야 하는 아버지들의 상황은 거의 연구되지 않았다. 이 논문에서는 자녀와 떨어져 한국에서 생활하는 아버지들의 역할을, ‘외국인 저숙련 이주노동자 아버지들’과 ‘아내와 자녀를 유학 보내고 홀로 사는 한국인 아버지들’의 사례를 분석하기로 한다. 그들은 가족의 행복을 위하여 생계를 책임지고 있으나, 가족의 행복은 경제적 기본 욕구 충족뿐 아니라 사회적 상호작용을 필요로 한다(Hamer 2001; Hobson 2002; Collier and Sheldon 2008).

3. 한국에서 원거리 아버지들의 출현

1) 외국인 저숙련 이주노동자 아버지

한국의 저숙련 외국인력제도는 외국인 고용허가제다. 외국인 고용허가제는 취업 허가를 받은 외국인에게 한국인과 동등하게 노동법에 의해 보호하고 있다는 점에서는 노동자의 권리에 관한 전지구적 규범을 준수하고 있다는 평가를 받지만, 단신 이주를 원칙으로 하고 있을 뿐 아니라 가족의 동반을 제도적으로 봉쇄하고 있다는 점에서 이주노동자 관련 시민단체의 비난을 받고 있다. 정부는 이주노동자가 한국사회에 정착하는 것을 막기 위하여 저숙련 이주노동자의 동반가족 관련 사증(visa)을 설정하지 않는다. 그 결과, 한국은 이주노동자를 받아들인 지 20년이 넘었지만 영구정착으로 이어지지 않고 있다(Seol and Skrentny 2009).

한국 기업이 받아들이는 이주노동자들은 주로 20-30대의 청년층이다. 그들 중에는 미혼자도 있지만 기혼자도 적지 않다. 그렇지만 그들이 본국을 방문할 수 있는 기회는 별로 많지 않다. 1년에 한 차례 정도는 본국에 다녀올 수 있으나 ‘생계’를 위해 돈을 벌어야 한다는 사명 때문에 막대한 부담을 치르고 다녀오는 이주노동자는 거의 없다. 그러므로 대부분의 이주노동자 아버지들은 자녀와 떨어져 생활한다. 그들은 한국에 오자마자 휴대폰과 인터넷에

접속할 수 있도록 투자하므로, 정보통신 미디어를 통해 본국의 가족과 연락을 주고받기는 하지만, 합법적으로 체류 가능한 4년 10개월 동안 실제 만남은 거의 이루어지지 않는다. 더욱이, 2012년 외국인근로자의 고용 등에 관한 법률 개정으로, 이주노동자들은 최장 9년 8개월까지 한국에서 거주할 수 있게 되었지만, 한국 정부는 그 방침을 바꾸지 않을 것이라고 밝히고 있다. 그 결과 한국의 저숙련 외국인 이주노동자들은 장기간 아내와 자녀들과 떨어져 생활해야 하는 상황에 있다.

예외적이지만 가족이 재회하기도 한다. 이주노동자 자녀가 한국에 관광 등의 명목으로 방문하는 방식을 취한다. 일부 부모는 그 방식을 이용하여 자녀들을 한국으로 오게 하여 같이 생활한다. 고용허가제를 통한 합법취업자보다는 서류미비 이주노동자들이 이러한 방식을 사용한다. 출신국에 따라 아이들의 여권 발급 자체를 제한하는 경우도 있다. 그런 나라에서는 브로커를 통해 아이의 여권을 발급받는 방법 외에 다른 길이 없다. 그 경우 여권 발급에만 미화 2000~3000달러의 비용이 든다. 부모가 먼저 한국에 와 있는 경우에는 본국으로 직접 가서 자녀를 데려오기 힘들기 때문에 브로커에게 의뢰해 자녀를 입국시킨다. 브로커는 아이의 여권을 만들고 비자를 받아 입국시켜 부모에게 인계하기까지 필요한 여러 가지 업무를 대행한다. 그런데 통상 브로커는 의뢰인 아이의 여권을 별도로 만들지 않고 자신의 자녀인 것처럼 꾸며 동반 여권을 만드는 경우가 많다. 브로커 입장에서는 자신의 여권을 이용해 위장 입국시키는 것이 훨씬 용이하기 때문이다. 아이의 이름으로 된 여권을 발급받아 입국시키려면 훨씬 많은 수수료를 지불해야 한다.

아이들은 부모들의 직장 근무 때문에 혼자 힘으로 한국사회에 적응해야 한다. 한국에서 이주노동자는 대부분 하루 10시간 이상 힘든 노동을 하고 있다. 부모들이 모두 일하러 간 사이 아이들은 딱히 갈 곳이 없어 주로 방 안에서 생활한다. 엄마 아빠가 일하러 간 후, 아이들은 입에 맞지 않는 음식으로 대충 끼니를 때운다. 부모가 모두 직장에 다니는 한 아이는 몇 달 동안 외출하지 못하고 집 안에서 텔레비전만 보았다고 한다. 아이들에게 좁디좁은 단칸방은 감옥이나 다름 바 없다. 그렇다고 낯설기만 하고 사람들도 무섭게 느껴지는 방 ‘박’으로 나가는 것은 엄두도 내지 못한다. 2001년 3월 교육부는 초·중등교육법시행령을 개정하여 외국인 이주노동자의 자녀도 초등학교와 중학교 취학이 가능하도록 하였다. 그렇지만 실제 학교에 다니는 학생보다도 그렇지 않은 아이들이 더 많은 것으로 알려져 있다.

또 다른 유형으로는 한국에서 이주노동자들끼리 결혼하여 자녀를 출산하는 경우도 있다. 여성 노동자들이 임신한 경우 출산이 임박하기 전에 귀국할 수밖에 없으므로, 합법취업 이주노동자 부부는 거의 자녀를 낳지 않는다. 서류미비 이주노동자들은 자녀를 낳을 경우 직접 양육하기도 하지만, 젖을 떼 후 정도에 브로커를 통해 본국의 자녀에게 아이를 보낸다. 이 경우, 이주노동자는 자녀와 떨어져 생활할 수밖에 없다.

결국, 가족 단위의 이주가 허용되지 않는 상황에서 대부분의 저숙련 이주노동자는 단신으로 한국에서 생활할 수밖에 없다. 국내 시민단체에서는 전지구적 인권 규범에 위배된다는

점을 강조하고 있지만, 한국 정부는 여전히 그러한 원칙을 견지하겠다고 천명하고 있다.

2) 기러기 아빠

‘기러기 가족’은 1999년 말 정부의 초·중·고등학생의 조기유학 제한이 폐지되면서 생겨났다. 한국의 가족들은 국내에서 치열한 경쟁을 뚫고 달성할 수 있는 것보다 훨씬 나은 대우를 약속하는 기회를 찾아 너도나도 자녀를 해외로 보냈다. 한국의 기러기들은 미국·영국·캐나다·오스트레일리아·뉴질랜드 등 영어권 선진국은 물론이고, 싱가포르·홍콩·필리핀 등 영어를 공용어로 채택한 아시아 나라들과 중국 등지로 흩어져 있다(최양숙 2005). 기러기 가족들은 선진국뿐 아니라 중국의 대학들도 국내 대학보다 비교 우위를 지닌 것으로 평가한다. 상대적으로 경제적 여유가 있는 사람들은 초·중·고 자녀를 중국의 국제학교에 유학 보내 영어·중국어 동시 습득할 수 있게 하고, 그럴 수 있는 여유까지는 없는 사람들은 일반학교에 보내 중국어 하나라도 ‘잡을’ 수 있는 기회를 부여한다. 그리고 중국 대학을 졸업하면, 국내 대학 졸업자보다 훨씬 나은 대우를 받을 것을 기대한다. 기러기 가족 현상은 한국인이 가진 학벌주의와 일류병을 일정 정도 반영한다. 여기서 학벌주의란 업무 능력보다 특정 대학 졸업장을 중시하는 관행을 의미하고, 일류병이란 1등이 아니면 불만에 빠지고 어떻게든 1등급 집단에 진입하려는 움직임을 뜻한다.

아이(들)은 조기유학을 위해, 아내는 그 뒷바라지를 위해 외국으로 가고, 남편은 한국에 남아 돈을 벌며 해외 거주 가족의 생활비를 댄다. 드물게는 아빠가 아이들과 함께 외국생활을 하는 경우도 있지만, 대부분은 엄마가 따라가서 아이들 뒷바라지를 한다. ‘기러기 아빠’는 뜨거운 가족애 하나만으로 혼자 남은 외로움과 먹을 것도 제대로 챙겨 먹지 못하는 삶의 고단함을 감수한다. 한국인들은 ‘기러기 아빠’에게 연민을 느낀다. 종종 일간신문 사회면을 장식하는 기러기 아빠의 사망 사건은 많은 한국인들에게 충격을 주고 있다.

사람들은 기러기 아빠를 펭귄·기러기·독수리의 세 유형으로 분류한다. 펭귄은 날지 못하는 새다. 펭귄형 기러기 아빠는 경제적 형편이 넉넉지 못하여 가족을 방문할 엄두는 내지 못하고 월급만 꼬박꼬박 부치는 유형이다. 기러기는 가을과 봄에 번식지와 우리나라를 오가는 겨울철새이므로, 기러기형 기러기 아빠는 연간 한두 차례 가족을 만나러 갈 수 있는 경제적 여건을 가진 유형을 가리킨다. 독수리형 기러기 아빠는 돈이 넉넉해 언제든지 비행기 타고 가족을 만나러 갈 수 있는 유형이다. 독수리가 창공을 자유롭게 날아다니는 것을 비유한 것이다.

기러기 엄마들의 어려움도 만만치 않다. 우선 외국에서 경제적 어려움과 정서적 외로움을 이겨내야 한다. 그들 중 상당수는 아르바이트까지 병행하며 자식들을 뒷바라지 하는 데 여념이 없다. 미국의 경우, 엄마가 유학생 사증을 받아 만학도가 되면, 자녀에게 동반 사증이 나오고, 그 자녀들은 학비 부담이 없는 공립학교에 다닐 수가 있다. 그렇게 할 경우, 기러기

엄마들은 학업까지 병행해야 한다. 아이들의 현지 적응 스트레스를 받아주어야 하는 엄마의 정신적 부담도 엄청나다. 특히 사춘기 자녀를 둔 기러기 엄마들은 신세 한탄조차 하기 힘든 고립감에 시달린다고 한다. 그렇지만 기러기 아빠가 경제력에 의하여 유형이 분류되듯 기러기 엄마도 제 각각이다. 일부 부유층 기러기 엄마는 호화롭고 방탕한 생활을 향유하여 현지 교민사회의 우려 대상이 되고 있다. 어쨌든 기러기 가족은 자녀 교육을 위해 부모들이 무조건적 희생을 감수하는 한국인의 극단적 자화상이라 할 수 있다.

4. 원거리 아버지들의 상황 비교 분석

1) 아빠와 자녀의 만남

저렴하게 통신수단의 발달로 화상전화 또는 음성전화로 통화하는 것은 일상이다. 그렇기 때문에 자녀에게 아버지라는 존재가 잊히는 일은 없다. 그렇지만 실제 만남은 그다지 쉽지 않다. 생계비 획득자로서의 역할을 부여받은 아버지들이 자녀들에게 가거나, 자녀들을 불러들이기 위해서는 막대한 비용이 들기 때문이다. “독수리형 기러기 아빠”들조차 자녀들과 자주 만나지 못한다는 점을 고려하면, 실제 대면 접촉을 통한 부자관계는 거의 이루어지지 못하고 있다. 이주노동자 자녀들은 한국 정부의 가족 동반 금지 정책 때문에 같이 생활할 수 있는 길이 “제도적으로” 막혀 있다. 기러기 아빠는 해외 가족을 방문하거나 이주하여 생활하는 것이 제도적으로는 가능하지만, 유학 경비를 벌어야 하는 상황 때문에 “실질적으로” 한국을 떠날 수 없다. 그래서 자녀는 아버지의 부재 상황에서 성장할 수밖에 없다.

2) 한국사회의 여론

한국인들은 저숙련 이주노동자의 가족 문제에 대해서는 무관심하다. 이주노동자 지원 단체에서 간혹 이주노동자의 가족 동반 허용을 요구하기는 하나, 그것이 핵심 쟁점이 된 적은 한 번도 없다. 그렇기 때문에 한국사회의 여론은 이주노동자 아빠의 상황에 대하여 아무런 입장이 없다. 한국의 노동시장의 빈자리를 메워주는 이주노동자의 충원은 찬성하지만, 그들의 정착은 반대하는 것이 한국인의 일반적 인식이라고 한다면(Seol 2010), 이주노동자 아빠에 대한 무관심은 “애써 외면한 결과”로도 해석할 수 있다.

한국인의 여론은 기러기 아빠에 대해서 동정과 연민으로 가득 차 있다. 권장하지도 막을 수도 없는 일이지만, 그 가족이 자녀의 해외 유학을 선택할 수밖에 없는 상황을 이해하기 때문이다. 자녀의 ‘경쟁 우위’를 확보하기 위해 여러 가지 여건을 고려한 상황에서 “합리적 선택”을 하고 자신의 삶을 희생하는 아버지에 대해 이해는 하지만 직접적으로는 개입하지 않으려는 입장을 취하고 있다.

결국, 이주노동자 아버지들은 한국인의 무관심 대상이 되었다. 기러기 아빠는 한국인의 심

정책 동정의 대상이 되기는 하지만, 정책적 지원과는 거리가 멀다.

3) 한국정부의 정책

한국의 이주노동자 아버지들은 고용노동부의 외국인력정책의 대상이기는 하나 여성가족부에서 맡고 있는 가족정책의 범위밖에 놓여 있다. 기러기 가족의 자녀는 교육정책의 하나로 다루고 있다. 그러나 한국에 남아 생활하는 아빠는 가족정책이나 교육정책의 대상이 아니다. 여성가족부에서는 다양한 가족을 지원하는 정책을 수립하여 추진 중에 있다. 그 일환으로 다문화가족지원법에 근거하여 다문화가족정책을 펴고 있으나, 그 범위는 결혼이민자 가족에 국한되어 있다. 이주노동자 아버지는 물론이고, 기러기 아빠들조차 가족정책의 대상이 아니다.

5. 결론

전지구적 분산 가족 현상은 한국에서 결코 낯선 현상이 아니다. 그 가족에서 아버지들의 역할을 적극적으로 조명할 필요가 있다. 그들은 더 이상 사회적 무관심 또는 방치의 대상이 되어서는 안 된다. 아버지의 역할을 재정립하는 것은 ‘아버지의 권리’와 관련해서 중요하기도 하지만(Collier and Sheldon 2006), ‘사회통합의 기본적 단위로서 가족의 역할’과 관련해서 결코 무시될 수 없다. 홀로 남겨진 아버지들의 생활 환경을 에워싸고 있는 사회구조적 제약을 밝혀내고, 아버지의 역할을 재정립할 필요가 있다.

참고문헌

김혜준. 2011. 『파더후드: 대한민국에서 아버지 찾기』. 창과샘.

최양숙. 2005. 『조기유학, 가족 그리고 기러기 아빠』. 한국학술정보.

Beck, Ulrich, and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim. 2011. *Love at a Distance: The chaos of global relationships*. London: Polity.

Bryceson, Deborah, and Ulla Vuorela (Eds.) 2002. *The Transnational Family: New European Frontiers and Global Networks*. New York: Berg.

Collier, Richard, and Sally Sheldon. 2006. *Fathers' Rights Activism and Law Reform in Comparative Perspective*. Portland, OR: Hart Publishing.

Collier, Richard, and Sally Sheldon. 2008. *Fragmenting Fatherhood: A Socio-Legal Study*. Portland, OR: Hart Publishing.

Douglass, Mike. 2006. "Global householding in Pacific Asia." *International Development Planning Review* 28(4): 421-445.

Hamer, Jennifer. 2001. *What It Means to Be Daddy: Fatherhood for Black Men Living Away from their Children*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Hobson, Barbara (Ed.). 2002. *Making Men into Fathers: Men, Masculinities and the Social Politics of*

- Fatherhood*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mazzucato, Valentina, and Djamila Schans. 2011. "Transnational Families and the Well-Being of Children: Conceptual and Methodological Challenges." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 73(August): 704-712.
- Seol, Dong-Hoon. 2010. "Which Multiculturalism? Discourse of the Incorporation of Immigrants into Korean Society." *Korea Observer* 41(4): 593-614.
- Seol, Dong-Hoon, and John D. Skrentny. 2009. "Why Is There So Little Migrant Settlement in East Asia?" *International Migration Review* 43(3): 578-620.

The Globalization of Higher Education in China and Korea

Eui Hang Shin
College of Liberal Studies
Seoul National University

Table of Contents

- ▶ I. Purposes of the Study
- ▶ II. Dimensions of Globalization of Higher Education
- ▶ III. “Soft Power” and Globalization of Higher Education
- ▶ IV. Government Policies of China and Korea on International Migration of Students and International Branch Campuses
- ▶ V. Emergence of Transnational Higher Education and “MOOCs”
- ▶ VI. The Confucius Institutes
- ▶ VII. Discussion

Preamble

- ▶ Basic Concepts and the Tradition of Migration Studies
 - Migration as a behavior
 - Migrants
 - Limitations of the traditional approach
- ▶ Demography of Organizations
 - “Births” and “deaths” of organizations
 - Social mobility within an organization
 - “Migration” of organizations
 - Dynamics in relocation of organizations



Preamble: continued...

- ▶ New Perspectives on Higher Education
 - Educational technology
 - Commercialization
 - Internationalization
 - Democratization (?)
 - Educational imperialism
- ▶ “Soft Power” and International Relations
 - Historical changes in the national interests since the end of the cold war era
 - “Privatization” (?) of the policies of international cooperation

Internationalization of Higher Education

- ▶ Three Selected Dimensions of the Internationalization
 - International Migration of Student Population
 - International Migration of Faculty Members and Researchers
 - Online Transnational Education
 - International Branch Campuses
- ▶ A Matrix of the Population Flows
 - Country of Origin x Country of Destination



Conceptual Framework

- ▶ Higher education, knowledge economy, cultural commodity
- ▶ Internationalization of higher education
 - international market
 - “export” and “import” of higher education
 - “brain drain,” “brain gain,” “brain circulation”
- ▶ International migration of students and “soft power” of a nation state


Data Sources

- ▶ The Institute of International Education
 - Project Atlas
 - Atlas of Student Mobility
 - “Open Doors”
- ▶ UNESCO
 - UNESCO–UIS Global Digest
- ▶ The Observatory of Borderless Education
- ▶ edx.org, MIT OpenCourseWare (OCW), MITx, coursera.org, Open Yale Course (OYC)

The Increase of International Students, 1975–2009

Worldwide: A Growing Pie

- Worldwide, there were over **3.7 million** international students in 2009, a 6.4% increase over the previous year.



Source: OECD *Education at a Glance*, 2011

Major Flows of International Students: Origins and Destinations

Where Are the Students Going?

<u>Host Country</u>	<u>2009 Total Int'l Students</u>	<u>2010 Total Int'l Students</u>	<u>Top Places of Origin</u>
USA	690,923	723,277	China, India, South Korea
United Kingdom	415,585	455,600	China, India, USA
France	266,448	283,621	Morocco, China, Algeria
China	238,184	265,090	South Korea, USA, Japan
Australia	253,717	258,827	China, India, Malaysia
Germany	244,766	252,032	Turkey, China, Russia
Canada	161,679	174,760	China, India, South Korea
Japan	132,720	141,774	China, South Korea, Taiwan

Source: IIE's *Project Atlas* – iie.org/projectatlas

Chinese Government Policies on International Migration of Students

- ▶ The Origins
 - Deng Xiaoping's Development Policy Principles in 1970s and 1980s
 - "The Culture geared to the Modernization, of the World, and of the Future"
 - "Use the Intellectual Resources of Other Countries "
 - "Open Wider to the Outside World"

Table 1: Trends of Outflows of Chinese Students, 2005–2011

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Number of Students	118,515	134,000	144,000	179,800	229,300	300,000	339,700
Change (%)	–	13.1	7.5	24.9	27.5	30.8	13.2

Table 2: Top 10 Countries of Destination of International Migration of Chinese Students, 2011

Ranking	Country
1	U.S.
2	Australia
3	U.K.
4	Korea
5	Japan
6	Canada
7	Singapore
8	New Zealand
9	France
10	Russia

Source : <http://www.iie.org/Services/Project-Atlas/China/Chinas-Students-Overseas>

Table 3: International Students in the United States by Country of Origin, 2008/09–2010/11

Ranking	Country	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11	2010/11 %	Change (%)*
1	China	98,235	127,628	157,558	21.8%	23.3*
2	India	103,260	104,897	103,895	14.4%	-1.0
3	Korea	75,065	72,153	73,351	10.1%	1.7
4	Canada	29,697	28,145	27,546	3.8%	-2.1
5	Taiwan	28,065	26,685	24,818	3.4%	-7.0
6	Japan	29,264	24,842	21,290	2.9%	-14.3
7	Saudi Arabia	12,661	15,810	22,704	3.1%	43.6
8	Mexico	14,850	13,450	13,713	1.9%	2.0
9	Vietnam	12,823	13,112	14,888	2.1%	13.5
10	Turkey	12,148	12,397	12,184	1.7%	-1.7

*Percent Change between 2009/10 and 2010/11.

•Source: <http://www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/International-Students/Leading-Places-of-Origin/2010-12>

Table 4: International Students in China by Country of Origin, 2011

Rank	Country of Origin	Number of Students	Percent Distribution
1	Korea	64,442	21.3%
2	U.S.	23,292	8.0%
3	Japan	17,961	6.1%
4	Thailand	14,145	4.8%
5	Vietnam	13,549	4.6%
6	Russia	13,340	4.6%
7	Indonesia	10,957	3.7%
8	India	9,370	3.2%
9	Pakistan	8,516	2.9%
10	Kazakhstan	8,287	2.8%
	Others	110,752	37.8%

Source: <http://www.iie.org/Services/Project-Atlas/China/International-Students-In-China>

The Economic Impact of International Students on Host Country

- ▶ United States, 2010: \$21.3 billion
- ▶ United Kingdom, 2010: \$12.8 billion
- ▶ Australia, 2010: \$10.4 billion

- ▶ The Economic Cost of Sending Country: The Students in the U.S. Only
- ▶ China, 2010/11: \$3.9 billion
- ▶ Korea 2010/11: \$2.2 billion



International Branch Campuses

- ▶ Definition
 - “A higher education institution that is located in another country from the institution which either originated it or operates it, with some physical presence in the host country, and which awards at least one degree in the host country that is accredited in the country of originating institution.” (The Observatory on Borderless Higher Education)
- ▶ Problems of the Definition
 - Degree: NUS–Yale case
 - Accreditation: Being recognized by accreditation bodies in the originating country

Growth of International Branch Campuses (IBCs)

▶ Trends of Growth

- 1999: 35 IBCs
- 2009: 162
- 2012 (January): 200
- 2014: 237

▶ Originating Countries and Number of IBCs

- U.S.: 78
- France: 27
- Great Britain: 25
- India: 17
- Australia: 12
- Malaysia: 6

IBCs

▶ Hosting Countries and Number of IBCs

- United Arab Emirates (UAE): 37
- Singapore: 18
- China: 17
- Qatar: 9
- Korea: 4

▶ A Shift from the Middle East Region to Asia

- 37 new IBCs to be established between 2011 and 2014
- None in UAE, Qatar
- Most of new IBCs will be hosted by China, Singapore, India, and Korea

Factors that Contributed to the Growth of IBCs

- ▶ The government policies toward substituting the international migration of students
- ▶ The impact of “9.11” on Arab countries: Fears of backlash on the Arab origin students abroad
- ▶ The advantages of attending IBCs:
 - Lower cost of higher education
 - Prestige of foreign university degrees
 - Being able to maintain the family relationships
 - Gender related cultural norms
- ▶ The financial motives of originating institutions
- ▶ The possible enhancement of an international reputation of the institution

IBCs in China

- ▶ A drastic increase in the outflows of Chinese students
 - A total cumulative volume of outflows: 2 million since 1978
 - 340,000 students left China for their study overseas in 2011
 - The central government’s tenth 5-year development plan for the knowledge-based economy
 - The central, provincial, and local government support for the collaboration of the Sino-Foreign University
 - 36 Sino-Foreign universities as of March 2011

The University of Nottingham Ningbo

- ▶ Opened in 2004, the first Sino–Foreign university in China
- ▶ Campus Location
 - Ningbo Higher Education Park, Zhejiang Province
 - About 200km south of Shanghai
- ▶ Enrollment
 - About 4,950 undergraduate and graduate students as of 2011
 - About 400 international students
 - More than 400 teaching and administrative staff from 40 countries
- ▶ Degree Programs
 - Arts and humanities
 - Social sciences
 - Science and engineering
- ▶ President of the University
 - Yang Fujia, former president of Fudan University

NYU Shanghai

- ▶ To be open in September 2013
- ▶ Freshman cohort: 150 students
- ▶ Collaboration with East China Normal University
- ▶ Projected enrollment
 - About 3,000 students
 - Chinese students (50%) + International students (50%)
- ▶ Campus location
 - Pudong District, Shanghai
- ▶ A comprehensive research university in which the College of Liberal Arts and Science would be a core component of the university
- ▶ Plan to build a “Global Network University”
 - NYU New York
 - NYU Abu Dhabi
 - NYU Shanghai

College of Engineering, UC Berkeley, Shanghai

- ▶ Announced on November 15, 2011 to establish the Berkeley Engineering Academic Center at Shanghai Zhangjiang Hi-Tech Park
- ▶ Academic research partners
 - Shanghai Jiaotong University
 - Fudan University
 - Tongji University
 - Shanghai Advanced Research Institute
- ▶ Corporate Research partners
 - Marvell
 - HTC
 - VeriSilicon
 - Network Appliance
 - SMIC
 - Grace Semiconductor
- ▶ Research Areas
 - Information and communication technology
 - Green energy technology
 - biotechnology

Stanford Center at Peiking University

- ▶ Slated to open in Spring 2012
- ▶ 30,000-square-foot space/Lee Jung Sen Building (\$5,000,000 construction cost was donated by Lee Chien, a Stanford alumni)
- ▶ Construction started in September 2010
- ▶ Classrooms, offices, meeting rooms, and conference facilities
- ▶ The Stanford faculty's concern
 - Will SCPK be a “protected space”?

Duke Kunshan University

- ▶ Master in Management Studies Program
 - 3 six-week sessions in Durham
 - 2 six-week sessions in Kunshan (40 miles west of Shanghai)
 - A Duke degree program, not a Duke Kunshan degree as originally proposed
 - Wuhan University replaced Shanghai Jiaotong University as a partner university
 - The original plan
 - 60 students in the program's first year
 - Growing to 170 students within 5 years
 - The revised plan
 - Will serve 30-40 students for the first three years in a pilot mode
 - The City of Kunshan is providing the land and building
 - About \$260 million investment
 - Duke's financial commitments = \$37million in the first six years

Criticisms by Duke Faculty

- ▶ The project will drain money from the Duke Durham campus
 - \$37 million in the first six years
- ▶ Duke faculty members are not interested in teaching in China
- ▶ Market research
 - Chinese students would rather study in the U.S. so they can have immersion in the U.S. business/cultural experience
- ▶ The project has been spearheaded unilaterally by administrators without consultation with the faculty
- ▶ Uncertainties about the academic freedom for faculty and students

China's **Blacklisting** of Foreign Scholars

- ▶ Editors of *Tiananmen Papers* (2002)
 - Perry Link (professor emeritus, Princeton University)
 - Andrew Nathan (professor, Columbia University)
 - Robert Barnett (director, Modern Tibetan Studies Program, Columbia University)
- ▶ Co-authors of *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland* (2004)
 - "Xinjiang 13"
 - Denied permission to enter China
 - Prohibited from flying on a Chinese airline (on a **no-fly list**)
 - Charges
 - "phony scholars, and shameless fabricators of political rumor"
 - "a U.S. government mouthpiece, provides a theoretical basis for America"
 - "one day taking action to dismember China and separate Xinjiang"

Hanban and Confucius Institute

- ▶ Hanban (漢辦)
 - Chinese National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language
 - The Confucius Institute (孔子學院)
 - Invested \$500 million since 2004
 - 350 universities in 90 countries host the Institute
 - 75 universities in the U.S., including
 - Columbia
 - Stanford
 - University of Chicago
 - University of Michigan

The Confucius Institute at American Universities

- ▶ Financial support from the Hanban
 - \$100,000–\$200,000/year for an operating budget
 - Support of instructors for teaching the Chinese language and culture courses
 - Support of special events and programs
- ▶ Controversies
 - Stanford University
 - A proposal of \$4 million support for a chair professorship in Chinese studies with a condition of refraining from the Tibet issue
 - University of Pennsylvania
 - The faculty voted against the establishment of the Confucius Institute
 - University of Chicago
 - 174 faculty members protested the university administration's decision to open the Institute
 - Wide spread concern about the possibility of “self-censorship”

Korean Government Policies on Recruiting International Students

- ▶ 2004
 - “Study Korea Project”
 - Goal: 50,000 international students studying in Korea by 2010
 - 83, 842 international students by 2010
- ▶ 2008
 - Goal: 100,000 international students by 2012
- ▶ 2011
 - Goal: 200,000 international students by 2020
 - Global Korea Scholarship
 - 100 billion won by 2015

The Songdo Global University Campus

- ▶ Incheon Free Economic Zone
 - Underwood International College, Yonsei University
 - State University of New York, Stony Brook
 - Computer Science and Technology & Society
 - 54 students (spring semester 2012)
 - 47 in masters degree program
 - 7 in doctoral program
 - “Pathway Program” for undergraduate students
 - George Mason University
 - Management
 - Spring 2013
 - University of Utah
 - Science, Social Science, Humanities, Education
 - Fall 2013
 - Ghent University (Belgium)
 - University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
 - Saint Petersburg State University (Russia)
 - Alfred University (New York)



CAMPUS Asia Project

- ▶ Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology/Korean Council for University Education, 2012
- ▶ Cooperation among universities in Korea, China, and Japan
- ▶ BESETO Dual Degree Master’s Program on International and Public Policy Studies
 - Seoul National University
 - Peking University
 - University of Tokyo
- ▶ 10 Consortia

Korea Foundation Global e-School Project

- ▶ “The virtual education of Korean Studies”
- ▶ Real-time broadcast, Internet online courses on Korean studies
- ▶ 2011
 - 35 courses at 19 universities in 12 countries
- ▶ 2012
 - 121 courses at 57 universities in 23 countries
- ▶ My experience



New International Programs

- ▶ “1 + 3” Programs at Selected Universities in Korea
 - Daejin University
 - University of Nebraska, Kearney
 - Sejong University
 - Temple University (Pennsylvania)
 - Texas-Angelo State University
 - Griffith University (Australia)
 - Otemae University (Japan)

New International Programs

- ▶ Kwangwoon University
 - University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh
 - Nyack University (New York)
 - University of Hawaii, Manoa
 - ▶ Chodang University
 - Indiana University of Pennsylvania
 - ▶ Chung Ang University
 - California State University, San Marcos
 - California State University, Chico
 - California State University, San Bernadino
- 

New International Programs

- ▶ Sogang University
 - University of New Castle (Australia)
 - University of Technology, Sydney
 - ▶ Dongkuk University
 - Valdosta State University (Georgia, USA)
 - Charles Sturt University (Australia)
 - Queensland University of Technology (Australia)
- 

The Characteristics of the International Partner Universities

- ▶ The Admission Criteria
 - High school diploma or equivalent
 - High school records
 - Interviews
 - TOEFL, not required
 - English placement test
- ▶ One-year English course in Korea
- ▶ Transfer to the University
- ▶ These programs are organized and managed by such fringe organizations as “International Cultural Education Center,” “Global Knowledge Education Center,” “Computer Center.” and others

The Growth of “Cyber Universities” in Korea

- ▶ A List of Cyber Universities
 - Keon Yang Cyber University
 - Kyung Hee Cyber University
 - Korea Cyber University
 - Global Cyber University
 - Daegu Cyber University
 - Digital Seoul University
 - Cyber Hankook University of Foreign Studies
 - Seoul Digital University
 - Seoul Cyber University
 - Sejong Cyber University
 - Open Cyber University
 - Youngnam Cyber University
 - Won Gwang Digital University
 - Korea Social Welfare Cyber University
 - Hankook Cyber University
 - Hwashin Cyber University

Bill Gates on Online Learning, August 6, 2010

- ▶ “Five years from now on the web for free you’ll be able to find the best lectures in the world. It will be better than any single university. **The idea of going away to college will disappear relatively soon, and that universities will cease to be location based.** Students should get credit for their knowledge regardless of the means by which they acquire it. The cost and difficulty of obtaining a college education will drive students toward online classes.”
- ▶ Concentrate on developing a truly outstanding online course on each subject and stop wasting resources for having too many mediocre online courses on the same topics
- ▶ Predicted a limited impact of online courses on K-12 education due to the need of the supervision by teachers

edX: Harvard-MIT Partnership

- ▶ On May 2, 2012 Harvard and MIT announced a partnership, “edX” to offer free online courses
 - A nonprofit partnership
 - \$60 million project, \$30 million from each
 - Purposes
 - To build a global community of learners
 - To research teaching methods and technologies
 - Started by offering five courses in the fall semester, 2012
 - Courses in the humanities, the social sciences, and computer science/engineering
 - Offer a certificate, not credit
 - MITx becomes a part of edX
 - <http://www.edxonline.org>

Growth of edX

- ▶ Number of Partner Institutions Increased to 27 by May 2013: Total 52 Courses Are Offered as of Spring 2013
 - MIT (17 courses offered on edX)
 - Harvard (7)
 - Berkeley (13)
 - The University of Texas System
 - Australian National University
 - TUDelft (2)
 - Ecole Polytechnique Federale De Lausanne
 - Georgetown University (3)
 - McGill University
 - Rice University (1)
 - University of Toronto
 - Wellesley College (4)
 - Berklee College of Music



Growth of edX: continued...

- ▶ Boston University
- ▶ Cornell University
- ▶ Davidson College
- ▶ The University of Hong Kong
- ▶ The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
- ▶ Karolinska Institut
- ▶ Kyoto University (1)
- ▶ Universite Catholique de Louvain
- ▶ Peking University
- ▶ Seoul National University
- ▶ Tsinghua University
- ▶ Technische Univesitat Muchen
- ▶ The University of Queensland
- ▶ University of Washington

edX: Goals and Principles

- ▶ “We Are Empowering Learning in the Classroom and Around the Globe”
- ▶ “For Anyone, Anywhere, Anytime”
- ▶ “Goals”
 - Expand Access to Education for Everyone
 - Enhance Teaching and Learning on Campus and Online
 - Advance Teaching and Learning through Research
- ▶ “Principles”
 - Not for Profit
 - Open Source Platform
 - Collaborative
 - Financially Sustainable

edX: Enrollment

- ▶ A Test–Pilot Course, MIT’s 6.002X: Circuits and Electronics in Spring 2012: 154,763
- ▶ Harvard’s Public Health 207X: Health in Numbers: Quantitative Methods in Clinical & Public Health Research, Fall 2012: 30,000
- ▶ Harvard’s Introduction to Computer Science and Programming 50X, Fall 2012: 120,000
- ▶ About 70% of the Students enrolled in edX Courses are Students Outside the U.S.
- ▶ Possible Impacts of MOOCs on Higher Education in China and Korea

MIT Open Course Ware

- ▶ Started in 2001 with 50 courses
 - ▶ 2,080 courses as of January 2012
 - ▶ 696 out of 895 full-time faculty members (78%) participate
 - ▶ 127 million visits by 90 million visitors as of October 2011
 - ▶ Visitor distribution by region
 - U.S.: 44%
 - Outside U.S.: 56% (East Asia, 18%; Western Europe, 12%; South Asia, 9%; South America, 4%; others, 13%)
 - ▶ Visitor distribution by status
 - Students, 45%; Self-learners, 42%; Educators, 9%
 - ▶ Projected target: 1 billion visitors by 2020
- 

MIT OCW

- ▶ Video and audio lecture files
 - Downloaded 28,000,000 times by iTunes U
 - Listened 24,000,000 times via YouTube
 - ▶ Courses are translated into
 - Chinese
 - Spanish
 - Portuguese
 - Thai
 - Persian
 - Greek
 - Turkish
- 

MIT OCW

- ▶ Annual Budget (2011)
 - \$3,700,000
- ▶ Cost for opening a course
 - \$10,000–\$15,000
- ▶ Cost for making a course available on video
 - \$20,000–\$30,000
- ▶ Foundation Support
 - Hewlett Foundation: \$14,000,000
 - Andrew Mellon Foundation: \$10,000,000
 - MIT: \$10,000,000
- ▶ Fund Raising
 - The National Public Radio Fund Raising Campaign Style



Most Frequently Visited Courses of MIT OCW

- ▶ Introduction to Computer Science and Programming
- ▶ Physics I: Classical Mechanics
- ▶ Linear Algebra
- ▶ Single Variable Calculus
- ▶ Electricity and Magnetism
- ▶ Introduction to Algorithms
- ▶ Circuit and Electronics
- ▶ Differential Equations
- ▶ Multivariable Calculus
- ▶ Principles of Chemical Science
- ▶ Structure and Interpretation of Computer Programs
- ▶ Introduction to Biology

MITx

- ▶ An Online Interactive Learning Platform
- ▶ Started in Spring Semester 2012
- ▶ An attempt to overcome the limitations of MIT OCW
- ▶ Special Features
 - Free online course
 - Online tutors
 - Online laboratories
 - Interactivity: Online discussion with the “classmates”
 - Machine learning
 - Crowd-sourced grading
 - Certification for those who successfully complete the course and pass the tests (fees for the tests)

MITx

- ▶ The Prototype Course, Spring Semester, 2012
 - Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
 - 6.002x: Circuits and Electronics
 - An introductory course for undergraduates
 - Introduce engineering in the context of the lumped circuit abstraction
 - Help to make transition from physics to electrical engineering and science
 - Enrollment
 - 20 MIT undergraduate students
 - 120,000 non-MIT “students”

MITx

▶ 6.002x

◦ Instructors

- Anant Agarwal, EECS professor and director of Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL)
- Gerald Sussman, Electrical Engineering professor
- Christopher Terman, CSAIL co-director and senior lecturer
- Piotr Mitros, CSAIL scientist

◦ Implications of MITx

- Democratizing higher education
- A tool for education research
 - Automated lectures and grading
 - Interactive learning
 - Learning at learner's own pace and schedule

Registration

▶ Enroll in 6.002x Circuits & Electronics

- ▶ E-mail*
- ▶ Password*
- ▶ Username (public)* Nickname you'd like to use on forums.
- ▶ Full name* If you successfully complete the course, you will receive an electronic certificate of accomplishment from *MITx* with this name on it.
- ▶ Location Preferred format is city, state, country (so for us, "Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA").
- ▶ Preferred Language Please let us know what language you'd most like to see the content in (even if not your native). We're working on translations and internationalization.
- ▶ I agree to the [Terms of Service](#)*
- ▶ I agree to the [Honor Code](#), summarized as: *
 - Complete all mid-terms and final exams with only my own work.
 - Maintain only one account, and not share the username or password.
 - Not engage in any activities that would dishonestly improve my results, or improve or hurt those of others.
 - Not post answers to problems that are being used to assess student performance.
- ▶ Open an account

MIT Faculty's Views on MITx

- ▶ Generally supportive
- ▶ Some concerns
 - A distinction between training and education
 - “Education is much more subtle and complex and is likely to be accomplished through mentorship or apprentice-like interactions between a learner and an expert. ...The sweet-spot for expensive universities such as MIT is a blend of highly-produced training systems and a high-touch apprenticeship model that emphasizes direct between faculty and students. MITx aimed at neither.”
 - “If students can master course materials online for free, what incentives would there be for anyone to invest in an expensive residential college education?”

Massively Open Online Courses (MOOCs)

- ▶ “Coursera” Partners
 - Princeton
 - University of Pennsylvania
 - University of Michigan
 - Stanford University
 - UC Berkeley
- ▶ Free, online versions of their existing courses
- ▶ Past Failures
 - Fathom, for-profit online course venture
 - Columbia, London School of Economics, University of Chicago, University of Michigan
 - AllLearn, a nonprofit online course program
 - Oxford, Yale, Princeton, and Stanford

Discussion

- ▶ Changing perspectives on education
 - From the Idealism to the Pragmatism
 - Education as a “cultural product”
 - Higher education and international market
- ▶ Internationalization of Higher education
 - International migration of student population
 - International exchange of faculty members and researchers
 - Transnational education
 - Massively open online courses
 - International branch campuses

Discussion

- ▶ “Soft power,” “national interest,” and international flows of student population
- ▶ The role of the government in internationalization of higher education
- ▶ The “cultural/educational imperialism” in internationalization of higher education
- ▶ “Democratization” of higher education and MOOC
- ▶ “Commercialization” of higher education
- ▶ Internationalization of higher education and academic freedom

Discussion

- ▶ “training” vs. “education”
 - “Teaching a subject”
 - “Teaching students”
 - ▶ A declining significance of the location-based university education?
 - ▶ The future of the higher education
 - Ownership
 - Processes
 - Relationships
 - Outcomes
- 

Discussion

- ▶ On May 2, 2012 Harvard and MIT announced a partnership, “edX” to offer free online courses
 - A nonprofit partnership
 - \$60 million project, \$30 million from each
 - Purposes
 - To build a global community of learners
 - To research teaching methods and technologies
 - Expect to offer five courses in the fall semester, 2012
 - Courses in the humanities, the social sciences, and computer science/engineering
 - Offer a certificate, not credit
 - MITx becomes a part of edX
 - <http://www.edxonline.org>
- 

Discussion

- ▶ MOOCs
- ▶ “Introduction to Artificial Intelligence” by Sebastian Thrun and Peter Norvig, Stanford University, Fall Semester, 2011
 - Enrollment: 160,000
 - Translated into 40 languages
 - 23,000 students from 190 countries “graduated”
- ▶ MOOCs in the humanities and the social sciences
 - Challenges for grading the essay papers
 - “crowd-sourcing”
 - “natural language software”



Stunted Lives and Early Deaths. The New Inequalities of Life

Göran Therborn
University of Cambridge

Three Perspectives on Human Life

In human history there have, so far, been three different conceptions of human life. Most ancient is the view of life as something given to humans, in some process of creation, often laid out in a myth of origin. Such myths are usually part of what latter day observers and discussants call religions. But the givenness of life may also be fitted into modern stories of evolution.

The “givenness” of life has two meanings. Firstly, it means that life is bequeathed to us by some preceding process of creation or evolution. Secondly, it should also be taken as “given” in the analytical, social science sense, as a fixed parameter, inalterable in the processes to be analyzed.

Also very old, is another perspective, not incompatible with, in fact easily coexisting with the first. That is, the view of life as vulnerable, but protectable and repairable. This is the take on life by medicine and by magic, both of ancient vintage. The former is a main feature of ancient Sinic civilization, although in some forms existing in most cultures. Magic, both as a means of protection and of body aggression, also seems to have been virtually universal, although it has a particularly important place in African civilization. The medical conception came to develop into measures of collective protection, of quarantines and pest control, and later into modern preoccupations with public hygiene and ecology.

The third conception of human life, by contrast, is very recent, dating from the last quarter of the 20th century. The first successful in vitro fertilization (test tube baby) occurred in 1978. It is still not in the social and political mainstream.

This is the conception of life as constructed.

This view of life as a human construction looks into two different directions. One is mainly interested in technological production, of babies, of more beautiful bodies, of sexual change, of life prolongation. The other is chiefly concerned with the social allocation of life-courses, with the social constructions of early and later death, of health and of ill-health. It is this second focus which I am opting for here.

From Differences to Inequality

Humans have always been aware of their differences, between young and old, women and men, us and strangers, chief and commoners, free men and slaves, kings/emperors and ordinary humans, rich and poor, and between different castes, estates, or ranks. Inequality, however, was generally below their horizon. Occasionally, it was glimpsed through the lens of a universalistic salvationist religion, like Christianity or Islam, and invoked in peasant rebellions – before they were invariably crushed by the powers spiritual as well as temporal. . The equality of souls had no theological bearing on the organization of this world.

In the Euro-American area, inequality was discovered only by the 18th century Enlightenment. At the end of the century, the perception of inequality provided the main ideological force of the Atlantic Revolutions, in France and in the Americas.

Inequality is different from difference in three ways. First an inequality presumes some kind of commonality of the unequals. There is no possible inequality between, for instance, a fish and a table, because they have nothing meaningful in common. From different angles, Enlightenment thinkers converged on the idea, that all adult men, who were not servants, had in common a capacity of reason, to understand and evaluate this world. Secondly, in-equality is perceived when a norm of equality is found violated. If all, non-servant adult males were equally capable of reasoning, why should government be in the exclusive hands of hereditary kings and aristocrats? Why should high offices be reserved for people of noble descent? Why should the law treat men differently according to their birth status? The first two differences define inequality in contrast to difference, but there is also a third difference, in some sense implied in the second, which should be made explicit. An inequality is usually held changeable, if not necessarily abolishable, while a difference harbours no intrinsic possibility of change.

When was inequality discovered in East Asia? Perhaps a century later than in Europe. It emerged in the Chinese Taiping Rebellion and it was acted upon in the Japanese Meiji Restoration, from above with a view to strengthening the cohesion of the realm in front of external imperialist threats.

Three Different Kinds of Inequality

Learning from Amartya Sen, I think the most fruitful take on human inequality is inequality of the capability to function fully as a human being. This general notion may then be specified according to three fundamental dimensions of human life.

Human beings are organisms, bodies, with a life-course of growth and development, susceptible to pain, suffering, and death, as well as to pleasure, health, and vigour. Here we are dealing with vital, or life, inequality, manifested and measureable in life expectancy, years of health expectance, in bodily development (e.g., height), which has been found strongly correlated with brain development. Vital differences have been noticed for long, but life inequality as a social construction, now well known among experts in epidemiology, social medicine, and medical sociology/economics, is a late 20th century preoccupation, and is still beyond the vista of most civic discourse.

Secondly, humans are persons, with a self-reflexive life of meaning and autonomy, or their denials. Here we have what may be called existential inequality, usually studied under rubrics of racism, sexism etc. The key aspects here are recognition, respect, and freedom. The Enlightenment and the Atlantic Revolutions were mainly concerned with one dimension of existential inequality, the civic inequality of propertied (or at least non-servant) adult men.

Thirdly, there is the currently most discussed inequality, resource inequality, most often gauged in terms of income, but wealth, education, and social contacts are also relevant. Resources are crucial to humans as actors, with goals and ambitions. By the leaders of the American and of the French Revolutions, actors' resources were treated, not as inequality but , as differences, and as irrelevant to socio-political equality as your height or your waistline. However, in France, in Europe, and, later to some extent in the Americas, socialists, communists, and labour movements came to bring resource inequality into focus.

Vital Inequality

Inequalities of life and death and of health and ill-health – and not just different lots in the human lottery or of inscrutable divine design - are very recent discoveries, the history of which is still unwritten. Child mortality has been in focus of post-WWII development studies and aid, and as such obliquely as an instance of global inequality. The human development index of the UNDP, derived from Sen's capability approach to inequality, includes life expectancy as one of its key indicators. In the rich countries since the last quarter of the 20th century, vital inequality (without the concept) has been brought into light by a rather small, though growing, band of researchers in epidemiology, social medicine, public health, and medical sociology, and by some historians.

It has not yet been incorporated into the political mainstream, not even during the current economic crisis and the new public concern with inequality. A major reason for this is probably the asymmetry of information. In contrast to the cases of other kinds of inequality, say racism, sexism, or economic exclusion and exploitation, vital inequality is not something the victims usually have the first and the best information of. The intricate and often long socio-medical processes which produce unequal health and life expectancy are only recently dawning to specialist investigators.

Nevertheless, the effects of vital inequality are devastating, and not just between rich and poor countries, but also within nations between rich and poor, between the highly and the low educated, between the employed and the unemployed, and between advantaged and disadvantaged neighbourhoods, cities, and regions.

In India (in the early 2000s), for instance, an extra 100 per thousand children to the poorest fifth of the population die before the age of five in comparison with the most prosperous fifth. Almost half of Indian children surviving to age five are stunted (two standard deviations or more shorter than the WHO median for their age). From child development studies we know that childhood stunting is associated with hampered brain development and other lifelong consequences. In London, the gap of male life expectancy at birth between upper middle class Chelsea and Kensington, on one hand, and poor Tottenham Green on the other, is currently seventeen years, i.e., of the same size as the national gap between the UK and Myanmar.

Within countries, vital inequality is increasing in many cases. Between 1990 and 2008 US life expectancy among people without a college degree decreased (by 3 years for men, and 5 for women), while rising among the more educated. In Finland, the mortality rate at ages 35-64 increased strongly for the poorest fifth of the population between 2004 and 2007. In India, many young people are literally shrinking. From the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s, the average height at age 20 declined for both men and women in Delhi, Haryana and Punjab, and among women only in the big states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh.

Between countries, an equalization of life expectancy occurred after World War II – with decolonization and resumption of socio-economic development in India, China and other Asian countries, and with a global diffusion of preventive and public health. The curve was broken around 1990 by two regional health disasters, the explosion of HIV-AIDS in Africa, especially the south, and the restoration of capitalism in the former Soviet Union. The latter has been largely hidden from public view, although it is visible in the WHO and UN tables of life expectancy. A leading British epidemiologist, who has done research in the area (Sir Michael Marmot) has estimated the excess deaths in the ex-USSR countries in the 1990s to four million.

Although there has been a certain recovery in this millennium, neither Russia nor southern Africa are back at their life expectancy in the 1980s.

..., and Their Social Construction

The exploration of the socio-medical processes generating inequalities of health, life, and death is still in a pioneering stage. But some culprits are emerging.

Socio-economic organization

Poverty among affluence, such as, e.g., Indian stunting and shrinking alongside upper middle class “Shining”. Or Britain’s class and locality divides of life expectancy.

A special case is the sexual economy of southern Africa, where havoc was created by the HIV-virus in economies of long-distance, longtime male migration, served by a small pool of prostitutes and bringing the infection to the poor homes of their wives.

Hierarchy

:Work pressure without (much) autonomy creates psycho-somatic stress, with possibly lethal effects. A longitudinal study of the British Whitehall central bureaucracy found that the risk of premature death followed exactly the bureaucratic ladder, the higher your rank the lower your risk of early death.

Socio-economic development paths and policies

The brutal installation of capitalism in Russia, Ukraine etc. created a shock of mass impoverishment, unemployment, cultural humiliation, and a crash of health services. At the same time the price of vodka plummeted.

China has a much higher life expectancy than India (73 to 63) and a lighter disease burden. Nevertheless, from a life perspective there is something wrong with the Chinese path of development, in spite of its economic growth success. Between 1990 and 2008 all the four major chronic diseases increased their age-standardized death toll, with rural areas hit most severely. The 1990s were the decade when public health care was largely abandoned in China.

Unemployment usually leads to health deterioration and higher mortality rates. In the current European crisis, imposed austerity policies have seriously damaged the Greek health care system, leading, i.a., to increases of infant mortality and the return of malaria.

Family

A third important conveyor of vital inequality is the family, actually of growing importance despite the pop sociology of “individuation”. Family bears very significantly on personal security and harmony, and on the development of children.

Since mid-20th century there is a strong Western tendency to homogamy, particularly educational homogamy. It is also very visible in contemporary upper middle class India. That is, highly educated, high earning males are marrying highly educated, high earning women. But this is not only the marriage of two high incomes – or of two low incomes marrying. Contemporary middle class parents, - South Korea perhaps most, - invest not only more money but also more time and effort on in their children, than the rest of the people. Middle class families catapult their children into a higher orbit of mental and corporeal development from an increasingly lower age.

There is also a mounting class divergence of family stability in the West, with increasingly stable coupling among the middle class and growing instability among the

workingclass. It is most pronounced in the US, with devastating life effects on the lower classes, but the same tendency can be found in Sweden for example.

At the Tipping Point of Life Ethics and of Life Politics

The increasing perception that human lives are constructed, rather than given, may take the world into two opposite directions. On one hand, there is the upper middle class individualist interpretation, that human life is a matter of “style”, and it is up to each individual to choose a healthy or an unhealthy lifestyle. Those who make the wrong choice obviously have to bear the consequences.

On the other, there is the social science perspective of individual options as socially structured. In this perspective it is a task of politics to re-structure the parameters of choice in such a way that every individual has the capability to function fully as a human being.

Life construction will be an important focus of this century. At present it is at a tipping point between exclusivist (upper) middle class individualism and social concern.

Life Course, Risks and Social Exclusion in Asia: Where are we now?

Raymond K H CHAN
City University of Hong Kong
***Draft for comment

1. Life Course:

The life course can be simply understood as an ordered pattern of life, featured by life course markers, with pre-determined roles and functions assigned to individuals in each of the stages (Shanahan, 2000). In terms of age, it has been roughly classified into three-stage: youth, adulthood and old age. In these three stages, in a waged labor society, Kohli (2007) suggests that the life course is in a tripartition state – preparation for the youth (in receiving education and training), activity for the adult (in stable employment and formation of family) and retirement for the elderly (disengaged from employment). While life course mainly focus on individual transition throughout one's life, unavoidably, how one manage one's life course is very much tied up with one's experience and arrangement for family. Hence, interaction and coordination between individual life course and the family life course has to be incorporated into our analysis.

Leisering (2003) suggested that life course has different patterns in different historical stages. It has been shifted from *traditional* life course (till 1900) characterized by unstable and unpredictable life course; *industrial* life course (1900 - 1955) shaped by family and work; *Fordist* life course (1955 – 1973) in which welfare state came in shaping life course; then the *Post-Fordist / post-industrial* life course (since 1973) implies de-standardization with increasing discontinuities in family and working lives. The shifting standard life course differed in different historical periods with their own unique economic structure and social context.

There is an assumption that completing a task in the earlier stage satisfactorily can facilitate the fulfillment of the tasks at the later stages; and subsequently lower (or no) risk. On the contrary, inadequate preparation in one stage will lead to the effect of 'cumulative disadvantage' (Dewilde, 2003). The transition between different stages is also important as the sources of potential risks a person might face in the life course.

2. Standardisation and Institutionalization of Life Course

As defined by Bruckner and Mayer,

The institutionalization of life courses refers to the process by which normative, legal or organizational rules define the social and temporal organization of human lives. It can refer to stages or states in lives which can be formally or informally decreed like marriage, education, and retirement. It can also refer to events and transitions like leaving school, entry into and exits from labor contracts, or ages of pension entitlements (2005: 31).

Standardization of life courses occurred when ‘specific states or events and the sequences in which they occur become more universal for given populations or that their timing becomes more uniform’ (Bruckner and Mayer, 2005:31).

Researchers have argued that the life course is standardized and institutionalized in the modernization process (though some also argued that standardization as a project is not completed, and variation always there in the history [see Shanahan, 2000]). Efforts to theorize and construct the idea of institutionalization of life course developed in 1980s (Kohli, 1986, 2007), aimed at giving an account of the master narrative of the different forms in pre-industrial, post-industrial and modernized Western societies from 19th to 20th century. Such attempts implied that standardization was very much depended on the changing economic structure and system. Later, theorists also add one more component – the welfare state provisions which aims to provide additional resources for the people to cope with risks and meeting their needs arise from life course.

For the economic system, it imposes requirements on the individual through setting requirements for the labor force (such as level of skills and knowledge through formal certification), screening criteria for employable (and who have to leave workforce). This is particularly important in times of economic adversity, when the labor have to compete with each other for the limited jobs available. Hence, when the labor is young, they are expected to receive education and training, preparing them for entering into adulthood characterised by work. While they are getting old, and considered less valuable, they will be expected to retire and leave the job market. The age and meaning associated with age contribute to structuration and integration of life course stages. The initially ‘informal’ labour practice can gradually be institutionalised as formal rules (legislation), defining individual’s life stage progression (Buchmann, 1989).

Setting formal rules is one of the methods to institutionalize life course. For example, the government can set rules on the legal age of employment, terms of employment, occupational welfare, pension and other types of social security provisions, and retirement. The rules can also specify the the level of provision (statutory occupational welfare and pay package [such as through trade union collective bargaining]) and protection (employment practice) a worker can received, and hence how much current and future risk they have to tackle.

At the same time, social welfare policies also provided to institutionalise life course, to an extent that Leisering and Leibfried term it as ‘life course policy’ (1999). Guillemard (2005) also suggested that social welfare policies, such as compulsory schooling (and also expansion of higher education), and benefits for children and elderly, contributing to the institutionalization of life course. Leisering (2003) describes these effects as, explicitly, structuration (into different life stages) and integration (of different life stages), and implicitly, normative modelling.

Standardisation of life course might also be enforced by the prevailing dominant norms in a society. For example, the adult is expected to form their own family – be independent from his/her own family, marriage and rearing children. Adult is also expected to take up different roles as according to the gender perception and division of work.

In summary, the interaction among the macro (structural) factors such as the desirable economic practice, the institutionalised governmental sector and rules, and societal norms; the meso factors such as family considerations and constraints; and the micro (agency) factors such as personal characteristics and individual action and preference, constituting a dynamic process of institutionalization and standardization (and also de-institutionalization and de-standardisation) (Mayer, 2009). Standardisation of life course, in Kohli's argument reflected modernization. Yet, in a similar vein, Kohli also suggested that forces emerged in the process of modernization – such as individualization – serve as a driving force for de-standardization (Kohli, 1986). This is also a choice to re-rationalise arrangement to cope with the latest demands arising from changing economic and social contexts.

3. Destandardization and Deinstitutionalization of Life Course

It has been argued that in contemporary societies, such standardized (and in a sense, conventional and traditional) life course has been challenged and undergoing a deinstitutionalization and destandardization process. For the former, it refers to the previously clearly differentiated life course stages are now reintegrated / re-arranged or fused. For the later, it refers to the life events and sequences are less dominant among the population and more dispersed into different life course stages (Bruckner and Mayer, 2005). On the whole, life course is no longer in a simple linear manner, with greater variation found within the same age cohorts and between different generations; changing life courses choices in a different life stage (e.g., marriage / child rearing at a different age cohorts, education fused with work; phased retirement); changing life course markers' sequence (e.g., marriage and child birth) and age has become a less organizing principle.

Similar to those factors institutionalizing / standardizing the life courses, similar forces are there from the macro (e.g., social norms, economic structure and employment, social welfare reforms), meso and micro (e.g., individualization) levels.

For the economic sector, the increasing uncertainty of the economy, demonstrated by recurrent financial crises from 1970s in the West, has weakened job stability leading to greater job uncertainty. In order to have better job security, individual has to adopt various 'new' strategies, instead of relying protective devices: prolonging higher / specialized education; continuous and life-long education, training and retraining; adjusting to part-time and casual work pattern. Some might resort to family strategies (household economy) to cope with the work risk (which is closely related to current and future financial risk), such as marriage or postponement of marriage; postponement of child birth; adoption of dual-earner family model, shifting gender roles in employment, etc.

At the same time, theorists also argue for the increasingly prevalence of 'individualization'. Individualization refers to a voluntary, in some circumstances) process of individual searching for their own meaning of life, with greater sense of control over their lives and quest for freedom to choose their own life course design. The increasing room for individual decision making is also due to the weakening of the structural constraints (formal rules and law, social norms, and financial pressure [due to increasing affluent]). The process can also be involuntary as individual

were left on their own to pursue their own choices while facing risks, when risk responsibility has been shifted more to individual (and family as well) shoulder (Chan, 2009; Kemshall, 2001).

A major call for individualization is from the female, indicated, for example, by the increasing enrolment in education, participation in waged employment, and away from the caring roles. They have questioned various roles and functions imposed on them, such as marriage and child rearing as a must, and full-time housewife specializing in care as a preferable adult life stage. These challenge the normative and functional specialization within the family, as well as the gender division of roles / functions between male and female. As argued, the standardised / institutionalized life course is now a construct subjected to their and others interpretation and action, due to the urge for 'biographization' of life course as an individual project.

It has been pointed out that those new alternatives have argued for formal recognition of their choices of life courses as legitimate, and the system adjusted. Eventually, these could lead to a new round of (re)institutionalization and standardization. Nevertheless, in this process of change, as argued by Kohli (2007), tension created between the standardized life course and the claims for individualization and biographization leading to conflicts at different levels.

4. Risk and Social Policy Arrangement

In standardised / institutionalised life course, created and maintained in a relatively stable socio-economic environment, the major risks concentrated on resources deprivation in the two ends: childhood and elderly (the so-called 'Rowntree-type poverty cycle', see Dewilde, 2003). Hence, earlier welfare measures – social security system and pension - were constructed to guard against these predictable problems.

Yet, in the new context, the de-standardisation and de-institutionalization life course in a 'post'-modern globalized economy, where work and family are increasing unstable and uncertain, and where the state's power and credibility have been diminished, have led to more risks. 'New social risks' has been coined describing the issues relating to caring, balancing family and care duties and maintaining employment (Chan, Wang and Takahashi, 2010; Taylor-Gooby, 2005).

Increasing concerns have been paid to the transitional periods, such as youth (un)employment and retirement. Social policy no longer confined in tackling poverty and social exclusion concentrated in particular time period on particular groups, but has to address the increasing uncertainty spreading to different life course stages.

Apart from these so-called old and new social risks, there are two issues we need to attend to.

a. Alternative life course / identity risks:

This concerns the risk of social exclusion resulted from the selection of an alternative life course and hence an unconventional identity (and its associated roles and functions). For example, those remain single, co-habitation, same sex relationship, child-less family, prefer to work intermittently instead of a stable waged-labor, male who opt for full-time

house husband (or assuming greater familial responsibility). Normally, these choices are leading to explicit and implicit discrimination and social marginalization.

b. Compression of life course risks:

This type of risks resulted from the compression of certain life stage meaning shorter period while often asked to take care of more (burdening) life course tasks. A common example is the risks associated with 'shrinking middle' (Frericks, Harvey and Maier, 2010) – the compressing adult stage due to prolonged education (hence start work later) and often involuntary early retirement (esp. those low education and de-skilled labor groups). The shrinking middle is coupled with the more expensive cost for rearing child and older generation (increasing longevity who might not be well-covered by social security), likely to be concentrated when they are in their 40s (the so-called double-care burden).

If there has been a life-course policy, what are the new faces of these policies, and how are they going to further restructure in facilitating the pursuit of alternative life courses (leading or not leading to re-institutionalization or re-standardisation of life course)? At the same time, individual and familial strategies are adopted to guard against these potential risks (such as prolonging education, postponing marriage / child rearing), but that actually contributing to the compression of life stage.

5. Where is Asia now?

Life course research and literature are mostly come from the Western societies. The first question will be are these concepts applicable to the Asia societies? Similar to the researcher has done in the West, is there a standardised life course, at least common for a cohort? What are the factors standardizing or institutionalizing this? Are these societies also facing a 'de-' process, and if so, what are the results and what are the key contributing factors to it? What potential risks such life course choices engendering, and what kind of strategies have been adopted to tackle it?

Asia is a very diverse region. It might be more appropriate to limit our observation to the more developed societies, such as Japan and the four Asia NIEs (Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong) which enjoy comparable level of social and economic development among themselves. It is commonly assumed that Asian has a stronger (or relatively stronger) sense of family and collectivism. Following these assumptions, it is logical to argue that: a) individual life course closely developed with the family life course; b) life course task is very much in line with the conventional expectation – a standardised one going through various life markers; c) strong collective-orientation (or groupism) might reduce the room and desire for individualization. It is probable to argue that life course, and the norms associated, will be more (and still) traditional and conventional; and hence, more or less standardised and stable over decades.

Census data of various countries can offer us a general picture of the occurrence of major life markers. We take the transition from childhood – education to adult – work as the starting point. Statistics shown that the length of years of schooling of these societies have been significantly extended, due to the conventional emphasis and expected return from education, increasing

demand on quality of manpower, and the availability of public support and supply of higher education (e.g., enrolment of tertiary education in Taiwan can be higher than 90%). The total enrolment rate for Taiwanese aged 6 to 21 (i.e., 15 years of education) was 87.23% in 1990, and increased to 95.55% in 2012, representing the years of schooling could be close to 15 years. Obviously, the ending point for education – children (as a dependent) generally ended at 20 to 23 in these societies, postponed by 1 year to 5 years in 3 decades, compared to the previous cohorts.

Table 1: Expected Years of Schooling of Children (years)

HDI Rank		1980	1990	2000	2005	2012
	Very high human development	13.2	14.0	15.4	15.8	16.3
	High human development	10.3	11.2	12.3	13.1	13.9
1	Norway	13.1	14.0	17.5	17.5	17.5
3	USA	14.1	15.3	15.4	16.1	16.8
5	Germany	14.6	14.6	15.7	15.7	16.4
10	Japan	13.2	13.3	14.6	15.0	15.3
12	Korea	11.6	13.7	16.0	16.5	17.2
13	Hong Kong	11.0	12.0	12.0	13.7	15.5
18	Singapore	--	14.4	14.4	14.4	14.4

Source: UNDP Human Development Index

It is also noticed that male LFPR decreased while female LFPR increased steadily in recent decades. Statistics also indicated that high female LFPR found among those in their 20s and 30s, and significantly dropped from 40s. On one hand, that reflected the increasing uncertainty and increasing job interruption among the male adults. It also indicates, as shown in the West, a standardised life course between male and female before their 40s, even among the younger cohorts.

In different period of times, different countries have institutionalized the official retirement age, especially when they have installed their own national pension scheme. That formally set a timeline between the work – adult and inactivity – elderly. Before that, people can choose to work if they wished, especially when they were mainly self-employed (as farmers). Nevertheless, there is a general trend all these countries have postponed the retirement age recently, such as Japan, Korea and Taiwan extend this to 65, Singapore extends it to 62 (and with reemployment policy). Of course, there are gaps between official and effective retirement age: for example, in 2009, it was 61.3 (male) and 58.9 (female) in Taiwan; 69.7 (male) and 67.3 (female) in Japan; and 70.3 (male) and 69.8 (female) in Korea (OECD, 2011). It could be suggested that the extended work life has moderated the impact of postponement of the commencement of work life. Shrinking middle, in that sense, seemed cannot be established, as they can work for 40 years, which could be similar to the previous cohorts. Nevertheless, one has to pay attention to the phenomenon of drastic drop of LFPR among the 50s, meaning senior employment is a problem –

forced early retirement, or losing competitiveness in late adulthood. Hence, shrinking middle is not measured by the number of years that one can work, but the length of their work life that they can be productive, able to maintain a job and enjoy stable income. Risks associated with that kind of shrinking middle cannot be completely ruled out.

Marriage, as a life marker of adulthood, also postponed in all these societies. In a general sense, the latest age of first marriage pattern is already comparable to some of the Western societies, such as France (31.6 – M / 29.6 – F in 2008) and UK (30.7 – M / 28.5 – F in 2005); but still lag behind countries such as Germany (33.0 – M, 30.0 – F in 2008) and Norway (33.4 – M, 31.1 – F in 2008). One phenomenon deserves our attention – the increasing number of remarriage (in absolute number as well as percentage of total marriage) and remarriage at a later life stage (e.g., in Korea, 42.1 for male and 37.9 for female in 2002 to 46.6 for male and 42.3 for female in 2012). These reflect the importance of marriage in different age cohorts, and a more liberal approach for remarriage, especially for the female. While marriage rate slightly declined, family is still important for oneself in constructing their own life course (World Value Survey results in different countries asking for the importance of family in their life confirmed this). Marriage and remarriage can be a sensible strategy in managing individual / family risks (financial and care). Another phenomenon requires more time to draw meaningful conclusion: the decline (or stabilization) of divorce rate. For example, in Hong Kong, the crude divorce rate increased to 2.66 in 2006, dropped to 2.43 in 2009 and increased to 2.57 in 2010. In Korea and Taiwan, the trend is reverting: reached its peak in 2002 (3.0) and declined to 2.3 in 2012 in Korea; reached its peak in 2003 (2.87) and dropped to 2.41 in 2012 in Taiwan.

Table 2: Age of first marriage (Male / Female):

	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Japan	27.0 / 24.7 (1975)	28.2 / 25.5 (1985)	28.5 / 26.3 (1995)	30.5 / 28.8 (2010)
Hong Kong	26.8 / 23.4 (1976)	28.0 / 25.3 (1985)	30.0 / 26.9 (1996)	31.1 / 28.9 (2011)
Korea		/ 24.7 (1985)	27.8 (1990) / 26.1 (1995)	32.1 / 29.4 (2012)
Singapore	26.5 / 23.2 (1976)	/ 26.2 (1980)	/ 27.0 (1990)	28.8 / 26.2 (2001) 30.1 / 28.0 (2011)
Taiwan	28.2 / 22.1 (1971)		30.8 / 26.4 (2001)	31.8 / 29.4 (2011)

Birth out of wedlock is considered to be low (though increasing) in Asia. For example, proportion of births out of wedlock was 1.5% and 2.0% in Korea and Japan in 2009, respectively, compared to 55% in Norway and 36.3% in OECD in the same year. The sequence: marriage before having a child, is largely maintained, though the age of having the first baby postponed and the mean age is already close to 30 (for the mother). Child rearing is largely maintained, but the number of children in each family drastically reduced to one to two. This could be a sensible

strategy, both for the child (to concentrate all family resources for one child) and the parents as well (to keep more resources for their own retirement).

Table 3: Age of female giving birth to the first baby:

	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Japan	25.6 (1970)	26.7 (1985)	26.4 (1995)	29.1 (2009)
Hong Kong		25.1 (1981) 26.6 (1986)	28.8 (1996)	29.4 (2001) 30.0 (2011)
Korea			26.5 (1995)	29.1 (2009)
Singapore				28.9 (2001) 30.1 (2011)
Taiwan			26.4 (1998)	29.9 (2011)

Table 4: Total Fertility Rate

	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Japan	2.13 (1970)	1.76 (1985)	1.42 (1995)	1.23 (2010)
Hong Kong	2.67 (1975)	1.49 (1985)	1.30 (1995)	0.901 (2003) 1.204 (2011)
Korea	4.53 (1970)		1.63 (1995)	1.39 (2010)
Singapore	2.07 (1975)	1.61 (1985)	1.67 (1995)	1.20 (2011)
Taiwan	3.10 (1976)	1.89 (1985)	1.555 (1999)	1.065 (2011)

We do not have quality longitudinal dataset (such as the German Life History Study) providing us adequate evidence to show the different life courses across different generations, the prevalence of (what types of) risks, as well as the strategies that adopted to tackle these risks. These indicators show us a general picture of the life course in these Asian societies:

1. On the whole, there is a common understanding that Asian societies are undergoing a similar process as in the West, such as postponement of education, transition to adulthood – work, marriage and having first baby, and official retirement age – a standardised life course is taking shape.
2. Life course events / markers are still there across generations, with the sequence largely maintained; perhaps with the exception of retirement (while some work longer, some other choose to retire in 50s voluntarily).
3. Shrinking middle can still be possible due to the significant drop of LFPR (and for women, sharp drop commenced from mid-30s to 40s), and hence most productive life-span confined to mid-20 to mid-50.
4. Divorce is more popular (or acceptable), but remarriage is also more popular.

Public policy has contributed to the shaping of such life course by defining, for example, age for child labor, legal marriage, compulsory education, retirement age linked with pension – structuring individual into different life stages. There are also some policies sustaining the gender roles (by providing gender-specific provisions, such as maternity instead of paternity

leave); or supporting gender equality (such as child benefit, child care leave, and policy against gender discrimination).

It could be suggested that postponement (instead of deserting these completely) of various life course and the roles / tasks is obvious and common across these societies. And it can also be suggested that these are the strategies for the, especially the younger generation, to combat possible poverty in the adult and retirement stages. In extreme cases, currently, some youth even choose not to start working and continue to depend on their parents (the so-called *Ken Lou Zhou* in Chinese societies). Dual-earner family model, though might not be the most dominant pattern, is also a strategy to manage risks. Of course, such choices will bring to other types of risk: such as family-work conflict and caring problem. Statistics also show that there are more and more unmarried women in different societies (though that does not mean that they do not want to get married). Those aged over 30 are described as 'left-over women' in Taiwan and Hong Kong.

Individual also demands for greater public support to their choice of life course arrangement, for example: a) transition to adult – work, by providing more training (ensure better start and employment stability), assistance in home ownership (formation of family); b) deliver of tasks in the adult – work stage, by offering adequate labor protection (dismissal and compensation, and anti-discrimination policies for female) and life-long education and training, and provision of better care services; and c) deferral of elderly – retirement, by amending official retirement age, re-employment support, and active aging education to tackle ageism. All these policies will have implication on standardisation of life course. In that sense, pursuing their own desirable life course does not necessarily go against standardization.

Nevertheless, does the increasing demand for government intervention resulted in an expanded state, and hence, greater impact of institutionalization resulted from this? It is generally accepted that the welfare system in Asia is a minimalist / residualist model, heavily embedded with productivist orientation. It is also argued that the scale of provision has been expanded in these societies, for various reasons. While facing with the economic uncertainty since 1990s, these societies have, once again, restructured its orientation to adopt stronger favour of ALMP principles compared to non-intervention as in before (Chan, 2013; Lin and Chan, forthcoming). Gaps are still there, between the provision and the demand, and individuals are very much left behind on their own, need to mobilise their own and familial resources in coping with care demands (for example, see Chan, Soma and Yamashita, 2012; Ochiai, 2009). Tentatively, we can suggest the state's influence will be on setting basic legal framework (such as the age-specific conditions), and its impact is relatively limited. Hence, the shaping forces could be more from the economic structure, and conscious strategies adopted by individual in balancing the needs between objective constraints and individual pursuits.

This touches on the issue of individualization – are Asian enjoying greater freedom to determine their own life course / biography, and how different it is from the life course choices of the previous generations? Certainly, more empirical data required to give a more definite answer. The World Value Survey has data on how different countries' respondent assessed their freedom in deciding their own life goals. On the whole, the respondents would like to have their right to decide their own life goals, and still optimistic on the freedom of choice and control that they can have.

Table 5: Response to statement indicating desire for individualization and perceived freedom in making such choice (%)

I decide my goals in life by myself				How much freedom of choice and control?					
	Japan (2005)	Korea (2005)	Taiwan (2006)		Japan (2005)	Korea (2005)	Taiwan (2006)	Hong Kong (2005)	Singapore (2002)
Agree strongly	30.7	32.6	28.4	9 -10 (10 = a great deal)	6.8	18.1	33.2	13.3	21.6
Agree	62.3	55.6	62.7	6 – 8	55.4	56.8	48.3	43.8	63.2
Disagree	1.0	11.1	7.8	3 - 5	27.6	22.1	14.7	27.6	13.8
Strongly disagree	0.1	0.7	0.6	1-2 (1 = none at all)	4.1	3.1	3.7	4.1	1.2

Source: World Value Survey

By observation, the younger generation seems are keen on searching their own meaning / structure of life - leading to a variety of relationship patterns, and work pattern (work holiday, work for meaning of life, etc.). In these societies, some more unconventional choices will still be questioned as a desirable life course (for example, unmarried middle-aged women, career-minded women, childless family, same-sex family, reconstituted family through remarriage). While greater tolerance is there, pressure on these alternative life course choices also exist.

The conflict can be subtle and implicit, occur in in family daily routine – intra- as well as inter-generation. For the later, one of the key conflicts will be in the responsibility to support the aged parents – how far the younger generation can take up / willing to take up this responsibility when the care burden becoming more costly and longer-term, especially when the retirement protection is inadequate in Hong Kong, or growing uncertain in Korea, Japan and Taiwan. The Singapore government has enacted a law requiring the children to financially support their parents (institutionalization). For other places, individuals are demanding for a better public regulation and support to the retirees. The changes in the structure of life course, as well as the norms regulating the relationships, generated risks that individual and the society has to tackle.

It might be still valid to suggest that a standardised life course is still more or less intact, but different among different cohorts in the age definition. Such adjustments, together with the demands on public provisions and regulations, are considered as strategies for this generation to adapt and survive while facing with the demands. A preliminary review of data (noted that these are mainly cross-sectional) suggested that the changes are drastic (such as the ultra-low TFR) within a shorter period of time (such as aging), if compared with the West. These have posed serious challenges to individual, as well as the public sector (private sector too) in carefully designing their life courses as a preparation. The magnitude of risks could be even greater than

those happening in the West; and so do the conflicts between generations, and different risk groups when we have strong liberal and individualization of responsibility tradition.

In future research in this themes in Asia, there are many research questions for us to work on. Concerning the application of the concepts, we need to provide good empirical database to examine whether life course has been standardised or not, and by what factors, among different cohorts. If it has been de-standardised, we need describe the different life course of different age cohorts, and how the life course being shaped by macro, meso and micro levels factors (and by so, examine the individualization thesis). Specifically, we can study how life course being shaped by the changing socio-economic contexts from late 1990s – increasing work uncertainty, adoption of neo-liberal reforms in these Asia societies.

Interested to the social policy academic will be to examine how different cohorts facing the challenges: youth transits to adult, adult maintaining their employment, and older persons survive in their later life. It will also be interesting to examine the life course strategies adopted by individual reflecting their changing meanings of life, work, family, gender, and inter-personal / inter-generational responsibility, in coping with the risks associated with changing socio-economic contexts, as well as individualized choices. We can also examine the social policy impacts on supporting the life course choices, and whether it will institutionalise or promote diversity of life courses. On the whole, we are asking the question is the Asian model of welfare fit for meeting the coming challenges.

Of course, more vigorous and systematic researches have to be conducted to give a more accurate answer, as life course research is still limited in this region. This paper can only propose some observations and questions, rather than answers.

References

- Bruckner, H. and Mayer, K. U. (2005) De-standardization of the Life Course: What it might mean? And if it means anything, whether it actually took place? *Advances in Life Course Research*, 9:27-53.
- Buchmann, M. (1989) *The Script of Life in Modern Society. Entry into Adulthood in a Changing World*. London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Chan, R.K.H. (2009) Risk Discourse and Politics: Restructuring Welfare in Hong Kong. *Critical Social Policy*, 29(1):24-52.
- Chan, R.K.H., Soma, N. and Yamashita, J. (2011) Care Regimes and Responses: the East Asian Experiences Compared. *Journal of Comparative Social Welfare*, 27(2): 175-186.
- Chan, R.K.H., Takahashi, M. and Wang, L.L.R. (eds) (2010) *Risk and Public Policy in East Asia*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Chan, R.K.H. (2013) The welfare–work nexus in East Asia – a comparison of contexts, paths and directions. *Journal of Asian Public Policy*, 6(1):99-113.
- Dewilde, C. (2003) A life-course perspective on social exclusion and poverty. *British Journal of Sociology*, 54(1): 109–128.

- Esping-Andersen, G. (1999) *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Frericks, P. Harvey, M. and Maier, R. (2010) The 'paradox of the shrinking middle': The central dilemma of European social policy. *Critical Social Policy*, 30(3):315-336.
- Leisering, L. and Leibfried, S. (1999) *Time and Poverty in Western Welfare States. United Germany in Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Leisering, L. (2003) Government and the Life Course. In: J.T.Mortimer and M.J. Shanahan (eds). *Handbook of the Life Course*. New York: Kluwer.
- Guillemard, A.-M. (2005) The advent of a flexible life-course and the reconfiguration of welfare. In: J.G. Andersen, A.M. Guillemard, P. Hensen and B. Pfau-Effinger (eds) *The New Face of Welfare*. Manchester: Policy Press.
- Kemshall, H. 2001. *Risk, Social Policy and Welfare*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Kohli, M. (1986) The world we forgot: A historical review of the life course. In: V. W. Marshall (ed.). *Later life: The social psychology of ageing* (pp. 271–303). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Kohli, M. (2007) The Institutionalization of the Life Course: Looking Back to Look Ahead. *Research in Human Development*, 4(3–4): 253–271
- Lin, K. and Chan, R.K.H. (accepted) Repositioning Three Models of Social Policy with Reference to East Asian Welfare Systems. *International Social Work*.
- Mayer, K. U. (2001) The paradox of global social change and national path dependencies: Life course patterns in advanced societies. In: A. Woodward & M. Kohli (eds.). *Inclusions and exclusions in European societies* (pp. 89-110). New York: Routledge.
- Mayer, K. U. (2009) New Directions in Life Course Research. (Arbeitspapiere - Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung ; 122)
- Ochiai, E. (2009) Care Diamonds and Welfare Regimes in East and South-East Asian Societies: Bridging Family and Welfare Sociology. *International Journal of Japanese Sociology*, 18(1): 60-78.
- OECD (2011) *Society at a Glance 2010: OECD Social Indicators*. Paris: OECD.
- OECD (2011) *OECD Health at a Glance, 2011*. Paris: OECD.
- Shanahan, N.J. (2000) Pathways to Adulthood in Changing Societies: Variability and Mechanisms in Life Course Perspective. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26:667-692.
- Taylor-Gooby, P. (2005) *New Risks, New Welfare: The Transformation of the European Welfare State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Postindustrial Rearrangement of Human Competence: (Dis)ability and creativity

Yunjeong Joo
Seoul National University

1. A story of an artist with down syndrome

I will start a story on a person's life. Her name was Judith Scott(1943~2005) born with down syndrome. She was institutionalized for the half of her lives due to down syndrome. In her later days, she came to Creative Growth and created many art works, now valuing over 15,000\$ and sold in art markets. In Creative Growth, established in the seventies, San Francisco, USA, more than four hundred artists with developmental disability are making art works there. In Bay area only, there are five art centers for the disabled people and in USA there are more than fifty art centers for the disabled people and special organizations supporting those activities.

This is not an exceptional case for the U.S. but rather wide spreading in the developed countries. In Europe, many asylums are turned into art museum and art institution for the intellectually disabled, exemplified as the Gugging Art Museum in Austra. In Japan, there is a NPO organization called "Able Art". In South Korea, there are various art organization of the disabled people and supporting organizations.

Moreover, there are recent surge of disability aesthetics appreciation in art world, exemplified Marc Quiins' famous sculpture work "Alison Lapper Pregnant" portraying a woman with phocomelia neither grotesque nor pitiful but fully empowered suggest the radical transformation. This is not simply art world's quest for new kinds of sensation or new talents. But it shows fundamental changes in the frames and forms of disability contextualized in society. This is a small but very significant changes in understanding and contextualizing disability in society. The human competence is undergoing radical rearrangements triggered by the postindustrial social changes. The competence of the disabled, with the spread of the idea of normalcy and possessive individualism, was designated as incompetent and incapacitated during the industrial time, due to their lack of ability to fit into the standardized labor forms and the idea of normalcy. However, with the advent of postindustrial society, where service industries and creative industries are on the rise, there seems a possibility of the rearrangement of human competence not bound to the idea of normalcy/abnormalcy.

The disabled people's artistic activities are re-illuminated. The forms of lives are redefined and transformed in new ways. However, this cannot be simply understood as a progress brought by modernity. Since the first wave of excluding disability from society was largely related to the modern concept of competence and normalcy.

2. Competence and Normalcy during Modern Times

Life course for the disabled people were reformulated at the first half of the century. With the ideology of normalcy and standardization, they were excluded from the society, incarcerated within various institutions and asylums even risking the total extermination of them, as in the case of Nazi's eugenic extermination and also North Korean expulsion of the disabled from Pyeongyang. This discrimination and exclusion were mainly due to the idea of normal and fit

persons, who can function with rationality. At the threshold of such discrimination and exclusion, there lies the concept of 'competence' distinguishing normal from abnormal, fit from misfit. 'Competence' is the capacity or potential for adequate functioning-in-context as a socialized human. In this definition, capacities, potentials and adequacies are to be understood as socially constructed and ascribed, hence locally variable-rather than 'objective' attributes of persons. (Jenkins, 1998)

However, with the advent of modern legal cultures, competence was codified within written laws and played grounds for categorization of persons. "Those with normal competence and capacity enjoy rights; they can be held responsible for their acts because they are able to reason and conform their conduct to reason. Those with abnormal competence and capacity, in contrast, can be subjected to legal restraints on their autonomy and denied rights"(Minow, 1990;106)

However, as Lenard Davis(1995) shows "the normal is a configuration that arises in a particular historical moment. It is part of a notion of progress, of industrialization, and of ideological consolidation of the bourgeoisie."

For instance, with modern capitalist state, the legal concept of person has been transferred to East Asia via Japanese civil law, which centers on the 'normal person' who is able to make contracts and to possess property. However, in this newly established hierarchy of normalcy and abnormalcy, the disabled were registered in the section of abnormalcy and excluded from having legal rights in terms of contracts and qualification. The term disability and the disabled are themselves modern inventions, as modern institutions regulated by the ideology of "possessive individualism"(Macpherson, 1962) and "normalcy". According to this, human beings should be free from dependence of other's will. Here, the disabled dependent on other's wills cannot have full freedom and enjoy full rights as legal person. Unlike the common prejudice that the disabled have been liberated from traditional hierarchical rules with the introduction of modern education and welfare system, the disabled and disability came to be regarded and classified as a distinct social category of dependent and abnormal beings.

However, many anthropological and historical works on disability show different ways of integration in non-Western or non-modern society (Benedicte Ingstad, Susan Reynolds Whyte, 1995, Stiker, 2000) With the advent of late modern transformation, in this binary opposition of normal/abnormal, competent/incompetent, dependent/independent, there started to exist certain changes. I argue that disability art movements are blurring such binary opposition.

3. The transformation of competence and creativity

Unwriting of such fixed concepts of competence and normalcy started with many social changes. This flourishing of capability of the disabled people could be possible due to many reasons. I want to point out several key factors for that.

1) Deinstitutionalization, and The rise of social justice, disability rights movement.

"Founded in 1974, Creative Growth is among the oldest and largest art centers for people with disabilities in the world. At the time of our founding, the State of California made an important policy decision that people with developmental disabilities would no longer live in hospitals, but would become part of the community in which they were born. The State would use the money that went to hospitals to help pay for new community programs that served the people that once lived in the institutions."(DiMaria , 2012)

This important decision was Lanterman act in 1977, which recognized the rights of the people with developmental disability to pursue normal life within community. This was in part triggered

by welfare movement of normalization introduced by Wolfensberg. With his idea of social role valorization and normalization the need for community based services was on the rise and Creative Growth, the art center for the disabled people with developmental disability came to be established.

In Japan, able art movement started in 1970's by Harima Yasuo, former journalist. He started this movement at the 70's the time of rapid economic development and with their long shadows on the society. Working as a journalist at Asahi shinbun, he covered a story of a woman killing his two disabled sons and there were huge disputes who was responsible for such atrocity, for the woman or society itself, since society did not provide enough means for such vulnerable people to be protected. Then, he started a small art workshop in Nara city with people with disability to pursue the possibility of happy and creative life of disabled people. This is now developed into NPO called Able Art, and also various networking organizations linking Asia Pacific areas. The end of almost half the century's incarceration started worldwide influenced by the rise of social justice and disability rights movement.

Moreover, with the legalization of disability discrimination act in the U.S.A., U.K., South Korea, governmental agencies started to pay attention to various forms of discrimination in art and culture. Therefore, accessibility to art and culture came to be one of the key policy goals due to the legislation of disability discrimination act worldwide. However, since the voices of disability groups are on the rise, accessibility came to be widened to art participation and art making and expression through art.

Here, in this art center replacing the old medical centers or asylum models, the disabled people are called as artists instead of being labeled as retarded or patients. This rearrangement of roles of disabled from being diagnosed and cured in medical languages to creating and making art works produced tremendous changes not only for the disabled people themselves, but also for families and communities. Disability does not mean abnormal states to be cured and to be regulated any more but rather different forms of life to be respected and to be protected in this context.

2) The role of psychology on creativity and quest for new sensibility

The newly risen attention to disability and art for the developmental disability was in some sense possible to the new interests in creativity as human beings' key functions. Such literature was mainly developed by psychologists and the founder of Creative Growth (SF, USA) was also a psychologist.

“Our philosophy is that each person has the right to the richest and fullest development of which he is capable. Only then can society reach its fullest potential. Since we believe that creativity is the highest actualization of human functioning, it is of paramount importance to provide an environment in which creativity is appreciated, stimulated, and encouraged.”(Katz & Katz, 1990:3)

Such views of creativity linked with disability were often popularized by Oliver Sacks, the author of *Awakening*. He, based on his clinical studies on disabled people, often argue that there are different ways of experiencing and dealing with the world. So a person without a certain function whether due to injury or disease, recovers in different and creative way. He argues that the brain's capacity to create new pathways — is a crucial part of recovery for anyone who loses a sense or a cognitive or motor ability. (Oliver Sacks).

On the other hands, in Japan, Kurihara Akira, a prominent Japanese sociologist once emphasized the importance of primitive knowledge in the sense of Levi-Strauss. Reflecting the art exhibitions

created by the disabled people, Japanese sociologist Kurihara commented that Able Art (art works of the disabled people) is an expression of primitive knowledge distinguished from professional knowledge. According to him, primitive knowledge included knowledge on everyday life originated from life. Harima, Yasuo, quoting Miyajawa Kenji, insists that aesthetics of able art is open to sensibilities, since children and people belonging to non-civilized world are free from civilization and have very delicate sensibilities. The art works of people with developmental disability could open such possibilities (Harima, 2007)

As in the case of Creative Growth (USA) and Able Art (Japan), there were strong calls for new functions of humanity and new kinds of knowledge and learning distinguished from that of modern rational human beings. Disability seems to provide certain inspirations to overcome the constraints of modern rationality and competence. Thus, art made by disabled people provide new platforms for humanity to experience and express different forms of life. This is very evident in people's interests' in Savant Syndrome.

This is of course closely related with the social transformation, since with the rise of postindustrial society, modern types of competence were strongly questioned while calling for new kinds of competence such as creativity and new sensibilities and nurturing creative potential of the members of society.

3) Art world engagement, Outsider Art

The success of disability art was partly due to the existence of similar concepts in contemporary art. L'art brut, or outside art provided platforms for the art of the disabled to be accepted in art world. Art works of the disabled people started at first for medical diagnostic and research purposes. However, such clinical activities were redefined by French Artists DuBuffet and termed as L'art brut and asylum art, including the art works of the mentally handicapped, prisoners, elderlies, epitomizing "purity, spontaneity, authenticity, sincerity". This concept of outside art came to be rather under disputes among disability art movement, since in outside art, the voices of the disabled people are rather silenced. However, with this art platform of outside art, the artistic activities of the disabled could be recognized as legitimate art works. In New York, there are held annual outside art fair, where numerous works of disabled people were sold. Outsider art, L'art Brut challenged the concept of art institutions, with highly educated class of art elitism. It was an art movement challenging the mainstream art world. It provided a kind of fora for art and disability to ground the validity of their works. Outside art provided the frames where their art works can be understood as a part of art world.

Those three phenomena made impacts on the transformation of the competences of the disabled people, from normal and standardized competence to creative and different capability. However, for this, it was crucial for the disabled people to have minimum standards of living available for them. In the U.S.A and Japan, people with developmental disability could be provided means to survive with social security programs. This kind of project is possible in some sense after the completion of welfare states. These days, with the financial crisis in the state of California, this kind of art centers faces tremendous challenges to sustain. Moreover, the rigid concept of communication based on literacy and rationality came to be widened and not merely confined to verbal or rational communication, but also various forms of physical languages and artistic languages.

4. The questions to be explored

The definition of competence came to be open and widened however there remains much to be thought about and tackled.

1) Late modern challenges to equality

At the first moment of modernity, we encountered the exclusion of the disabled people and labeling of them as abnormal based on the concept of normalcy. With the achievement of substantial social justice, it is necessary to configure equal conditions for all walks of life. “Although equality is conceptually linked to the idea of the average or the norm, it is necessarily concerned with more than the middle reaches of the social spectrum. One of the most influential models of social and economic equality implies that as many people as possible should at least be included economically within the bottom reaches of the ‘average’ life style; that there is a minimum ‘normal’ level of access to social provision and goods of which everyone is entitled.... Questions on normality suggest the possibility of a sting in equality’s tail: relatively equal access to valued goods and conditions of life may be implicitly conditional upon fitting in to a ‘normal’ lifestyle or way of life.”(Jenkins, 1998)

If we start to ask questions on the validity of ‘average’ and ‘normal’, how can we reconfigure equality without succumbing to the idea of standardized and normal forms of life?

2) New forms of life politics and narratives

We should be aware of the importance of small, grass roots movement. we tend to be very pessimistic about future. But somewhat such pessimistic forecast itself is coopted by the capital centered, power centered narratives. I believe that making realistic forecasts, also discovering other narratives is also an important job for social scientists.

Engaged with disability and art movement for about ten years, I encountered tremendous changes in terms of policy, people’s reception of disability. I may not call them as progress or enlightenment, but they become richer and more nuanced. It is necessary to write new forms of life politics and narratives for more creative futures: How we institutionalize, imbricate, create forms of lives? What are the possible forms of lives without making people turning into the semi-automaton? How can we accept and appreciate the fragility and precariousness of life and share our resources and live together?

3) Regional variations of life politics and narratives

Bibliography

주윤정 외, 2007, 『에이블 아트: 차이와 소통의 예술』, 사회평론.

『できる!アート: 福祉施設における<アート化の軌跡』, (2001), 財団法人たんぼぼの家.

『Able Art:魂の藝術家たちの現在』, (1999), 財団法人たんぼぼの家.

『Touch the Spirit: Able Art 国際フォーラム』, (2001), Able Art Japan.

『このアートで元気になる : エイブル.アート '99』, (1999).

『こんなアートスペースがあったらいいな:障害のある人.アート.まち』, (2000), Able Art

播磨靖夫, (1999), 「エイブルアートとなにか」, 『Able Art:魂の藝術家たちの現在』, 財団法人たんぼぼの家.

- Barnes, C, & Mercer, G., 2001, *Disability Culture: Assimilation or Inclusion*, Albrecht, Seelman and Bury eds., 2001, *Handbook of Disability Studies*, Sage.
- Bowler, Anne E., 1997, 'Asylum art: the social construction of an aesthetic category', Zolberg, Vera L. .Cherbo, Joni M. ed., *Outsider art - Contesting boundaries in contemporary culture*, CAMBRIDGE university press.
- Casling, Dennis, 1994, 'Art for Whose sake?', *Disability & Society*, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp.383-394.
- Corker, Mairian .Shakespeare, Tom, 2002, *disability/postmodernity*, NewYork: continuum.
- Crutchfield Susan & Epstein, Marcy, 2000, 'Introduction', *Points of Contact - disability, art, and culture*, The University of Michigan.
- Davies, Lenard, 1995, *Enforcing Normalcy: Disability, Deafness and the Body*, Verso.
- Dyer, Geraldine & Hunter, Ernest, 2009, *Creative Recovery : Art for mental health's sake*, *Australasian Psychiatry*, vol.17(supplement)
- Ingstad & Whyte, 1995, *Disability and Culture*, California Univ. Press.
- Jenkins, Richard et all, 1998, *Questions of Competence: Culture, Classification and Intellectual Disability*, Cambridge.
- Katz, Elias, 1996, *A creative art centre for adults with developmental disabilities*, *Disability and Rehabilitation*, vol.18(5), pp261-264
- Katz, Elias et al., 1987[1991], *Freedom to Create*, Richmond : National Institute of Art & Disabilities
- _____, 1990, *Art & Disabilities*, Richmond : National Institute of Art & Disabilities
- Kuppers, Petra, 2003[2005], *Disability and Contemporary Performance : Bodies on Edge*, NewYork&London : Routledge
- Masefield, Paddy, 2006, *Strenth : Broadsides from Disability on the Arts*, London : Trentham Books
- Millet-Gallant, Ann, 2010, *The Disabled Body in Contemporary Art*, NewYork : Palgrave macmillan.
- Minow, Martha, 1990, *Making all the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law*, Cornell University Press.
- Mitchell, David T. .Snyder, Sharon L., 1997, *The Body and Physical Difference - discourses of disability*, The University of Michigan Press.
- Morrison, Elspeth .Finkelstein, Vic, 1993, 'Broken arts and cultural repair: the role of culture in the empowerment of disabled people', Swain, John .Finkelstein, Vic . Sally, French . Oliver, Mike ed., *Disabling Barriers - Enabling Environments*, London: SAGE Publications.
- Nussbaum, Martha, 2011, *Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach*, Belknap Havard.
- Oliver, Michael, 1996, *Understanding Disability - From Theory to Practice*, New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Rhodes, Colin, 2000, *Outsider Art: Spontaneous Alternatives*, London: Thames & Hudson.
- Pointon, A. with Davies, C. eds., 1997, *Framed: Interrogating Disability in the Media*, London: British Film Institute.
- Sandahl, Carrie & auslander, Philip eds., 2005, *Bodies in Commotion : Disability & Performance*, Ann Arbor : The University of Michigan Press

Siebers, T., 2010, *Disability Aesthetics*, The University of Michigan Press.

Silvers, Anita, 2002, "The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Disability, Ideology and the Aesthetic," *disability/postmodernity*, New York: continuum.

Solvang, P. K. "From identity politics to dismodernism? Changes in the social meaning of disability art" *European Journal of Disability Research* 6. 178-187. 2012.

Stone, John H. eds., 2005, *Culture and Disability : Providing Culturally competent Services*, Sage Publications

Sutherland, A., 1997, "Disability Arts, Disability Politics", *Framed: Interrogating Disability in the Media*, London: British Film Institute.

Taylor & Francis. "Worlds remade inclusion through engagement with Disability Art". *International Journal of Inclusive Education*. 2007.

Tremain, S. ed., 2005, *Foucault and the Government of Disability*, The University of Michigan Press.

Stiker, Henri-Jackques, 1999, *A history of disability*, University of Michigan Press.

INTIMACY, INDIVIDUALISM AND THE FUTURE OF RELATIONSHIPS

Lynn Jamieson
Edinburgh Univ

To give an overview of this talk, I will briefly note that various theoretical traditions in social science place great emphasis on personal and intimate relationships in the formation of self and society but some do not. I suggest the first view more convincing. I'll shift to looking at ways of talking about and theorising global social change. I note analysis that gives intimacy and personal life a key role in social change and analysis that places the key drivers of change as remote from personal life which becomes a victim or opportunist beneficiary of the action elsewhere. Also, I note characterisation of social change as 'Individualisation' seems to suggest the fading significance of binding relationships. Moreover, some European and American commentators put growing emphasis on the value of the individual, or the ideology of individualism, at the heart of change. I note the analysis of Professor Yan and Professor Chang indicating that China and South Korea are experiencing individualisation without individualism and ask whether individualisation, nevertheless, will, in time, lead to individualism. I will argue that individualisation and some forms of individualism do not necessarily mean a demise of relationships. There are many ways of arguing this. I suggest that in the context of European-American cultures a mythical version of the past helps to inform understanding of social change in the present. I will use research evidence gathered with colleagues in Scotland on the personal lives of people living alone noting the difference in the material and cultural context of living alone in Scotland and Korea. Finally I will reflect on how the global problem of climate change intersects with personal life as a way of returning to the significance of intimate personal relationships in effecting social change.

Defining Relationships

Connection (consequential, significant)

Between people: durable pattern of interaction, mutual recognition and acknowledgement

Personal: a continuum of 'closeness' and 'intimacy' from acquaintance to closest intimates, 'nearest and dearest'

At its simplest, a relationship is some form of consequential or significant connection. Connections need not be between humans and for good reason there is much sociological interest in relationships between humans and things and humans and other species. However, I'm focusing here on relationships between people; citing David Morgan's work on acquaintances (2009), I note that in current UK usage of the English language, for a connection between people to be recognised as 'a relationship', this involves a durable pattern of social interaction that is meaningful to those engaged in it and would be acknowledged and recognised as a type of relationship by them (Jamieson & Milne 2012). Relationships are only one form of social interaction and, of course, not the only possible unit of analysis for the study of social life. Nevertheless, personal and intimate relationships are often recognised in theoretical traditions of social science as playing a key role in the shaping of selves and social worlds.

Personal relationship matter

The essential context of being human: reproduction of the self, ('ontological security'), species, culture.

Do some matter more than others?: 'significant others' & background chorus

The type of relationships that have been given most weight in such theoretical traditions, the 'significant others', involve regular and sustained co-presence, typically built on physical proximity, and affect. They are emotionally charged relationships. The everyday English language phrase 'nearest and dearest' and some uses of the term 'intimacy' sum this up. Personal relationships, particularly emotionally close intimates, have been singled out in classical social theory as fundamental to 'ontological security', a secure sense of an agentic self, of a place in the social world, and of basic trust in others. Personal relationships, particularly parent-child relationships and couple relationships retain central place in some strands of contemporary Western theorizing of subjectivity and identity drawing on the sociological traditions of phenomenology (Schutz 1932), symbolic interactionism (Mead 1927), as well as a number of social psychological traditions including those building on psychoanalysis (Freud 1930). One version of this is that our sense of self is sustained by an inner circle of a small group of intimates and then there is a background chorus (Berger and Luckman 1967) While Western sociology has always had traditions emphasising the fact that the individual is socially shaped, at the level of popular cultures the concept of the person as individual often downplays social relationships and interdependence.

Why might they not matter?

Personal life is the periphery or end point, never the start of social change?

Theoretical approaches to self-formation turning away from intimate relationships – emphasising the self as shape by discourse (Rose drawing on Foucault)– suggesting a self that is supported by a wide network of weak ties and mediated relationships has a better chance of successfully making his or her way in the world than one bound by strong ties (Wellman et al).

Barry Wellman's concept of networked individualism drawing on Castell's analysis of The Network Society

'the individual – and not the household, kinship group, or work group – is the primary unit of connectivity ... people must actively network to thrive or even to survive comfortably. More passive or unskilled people may lose out, as the group (village, neighbourhood, household) is no longer taking care of things for them' (Wellman et al 2006, 164-165).'

Theorising Global Social Change

Futures typically include continuity and change.

Prediction usually include projecting the present forward and sometimes, ‘reading history sideways’.

We could argue, for example, about the appropriateness of Ron Lesthaeghe’s and his collaborator’s analysis of the ‘spread’ of the ‘second demographic transition’ (He argues that a cluster of demographic changes including: sub-replacement fertility linked to postponement of starting a family; rise in ages at marriage reflecting a free partner choice and ‘female autonomy’; Premarital cohabitation more common and more acceptable will spread across the globe with “post-materialist values” at individual and collective level

Radical departures (‘Arab Spring’) are not usually predicted

Various theorists try to identify ‘waves’ and ‘mechanisms’ of history (current examples include Goran Therborn’s analysis of waves of globalization)

Myths and partially evidenced stories told about change in the past inform predictions of the future

A historical story - From ‘The Family’ to Sex and Intimacy

Burgess, E. W. & Locke, H. J. (1945). *The Family: From Institution to Companionship*

Giddens, A. (1992). *The Transformation of Intimacy* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Weeks, J. (2007). *The World We Have Won: The Remaking of Erotic and Intimate Life*. London: Routledge.

An Enduring myth

‘Just as the Industrial Revolution and urbanization were built on the breaking of extended family ties and the rise of the separate nuclear family, so too is the Information Age reliant on individual skill portfolios and the freedom of the footloose worker to move as the new “turbo-capitalism” requires’

Don Edgar ‘Globalization and Western Bias in Family Sociology’ in JACQUELINE SCOTT, JUDITH TREAS and MARTIN RICHARDS (eds.) The Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Families

Living alone

Almost half of households in Sweden are people living alone, about a third in the UK.

Trend is to grow.

But diverse population and diversely socially connected

Resist interpreting through myths of the past

Living alone is increasingly common across the globe.

Country	1950a	1980b	1990b	2000b, *	2010b, †
Sweden	21	33a	44	47	49
Finland	18	27	32	37	41
Norway	15	28	34	38	40
Japan ‡‡	5	20	24	28	31
United Kingdom	11	22	27	29	29
Italy	10	18a		23	29
Czech Republic		24	27	30	27
United States	9‡	23	25	26	27
Canada		20	23	26	27
Portugal	8	13a	14	17	
Spain		8	10	12	18
Hong Kong, f				16	17‡
Cyprus	12 ¥	10	13	16	
South Korea					16
Brazil, e				8	
China #				8#	10#
Argentina, e				7	
India, g				4	4

The trend to living alone is part of a package of demographic changes, the restructuring of life events - partnering, parenting, household formation, death - that constitute populations, the individual life course and the institutional arrangements such as marriage by which it is structured. Media reports for Korea indicate a very rapid increase to 23% of all households in 2013. Demographic trends like age of marriage, rates of living alone and the duration of life are not randomly and independently fluctuating, but complexly interconnected. Göran Therborn (2004, 2011) has tried to capture such interconnections by use of the compound noun 'family-sex-gender system'. For living alone to be possible for young adults, women as well as men requires the demise of traditional family-sex-gender systems that lock young people quickly into life-long arrangements in which women are subordinate to and economically dependent on male kin.

The elements of interconnected systems of demographic change that require particular attention are different for living alone in older age and at working age. The former is most obviously linked to increased longevity and the decrease in three generational households as a standard arrangement. Longevity is now, in almost every nation, typically greater for women than men, but it also varies markedly within countries by levels of economic advantage. In India, for example, poor widows, who have no economic independence and lower social worth than widowers, have very high mortality if they are not supported by a son (Chen 2000). On a global scale, the residence arrangements of the population who reach old age are changing; the number living as a couple by themselves is notably increasing, including in some parts of the world where this is not conventionally the desirable or appropriate form of household. In much of Asia, a parenting couple should not, in an ideal world, experience an 'empty nest' stage, since the

desired arrangement does not involve all children leaving home to set up their own households elsewhere but increasing numbers do and, as some contributing to this conference have documented, increasingly accept this. In parts of the world where couples conventionally live by themselves except when they have school-age children, old people typically face living alone and doing so for long periods if a partner's death is premature and remarriage does not follow.,

The trend is often treated as symptomatic of problems and threats to the future, but for some commentators it speaks of new freedoms and opportunities. In academic and popular discussion younger people living alone are sometimes conjured up as exemplifying 'globalization' and individualization - individualized consumers with no ties to any particular place or strong affiliations who have a mind-set and self-image that fits with the residential arrangement of living alone. People who feel they are exercising choice and choosing to invest in themselves rather than families and relationships. The older person living alone is often depicted not as somebody who has turned their back on others but who has been left sad and lonely.

The evidence shows a much more complicated picture. The evidence, in Europe and North America concerning younger people living alone shows a diverse population in terms of socio-economic characteristics, more men than women, who come to live alone by a number of routes most often without intending it to be a life style choice or a long term arrangement. Most want to live with a life-partner. In our UK study of 25-44 year olds, some had established households for themselves because they did not yet have a partner and consider themselves 'too old' to be living with their parents and beyond sharing with peers, which is seen as a transitional arrangement. Some have fallen out of failed relationships and some are parents, mainly fathers, no longer living with their children. For those who were buying their home, it is also seen as an investment in their future by 'getting on the property ladder'. The most economically disadvantages are in social housing, rented from government or charities which have waiting lists of those who want housing and allocate on the basis of needs basis. A higher proportion of working-age people living alone have long-term illness or disability than among those of the same age living with others. There is also considerable diversity among older people living alone, albeit the largest category is women who are widowed.

The trend has often involved more older people at first and then the proportion of working-age people also grows.

	Ages 18-29			Aged 30-59†			Aged 60 + ††		
	Σ	♀	N	Σ	♀	N	Σ	♀	N
All ESS*	12	11	24,148	17	14	53,730	25	50	29,253
USA	7	7	51,014k	12	9	103,966k	16	36	39,151k
Northwestern Europe	19	14	7,864	22	17	19,757	27	50	10,719
Southern Europe	9	7	3,575	12	8	7,825	16	32	4,644
Eastern Europe	7	5	8,031	12	11	18,089	23	45	10,123

Source: ESS European Social Survey

Countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and Ukraine

† For USA Aged 30-54

†† For USA 65+

The international ranking in the levels of living alone more or less map onto the family-sex-gender systems outlined by Göran Therborn and are likely to continue to do so. North-western Europe is the variant of the Christian family system that is most tolerant of youth independence. Living alone will remain more uncommon among working-age adults in regions where family-sex-gender systems are more securely patriarchal exercising tighter control over women and young people. There are still many contexts in which young people have limited or no access to a period of independence beyond parental control and prior to marriage. For women, living alone is neither practical nor desirable when the normative order requires their supervision and the majority lack routes to secure economic independence, denying them easy exit from marriage and ensuring divorce or widowhood are economic catastrophes without the support of kin, as remains the case in India, for example. In countries experiencing rapid economic growth and individualization, such as China and South Korea, living alone is a rapidly growing trend but persisting gender inequalities and differences will continue to mean that working-age women are less likely to live alone than men and, as long as women continue to live longer, older women more likely to do so than men.

Struggling to live alone despite cultural disapproval and material adversity is obviously a very different experience from living alone when half of all households have only one person.

Jesook Song (2010) has interviewed women aged in their thirties who are living alone in South Korea and who think of themselves as pioneers. She suggests that patriarchal views continue to create intense pressure on women to marry and gender inequalities in the labour market combine with various housing practices to make it more difficult for women to live alone than men. The requirement to have a significant deposit even to rent a home combines with gendered rules about bank loans and heterosexual marriage-centred housing practices. Unmarried women continue to face much more stigma and defend themselves by pride in their achievement: “Who is more capable here? You or me?” (Song, 2010, 135). Song fears that in staking their claims as successful individuals women are buying into a version of individualism allied with neo-liberal policies blind to the plight of homeless women and other vulnerable groups.

The global trend of living alone should not be caricatured as all bad or all good. It is not the culmination of trends signifying social disintegration and the end of durable caring relationships. Treating the trend as symptomatic of current problems, as if it represents the ultimate outcome of selfish individualism, feeds into the negative stereotypes of people living alone as either turning their backs on others or as left behind, abandoned, bereft of others. These stereotypes do considerable violence to the variation of circumstances and routes leading people to live alone at different stages and ages, and underestimates the range of their social networks and commitments to family, friends, places and, for some, communities. At the same time, simply celebrating the trend to living alone, as if there were no associated dangers, also does disservice to the range of evidence.

In circumstances in which women live alone as a political choice, standing up for their own independence against the odds, as it is for unmarried women in their thirties in South Korea, the stakes are high and comfort is always elusive since the wider context remains hostile. In regions where living alone is already established, men and women fall into living alone by a variety of

routes, often without intending either any political stance or lifestyle statement. In the USA and in the UK, most working-age adults begin living alone believing it is a temporary stage, and remain open to co-resident partnership arrangements. Research in the United States suggests that some become radicalized by their experiences of prejudices, and more militant about being single and living solo as a life style. In our UK study of people living alone age 25-44, there was little evidence of this militancy, but as in the United States, most people living alone over time describe themselves as living happily alone and are conscious of benefits of their residential arrangement. The longer people live alone, the more hazardous living with others can seem. Nevertheless, in our UK study, there is a minority proportion of younger people living alone who are not contented and who do indeed feel sad and lonely and most people living alone can itemize negatives as well as positives. Parents (mainly fathers) sometimes regret the reduced contact with children and difficulties of parenting across households or distance. Many people living alone have persisting difficulty in eating alone with pleasure, particularly those who face this daily without any interrupting rhythm of routine arrangements with family or friends. Most people living alone try to maintain a home that is hospitable to others, and many display relationships with family and friends in and through their home. Many have rich social networks and are embedded in family and friendship relationships. The pleasures and freedoms of living alone can sometimes feel like unshared burdens of responsibilities and risk. While most people living alone are embedded in support networks of friends, family and organizations that can deliver assistance in times of need, this is not true for all. Nor are all who are living alone in mid-adulthood able to make or think in terms of making financial provision for living alone in older age. There are reasonable policy concerns about growing burdens of care for older people who have neither partners nor children to assist them. The possibility that the trend will add to the planet's burden of carbon footprint is a very real threat. However, the potential also exists for people living alone to be part of the solution rather than an added element of the problem. The stereotyping of people choosing to live alone in order to look after no one but their self plays to a fictitious history (and projected future) promulgated by American functionalist theorists, of how Europeans and Americans recently turned away from extended kin in order to focus in on their nuclear families, as mobile units that fit with capitalist systems of production (Goode, 1970). Historical demography in the UK and northern Europe has demonstrated a very long tradition of nuclear family households and also a long historical tradition of treating individuals as proprietors of their own person. The development of industrial capitalism was not the beginning of nuclear families or the origin of an ideology of individualism. This fictitious history makes it seem more plausible that people are now turning from their nearest and dearest to care only about themselves.

A more sophisticated picture is needed than reading off individualization and individualism from the development of capitalism and many scholars including people present here have been working on this for some time. Goran Therborn's work acknowledges the long historical roots and geographical moorings of different cultural arrangements for organizing family, gender and sexuality. In terms of creating the necessary and sufficient conditions for living alone, family-sex-gender systems have to allow men and women to see this as a possible and desirable living arrangement and social and economic conditions need to make it practical. As theorists who seek to analyse social change in terms of the emergence and persistence of social practice would say, a social practice requires an alignment of materials, meanings and competences (Shove et al 2012) – the 'possible' of living alone involves competences and materials and the 'desirable'

involves meanings. Access to individual financial independence across a life course as a driver of living alone requires not only access to the income (materials) but access to and the valuing of autonomy and control (meaning and competences), not just the opportunity to earn a living wage. This returns me to the relationship between individualisation and individualism. Many working-age people living on their own do not wish to do so as long term arrangement but nevertheless acquire heightened competence in living independently and heightened valuing of independence. Research in Europe and North America finds participants who are contentedly living alone in their thirties or forties, who did not imagine that satisfaction in such a situation would be possible when they began living alone as a temporary arrangement in their twenties. Their self identity of contentment with living alone potentially feeds into a shift in the public identity associated with this living arrangement. living alone is a 'process of doing' that forges and reproduces social practices (Shove et al., 2012). Their experience of doing has modified meanings and perhaps values and their sense of living alone as an arrangement that should not be given up easily contributes to associated trends of delayed partnership and childlessness. This also illustrates both that how people live their personal life can effect social change and the tendency for blurring between individualisation and individualism.

At the same time, people living alone do not typically exemplify the pessimistic predictions about individualism. Those who are solitary and disembedded from people and place are the exceptions. What people value is control over their affairs rather than being alone as such but this does not mean neglect of others. Some have dispersed social networks and some local but for the majority family and friendship relationships remain centrally important. This population are no more likely to neglect their parents in older age than those living with others.

The association of the increasing trend of living alone with widening access to economic independence and economic growth also ties it to growing consumption and environmental catastrophe. Unless the 'work-to-spend' cycle (Schor, 2010) is broken, higher incomes are associated with higher consumption. However, living alone is not restricted to the affluent and living alone is not the driver of the connections between economic growth, consumption and environmental damage. Catastrophe would not be averted simply by people desisting from living alone, although this fact does not reduce the desirability of considering how the carbon impact of the trend might be reduced.

Living alone together in forms of cooperative housing and co-housing where people share some facilities but also have control over their own space is a route that small minorities are beginning to advocate and explore. As a set of social practices, living-alone-together involves collectively attending to proximate social ties with those sharing facilities and services built around cohousing or cooperative housing as well as sustaining and managing the facilities and services themselves. What are the possibilities of finding a new balance of individualisation and individualism, intimacy and maintaining distance? The common responsibilities in such housing arrangements would require sustained attention, whether or not people are occasionally or frequently residentially mobile and regardless of being also embedded in virtual, transnational and non-local networks. If our UK study could be generalised it would suggest that such a shift in practices is a much bigger departure from the model of living alone occupied by some sectors of this diverse population than it is for others - some, more women than men in urban areas, and more rural than urban dwellers, are already embedded in local responsibilities but many are not - and this makes its success likely to be uneven. If state intervention provided the material element, the housing, would a social practice of living-alone-together grow? Some of the

necessary meanings and competences have been acquired by the current population living alone. Would this form of housing be considered as an attractive or 'least worst' option to the potential residents? Either way, the practical knowledge gained – assuming the experiences of living and participating in co-housing or cooperative housing is positive and fosters collective social and environmental benefits – will contribute to change. The process of doing transforms practical knowledge, meanings and competences which shift careers of practice in ways which then potentially contribute to the circuits of reproduction of practices (Shove et al., 2010). However, for this to be even at the starting line, appropriate housing elements have to be in place. There seems little likelihood of any Western governments expanding provision of affordable housing with shared facilities or services in the short term, given the economic climate and widespread cuts in welfare provision. Nevertheless, this is a matter of public and political priorities which may shift over time under increasing pressure to reduce environmental impact and given the increasing acceptability and desirability of living alone in a growing number of countries across the globe.

Among the many potential gains of thinking about the future of personal relationships in dialogue from different parts of the world, is the increased visibility of ethnocentric thinking and the enhanced possibility of escaping its blinkers.

Parent-Driven Divorce and Individualization among Chinese Youth

Yunxiang Yan
UCLA

One of the most important and intriguing features of the ongoing process of individualization in the contemporary world is the paradoxical practice of living “a life of one’s own through conformity” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 151), meaning that the promotion of choice, freedom, and individuality does not necessarily make every individual unique. This is because that by removing the option to seek the protection of tradition, family, or community (detraditionalization) and by compelling individuals to be proactive and responsible through the impacts of the modern education system, labor market, and other institutional mechanisms, the influence of modern social institutions on the individual has actually increased, leading to the phenomenon of “compulsive and obligatory self-determination” (Bauman 2001: 32).

Therefore, the distinction between individualism and individualization is the key to understanding the individualization thesis. As Ulrich Beck reminds us: “In other words, *individualization* must be clearly distinguished from *individualism*. Whereas individualism is commonly understood as a personal attitude or preference, individualization refers to a macro-sociological phenomenon, which possibly—but then again perhaps not—results in changes in attitude in individuals. That is the *crux of contingency*—how individuals deal with it remains an open question” (2007: 681; italics in original). I would like to add that how individuals deal with individualization by and large depends on the larger social context and it is both a reflection of the localized process of individualization and a constituent part of the dynamics of the localization of individualization. The consequence of the return to parental power and the family institution, as I will demonstrate below, is a new individual strategy for dealing with individualization in China. This strategy is based on an alternative model of individualization without classic individualism and it is rapidly resulting in social changes (Yan 2009, 2010) (for a similar pattern in Korea, see Chang and Song 2010).

Along with the decline of parental power after the 1949 communist revolution, throughout the second half of the twentieth century generations of Chinese youth were gaining independence and autonomy (Yan 2003). Yet, contemporary youth in the new century have now turned to their parents for support and protection, embracing a return of parental power in important domains of their lives, including education, spouse selection, career choice, marriage arrangements, post-marital residence, and child-rearing. The most intriguing development, however, is the increasing influence of parental power in determining the dissolution of marriages among Chinese youth, a new phenomenon known as “parent-driven” or “parent-arranged” divorce in Chinese public discourse. Does the return of parental power constitute a counterforce to individualization in China? Or it is actually part and parcel of the process of individualization, reflecting the individual’s strategy of coping with and riding the tide of individualization? This is the central research question that I seek to answer in the present study. In the first half of the article, I examine the dynamics of parent-driven divorce and the respective roles of the parents and the young couples in such cases. In the second part of the article, I examine the factors that contribute to this new social phenomenon and discuss the impact of the rising parental power in both the private and public spheres as well as the implications of the Chinese case for our understanding of individualization as a global trend of

social change. Data used in this article were collected from multiple fieldwork trips in China and the secondary literature.

Parent-Driven Divorce among Chinese Youth

On a summer day in 2010, I was reading the Chinese news online when I was struck by the headline “A young couple goes to divorce court escorted by their parents.” I could not help but wonder why the parents had accompanied the couple to the divorce court: Did the couple really want to seek a divorce? It turns out that Mr. Hu and Ms. Wang (both are pseudonyms) had married in the previous year and had since lived with Mr. Hu’s parents. As a single daughter, Ms. Wang had never learned how to do household chores and this led to many complaints from her mother-in-law. In March 2010, without consulting her mother-in-law, Ms. Wang returned to her natal home to take care of her own ailing mother. This lack of communication triggered even more complaints by the parents on both sides. When Ms. Wang wanted to retrieve something from her home the following May, her mother-in-law did not allow her to enter. Demanding an apology, both Ms. Wang’s parents and her brother called on her in-laws. What began as an oral dispute evolved into a fist fight and then to a nasty legal battle in divorce court. The most intriguing part of the story, however, is that as the parents on each side were vehemently shouting at one another, the young couple sat together very calmly, as if the divorce was really between their elderly parents (Lin and Wang 2010). Reading this story made me to rethink the phenomenon of parental power, an issue that I had studied in the past, and I decided to examine its role in the life of divorcing young couples. These young couples had been born after 1980 and thus were known as the ‘80ers, or the post-1980 generation. To my surprise, the case of Hu and Wang turned out to be the norm rather than the exception.

According to statistics released by the Ministry of Civil Affairs in early 2011, the divorce rate in China has been on the rise since 2004. A total of 465,000 couples (most living in urban areas) dissolved their marriages during the first quarter of 2011, an increase of 17 percent over the same period in 2010. Most noteworthy, however, is the fact that nearly 40 percent of these divorced couples were young people born in or after 1980. Among the ‘80ers divorced couples, 90 percent were singletons (Li 2011: 28).

Parents on both sides typically play a major role in the divorce of the ‘80ers. Among the 60 divorce cases of young couples processed by the Daowai District Court in Ha’erbin city during the first six months of 2012, more than 60 percent either were presented by the parents of the divorcing couples or involved courtroom arguments between the parents (Shan and Sun 2012). Court records at the Wuhan Intermediate Court reveal that parents accompanied divorcing young couples to court in virtually all the cases, and more than 50 percent of the parents actually represented their divorcing child during the court proceedings (Wang, Zhong and Ouyang 2010). Other investigative reports in the Chinese media show that parents actually made the final decisions as to whether the young couple should divorce, how the common property should be divided, and who should raise the couple’s child. This new phenomenon is commonly referred to as the “three parental arrangements” (Ye 2011), “parent-arranged divorce,” or the new wave of parent-driven divorce because of the relatively high rate of divorce among the ‘80ers (Lin and Wang 2010; Shan and Sun 2012; Wang, Zhong and Ouyang 2010).

Parent-driven divorce stands in sharp contrast to the first wave divorce in the People’s Republic that targeted the traditional practice of parental-arranged marriages. Supported by the 1950 Marriage Law that legally banned arranged marriages, after 1949 millions of Chinese women successfully divorced their husbands who had been chosen by their parents (Diamant

2000). The irony of the development from the arranged marriages by parents in pre-1949 China to the current practice of arranged divorces by parents becomes even more intriguing if we take into account two other factors. First, the decline of parental power has been widely recognized as one of the most important changes in Chinese society since 1949 (Parish and Whyte 1978). Second, contemporary Chinese youth, most of whom are singletons, are known to be over-indulged little emperors who have a strong sense of self-awareness and more individualistic values, and who enjoy more freedom of choice.

Although the high rate of divorce among singleton '80ers has attracted the attention of public opinion and the mass media, academic research has typically lagged in this area. But a common consensus quickly emerged from the public discourse. That is, the most important reason for divorce among the current generation of Chinese youth is the powerful influence of their parents. Parental power typically contributes to, or even directly causes, the rising divorce rate among Chinese youth in four principal ways.

First, excessive parental interference and supervision, along with devoted parental love and care, are the most common and direct causes of conjugal conflicts, often ending eventually in divorce among the young people. Due to a variety of reasons, more young couples in urban China prefer to live with parents, on one side or the other. Thus young couples are subject to both the care and the management by their parents. While enjoying parental care and pampering, many couples do not welcome parental management because it can easily develop into parental control. For example, the most dramatic cases I have collected thus far share a plot that should only be seen in soap operas. The mother-in-law constantly and frequently enters the young couple's bedroom without even knocking. Why? In one case the mother needs to help her adult son get dressed in the morning, while in the other two cases the mother wants to make sure her son is well covered by a blanket while sleeping. In another case, the mother eventually moved into the young couple's bedroom so that her son would be well cared for throughout the night. In yet another case, the mother even regulates the frequency of the couple's sexual intercourse, arguing that too much sex could damage her son's health. In all these cases, when the young wife protested about her mother-in-law's intrusion into their private life, her husband disagreed with her and explained that his mother had always done these things for him and he needed such motherly love. Thus divorce was the only solution (Ding and Jin 2011; Guo and Ma 2011).

Admittedly, these cases are the extreme, but they are also representative of most divorce cases in the sense that today parents on both sides are playing a centrally important role in the everyday lives of the married '80ers. In most cases, the initial causes of the intergenerational quarrels or conflicts are trivial, such as the young husband watching TV or playing too many games, drinking too much, or disrespecting his in-laws; a young wife refusing to do household chores, spending too much money on clothing, or disrespecting her in-laws. Quarrels and conflicts occur more often between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law when the young couple lives with the husband's parents. But conflicts also occur between the son-in-law and the mother-in-law when the young couple lives with the wife's parents. Such family tensions are not new, but now when a conflict occurs between a daughter-in-law and her mother-in-law, her own parents will quickly become involved to protect their daughter, using any means whatsoever, including committing acts violence against the parents-in-law or demanding that she file for divorce. The reverse is also true when a son-in-law becomes involved in conflicts with his in-laws when he lives with his wife's family.

The interference by in-laws, particularly on the wife's side, is a new development that conflicts with the traditional kinship ideology and behavioral norms of the patriarchal family. In traditional Chinese culture, a married daughter was supposed to be quickly and fully incorporated into her husband's family and the patrilineal kin group. Her ties with her parents and her own natal family are reduced to the level of mutual visits and help between close relatives, as opposed to the intimacy of family members. Her parents no longer remain close to her. Once and for all, she has been transferred from her own parents to her husband and his parents, and, in terms of personal identity, she has evolved from a daughter in her own family to a secondary, supportive, and ideally submissive member of her husband's family, playing the roles of wife, daughter-in-law, and or mother of her children. Her name will eventually disappear, along with her personal identity (Watson 1986). The following popular saying captures this /transformation: "A married-out daughter is like the spilled water." In contrast, a married daughter in urban China today still remains the singleton daughter of her parents. Her parents will do anything possible to make sure that their beloved daughter is not ill-treated after marriage. Moreover, when her parents are involved in direct conflicts with her parents-in-law during the divorce process, they tend to be much more emotional and unreasonable, often pushing for the divorce of the young couple even if the couple is still emotionally bound to one another. In one case, a young woman's parents scolded her in court: "If you do not divorce him, you are no longer our daughter!" In another case, the judge asked a man who had pressed for his niece's divorce: "What if your niece has difficulties remarrying in the future?" The man replied: "No problem. I can afford to support her for life!" (Li 2011).

Second, the parents' excessive promotion of their single child's individual interests after marriage, as opposed to his/her conjugal ties, is another major cause of marital conflicts and ultimately divorce. While the parents of the husband tend to over-protect their adult son from doing household chores or other daily tasks, the parents of the wife pay much more attention to property ownership. In a 2012 case, a young couple filed for divorce because the wife's parents insisted that their daughter be registered as the owner of the new apartment unit purchased by the husband's parents for their marriage; her parents argued that the property ownership would give their daughter a sense of security and protection against future marital problems. When the request was rejected by the husband's parents, a resultant conflict ended up in fist fights between the two sets of parents and their respective relatives (Shan and Sun 2012). It should be noted that when the female side is more wealthy, the demands are made by the husband's parents and, ironically, for the same reason, that is, to protect their adult son from being bullied by his wife and her parents. By the same token, the husband's parents frequently complain about a daughter-in-law for not being caring, gentle, or hard-working. A son-in-law is looked down upon by the wife's parents and may be scolded for not making enough money to be successful. In different ways and with different demands, the parents on each side view the marriage of the young couple as a means to advance the personal interests of their adult child, be they economic or material interests.

Providing a large dowry was a traditional strategy to raise a daughter's status in her husband's family. This tradition has been revitalized since the 1990s in both urban and rural China. Meanwhile, the provision of a new house in the countryside or an apartment unit in the city has become a key element in the standard bridewealth offered by the husband's parents. Elsewhere I document how engaged young couple worked together to demand a large amount of bridewealth as a way to force the husband's parents to relinquish some of the family property to the newlywed couple. I also noted the support that young women generally receive from their

parents when they press for more bridewealth (Yan 2006). To demand the direct transfer of property ownership under their daughter's (or son's) name, however, is a more radical development in parental involvement in a young couple's marriage life. Both survey data and my own interviews show that parental demands for property ownership after the marriage of their adult child have been rather common in both rural and urban China since the marketization of housing and popularization of the notion of property rights. The major difference is that in the rural areas conjugal ownership of the new house is typically recognized as a form of bridewealth and is sanctioned by the written bridewealth contract and the wedding ritual performed in the village community (Yan 2009: 155-182), whereas in the cities home ownership may still belong to the parents or their own adult child instead of to the young couple as a conjugal unit.

The third and equally important factor is that the married '80ers are still heavily dependent on their parents and when their marriage does not work out, they resort to their parents for advice and help with the divorce process. As indicated above, many young couples live with either the husband's or the wife's parents, or they take their daily meals with the parents even if they live separately. While shifting the responsibilities and burdens of everyday life to their parents, young couples have become increasingly reliant on their parental support in terms of decision-making and management of their interpersonal relations, including that of the conjugal relationship. Court divorce records reveal that when quarrels or conflict occur in the family life of the '80ers, it is common that the young woman will seek parental support. Young men, too, are willing to have their parents to step in. This is particularly true when the conflict is between an adult child and the in-laws. The intriguing point is that by seeking one's own parents' support and interference, the conflict almost inevitably develops into a much tenser problem between the two sets of parents who are equally overprotective of their married singleton son or daughter. Parents-in-law on each side invariably blame and accuse their counterparts for failing to educate their son or daughter to be a decent person and to be a responsible wife or husband (Lin and Wang 2010; Shan and Sun 2012).

When I asked young couples why they did not try to solve their marital problems on their own, most often they referred to the issue of trust. Their most common responses were "in this world I can only trust my parents," "my parents will always wholeheartedly love me and be there for me," or "I do not know what else I could have done aside from telling my mother." Because of their passivity in dealing with family conflicts and marital problems, more than half of the divorcing young couples chose to let their parents represent them in the court proceedings. In other cases, parents will speak for their adult child regardless of what their children may want because they feel that the latter are ill-equipped to argue on their own behalf.

Lastly, the heavy parental investment in the marriage life of Chinese youth tends to intensify conflicts between the two sides once a divorce claim is filed in court and to make any reconciliation almost impossible. Not every divorcing young couple needs to go to the court, as roughly about 40 percent divorce cases are settled through private discussion and mediation. The majority of cases that have to be settled through legal channels, however, always focused on two common issues: property division and child custody. However, a close reading of the cases reveals that, again, it is the parents on each side who are fighting over these things. The young couple shows little interest in or patience for these issues; throughout the entire legal process, they just sit quietly on the side, playing video game or sleeping (Wang, Zhong and Ouyang 2010).

The reason for the young couple's indifference or passivity is rather simple. The apartment unit and other major material items in the couple's marriage are provided by their parents. The male side typically pays for the apartment (or at least provides a large down-payment) whereas the female side furnishes the unit. By the time of divorce, the parents have already had emotional arguments over the property deed, receipts, and other documents, but the couple has played a very small role in them. By the same token, the parents from one side or from both sides have been taking care of the couple's baby or child and thus they are emotionally bound to their grandchild and/or feel passionate about continuing the family descent line. Therefore, arguments over custody almost entirely depend on the parents' interests. When the parents prefer not to be granted custody, the couple usually is not interested either. The argument then becomes one over how to impose responsibility for custody on the other side (Li 2011).

By interfering in the everyday life of a young couple through excessive demands for the individual interests of their child, or by making important marital decisions on his/her behalf, or by assuming control over the division of property or custody issues during divorce proceedings, the parents of the '80ers have become the driving force behind the latest wave of divorce among Chinese youth. Young couples of the post-1980 generation seemingly surrender their autonomy and freedom of choice to their parents when they encounter difficulties in their marital life, thus reinforcing the rising power of their parents.

Parental Power in the Paradoxical Process of Individualization

Given the above intriguing developments, a number of questions arise. While clearly indicating the return of parental power in family life, is the new phenomenon of parent-driven divorce similar to the earlier practice of arranged marriages? Or is it a return of filial piety since so many young Chinese end up following the advice of their parents? If the dissolution of a marriage has once again become a matter between two extended families, instead of merely between husband and wife, have the family and marriage in China returned to more traditional patterns? However, there is yet an even more interesting issue. The current generation of Chinese youth has grown up in a social context of market-oriented reform, the individualization of society, and the global triumph of individualism and consumerism. Therefore, the current generation should be more individualistic, independent, and capable of making their own decisions than were elder siblings or their parents. Then why are they accepting this phenomenon of parent-driven divorce and what does this tell us about the individualization process in China? What is the applicability of the individualization thesis in social theory? In the remaining part of this article, these issues will be dealt with in relation to the ongoing debates on individualization in social theory.

As opposed to more superficial impressions, the phenomenon of parent-driven divorce actually represents a new development in the process of individualization instead of a simple return to traditional practices, such as like arranged marriage by parents. The most obvious difference lies in the motivation behind and function of the parental interference. In traditional practice, marriage was a means to a more important and larger goal of becoming the legitimate and reliable means of production and reproduction for the sake of continuing the family line and, by extension, the descent line of the patrilineal group. Parental power in arranged marriages first and foremost was exercised to secure collective (family and kin group) interests. In contrast, the current practice of parent-driven divorce serves the individual interests of the divorcing couple instead of the collective interests of the family group because the parents are

proactively exercising their power to protect what they regard as the fundamental interests of their singleton son or daughter.

By the same token, the passivity of the '80ers vis-à-vis their overprotective parents differs from the traditional practice of filial piety that requires the children's unconditional respect and obedience to their parents as well as the sacrifice of their personal interests for those of their parents. In the current practice of parent-driven divorce, the parents are only called in as problem-solvers when there are difficulties or conflicts in the spousal relationship, including difficulties in court representation. Alternatively, the parents, as trusted domestic helpers in the daily routines of family life, are needed so much by one party in the marriage that the other party feels that he/she is being squeezed out from the intimate and private relationship. Either way, the dependence of the '80ers on their parents and their acceptance of parental interference in dealing with their divorce merely reflect a long-practiced egotism, that is, their demanding of rights while avoiding responsibilities. This is a defining feature of what I refer to as the rise of the "uncivil individual," which is a result of the misunderstood and unbalanced development of individualism during the Chinese process of individualization (Yan 2003).

In other words, an arranged marriage is a collective-oriented practice for the family group, whereas parent-driven divorce is an individually oriented practice for one individual in a marriage. As the legitimization and pursuit of individual interests are part and parcel of the ongoing process of individualization, parent-driven divorce can also be viewed as a product of individualization, or at least as new wine in an old bottle.

There is, however, something traditional about the return to Chinese family life, that is, the central importance of the vertical parent-child relationship among intra-family relations. When forced to choose between one's parents and one's spouse, many '80ers will chose to side with their parents – recall the extreme case of the mother-in-law sleeping in the couple's bedroom. In most divorce cases, closer ties with one's own parents are identified as the number-one marriage breaker. This is especially true for young women who regard their husband's choice of positioning as a key indicator of the quality of their marriage. Most '80ers cannot live without the parental care and pampering even after they have married and have their own family. Most young husbands defend their parents' interference in their married life as a sign of parental love, or at least of good intentions, and they dismiss their wife's protests about intrusions of privacy. It is no wonder that 75 percent of the divorce claims in Chinese court between 2003 and 2010 were filed by the female partners in the marriage (Guo and Ma 2011). If this trend continues, the parent-child relationship will likely replace conjugal ties and once again become the axis of family relations. In this sense, there is a strong possibility of a return to the traditional.

In traditional Chinese society, most (if not all) social activities were organized within the family and kinship networks. Power and authority were based on the superiority of the senior generation over the junior generation, the older over the younger, and men over women. As a result, the traditional Chinese family was characterized by the centrality of the parent-son relationship in family life and the superiority of this relationship over all other family relations, including that of conjugal ties (Fei 1992). This traditional family configuration began to change during the Maoist era (1949-1976), when parental power and authority steadily declined and conjugal intimacy and youth power began to rise (Parish and Whyte 1978; Salaff 1973). By the 1990s horizontal conjugal ties had become both the central axis of family relations and the foundation of the family ideal shared by most individuals in China. This represented a fundamental change in Chinese family structure (Yan 2009).

What was concurrently developing in the 1990s, however, was the emergence of the child or the children, as the center of the conjugal relationship and the new focus of family life. This trend was intensified by the single-child policy. Along with improvements in the living standard and the accumulation of family wealth since the 1980s, parents invested heavily, both economically and emotionally, in child-rearing, consequently fostering a new type of parent-child relationship. This relationship is based on pampering, caring, and emotional bonding, as opposed to traditional patterns based on discipline and the ethics of filial piety (Fong 2004). To a great extent, this resembles a unique strategy of the “uterine family” used by Chinese women to cultivate intimacy and closeness with their children under the oppressive structure of patriarchal power and male dominance (Wolf 1972). Growing out of such a uterine family, the '80ers have a much closer relationship and emotional attachment with their parents than did previous generations of Chinese youth. Consequently, they are used to seeking parental advice and protection when they encounter difficulties or challenges in both the private and public spheres. In two non-systematic small surveys I conducted with college students in Shanghai (n=68), 70 percent of the students chose to break up with their girlfriend/boyfriend if they encountered strong parental objections, and nearly 90 percent of the students agreed that this act was an expression of filial piety. To answer why, more than half of the students stated that their parents had done everything possible for them and thus they ought to listen to their parents, whereas about 30 percent cited a belief in parental wisdom as their rationale. Yet all of them emphasized that it is virtually impossible today to marry and start a family without substantial support from the parents of both sides because the couple will need to have an apartment and an automobile to start their marriage.

Such close and intimate ties is derived from the strong moral, emotional and financial support that the '80ers have received from their parents. Its continuity largely relies on the continuity of parental support. In other words, the vertical parent-child relationship might y return as the central axis of family relations if it performs more functions and focuses on the individual interests of the '80ers. However, a return to the centrality of the parent-child relationship will only serve the individual interests of one partner in the marriage—be it the husband or the wife. At the same time, such a return will eclipse the individual interests of the other partner and eventually possibly lead to a dissolution of the marriage. In this sense, such a contestation between the vertical parent-child relationship and the horizontal conjugal relationship is another product of the ongoing individualization process in China. Once we consider the equally close and intimate parent-child relationship brought in by the other partner in the marriage, there will be two sets of parent-child relations interacting with the conjugal relationship of the young couple. All three sets of relations will compete with one another in the conjugal family of the young couple. This is certainly a new development in the relational structure of the Chinese family in the era of individualization.

Beneath the rhetorical question of whether parent-driven divorce is a new phenomenon or merely a return to traditional culture, the more important questions are: (1) What motivates the post-1980s generation of Chinese youth, known to be independent and freedom-loving “*xin xin renlei*” (the new-new human race) in Chinese society, to accept and even to seek parental authority and power when dealing with their own marriage problems? (2) Does this indicate a reversal of the process of individualization in China? To address these questions, we need first to unpack what kind of autonomy and independence Chinese youth have gained and to understand the particular features of the Chinese individualization process.

Individualistic, free-spirited, materialistic, competitive, rebellious, Westernized, and thus modern, are among the most frequent adjectives used to describe and define the new generation of Chinese youth. This generation grew up drinking Coca Cola and eating hamburgers and they quickly developed a taste to listen to Hip Hop, to breakdance, and to watch NBA games. They defied their parental advice and dyed their hair, pierced their ears, and wore all sorts of trendy clothing in a restless pursuit to be cool. The '80ers are well-informed as well, as one-quarter of them have learned at least one foreign language (mainly English), more than 40 percent of them have had 14 years of education or more, and they constitute about 40 percent of China's 100 million Internet users. We also know that the current generation of youth, both urban and rural alike, who grew up little influenced by the Communist ideology, are open-minded toward new ideas, uninterested in party politics, and yearn for freedom and individuality. On these grounds, it is plausible to say that the '80ers in China share a lot in common with Generation Y in the United States (Yan 2006).

This familiar emphasis on the freedom of individual choice and expression by Chinese youth, however, also bears an interesting cultural twist. When interviewed by a Western journalist in 2004, Chun Shu, a high-school-dropout-turned-writer and the cover girl for the February issue of *Asian Times* in 2004, explained her understanding of freedom and choice: "Our concept of freedom is different from the West's. We want the physical freedom to travel where we want, work where we want, have the friends we want. But right now we can't be so concerned about spiritual freedom" (Beech 2004). Indeed, although Chun writes bluntly about her own life, but does not touch on the topics of democracy, freedom, and equality that have often motivated youth in other parts of the world. Chun's careful choice is quite representative of the generation of '80ers in China. They seem to understand clearly to what extent they can exercise their youthful agency to seek freedom and individuality and they plan their youthful activities accordingly. In general, anything that falls within the sphere of private life seems to be acceptable and safe for experimentation and self-indulgence. But very few areas in the public sphere have been explored by members of this generation, either as individuals or in groups. Noting this differences between private and public activities, Beech (2004) describes the post-1980 Chinese youth as "dogs wearing electric collars that know just how far they can stray without getting shocked."

Run-away materialism is one of the defining features of the rapidly changing culture and society in China since the 1990s (Wang 2002), yet the '80ers differ from their parents in terms of their materialistic pursuits. Growing up under radical Maoism and widespread poverty, most of the parents of the '80ers are self-driven and hard-working fighters who focus on the accumulation of wealth and the relentless pursuit of every possible opportunity to become rich. Materialism is an end to itself that helps to define the social status of the individual in the form of accumulated wealth instead of a means to an end of self-indulgence. This is why so many parents have pressured their singleton child to receive high test scores, enter prestigious universities, secure high-paying jobs, and eventually to become rich and successful. By the same token, parents push their married daughter/son to fight for property ownership in the marriage union or monetary compensation in divorce.

In contrast, most '80ers embrace materialism through consumption. They are self-driven and self-indulgent seekers of material comforts. To achieve material comforts is a changing target promoted by the rapid and effortless consumerism, and most '80ers relentlessly seek parental support, even at the expense of trading in their own autonomy and independence. This may partially explain why the '80ers choose to listen to their parents when making decisions

about their own marriages and why they hide under their parents' protective wings during nasty divorce battles. All in all, the post-1980 generation of Chinese youth is a group of frail pragmatists who regard the enjoyment of material comforts, as opposed to the accumulation of wealth, as the most important goal in their pursuit of happiness in family life. To realize this goal, they can be docile, patriotic, or aggressively competitive, all depending on which tactic works best in the specific context (see Yan 2006). It is therefore both a rational choice and a true expression of selfhood that the seemingly independent and autonomous '80ers bend to parental power for protection, indulgence, and material comforts.

The return of parental power in the lives of Chinese youth, however, has much deeper roots in the larger society that is undergoing a paradoxical process of individualization. This process is unfolding through the rising awareness of individual rights and the pursuit of self-realization in certain areas on the one hand and the individualization of the social structure promoted by state-sponsored institutional changes on the other. The process has undergone two distinctive stages from 1949 to the present.

First, a partial individualization occurred from 1949 to 1977 when state-sponsored social engineering enabled the individual to be disembedded from the family, kinship, and local community on the one hand and to be re-embedded as a socialist subject in the state-controlled redistributive system of work, life, and well-being on the other hand. The second stage began in 1978 when Chinese leaders launched the market-oriented economic reforms and reversed the previous "collectivist way of individualization." During the 1980s the party-state was cautious about implementing changes in individualization and privatization because it still remained under the spell of the Communist ideology and the planned economy. What it did do, however, was gradually loosen up its control over the economy, selectively tolerating bold individual attempts to reform from below, making policy adjustments to accommodate successful local experiments, and calling for nationwide institutional changes after local experiments were repeatedly tested on larger scales.

After the party-state completed its ideological reorientation by 1993 it began aggressively to promote in a top-down aggressive fashion a series of marketization and privatization reforms aimed at cutting social welfare and shifting more responsibilities to the individual, for instance through the large-scale downsizing and privatization of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This was accomplished between 1998 and 2003 through bankruptcies, sales and auctions, and mergers and acquisitions. Chinese official data reveal that between 1998 and 2003 more than 30 million workers were laid off from SOEs, representing a 40 percent cut in the SOE work force (Hurst 2009: 16 NOT IN REFERENCES). Similarly, the major reform projects since the late 1990s, namely, the privatization of housing and the marketization of education and medical care, are all institutional changes launched by the state to force individuals to assume more responsibility, to more actively engage in market-based competition, and to take more risks and to be more reflexive. These institutional and policy changes eliminated most of the responsibilities of the state. At best, local government agencies have thus become increasingly developmental, and at worst increasingly predatory. These institutional changes toward individualization have come to be referred to as "*xieze*" (meaning that the party-state is "rid of its responsibilities").

During both stages, the Chinese party-state played a key role in directing the flow of individualization and managing the interplay among the key players: the individual, the market, social groups, institutions, and more recently global capitalism. In this party-state-managed individualization, the individual remained a means to the end, that is, modernization, instead of

an end in and of itself. This fits well with the traditional definition of the individual in terms of its subordination to a bigger and collective entity – be it the ancestors, the family, or the nation-state. As a result, the central axis of individualization in China is a changing relationship between the individual and the party-state instead of a categorical shift in the individual-society relationship as occurred in Western Europe (see Beck 1992). Moreover, the Chinese process of individualization began without the three premises that constituted the foundation of individualization in Western Europe, that is, a well-rooted cultural democracy, a welfare state regime that provided a safety net to individual citizens, and an ideological tradition of classic individualism and political liberalism that emphasized the dignity, autonomy, and freedom of the individual (Bauman 2001; Beck 1992; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002). Furthermore, along with the marketization and institutional reforms that aim to shift more burdens of self-reliance and productivity onto the shoulders of the individual, there have not been any new social mechanisms to re-embed Chinese individuals who were either proactively disembedded themselves or were forcefully thrown out from the previously all-embracing social categories, such as the traditional extended family, the close-knit community, or the Maoist work-unit. The Chinese state actually remains hostile toward any serious attempt by the individual to self-organize or toward any new forms of social organization outside the state-sanctioned system. The difficulties and challenges that Chinese NGOs have encountered are obvious examples.

Consequently, the individual in China is pressed to live a life of one's own through a “do it yourself” (DIY) biographical approach in an increasingly competitive and risky society and under tremendous pressures and fears. In the case of Western Europe, these pressures and fears caused by the precious freedom of individualization made individuals more dependent on various forms of social institutions and social organizations as mechanisms of re-embeddedness. The absence of these mechanisms of re-embeddedness in China means that the individual is left in a new space between the powerful party-state that continues to consign more responsibilities to the individual (hence the shrinking of institutional support) on the one hand and the family organization that is represented by the more resourceful parents with open arms on the other. The return to the family haven and parental protection become all the more appealing when Chinese youth are driven by ever strong desires for instant individual gratification on almost all fronts, including marriage and the accompanying property and material possessions. Yet they can never meet their needs with their own income and individual efforts alone. Naturally, and with almost no other choice, a whole generation of Chinese youth has returned to the haven of the family organization in a search for the protection and security provided by parental power and authority. The more competitive and risky of the large social setting in which they live and work, the more they are likely to resort to parental power and authority for protection and security. This is why the stem family has become much more popular in the cities than in the countryside and it is also why most parent-driven divorce cases occur in the cities.

Seeking parental protection and provisions after all is an individual choice on the part of Chinese youth for the purpose of realizing their life goals, even though their goals have become identical during the ongoing process of individualization under strong state power and market power. From this same perspective, we can also better understand the return of parental power to other domains of life of Chinese youth, such as education, job searches, spouse selection, marriage financing, and child rearing. Individualization in China may very well bring parental power and the family organization back to the central stage, albeit for the quite different purpose of pursuing individual interest. What is missing here is the autonomy of the individual at the spiritual and material levels, the core of classic individualism.

Last but not the least, how individuals deal with individualization may in turn have an impact on the larger social context. As I argue elsewhere, despite the Chinese party-state's efforts to promote proactive and self-reliant individuals through a series of institutionalized changes in individualization, the same party-state still regards the individual as a means to the collective end of modernization and nation-building; consequently, the party-state remains hostile toward social organizations outside the control of the government and it makes every effort to prevent the emergence of new social mechanisms of re-embeddedness for individuals. The increasingly individualized Chinese society has also shown a tendency to become an atomized society where individuals compete against one another and seek the protection of a powerful government. In such a social-political context, one cannot help but speculate whether the current generation of Chinese youth will accept, and even seek, a resourceful and benign yet authoritarian polity as the best choice for public power, much how they seek, embrace, and utilize parental power and authority in the private life sphere. Of course, this is way beyond the scope of the present article, but it is highly relevant for our understanding of the ongoing transformation of Chinese society and the Chinese individual.

References

- Bauman, Zygmunt. 2001. *The Individualized Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Beck, Ulrich. 1992. *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. Trans. by Mark Ritter. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- _____. 2007. "Beyond Class and Nation: Reframing Social Inequalities in a Globalizing World." *British Journal of Sociology* 58(4): 679–705.
- Beck, Ulrich and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim. 2002. *Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and its Social and Political Consequences*. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Beech, Hannah. 2004. "China's 'New Radicals'." *Asian Times*, 26(1): 4
- Chang Kyung-Sup and Song Min-Young. 2010. "The Stranded Individualizer under Compressed Modernity: South Korean Women in Individualization without Individualism." *British Journal of Sociology* 61(3): 539–564.
- Diamant, Neil J. 2000. *Revolutionizing the Family: Politics, Love, and Divorce in Urban and Rural China, 1949-1968*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Ding Qin and Jin Sulian. 2011. "Parental Interference as the Major Cause of Divorce among Post-1980 Couples." *Yuyao ribao*, September 24.
- Fei Xiaotong. 1992 [1947]. *From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society: A Translation of Fei Xiaotong's Xiangtu Zhongguo*. Trans. by Gary Hamilton and Wang Zheng. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Fong, Vanessa L. 2004. *Only Hope: Coming of Age Under China's One-Child Policy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Guo Shuang and Ma Xinran. 2011. "The Determining Influence of Parents in Divorce Among the '80ers." *Xinmin wanbao*, July 7.
- Hurst, William. 2009. *The Chinese Worker after Socialism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Li Yamin. 2011. "Parental Interference, Economic Interests, the Social Environment: Which is the Driving Hand Behind the Wave of Divorce?" *Tianjin ribao*, August 19.
- Lin Xiao and Wang Yimin. 2010. "A Young Couple Goes to Divorce Court Escorted by their Parents." *Jianjiang wanbao*, July 6.

- Parish, William L. and Martin King Whyte. 1978. *Village and Family in Contemporary China*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Salaff, Janet W. 1973. "The Emerging Conjugal Relationship in the People's Republic of China." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 35(4): 705–717.
- Shan Xiaotong and Sun Haiying. 2012. "90% of Divorces among '80ers Involve Parental Influence." *Shenghuo bao*, July 26.
- Wang, Xiaoying. 2002. "The Post-Communist Personality: The Spectre of China's Capitalist Market Reforms." *The China Journal*, no. 47: 1–17.
- Wang Zhe, Zhong Faxuan and Ouyang Jun. 2010. "Parent-arranged divorce among the '80ers." *Hubei ribao*, October 27.
- Watson, Rubie. 1986. "The Named and the Nameless: Gender and Person in Chinese Society." *American Ethnologist* 13(4): 619–631.
- Wolf, Margery. 1972. *Women and the Family in Rural Taiwan*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Yan, Yunxiang. 2003. *Private Life under Socialism: Love, Intimacy, and Family Change in a Chinese Village, 1949-1999*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- _____. 2006. "Little Emperors or Frail Pragmatists? China's '80ers Generation." *Current History: A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs* 105 (692): 255–262.
- _____. 2009. *The Individualization of Chinese Society*. Oxford: Berg.
- _____. 2010. "The Chinese Path to Individualization." *British Journal of Sociology* 61(3): 489–512.
- Ye Qing. 2011. "Parents Making Decisions regarding Initiating their Child's Divorce, Property Dissolution, and Child-rearing." *Beijing chenbao*, April 7.

Portrait of Unmarried One-Person Household in Early Adulthood : Delayed Transition or Achieved Individualization?

Meejung Chin
Seoul National University (mchin@snu.ac.kr)

The sharp rise in one-person households of all ages is one of the most significant changes in Korean families. One-person households account for 23.9% of all households and 11.1% of all population aged 15 or over (Korean National Statistics, 2010). The age distribution of one-person households shows that while living alone is prevalent at all ages, this is particularly so in young adulthood and old ages. Simply, 34.0% of ages 15-39, 16.0% of ages 40-64, and 36.1% of age over 65 are living alone forming one-person households. If we look at the statistics of other Western states, we come to know that this is a global trend, at least among the developed countries. According to the OECD Family Database, 27.7% of all households are one-person households among the OECD countries on average. One-person households are often considered as an example of 'institutionalized individualization', employing Beck's terminology, in developed states. Individuals live an independent life thanks to institutionalized support and security such as welfare. Unlike the Western developed states, South Korea (Korea hereafter) has undergone family-centered modernity without building up social systems for individuals (Chang, 2011). How come, then, are one-person households increasing such rapidly in Korea? How can this trend be interpreted with respect to individualization? In this paper, I attempt to think about these questions by looking at the lives of one-person households. Because the lives and experiences of young adults and old adults call for different framework of analysis, I will focus on one-person households in early adulthood.

In the traditional life course, young adults may live away from their parents only for education- or employment-related reasons. When young adults move to other cities for education or employment, they leave their parents. When they get married and form a family, they make a transition to a two-person or three-person household shortly. The one-person household in young adulthood, therefore, has been considered as a temporary arrangement of living at the time of transition. Without acceptable reasons, parents do not allow young people to leave the family. Young adults who attend school or find a job in their hometown or city do not have a chance to leave their family until they get married. As the age at first marriage increases, however, living alone becomes prolonged and complicated. Young people leave their parents' home before marriage and start a life as a one-person household even when their parents live in the same town or city.

Before addressing the issue, I will portray the lives of one-person households in young adulthood based on in-depth interviews with thirteen never married men and women in their 30s. The data were drawn from a nation-wide project on 'Change of Family Structure and Its Policy Implication' conducted by Korea Institute of Health and Social Affairs (PI: Chung Kyung Hee). This is a comprehensive project on one-person households utilizing both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. It includes analyses of 1980-2010 Census data, a telephone survey of 4,000 one-person households, a telephone survey of 2,000 adults (in order to investigate general attitudes towards living alone), focus group interviews and in-depth interviews with young-, middle-, and older adults who live alone. I used the data from in-depth interviews with seven

men and five women. They were between 29 and 39 years old (one third was in their early 30s, one third was in their mid-30s, and one third was in their late 30s). Four of them graduated from high school, seven graduated from college, and one had a master's degree. All but one man were employed and their occupations were white collar workers, service sector workers, a daycare teacher, and a professional. Four of them were temporarily employed. They have lived alone from one to ten years. The descriptive characteristics of the interviewees were summarized in Table 1.

They started to live alone when they moved to Seoul to find job opportunities. Those four people who were originally from Seoul left their parents' home when they were older than those who moved from other regions to Seoul. They had to find an acceptable excuse to leave, such as parents' retirement or sibling's marriage. When their family reorganized a living arrangement or family structure, they took advantage of this as an opportunity to leave home. Current financial status of the one-person households was associated with what they received from their parents. All but one participant were financially independent, sent occasionally gift money to parents, and prepared for their future. However, stable housing and decent lives depended on the assistance from parents. Those who had forgone parental support at the time of transition continued to have housing or financial difficulties. Ironically, parental financial support was a stepping stone for the independence of the young adults. Due to extremely high housing costs in Seoul, it is not liable for a young adult (or a young couple) to lease or purchase the first housing by him/herself in Korea. Their independent living relies on parents' generosity or capability to help.

There is a common misconception on the lives of one-person households. They are often described as socially isolated. However, I found that most of them were engaged in family and social relationships. They had a good relationship with their family maintaining frequent interactions. They reported that their relationship with parents became even better. When they lived with their parents, they had frequent conflicts due to different life styles and rhythms. Once starting to live apart, there was less interference and conflicts in everyday life. They were also active in social relationships with people in similar ages. They participated in various types of social clubs and gatherings for hobby, sports, English/foreign language learning, or religious purposes. Joining these clubs and gatherings allowed them to meet new people and go out on a date in particular. Because those whom they met in clubs and gatherings were not close friends or colleagues, they felt it relatively easy to maintain social distance at their convenience. They shared activities and exchanged emotional support, but had no long-term obligation. They could move to different social clubs if they had any kind of problems. Still, they acknowledged the importance of engagement in social relationships.

Probing into what they expected from marriage was a good way to speculate how they internalized social norms on marriage and identified their status. Expectations of marriage differed by gender, age, and their current financial situations. The majority of men projected that they would get married. They said that they just postponed marriage because they were not financially ready. They seemed to accept the social expectation that man was responsible for the first housing upon marriage. Only three out of seven men had someone to marry and the others had no concrete plans. In comparison, women were ambivalent about marriage. While they were enjoying living alone and did not want to break the current equilibrium, they were worried about supporting themselves economically and emotionally through the entire life without a partner who would share the burden. Those who passed mid-30s sought for a rationale for their current

state of life. During the interviews, many women implied that living alone was not their preference. It seemed that they tried to protect themselves from social pressure by communicating that their current situations were not voluntary.

It should be noted that not all unmarried young people choose to live alone. They can live with parents, siblings, or friends. In fact, many of the interviewees had previously lived with siblings, friends, or colleagues. However, they finally chose to live alone. They preferred moving to a smaller/poorer housing unit to living with friends or siblings when they had financial issues. What they valued the most was privacy. They described privacy as a freedom to live by their own life rhythm: to wake up, eat, watch TV, and go to bed when they wanted to. They wanted to make their own decision on a way of living and to monopolize their time and space. Although it may sound trivial, it is very important for them to live a daily life without being interrupted. Some of them had emotional problems such as depression but they seemed to accept this suffering as a cost of living a private life.

In this paper, I looked into how some young adults began and lived their lives as a one-person household, how they perceived their status, and how they viewed their future. The results of the interviews provide a mixed picture. On one hand, young people in one-person households seemed to live an independent life, emphasizing private occupancy of time and space. It is important for them to live an individualized life. They followed their own life rhythm, scheduled their life events (when to get married, for instance) without consulting their parents, chose social relations with those who supported their lives, and tried to be economically independent from their parents. On the other hand, only a few were able to be completely independent from their parents. They often relied on their parents when they had financial problems (e.g., for house rent or for living cost when they were out of job, etc.) and were consequently under the influence of their parents. Furthermore, they seemed to maintain a traditional ideation of the family. Men expected to get married when they became financially ready and women expected their spouse to be in a higher status socially or economically than themselves. Some women viewed marriage as a solution to their financial problems. Although having it postponed, they seemed to be willing to follow a typical pathway of family life course.

These portraits of unmarried one-person households in young adulthood support the idea of 'individualization without individualism' as Chang and Song (2010) described of Korean families. Without an ideational change from familialism to individualism, people chose a seemingly individualized life. Chang and Song (2010) interpreted this tendency as a strategy of avoiding family burdens and risks, calling it a 'risk-averse individualization', which means a social tendency whereby individuals extend individualized stages of life to minimize family-related risks of modern life. Those who live in a one-person household delay their transition to a family because they are explicitly or implicitly not ready to form a family in a way that is prescribed by social norms.

However, there are gender differences in how they reflect on their current status. Ambivalence shown by some women implies that they were facing a dilemma between an increased economic protection and a potential loss of their lives as individuals. They missed timing not because they were not able to meet someone to get married, but because they felt what the marriage would be like, if not consciously. These women were in the process of reconstructing their identity as an unmarried person. The experiences of living alone could contribute to building a new identity.

They learned that living alone could be a liable option of life. Traditionally, living a life and being engaged in intimate relationships could be fulfilled together only through a family. Yet, the life of a one-person household manifests that those two could be separated and pursued without sacrificing relationships with a family. Although the majority of one-person households have passively or involuntarily been formed, their experiences opened a new way of living and created a new type of identity.

Reference

Chang, K-S. (2011). Social reproduction in an era of ‘Risk Aversion’: From familial fertility to women’s fertility? *Family and Culture*, 23(3), 1-23.

Chang, K-S., & Song, M-Y. (2010). The stranded individualizer under compressed modernity: South Korean women in individualization without individualism. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 61(3), 539-564.

Hong, C-S. (2012). Compressed individualization and ‘gender’ category in 1990s Korea. *Women and History* 17, 1-25.

Kang, E-Y., Chin, M., & Ok, S-W. (2010). An exploratory study on the factors related to women’s voluntary ever-singleness: Focusing on marriage and family values. *Journal of the Korean Home Economics Association*, 48(2), 135-144.

<Table 1> Characteristics of the Participants in In-Depth Interviews

	Sex	Age	Length of living alone	Education	Hometown	Occupation	Income
A1	F	36	5	HS	Seoul	White collar	200K
A2	M	38	10	College			0
A3	F	35	10	Master		Pharmacist	350
A4	F	33	1	HS	Seoul	Temporary	200
A5	M	35	5	College		White collar	300
A6	M	34	10	College	Seoul	Sales	350
A7	F	29	6	College		Daycare teacher	150
A8	M	38	6	HS		Self-employed	150
A9	F	30	8	College		Café	140
A10	M	38	5	College		Blue collar	190
A11	M	39	3	College	Seoul	White collar	400
A12	M	33	10	HS		temporary	150

The Effect of Widowhood on Parent-Child Relationships in Korea

Jung-Hwa Ha (Seoul National University)

Hyunsook Yoon (Hallym University)

Yeon Ok Lim (Hallym University)

Sunyoung Heo (Seoul National University)

Although widowhood brings much distress and social isolation to the bereaved older adults, previous studies in the US have suggested that late-life widowhood has more positive than negative effects on parent-child relationships especially in the short-term (Ha and Ingersoll-Dayton 2008). However, little is known about the effects of widowhood on intergenerational relationships in other countries that share different cultural norms. The purpose of this study is to explore the impact of widowhood on intergenerational relationships in Korea where interdependence and filial piety are more valued than independence as social and cultural norms. Using a probability sample of Korean elders, we examine (1) the extent to which widowhood affects older adults' feelings of ambivalence and positive/negative interactions with children in Korea; and (2) the moderating effects of older adults' expectations about children's filial responsibilities and geographic proximity.

Methods

Sample

Analyses are based on data from the Survey on the Quality of Life of the Elderly, a stratified multi-stage probability sample of adults aged 45 and over living in the cities of Seoul and Chuncheon, Korea. The first wave of data collection occurred in 2003. A total of 2,529 individuals aged 45 and over participated in this baseline survey. Of these respondents, 1,009 were residing in Seoul and 1,520 were residing in Chuncheon. Seoul is the capital city of Korea and a highly urbanized city. Chuncheon has mixed characteristics of urban and rural environment. After the 2003 interview, an additional face-to-face interview was conducted in 2004 to assess psychosocial aspects of older adults' lives. Among individuals who participated in the 2003 survey and are aged 60 and over ($n = 2078$), 800 respondents were randomly selected to participate in this additional survey. The analytic sample of the current study consists of 360 widowed and 384 married individuals who participated in the 2003 and 2004 interviews. Age of the respondents ranged from 60 to 103.

Measures

Dependent variables. The measure of *ambivalence*, defined as the extent to which older persons perceive their relationships with children as both positive and negative, uses the computational formula suitable for capturing both the similarity and the intensity of positive and negative components (Thompson and Zanna 1995; Willson, Shuey et al. 2006):

$$\text{Ambivalence} = (\text{positive} + \text{negative})/2 - |\text{positive} - \text{negative}|$$

This formula has been used in previous research examining the effects of parents' widowhood on intergenerational ambivalence in the US (Ha & Ingersoll-Dayton, 2008), although specific items used to assess positive and negative aspects of the relationship are different. In the current study, *positive interactions* with children comprises of the following three items: (a) I talk to my children about private matters, (b) I feel very close to my children, (c) I agree with my children on almost everything. *Negative interactions* with children comprises

of the following three items: (a) I argue with children or (b) I feel awkward or tense in my relationship with children (c) I am angry toward my children. Both measures capture older parents' perception of their relationships with children rather than children's perception.

Moderating variables. *Expectations about filial responsibilities* ($\alpha = .72$) is a mean of the following six items: (a) Married children must live close to their parents, (b) When parents become ill, children should care for their parents, (c) Children should provide financial assistance to parents, (d) If children live close to their parents, they should visit parents at least once a week, (e) If children live far away, they should write to or call parents at least once a week, (f) Children should feel responsible for their parents. Response categories ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. *Geographic proximity to children* was assessed with two dummy variables capturing whether the respondent lives within one hour (1 = yes; 0 = no) and whether the respondent has a coresident children (1 = yes; 0 = no). Reference category included those who have no children within an hour or coresiding.

Control variables. Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics can affect the extent to which parents need support, which may in turn affect parent-child relationship. Thus, age, gender (1= female, 0= male), place of residence (1= urban, 0 = rural), literacy (1= illiterate, 0 = literate), education (1-6 years, more than 6 years, no formal education), and the number of children.

Self-rated health (1= very poor, 5=very good) and financial status (1= very poor, 5= very good) are controlled because they may be associated with the likelihood of being widowed and also can affect the extent to which widowed parents depend on children for support (*).

Results

Descriptive statistics

First, we conducted t-tests examining the mean level differences between married and widowed persons in both dependent and independent variables. As shown in Table 1, widowed parents experienced significantly higher levels of ambivalence, lower levels of positive, and higher levels of negative interactions with their children than widowed parents. On average, widowed sample was older and reported poorer health and financial status. Moreover, a greater proportion of the widowed sample was female, urban-dwelling, and illiterate. The percent of the sample who has attended secondary school was also lower among the widowed than the married sample. About 32% of the married sample lived with children and 49% lived within an hour-distance of their children, whereas more than half (53%) of the widowed sample lived with their children and 30% lived within an hour-distance.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics

	<u>Married</u>		<u>Widowed</u>		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
<i>Dependent variables</i>					
Ambivalence	-0.34	0.68	-0.07	0.79	***
Positive interactions	1.51	0.65	1.34	0.63	***
Negative interactions	0.44	0.58	0.69	0.73	***
<i>Socio-demographic variables</i>					
Age	71.39	5.35	74.47	6.42	***
Gender (1= female, 0= male)	0.33	0.47	0.91	0.29	***

Self-rated health (1= very poor, 5=very good)	2.80	1.20	2.44	1.06	***
Place of residence (1= urban, 0 = rural)	0.59	0.49	0.66	0.47	*
Literacy (1= illiterate, 0 = literate)	0.20	0.40	0.47	0.50	***
Financial status (1= very poor, 5= very good)	2.48	1.03	2.20	1.07	***
Education					
1-6 years of education	0.37	0.48	0.33	0.47	
More than 6 years of education	0.40	0.49	0.14	0.35	***
Number of children	3.91	1.49	3.86	1.93	
<i>Moderating variables</i>					
Geographic proximity to children					
Child lives with the respondent	0.32	0.47	0.53	0.50	***
Child lives within one hour	0.49	0.50	0.30	0.46	***
Expectations about filial responsibility (1=lowest, 5= highest)	3.76	0.67	3.85	0.62	*

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Effects of widowhood on positive and negative relationship with children

Table 2 shows the multivariate regression models that estimated the effects of widowhood on positive and negative social interactions with children. Model 1 shows the main effects of widowhood on positive and negative social interactions. Model 2 shows the moderating effects of parents' filial expectations and Model 3 shows the moderating effects of coresidence with children.

As shown in Model 1 and consistent with descriptive findings, widowed parents showed fewer positive and more frequent negative interactions with children than married parents. The level of expectation about filial responsibilities did not influence both outcomes.

Among the control variables, being female, living in the rural area, good financial status, and children's proximity predicted greater positive interactions with children. Older age, good health, good financial status, and children's proximity were significantly associated with less negative interactions.

Model 2 shows that parents' filial expectations do not significantly moderate the relationship between widowhood and parent-child relationship. On the other hand, coresident status of children mattered (Model 3).

Table 2. Effects of widowhood on parent-child relationships in later life

	<u>Ambivalence</u>			<u>Positive interactions</u>			<u>Negative interactions</u>		
	Model			Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Independent variables</i>									
Widowed (1= widowed, 0= married)	0.24*** (0.069)	-0.09 (0.326)	0.02 (0.142)	-0.16** (0.058)	-0.08 (0.272)	-0.30* (0.119)	0.19** (0.059)	-0.07 (0.279)	0.27* (0.122)
<i>Socio-demographic variables</i>									
Age	-0.01 (0.005)	-0.01 (0.005)	-0.01 (0.005)	-0.00 (0.004)	-0.00 (0.004)	-0.00 (0.004)	-0.01* (0.004)	-0.01* (0.004)	-0.01* (0.004)
Gender (1= female, 0= male)	-0.04 (0.073)	-0.04 (0.073)	-0.04 (0.072)	0.23*** (0.061)	0.23*** (0.061)	0.23*** (0.061)	-0.00 (0.062)	-0.00 (0.062)	-0.00 (0.062)
Self-rated health (1= very poor, 5=very good)	-0.07** (0.025)	-0.07** (0.025)	-0.07** (0.025)	0.04 (0.021)	0.04 (0.021)	0.03 (0.021)	-0.07** (0.021)	-0.07** (0.021)	-0.07** (0.022)
Place of residence (1= urban, 0 = rural)	0.00 (0.058)	0.01 (0.059)	0.02 (0.058)	- (0.049)	0.21*** (0.049)	0.20*** (0.049)	0.06 (0.050)	0.06 (0.050)	0.05 (0.050)
Literacy (1= illiterate, 0 = literate)	0.02 (0.087)	0.01 (0.087)	0.02 (0.087)	-0.13 (0.073)	-0.13 (0.073)	-0.13 (0.073)	0.03 (0.075)	0.03 (0.075)	0.03 (0.075)
Financial status (1= very poor, 5= very good)	-0.10*** (0.028)	0.10*** (0.028)	-0.10*** (0.027)	0.13*** (0.023)	0.13*** (0.023)	0.13*** (0.023)	- (0.024)	- (0.024)	0.16*** (0.024)
Education (Ref: no formal education)	0.06 (0.087)	0.06 (0.087)	0.07 (0.087)	0.07 (0.072)	0.07 (0.072)	0.08 (0.073)	-0.06 (0.074)	-0.06 (0.074)	-0.06 (0.075)
1-6 years of education	0.00 (0.101)	0.00 (0.101)	0.00 (0.101)	0.14 (0.085)	0.14 (0.085)	0.14 (0.085)	-0.04 (0.087)	-0.04 (0.087)	-0.04 (0.087)
More than 6 years of education	0.05** (0.017)	0.05** (0.017)	0.04** (0.017)	0.01 (0.014)	0.01 (0.014)	0.00 (0.014)	0.01 (0.015)	0.01 (0.015)	0.01 (0.015)
Number of children	0.05** (0.017)	0.05** (0.017)	0.04** (0.017)	0.01 (0.014)	0.01 (0.014)	0.00 (0.014)	0.01 (0.015)	0.01 (0.015)	0.01 (0.015)

Moderating variables

Geographic proximity to children

Child lives with the respondent

-0.00 (0.080) -0.01 (0.080) -0.21 (0.109) 0.13* (0.067) 0.14* (0.067) 0.07 (0.092) -0.22** (0.068) 0.23*** (0.069) -0.21* (0.094)

Child lives within one hour

-0.14 (0.079) -0.14 (0.079) -0.20 (0.102) 0.14* (0.066) 0.14* (0.066) 0.06 (0.085) 0.25*** (0.067) 0.25*** (0.068) -0.19* (0.088)

Expectations about filial responsibility

(1=lowest, 5= highest)

0.01 (0.042) -0.02 (0.056) 0.01 (0.042) 0.06 (0.035) 0.07 (0.047) 0.05 (0.035) -0.01 (0.036) -0.04 (0.048) -0.01 (0.036)

Interaction terms

Widow x Child lives with the respondent

0.40* (0.159) 0.15 (0.134) -0.04 (0.137)

Widow x Child lives within one hour

0.12 (0.161) 0.19 (0.135) -0.14 (0.138)

Widow x Filial expectation

0.09 (0.084) -0.02 (0.070) 0.07 (0.071)

Constant

0.46 (0.388) 0.61 (0.414) 0.62 (0.394) 1.02** (0.324) 0.98** (0.346) 1.11*** (0.330) 1.93*** (0.332) 2.05*** (0.355) 1.89*** (0.339)

Adj. R-squared

0.08 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15

Standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Conclusion

In conclusion, we found widowhood has a negative influence on the relationship between aging parents and adult children and that such negative association between widowhood and intergenerational relationship is moderated by living arrangement but not by parents' expectations toward their children. These findings shed light on several areas where practitioners can intervene to make the intergenerational relationships more positive in Korea. For example, community senior centers could provide educational classes that teach older adults living with their children skills to communicate their needs to children without straining the relationship. Further, the findings also call for services that assist adult children who live with their aging parents and take the primary responsibilities of caregiving for their widowed parent or a parent-in-law. Services such as respite care, homemaker service and assistance for older adults with instrumental needs, bereavement counseling, and increased opportunities for bereaved older adults to interact with people outside the family could reduce the negative implications of widowhood on intergenerational relationship.

References

- Ha, J. and B. Ingersoll-Dayton (2008). "The effect of widowhood on intergenerational ambivalence." The Journals of Gerontology: Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences 63B(1): S49.
- Thompson, M. M. and M. P. Zanna (1995). "The conflict individual: Personality-based and domain-specific antecedents of ambivalent social attitudes." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 63: 259-288.
- Willson, A. E., K. M. Shuey, et al. (2006). "Ambivalence in mother-adult child relations: A dyadic analysis." Social Psychology Quarterly 69: 235-252.

Pathways to post-patriarchal society
: Global convergence of gender (non-)preference and East Asian particularities

포스트-가부장제 사회로의 경로
: 성별 (비)선호의 전지구적 수렴과 동아시아의 사례

Ki-Soo Eun
Seoul National University
은기수 (서울대)

1. 자녀 성선호의 글로벌 트렌드

동서양을 막론하고 전통시대에는 소수의 사회를 제외하고는 여아보다는 남아를 선호하는 경향이 강했다. 농경사회에서 노동력이 필요하기도 했고, 대부분이 남성 중심의 가부장적 사회였기 때문에 여아보다는 남아를 더 선호했다. 그러나 근대 사회로 이행하면서 크게 두가지 이유에서 자녀의 성선호가 변하기 시작했다. 하나는 인구학적 변천이다. 사망력과 출산력이 높았던 시절에는 노동력을 확보하고 가계를 계승하기 위한 남아의 확보가 각 가족이 당면한 최대의 관심사의 하나였다. 그러나 근대사회로 접어들면서 인구도 근대인구로 변모했다. 사망력도 낮아지고 출산력도 낮아지면서 출산한 자녀를 일찍 잃을 가능성도 낮아졌다. 반면에 자녀에 대한 선호가 양에서 질로 변했다.¹⁶³ 인구학적 변천은 일단 자녀의 수에 대한 관념을 크게 바꾸어 놓았다. 또 다른 하나는 성평등의식의 진전이다. 근대에 접어들어서도 양성평등 의식이 크게 높아지지는 않았다. 그러나 여성에 대한 교육의 기회가 확대되고, 성평등에 대한 의식이 고양되면서 자녀에 대한 성선호도 바뀌게 되었다.

그 결과 전 지구적으로 자녀에 대한 성선호가 일정한 방향으로 수렴되고 있다. 출산력변천의 결과 이상자녀의 수 및 부부당 실제 갖게 되는 자녀의 수가 2-3명 수준으로 감소하고 있다. 출산자녀의 수가 2명 혹은 3명 수준으로 감소하면서 일반적으로 나타나는 자녀성선호의 경향은 자녀의 수만큼 자녀의 성을 골고루 균형을 맞추고 싶은 선호이다. 이는 성균형 선호(gender balance preference)라고 일컬을 수 있다. 또 하나의 자녀 성선호는 무 성선호(gender indifference preference)라고 일컬을 수 있다. 자녀의 성에 관한 선호에서 특정한 성을 지적해보라고 하면, 대부분의 사람들은 아들 혹은 딸 등 특정한 성을 지적하기 보다는 아들이든 딸이든 상관없다는 식으로 특정 성을 선호하는 의식이 없는 무 성선호 태도를 드러낸다. 전통사회에서 근대사회로 이행하고, 근대사회의 진전과 함께 이루어진 사회변화는 자녀의 성선호에도 중대한 변화를 초래했다. 그래서 우리는 20세기를 지나 21세기 자녀의 성선호의 글로벌 추세는 자녀 성균형 선호 및 무 성선호라고 말할 수 있다.

2. 아시아 지역의 자녀 성선호 변화

전 세계적으로 자녀의 성에 대한 선호는 자녀 성균형 선호 및 무 성선호 방향으로 움직이고 있는데, 아시아 몇 지역에서는 매우 특징적인 자녀 성선호 현상이 나타났었다. 최근까지도 연구자 및 일반인의 주목을 받고 있는 자녀 성선호는, 중국, 인도, 한국 등지에서 관찰되는 매우 강한 아들 선호(son preference)이다. 인도의 아들 선호의 경우, 모든 인도에서 아들 선호가 강하게 나타나지는 않는다. 지리적으로 중국과 가까우면서 중국으로 대표되는 동아시아적 문화의 영향이 강할 수 있는 인도 북동부지역에서 특히 아들 선호가 강하게 남아 있다. 중국과 한국은 모두 유교의 영향이라고 할 수 없지만, 중국의 경우 출산력 억제를 위해 한자녀정책을 펼치면서 아들 선호의 결과 출생시성비가 크게 왜곡되는 현상이 오랜 기간 지속되어 왔다. 한국도 아들 선호는 별로 약해지지 않은 상황에서 짧은 시간에 출산력이 급격히 낮아지면서 특히 1990년대에 출생시 성비가 크게 왜곡되는 현상을 관찰할 수 있었다. 인도, 중국, 한국 등 아시아 삼국은 출생시 성비가 정상성비와 매우 큰 차이를 보일 정도로 왜곡되어 이들 세 사회의 아들 선호가 큰 주목을 받았었다. 그러나 최근 한국사회에서는 아들 선호가 빠른 속도로 약화되고 있다는 연구가 이루어지고 이를 해명하려는 시도가 이루어지고 있다.

눈을 돌려 한국, 일본, 중국, 대만 등 동아시아 혹은 동북아시아 사회의 자녀 성선호에 국한시켜보면, 일반적으로 이들 지역은 일반적으로 유교의 영향을 강하게 받았었고, 현재도 유교의 영향이 남아 있어 남아선호가 강한 것으로 이해되고 있다. 이러한 이해는 일부는 맞을 수 있지만, 전적으로 맞다고 보기 힘들다. 2013년 현재 과거 2-30년에 걸친 변화 및 최근 10년의 변화를 살펴보면 동북아시아 지역에서 일어나고 있는 자녀 성선호는 우리의 과거 동북아시아 사회의 자녀 성선호의 이해와는 전혀 다른 새로운 변화가 이루어지고 있음을 발견할 수 있다.

먼저 지난 2006년에 한국, 일본, 중국, 대만 등 네 사회를 대상으로 이루어진 동아시아 사회조사의 결과를 살펴보자. 다음 <표 1>은 한국, 일본, 중국, 대만 등 동아시아 네 사회의 자녀 성선호 및 동일한 문항을 채택하여 이루어진 베트남과 태국의 조사에서 나타난 자녀 성선호 결과를 보여주고 있다.

Table 1 Gender Preference for Children in Six Asian Societies

	Son	Daughter	No Pref
Vietnam	56.8	8.2	35.0
Korea	42.0	34.2	23.7
China	25.4	9.4	65.2
Japan	23.3	29.2	47.5
Thailand	22.3	30.6	47.2
Taiwan	21.2	11.7	67.1

Note: The question was “If you were to have only one child, do you want to have a son or a daughter” in the surveys. East Asian Social Survey was conducted in Korea, Japan, China and

Taiwan in 2006. The same question was adopted in Vietnamese and Thai Family Surveys in 2010.

Source: East Asian Social Survey in 2006; Vietnamese Family Survey in 2010; Thailand Family Survey in 2010

<표 1>은 아들 선호가 높은 사회부터 낮은 사회로 정렬한 결과를 보여준다. 이 결과에 따르면 베트남의 조사 대상자 57%가 아들을 선호한다고 응답하여 아시아 6개 사회 가운데 가장 높은 아들 선호를 보여준다. 아들 선호가 두 번째로 높은 사회는 한국이다. 한국의 조사에서 전체 응답자의 42%가 아들을 선호한다고 응답해서 한국은 아시아 6개 사회 가운데 두 번째로 남아선호가 강한 사회로 나타난다. 한국의 뒤를 중국, 일본, 대만, 태국 등이 잇고 있지만, 아들 선호의 면에서 중국부터 대만까지는 그렇게 큰 차이를 드러내지 않는다.

딸 선호가 높은 사회부터 낮은 사회로 정렬해서 살펴보면 이번에는 한국이 전체 응답자의 34%가 자녀를 딱 한 명만 낳아야 한다면 딸을 갖고 싶다고 응답하여 아시아 6개 사회 가운데 가장 딸 선호가 강한 사회로 나타난다. 딸 선호의 순위에서 한국의 뒤를 태국(30.6%), 일본(29.2%)이 잇고 있다. 일본 이후에는 큰 차이를 두고 대만, 중국, 베트남이 잇고 있다.

마지막으로 자녀 성선호의 글로벌 트렌드의 하나인 자녀 무 성선호의 경향을 보면, 놀랍게도 대만(67.1%)과 중국(65.2%)에서 자녀 무 성선호 경향이 가장 강하게 나타난다. 그 다음은 일본(47.5%)과 태국(47.2%)으로 나타난다. 한국은 자녀 무 성선호 비율이 23.7%로 아시아 6개 사회에서 가장 낮은 비율을 기록하고 있다. 달리 말하면 아시아 6개 사회에서 한국은 아들 아니면 딸을 선호하는 응답이 주를 이루고 아들, 딸 상관없다는 자녀 무 성선호 의식을 드러내는 비율이 매우 낮다는 것이다. 만약 자녀 성선호의 글로벌 추세와 하나로 자녀 무 성선호를 꼽을 수 있다면 한국인의 자녀 성선호는 글로벌 추세와는 매우 다른 양상을 보이고 있다고 말할 수 있는 것이다.

3. 아시아 지역의 성별, 연령별 자녀 성선호 변화 이해

2006년에 한국, 일본, 중국, 대만에서 이루어진 동아시아 사회조사의 결과 및 동일한 문항을 채택하여 이루어진 2010년 베트남과 태국 조사의 결과에서 얻어진 자녀 성선호 결과는 매우 “이상한” 결과를 보여주고 있다. 여기서 “이상”하다는 의미는 아시아의 자녀 성선호 의식이 우리가 일반적으로 인식해 온 자녀 성선호의 추세와는 매우 다른 추세를 보여주고 있다는 의미이다. 왜 이런 결과가 나타나는지 이해하기 위해 먼저 아시아 6개 지역의 자녀 성선호를 응답자의 성별로 나누어 살펴본 결과가 다음 <표 2>에 제시되어 있다.

Table 2 Gender Preference for Children by Sex in Six Asian Societies

	Male			Female		
	Son	Daughter	NoPref	Son	Daughter	NoPref
China	27.4	7.6	65.0	23.7	11.0	65.4
Vietnam	56.1	5.0	38.9	57.4	10.9	31.7
Japan	34.6	18.4	47.0	14.1	38.1	47.9
Thailand	30.8	19.6	49.6	17.5	36.8	45.7
Korea	45.9	26.7	27.4	38.9	40.3	20.8
Taiwan	24.3	8.1	67.7	18.2	15.3	66.6

Source: East Asian Social Survey in 2006; Vietnamese Family Survey in 2010; Thailand Family Survey in 2010

자녀 무 성 선호 경향이 강하게 나타났던 중국과 아들 선호가 강했던 베트남에서는 성별로 자녀 성 선호 경향에 큰 차이가 없이 비슷하다. 반면에 딸 선호가 강했던 일본과 태국에서는 남자 응답자는 아들을 선호하고, 여자 응답자는 딸을 선호하는 것으로 나타난다. 반면에 아들 선호와 딸 선호가 동시에 강한 것으로 나타난 한국에서는 남자 응답자의 경우 딸보다는 아들을 선호하는 경향이 나타나는 반면 여자 응답자는 아들 선호와 딸 선호가 비슷한 것으로 나타난다. 자녀 무성 선호 경향이 강했던 대만에서는 남자 응답자의 경우 아들과 딸 가운데 아들을 선호하는 경향이 강하고, 여자 응답자 가운데에서는 아들 선호가 딸 선호보다 강하지만, 그 차이는 크지 않은 것으로 나타난다.

<표 2>에 나타난 결과는 성별로 자녀 성 선호 유형에도 각 사회에 따라 차이가 있음을 보여준다. 그러나 <표 2>의 결과는 한국에서 왜 아들 선호와 딸 선호가 동시에 높게 나타나는지에 대해서는 명확한 정보를 제공하지 못한다.

다음 <그림 1>과 <그림 2>는 연령별로 아들 선호와 딸 선호의 경향을 보여주고 있다.

Figure 1 Son Preference by Age





Figure 2 Daughter Preference by Age



<그림 1>과 <그림 2>에서 뚜렷하게 관찰되는 현상은 여러 사회에서 자녀의 성 선호에 관해 연령 혹은 세대별 차이가 약간씩은 있다는 것이다. 그러나 연령별 자녀 성 선호의 차이가 한국처럼 극적인 사회는 존재하지 않는다. 한국은 <그림 1>과 <그림 2>의 기울기의 급격성에서 쉽게 알 수 있듯이, 고연령층에서는 여전히 아들 선호가 뚜렷하고, 연령이 낮아질수록 딸을 선호하는 경향이 강하게 존재하고 있다. 즉 한국이 아시아 6개 사회 가운데 아들 선호는 두 번째로 높고, 딸 선호는 첫 번째로 높은 이유는 자녀 무 성 선호 경향이 아시아 6개 사회 가운데 가장 낮은 가운데, 높은 연령층은 여전히 아들을 선호하고, 반면에 연령이 낮아질수록 아들보다는 딸을 선호하는 경향이 강하기 때문이다. 한국을 제외하고는 연령 혹은 세대별로 자녀의 성 선호가 이처럼 극적으로 변하고 있는 사례를 보기 힘들다.

4. 최근 한국의 자녀 성 선호 변화

2006년에 실시된 동아시아 사회조사에서 나타난 자녀 성 선호 결과는 우리를 놀라게 하였고, 다른 한 편으로 왜 이처럼 아시아 사회의 성 선호가 매우 이질적인 현상을 보이는데 대한 의문을 증폭시켰다. 특히 한국의 경우 아들 선호와 딸 선호에 세대간 차이가 매우 크게 존재한다는 사실은 한국 사회의 변동에 대한 새로운 궁금증을 유발하였다.

한국에는 2006년에 실시된 동아시아 사회조사의 자녀 성 선호에 관한 문항이 2004, 2008, 그리고 2012년에도 한국종합사회조사에서 반복되었다. 현재 2012년 자료는 아직 이용할 수 있는 단계가 아니기 때문에 2004, 2006, 2008년 등 4년에 걸친 한국의 자녀 성 선호 변화를 이해해 볼 수 있다.

Table 3. Gender Preference for Children in Korea, 2004, 2006, 2008

Year	Son	Daughter	No gender preference	N
2004	36.8	32.4	30.8	1292
2006	42.0	34.2	23.7	1601
2008	42.6	41.1	16.3	1499

Source: Korean General Social Survey 2004, 2006, 2008

<표 3>은 한국 사회에서 최근 4년간 이루어진 자녀 성 선호 변화를 보여준다. 우선 가장 큰 변화의 하나는 한국 사회에서는 자녀 무 성 선호 비율이 2004년부터 2008년까지의 4년동안 놀라울 정도로 감소하고 있다는 것이다. 2004년에 30.8% 였던 자녀 무 성 선호 비율이 2008년에는 16.3%로, 거의 절반 수준으로 감소하고 있다. 이처럼 감소한 자녀 무 성 선호 비율은 남아선호와 여아선호로 이동하였다. 그래서 2006년에는 자녀 무 성 선호가 감소한 비율이 남아선호 42%, 여아선호 34%

로 변모하였다. 즉 2006년에는 남아선호가 더 강화된 것이다 그런데 다시 2년 후에는 남아선호는 정체되어 있는 반면에 자녀 무 성선호 비율이 더 감소하면서 여아 선호가 2006년 34%에서 2008년에 41%로 크게 증가하고 있다. 그래서 2008년 현재 사회 전체적으로는 여전히 남아선호가 42.6%, 여아선호가 41.1%로 남아선호가 여아선호를 약간 앞지르고 있지만, 그 차이는 불과 1.5% 포인트 밖에 되지 않는다. 이 추세가 계속되고 있다고 가정한다면 2012년에 조사된 자료가 공개되어 분석되는 경우 2012년 현재 한국사회는 여아선호가 남아선호를 앞질러, 한국이 더 이상 남아선호 사회가 아니고 여아선호 사회로 나타날 가능성이 높다.

5. 아시아 각 국의 자녀 성선호 변화 이유

왜 이처럼 아시아 각 국의 자녀 성선호가 이질성을 보이고 있고, 글로벌 추세와는 다른 방향으로 가고 있을까. 먼저 베트남의 경우, 최근 출생시 성비가 남아선호 현상을 반영하여 남아 출생아 수가 여아 출생아 수를 훨씬 초과하는 출생시 성비 왜곡 현상이 두드러지고 있다. 즉 베트남에서는 아직도 남아선호가 약화되지 않고, 여전히 강한 가운데, 초음파검사의 보급 및 선택적 성 출산의 경향이 강화되어 출생시 성비가 왜곡되는 현상이 강화되고 있다.

한 편, 유교적 영향이 강했던 대만사회에서는 여성의 교육수준이 향상되고 일하는 여성이 지속적으로 증가하면서 남아 중심의 자녀 성선호에 큰 변화가 일어났다. 그래서 1990년대부터 대만에서는 남아선호가 급속히 약화되고, 대신 자녀의 특성 성에 대한 선호가 없는 자녀 무 성선호(gender indifference preference)가 강해지고 있다 (Lin 2009). 이러한 변화의 추세가 <표 1>에 분명하게 드러나 있다. 일본은 20세기 초반에는 남아선호 사회였지만, 이후 남아선호가 약화되고 여아선호 사회로 바뀌어 왔다 (Fuse 2013). 태국은 전통적으로 불교국가이면서 가부장적 사회의 역사가 별로 없었다. 그래서 태국은 오랫동안 성중립적 혹은 여아선호 국가로 알려져왔다. 이런 현상이 역시 <표 1>에 잘 반영되어 있다. 중국의 경우가 매우 예외적으로 보인다. 그러나 2006년에 실시된 동아시아 사회조사가 중국의 경우 농촌과 도시를 망라하는 중국사회를 대표하는 표본인지 의문이 제기된다. 중국에서 이루어지는 조사연구가 주로 도시지역이 많이 포함되기 때문에 2006년 동아시아 사회조사 결과도 중국의 도시지역에 거주하는 응답자의 태도가 많이 반영되지 않았나 생각된다.

그럼 한국인의 자녀 성선호가 남아선호에서 불과 4년 정도의 짧은 시기에 여아선호로 급속히 옮겨가고 있는 현상은 어떻게 설명할 수 있을까? 필자는 다음과 같은 몇가지의 가설적 설명을 제시하려고 한다.

첫째, 한국사회는 1997년 경제위기를 겪으면서 개인, 가족, 사회가 근본적으로 변하게 되었다. 개인적으로는 미래의 삶에 대한 불확실성이 극도로 높아졌다. 교육수준을 높이거나 아니면 소위 일류대학을 나와 한국사회에서 성공적인 삶을 위해

중요하다는 학벌을 확보하거나 아니면 개인만의 독특한 기술(skill)을 확보한다해도 미래의 성공적인 삶을 담보할 수 없는 불확실성이 매우 높은 수준으로 증대했다.

둘째, 이 불확실성을 유발하는 원인의 일단은 인구학적 변화 및 노동시장의 불안이다. 평균수명은 계속 높아지지만, 안정된 일자리는 적어지고, 사회경제적 커리어의 기간은 계속 짧아지고 있다. 이런 현실 속에서 남녀 모두 경제적 안정성이 감소하고 있지만, 이 부정적인 영향은 여성보다 남성에게 더 크게 미치고 있다. 남성의 경제적 능력은 상대적으로 감소하는 반면, 여성의 경제적 능력은 교육기회의 확대와 노동시장으로 진출이 늘어나면서 상대적으로 증가하고 있다. 이는 부계 혹은 남계중심의 가족 및 사회구조 속에서 남성의 역할과 권력을 급속도로 약화시켜 남성의 존재 자체를 약화시키는데 이르고 있다.

셋째, 가족의 차원에서 남성생계부양형 가족 모델은 위와 같은 불확실성이 증대하면서 더 이상 한국 가족을 지탱할 수 있는 모델로서의 적합성을 상실했다. 1997년 경제위기 이후 한국의 가족가치는 크게 달라지지 않았다. 여전히 전통적인 경향이 강한 가족가치로 남아 있다. 그런데 가족가치 가운데 성역할에 대한 태도는 더 이상 전통적이지 않다. 남녀노소를 불문하고, 남자는 밖에서 일을 하여 돈을 벌고, 여자는 집안에서 자녀를 양육하고 가사를 맡는다는 성역할을 더 이상 받아들이지 않게 되었다. 대신 여자도 능력이 있고, 일할 수 있으면 밖에서 일을 하여 돈을 벌며 가족경제에 기여하고, 남성이 일할 수 없을 때에는 생계부양자 역할을 담당할 수 있어야 한다는 방향으로 성역할에 심대한 변화가 일어났다. 이런 변화 속에 남성생계부양형 가족 모델은 더 이상 한국 가족의 모델로서 적합성을 잃었다.

넷째, 그러나 이런 가족 모델의 변화가 남성의 부담을 현실적으로 많이 줄이지도 못했다. 결혼과 가족생활에서 남성의 정신적, 도덕적, 물질적 부담은 크게 감소하지 않았다. 결혼비용도 여성보다 남성이 더 많이 부담해야 한다. 가족생활에서 부모를 모셔야 한다는 의무감은 약화되었지만, 아직도 가족생활은 남계 중심의 가족생활의 틀에서 벗어나 있지 못하다. 이런 가족구조 속에서 남성은 남성대로, 여성은 여성대로 불만스러운 가족생활을 영위해야 하는 상황에 놓여있다. 남성은 무력감에 시달리고, 여성은 자신의 성취 및 기대와 현실 사이에 놓여 있는 커다란 간극에 절망하고 있다.

다섯째, 국가는 여전히 가족을 둘러싼 삶에 적극적으로 개입하여 원만한 가족생활을 유지할 수 있는 도움을 주지 못하고 있다. 이미 인구학적, 사회구조적 변화로 인해 과거에는 가족이 담당해야 했던, 부양을 포함한 여러 부담을 현대 사회에서는 가족이 더 이상 담당할 수 없고, 사회 및 국가가 함께 분담해야 하는 현실이 된지 오래지만, 국가의 역할과 실질적인 기여는 아직도 턱없이 부족하다. 결국 가족의 부담은 여전히 크고, 특히 가족내에서 남성이 수행해야 하는 역할과

기대는 아직도 크게 남아 있다. 그러나 현실은 남성의 역할, 권한, 능력이 이미 과거에 비해 현저히 약화된 상태이다.

여섯째, 조선왕조는 500년동안 유교를 국가이념으로 채택하고 모든 사회제도를 유교원리에 입각한 부계사회로 변모시켰다. 그러나 조선사회가 유교원리에 입각한 사회제도로 완전히 바뀌게 된 것은 조선후기에 이르러서였다. 불교가 조선시대에 갖은 탄압을 받았어도 일반인의 의식과 삶 속에서는 여전히 살아 있었듯이 부계중심원리가 약하고 여성의 지위가 상대적으로 높았던 고려시대의 삶의 양식과 그 유산은 조선시대 및 그 이후 한국인의 삶 속에도 여전히 명맥을 유지해왔는지 모른다. 엄격한 부계중심의 조선시대에도 모계의 가족 배경은 한 가족, 한 개인의 사회적 지위를 결정하는데 매우 중요한 요소였다. 이런 전통이 있었기에, 현대 한국인의 가족의 삶 속에서도 자주 부계 친척과의 관계보다 모계 친척과의 관계가 더 실질적이고 중요하게 작동해왔다. 오늘날 젊은 맞벌이부부의 자녀양육 문제를 해결하는 가장 대표적인 방식이 여성의 친정 가족의 자원을 이용하는 것임은 이런 전통이 현대 한국사회에도 강하게 남아 있었다는 방증일지 모른다.

한국의 자녀 성선희는 남아선호에서 여아선호로의 변화라는 혁명적인 변화를 경험하고 있다. 이런 변화는 세계사적으로도 유례가 없는 일이다. 왜 이런 변화가 한국사회가 일어나고 있는지 설명하기 위해서는 자녀 성선희의 글로벌 변화 추세 및 아시아 지역의 자녀 성선희의 변화를 비교하고 각 사회의 사회변동의 특성에 대한 올바른 이해를 필요로 한다.

Modernity/modernities and personal life : reflections on some theoretical lacunae

Stevi Jackson
York University

This paper represents an attempt to address some of the issues raised by thinking about social change, personal life and gender relations in both European and Asian contexts. In particular, I want to raise some questions in relation to debates on ‘intimacy’ and ‘modernity’. I have many questions but few answers; this is intended as a ‘think piece’ not a fully formed intervention into the debates I address. Central to what I have to say is the awareness that both ‘intimacy’ and ‘modernity’ have largely been framed from a western perspective:

‘Intimacy’ is a western concept that does not easily translate – and even in the West the lay understanding of the term differs from its academic usage. The idea of ‘practices of intimacy’ has been suggested as a means of thinking beyond the parochially western. These are: ‘practices which cumulatively and in combination enable, create and sustain a sense of a close and special quality of a relationship between people’ (Jamieson 2011). This may not help with the cultural specificity of the term itself but it does make it simultaneously less abstract/ more concrete and less specific as to the content of such practices – and therefore more conducive to cross-cultural comparison. *Modernity*, from its use by 19th century theorists through to recent theories of late, high, second, reflexive modernity (and postmodernity) has largely been conceptualized from both Eurocentric and androcentric perspectives.

- Eurocentrism beginning to be acknowledged by western theorists – multiple modernity theories and Beck’s recent calls for a cosmopolitan sociology at least recognize if not overcome this. Postcolonial theories and, importantly, by East Asian scholars’ interventions in debates on modernity also contribute to challenging Eurocentrism.
- Androcentrism – feminists have contested both the ‘old’ theories of modernity for their gendered biases and also more recent theories – and have been particularly active in critiquing mainstream theorists of the consequences of modernity for personal life (especially the work of Beck, Giddens and Bauman).

I am, then, interesting in assessing challenges to universalising theories of the consequences of modernity for intimate life, taking account of both Western feminist and Asian contestations of these ideas. This in itself raises questions about the hegemony of Western academic theory in general and theories of modernity in particular and why many East Asian scholars take western ideas of modernity as their starting point even as they modify and contest them. In the long history of theorizing modernity, western scholars have tended to assume (until very recently) that their parochially based theories are universally applicable (and this goes for social theory in general). Consider:

‘Europeans, North Americans ...[and others have] been doing area studies in relation to their own living spaces. That is, Martin Heidegger was actually doing European Studies, as were Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu and Jürgen Habermas. Once we recognize how extremely limited the current conditions of knowledge are, we learn to be humble about our knowledge claims. The universalist assertions of theory are premature, for theory too must be

deimperialized'. (Kuan-Hsing Chen, *Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization*, 2010, p.3)

We therefore need to be aware that we construct theory from particular locations and imagine the world from specific vantage points and this profoundly affects how we envisage modernity. In accepting that modernity is lived and imagined from differing locations I am not (necessarily) buying into a multiple modernities position, but rather taking my cue from Gurminder Bhambra's argument that modernity itself is a product of historical interconnections between regions and nations rather than something that was originally endogenously European. Yet modernity as it is imagined outside the west often takes western modernity as a point of reference (in both academic and lay imaginings). For example, Tanabe and Tokita-Tanabe argue, contra Giddens, that Asian modernity cannot be understood as 'post-traditional'; rather, tradition persists within modernity. Asian modernity involves a 'complex self-reflexive endeavour to position oneself for *and* against "European modernity" and "indigenous tradition"' (2003: 4) Indeed it is common to establish the specificity of Asian versions of modernity by contrasting them with the imagined modernity of western theorists such as Giddens and Beck.

Hence we have an asymmetry here between western theory and that generated elsewhere, evident in Asian scholars' constant references to western work while little citation occurs in the opposite direction. But there is another asymmetry here. Not all western theory travels east. In terms of debates on modernity, it is certain 'big name' male theorists whose work is taken up, notably Beck and Giddens. What does not travel is the work of their many, often feminist, critics. So, we are facing hierarchies of knowledge and recognition that are both Eurocentric and androcentric.

Why should Asian scholars take any notice whatsoever of western feminist and other critical interventions into debates on modernity? First, if western theorists are taken as representing the 'truth' of late modern social conditions in the western world and then as the basis of contrasts with Asia, false comparisons are being made. Moreover, modifying theorists such as Beck or Giddens to fit China or Korea, while ignoring critiques of their work, leaves the account of western modernity untouched.

- Western societies are seen as far more individualized than they actually are
- Western societies are imagined as wholly de-traditionalised – as if only Asian societies have traditions
- Overly homogenised 'monochrome' view of western societies
- Leaves untouched the idea that western modernity an endogenous achievement (Bhambra 2007, 2010)

Around these issues there are a number of debates, but the debates do not 'join up' (they take place in separate intellectual arenas). They include:

- Ongoing debates on multiple modernities, cosmopolitan sociology, provincialized sociology (here used as shorthand terms for a variety of positions); these rarely deal centrally with gender or intimate life (though some participants in these debates, e.g. Therborn, have had a great deal to say about this).
- Some East Asian scholars' adaptations of western theories of modernity (e.g. Chang 2010a & b; Chang and Song 2010; Yan 2009; 2010); here due attention is often paid to gender relations but with little acknowledgement of western feminist critiques of modernity theorists.
- Feminist research on the gendered consequences of modernity in Asia, most of which is disconnected from sociological debates on modernity.

- Postcolonial theory; primarily developed in relation to South Asia – needs considerable modification to deal with East Asia

Another issue, outside these debates, is also worthy of consideration:

- The place of family life/intimate relationships in social change, as potentially implicated in processes of change rather than affected by or adapting to change

In what follows I pull out two perspectives from these diverse strands of theorizing, considering two approaches to modernity that I think are ‘good to think with’, before returning to the question of gender, families and intimate relationships.

Rethinking modernity?

Gurminder Bhambra and Chang Kyung-sup are both theorists whose work has impressed me and both seem to capture crucial aspects of the modernity we each, from our separate locations, inhabit – but their approaches may also be incompatible. Bhambra is the most trenchant critic of Eurocentrism of the modernity (and associated) debates, in particular of the failure to question the idea of endogenous European modernity. She does not, however, discuss issues of gender or intimacy in this context. Chang initially developed the idea of compressed modernity in the Korean context, but has broadened it out in more recent work. Gender and familial relations are central to his discussion of East Asian specificity.

Bhambra argues that the development of European modernity depended on knowledge and technologies from outside Europe as well as colonial exploitation of other regions. The history of modernity is therefore a history of interconnections. She says:

‘...understanding Europe in terms of global interconnections will provide a better understanding of how modernity has developed and, at the same time, alter our understanding of what it means to be modern, and alter our understanding of the European ‘ownership’ of modernity as an originary project’ (Bhambra, *Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination*, 2007, p.78)

From this perspective there are not multiple modernities – just one, but made up of asymmetrical global interconnections. Chang, on the other hand, has developed a theory beginning from South Korea’s specificity.

‘South Koreans have created their national history and personal biography in a fundamentally family-dependant way. In that way, they have successfully condensed what Westerners had experienced socially, politically, and above all, economically for over two centuries into an experience of less than half a century...The ideological and practical primacy of family over the individual and society in various domains of life is as much a modern practice as a tradition. Such experiences may be considered a unique criterion in distinguishing the structure and dynamic of South Korean society from those of many other societies. However, the same experience may be examined as a crucial real-world reference in critically reappraising the empirical relevance of Western social sciences.’ (Chang Kyung-sup, *South Korea under Compressed Modernity*, 2010, p.5)

Can Bhambra’s view of modernity be reconciled with Chang’s? She argues that ‘A cosmopolitan sociology that was open to different voices would...be one that “provincialized” European understandings’ (Bhambra 2007: 154). Chang’s is a different voice and one that is conveying important insights into how modernity looks and feels for an East Asian perspective.

The idea of compressed modernity seems to capture something central to the East Asian experience of extremely rapid economic development and social change. Initially (Chang 1999) it was defined largely in temporal terms, but in more recent work Chang analyses it as a complex matrix of temporal and spatial compression. In a recent paper in BJS, Chang (2010b) argues that we are all living with compressed modernity in this 'second modern' world, that it has now become a universal condition of second modernity – as a result of 'national societies (or civilizational conditions) being internalized into each other' (p.448). Differing societies, though, are subject to differing degrees of compression, Western societies experience a lower order of compressed modernity since current conditions 'have more often evolved from internal (endogenous) historical processes with the external influences incorporated in a carefully managed of non-western societies where conditions 'imposed, borrowed or adapted ...with internal civilizational elements subjugated' (p 450). This argument does recognize that there are external influences on western society, that there are differing positions within global interconnections and captures the asymmetry and unevenness of global flows of power.

From Bhambra's position, however, these observations would be seen as insufficiently historicized. Chang notes the unevenness of modernization in Europe (and its transplantation to N. America and Oceania) and points out that for most western countries 'modernity has never been a self-contained evolutionary experience', which would seem to bring him close to Bhambra's position. He is, however, referring primarily to relations *among* western countries and not to the ways in which western modernity was shaped by interactions with other regions. He does see such interactions as making an impact on the western world under late capitalist conditions as a result of which 'the rest of the world *has suddenly become* part of the basic economic, social, cultural and ecological fabric of advanced capitalist nations' (p, 542, my emphasis) and argues that 'under second modernity, advanced capitalist societies increasingly experience the civilizational internalization of hitherto peripheral others'. Bhambra would maintain that the rest of the world has not suddenly become incorporated into the fabric of advanced capitalist societies but has long been integral to them; therefore these 'others' have never actually been peripheral to European modernity.

Some questions

Might it be useful to make a distinction between modernization projects as distinct from modernity? If we accept, following Bhambra, that modernity is a product of interconnected histories, we cannot see modernization projects as 'becoming part of modernity'. How do we conceptualize this – might we see it as aiming for relocation to a more privileged place within global interconnections? This would account for the orientation towards the west of rapid modernizers, noted by Chang and others. And if we accept that modernity product of interconnected histories and therefore countries and regions cannot be placed 'outside' modernity or thought of in terms of the modern/tradition binary, does this leave us without an adequate language to conceptualize social change and societies with differing economic underpinnings? And how do we then account for the specificity of the East Asian situation and the consequences of such rapid development, what the concept of 'compressed modernity' seems to capture?

Families, intimacy and modernity

If modernity is the product of global interconnections, then even if there are not multiple modernities there are multiple local experiences of modernity. It also seems that if we are to consider the history of global interconnections we should also attend to the histories of the local conditions from which those interconnections were made. And family forms and practices of intimacy may well be an important aspect of this. Throughout Chang's work he has emphasized the importance of familialism to the development of Korean capitalism. This suggests that family forms, relationships and practices may play a part in shaping social change – i.e. that they are not just affected by change but may help *affect* it. Among western historians and feminists a few decades ago such points were made in relation to the development of industrial capitalism in North Western Europe.

Differing family forms in Asia and the West may also have continued to shape conditions today so that even where we see similarities in global trends differences persist. Historical processes that seem to have been observed across many of the rich capitalist and rapidly developing parts of the world have occurred in different ways – for example the rise and partial decline of the housewife – as documented in Asia by Ochiai's work (Ochiai and Moloney 2008). Today delayed marriage and child bearing, low birth rates (exceptionally low in much of East Asia) and women's increasing socio-economic independence are common features of wealthy capitalist societies, but with variable consequences. In this respect Chang and Song (2010) contrast East Asian familialism with the 'elective' family relationships of the West posited by Beck and Beck Gernsheim. Most western feminist commentators have doubts about the degree to which family relationships are 'elective' – commitment, care, family obligations and moral reasoning are all well documented in recent studies of intimate life in Britain, despite its apparent instability. Beck and Beck Gernsheim (2002) themselves note that western women are caught between living for others and making lives of their own.

To take one example: while Chang and Song argue that Korean and other East Asian women are prolonging individualized stages of life by delaying marriage, many western women are not – they are forming couple bonds, albeit often through serial cohabitation, and the ideal of living as a couple remains strong – arguably strengthened by the legal recognition of same-sex partnerships and parenthood. I would agree that individualism as an idea is much stronger in Europe (and arguably in Britain has a long history), but there is evidence of the importance of close personal relationships nonetheless. If East Asian women are undergoing individualization without individualism, as Chang and Song argue, it may be that western women are individualist without being fully individualized.

**Rationality, instrumentality, and the affective
: Crossings and blurrings in relations of care and intimacy**

Rajni Palriwala
Univ of Delhi

*****Draft: Not to be quoted**

With generalised commodity production, the spread and deepening of capitalism, and aspirations to associated modernity (tied to European Enlightenment), the dichotomy of the market and the home and of reason and emotion have been taken as social fact and valorised. Both reason and emotion, it is asserted, are the better for being kept apart. This dichotomy has paralleled an ideal of the self and of the citizen as an autonomous, self-sufficient individual. Philosophical and sociological discourses seemed to suggest that the individual - for the health of the self, reason, and emotion - can or should ensure the compartmentalisation of instrumentality and the expressive, of self-interest and altruism in different spheres and relations, even as they must both be present in the life of that individual.

Yet, if we look at parallel distinctions of theoretical and practical reason or view emotion as both meaning and feeling, the maintenance of this dichotomy can be questioned. This can be demonstrated if we look at social relations and practice in those spheres of life designated as the rational - the economic or policy-making. Further, even within the frame that maintains the appropriateness of the dichotomy, emotion untempered by reason may be seen and experienced as dependency creating, a disabling obsession, or as giving rise to the terrorist. Hierarchies of emotion may be constructed based on purity of feeling or the reasonableness of feeling.

It is perhaps in those spheres of life designated as proper arenas for emotion, if not passion, in contemporary times - the intimate, the familial, the social - that the crossings, blurrings, and mutual creation of meaning between reason and emotion is most evident. This is relevant to a series of questions of fundamental sociological significance regarding consciousness, consent, and dimensions of agency. For example, why does a woman stay in an abusive domestic emotion? Neither explanations based on her purely emotional, non-rational impulses, nor on rational motivations are satisfactory. Care given without rational thought of what is required as well consideration of the care receiver's and carer's affective selves are not likely to meet the concerns of either individual, with bringing in thereby various social strains. Comparisons across cultures, classes, genders, and other lines of stratification indicate that the intertwinings of the instrumental and the affective vary in form, articulation, and acceptability. These variations are not just individual and contingent, but may be seen in terms of structures of feeling (to use Raymond William's concept).

In looking at love and care as meaning and feeling, expressed in various practices of words and labour, we can trace the embedding in political economy of these structures of feeling as well as of the normative distinctions between the rational and affective. Thus, it has been argued that in a context, wherein despite the dominance of commodified labour unpaid care work remains significant, the dichotomy between the instrumental and the expressive can ensure the performance of unpaid labour - as a labour of love.

In this presentation, I narrate ethnographic and empirical examples of the interpenetration of what may be designated as the instrumental and emotion in social

practice. In questioning the validity of the dichotomy of reason and emotion, I go beyond the valorisation of the latter as well as the radical feminist idea of the 'personal is political'. As a first step in ongoing work, the ethnocentrism and class and gender biases in the construction of this dichotomy emerge. The simple descriptive question one could be addressing here is: Which is the sociological normal and the socially normal within a society and culture and across societies and culture? The separation of the instrumental and the affective, or their imbrication in each other?

I narrate conversations from rural Rajasthan, from 30 years ago; from Leiden, The Netherlands from 13 years ago; and from north India about 5 years ago. I also cite examples from other ethnographies.

First, a village in Eastern Rajasthan (Western India) over 30 years ago. A young couple, farmers who lived in the midst of their fields, away from their kin in the village centre, were having an argument -- part serious, part mock. They asked their 9 year old daughter, Kamala, who did not go to school, whom she would side with. Kamala was in a quandary. At first she said she would back her mother, because "who would feed her if her mother refused to serve her?" A little later, she said, "But no, I should side with my father, for it is he who earns and brings the grain, and what if he refuses to do so?" Finally, she said that she could not decide. What was her dilemma? Not the logic and rationality of either parent's position in the argument, even if she had understood it. I first picked up on this narrative to take forward an analysis of local understandings and valuation of women's and men's work. However, what struck me increasingly was the more immediate concern for Kamala. Backing either parent was simultaneously a declaration of love for the parent, an evaluation of the care and power of each parent in their relationship with her, and an attempt at a rational assessment of which love and relationship she was more dependent on. For her and her parents this was all of a piece. Children and parents loved each other for what they had done for each other and would do - the normal was an intertwining of reciprocity and instrumentality and love.

In other words, love is known through its material and bodily expressions and constituted through them. As is care. In a dispute over family partition with their son, an old couple insisted that subsequent to the division of the ancestral property, on their death their share would not automatically go to their son, but to whoever looked after them when they were no longer able to do so themselves, whoever performed the death ritual and gave the death feast. There was a clear understanding that love, care, and material interest were not worlds apart. The tie between familial relationship and property is of course a theme much discussed. What is emphasised here is how this dynamic structures intimacy, familial love and emotion. Explanations of the greater likelihood of the continuance of joint families among the propertied rather than the propertyless vary (Shah). In public discourse, it is assumed that there is more love and affection among those who remain together and, by implication, the propertied have more love and affection and civility. In sociological analyses, the power of a propertied head of household rather than one without any property to pass on, has been discussed (Vatuk, Sharma). In various ways, we see the political and cultural economy of love, power, and sharing of material interests.

Sitting around on a hot, lazy afternoon, embroidering 'odnis' or half-saris, three young women, sisters and neighbours, one unmarried, were discussing marriage, weddings, trousseaus, dowry, and in-laws, with me. That parents did not give the same amount in dowry to all daughters came up. While changing economic circumstances over

time and the match were pointed out as issues, it was not acceptable to one young woman. To paraphrase her, "If my parents love me, they will give me a dowry. As much as they gave my sisters. They know that it is necessary for me to be respected in my marital home." Her brothers would get the land, equally so, whatever they did. She should get dowry both as right and if her parents loved her. This young woman's voice was not singular. For people like me - who had grown up on a diet of 'modernist' literature in which material gain could not be the test of love and who viewed (and still view) dowry as a manifestation of the devaluation of women - perhaps she was dissembling on her greed. She was using an emotional argument, often successful in the South Asian context, to enrich herself. In many cases and narratives, one heard of how parents gave or should give for their daughter's happiness, because they loved their daughter. In giving dowry and celebrating the marriage in as grand a manner as possible, they did not just acquire status for themselves, they not only showed respect for their new affines, but love for their daughter and son-in-law. The emphasis was not on a token - that was given by more 'distant people'. Rather those with the closest bond - where love, kinship, and duty were intertwined - gave more because they were closer and loved more. The issue is not the correctness of the argument or its justification of practices otherwise detrimental to social justice and gender equality. Rather it seemed that 'love' for and 'happiness' of a daughter was increasingly the language in which material prestations of dowry were being demanded and justified, when its rightfulness as tradition or ritual seemed no longer sufficient, and daughters' rights to property was becoming even more contested.

All these examples are from rural families of middle and poor peasant status. What of the rural elite or the urban? A common argument made by commentators on the declining juvenile sex ratio in India rests on traditional son preference - a desire and a value rationality that leads to sex selective abortion and daughter neglect. [One question here - How is value rationality to be squared with the separation of reason and emotion? Does value become a purely rational phenomenon - with no feeling attached to it?] Others argue that son preference was not a matter of traditional ritual values alone, but the outcome of traditional practices which demanded that parents-son intimacy could and must be fostered for care in old age. How are the instrumental and affective to be separated here, except heuristically by the analyst? Is this imbrication of affectivity and instrumentality to do with the lack of modernisation - the "backwardness" of extra-capitalist agrarian society?

In the Netherlands, one heard that as a result of universal old age pension, old people were not dependent on their children and care by the latter was from love alone. Yet, concerns regarding property were not entirely absent, as I indicate later. In urban wards and villages in the most developed provinces of north India, parents argued that it was modern and rational and scientific to have small families and not to have daughters. The immediate economic, social, and sexual burden of daughters, the lack of return support and regular care in old age given post-marriage residence practices appeared coalesce into an emotion of aversion towards daughters. This was translated into and made through individual actions of sex selective abortion and favoured treatment of sons in nutrition, medical care and schooling. So modern rationality enabled an evaluation of the intimate relationships and love that are to be fostered and those that are not tolerable.

Can we explain this in terms of more rational and less rational cultures? The case that Esther Goody discusses in the volume edited by Medick and Sabean on material interest and emotion could be read as an example of cultural dissonance or of

"backward, pre-modern culture." She looks at cases of children given for fostering by Ghanaian parents in the UK. The Ghanaian parents saw themselves as continuing a practice followed in Ghana of sending children to live with kin, friends, or others; the children would learn productive skills, may be get away from the difficulties that the parents lived in, and in time return to support and care for the aging parents. For these parents, the practicality and instrumentality this implied did not mean less love for the children - rather it was because of love that children were sent away. Certainly this love may not have the intimacy that was present in relations with children who remained at home during childhood - such as daughters - as is suggested in narrations of a similar practice followed among the landed aristocracy in medieval England (J. Goody). The courts in the UK and the parents who had fostered the children, however, went further. They saw the fact of the "giving up" of the children as evidence of the lack of love or of unreliable love, with material interest being the reason that the Ghanaian parents, on returning to the UK, wanted the children back. The foster parents had taken the children through pure love, in caring for them come to love them more, and had claims on them for the care they had given; the children had got used to a way of life and it would not be right to uproot them from that life. Was not reason, meaning, and feeling all entering these latter arguments even as the lack of love on the part of the Ghanaian parents was an argument given against their claims? So cultural difference and lack of modernisation, such that you neither love properly nor are fully rational in less developed contexts does not seem a satisfactory explanation.

That the linear movement from less modern to more modern cultures and the increasing separation between the instrumental and the affective is not so clear cut is again evident when I turn to what a notary in Leiden said to me during an interview. Leiden falls in the most urbanised, developed region of The Netherlands known as the Randstad and the interview took place over a long and enjoyable dinner in the early 1990s.

I think the quarrels over inheritance are not so much about the property itself but about power and favouritism in the family. My clients used to say it's not about money, and I used to think, of course you will say that. But now I realise that it is true - it is about power in the family. The discussions are about how 'you were given this and allowed to do this and I was not', how 'you got your way here' and 'you were asked and I was not'.

While our notary points to the issue of power, what emerges is of course a contestation of who was loved more and that favouritism in love by parents is not acceptable, as this love intertwines with power. As a value, parents are supposed to love all children equally and the material expressions of that love have to express this or compensate for differentiations. So if there is 'proper' love and 'proper quantities' of love, can we think of the rational and the emotional as a dichotomy in practice, even when it may be so in value? The latter will of course influence the way meaning and feeling in emotion is experienced as well as the way the rational enters everyday life.

In this very developed, modernised, and self-assuredly rational, self-reflective culture, the dominant tenor was to assert that filial love should be uncorrupted by claims of reciprocity and calculation. Reading an extract from a letter published in an important daily in response to an article on care leave proposals and new policies regarding single parents that asserted that childcare responsibilities cannot be the reason to opt out of paid work and receive social security:

Women should stop this whining for good. No one's pushing them to take up a job. It's their own free will. They only want a job to earn money to consume yet more, is it not so? And is it not that sick children are given lots of presents and promises to do nice things as soon as they are better? But then, for all that mummy must go out and earn the money and surely my little darling understands that? Of course the little darlings understand that, they are not fools. Later when they are big, they will tell mummy, dear mummy, you are now old and weak and need help, but I cannot be there for you, for when I was ill and small, where were you?

This line of thought and feeling in this passage is not black and white - but two things are evident. One, care and love are to be expressed in time taken out and spent with the loved one, the person who needs care - care as love's labour is the marker. Two, care today depends on care given yesterday - so rationally one should not expect the first without the second. Together, what is being suggested is that the intimacy built through caring labour and time and investment in that labour and time will lead to care and love in the future.

Parallel to this are many narratives of old people who lived alone, at home or in an institution, who were unhappy that their paid carers merely took care of their physical needs and left - they did not talk, smile, joke with them. [Jamieson's discussion of women who wanted their husbands to talk to them, not just do their tasks around the home] The elderly, in these narratives, wanted a relationship, a bond, warmth, which went beyond that of the paid worker-client, not least because that was their understanding of care - that it was performed in a caring relationship imbued by warmth and emotion, and their well-being depended not just on physical care but human interaction. This is also pertinent to discussions on illness narratives and doctor-patient relationships, in which one could trace the conscious and unarticulated intertwinings of medical science and rationality as well as that designated as the affective, emotional, and the non-rational.

I stop with one analysis of the instrumental and expressive in the lives of "mail order brides" and their husbands. From Constable (2003:116) "Filipinas and Chinese women rarely objected to the idea that their relationships with U.S. men were related in part to political relations and the global flow of capital. U.S. men, by contrast, often objected strongly. Most men considered it distasteful to connect politics and market forces with personal lives and intimate relationships, or to propose that love might not be the single or most essential ingredient of a marriage. [But so may U.S. women - who become themselves in a world in which the instrumental and the expressive, the private and the public are distinct, and if mixed, a corruption.] Women from China and the Philippines often articulated the importance of love, but were not so resistant to the idea that marriage involves personal and political considerations."

Is Asia the Future of Europe? : Transformation of Care Regimes in Asia

Emiko Ochiai
Kyoto University

1. Growing concern on care in Asia

Since the 1990s, there has been increasing interest in care around the world, both in general society and in academia. However, a close look at everyday life in Asian societies reveals a considerable diversity among them. This paper examines different patterns of familialism in Asia and their changes, based on an empirical study of care regimes in Asian societies.

To begin with, we need to note that the social conditions surrounding care in Asia are not necessarily the same as that of the West. The first point here is the speed of demographic change and population ageing. Japan drew ahead of the West in the 1990s, and at the moment, with more than one in five people over 65, is the most aged society in the world. However, the proportion of the elderly in countries in this region other than Japan is relatively low. There is still some time before Asian societies other than Japan will be actually faced with the full array of problems. The second point to note is that the welfare state in Asian societies is still at the embryonic stage. A comparison of the proportions of social expenditures for the family in the OECD countries in terms of total GDP shows that Japan is at the same low level as the countries of Southern Europe and North America, with Korea even lower. Third is the present varieties of gender roles and the diversity of the directions of change. In the societies of the Western world, women were turned into housewives in the modern age, and the second modernity has taken them away from home. However, we might be able to say that the housewifization in societies like Thailand, Singapore and China, where female workforce rates are high, and the opposing trend of gradual de-housewifization in places like Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, are both present in Asia. As the fourth point that characterizes care in contemporary Asia, we can bring up the international migration of care workers. There is also international migration of care workers in the West, but the scale is smaller than Asia.

When discussing care in Asia, cultural factors cannot be ignored. It is usually stated that, prior to the establishment of the welfare state, care was performed within the family and by the female members (mothers, wives, daughters, daughters-in-law). It is easy to think that this is particularly so in Asia, with its Confucian emphasis on filial duty and tradition of extended families where the ageing parents reside with their children. However, I would like to note here that it is risky to oversimplify this point. Family members taking on care duties, and particularly for women to be given that role, is a phenomenon of modernity. This modern type of gender role division became considered to be an Asian tradition through the mechanism I named “traditionalization of modernity” by the effect of Orientalism and Self-Orientalism in the Asian region.

2. Theoretical framework and concepts: care diamond, familialism, de-familialization

This paper uses the care diamond framework, in which the roles played by the state, the market, the family, and the community are seen, to provide a comparative analysis of care in various Asian societies. This paper makes a slight change to the care diamond to use it in an Asian context. The “family sector” is

renamed to the “family and relatives sector” that goes beyond the nuclear family and a single household.

There are two points we need to be aware of when using the care diamond for analysis. One is whether the unit of analysis is the whole of society (a macro-level analysis) or individual people (a micro-level analysis). The other point is that the provision and the financing of care are separate things. The care diamond framework is suited to use in care provision.

According to Esping-Andersen, “a familialistic welfare regime” is one where “the family should have the greatest welfare responsibility towards its members” (Esping-Andersen 1999, Ch.3). In contrast, “A de-familializing welfare regime is one which seeks to unburden the household and diminish individuals’ welfare dependence on kinship” either by the welfare state or through market. (Esping-Andersen 1999, p.51).

Leitner proposes a logic to discuss how there are varieties of familialism. He examines familialistic policies such as time rights, and de-familializing policies such as the public provision of child care and the public subsidy of care provision through the market, and categorizes them into the four groups of “explicit familialism,” where the former is strong and the latter weak, “de-familialism,” where the former is weak and the latter strong, “implicit familialism,” where both are weak, and “optional familialism,” where both are strong (Leitner 2003). However, Leitner’s categorization is about policy types. In other words, these categories are only related to the state functions.

This paper proposes another framework for categorizing the degrees of familialism and de-familialization. There are two directions in de-familialization: by the state and through the market. We can cross these two directions. De-familialization through the market can also be termed “commodification.” The policy that promotes this trend is liberalism. De-familialization by the state can also be termed “socialization.” This trend is promoted by a purer socialism, rather than social democracy per se. The coexistence of de-familialization through the market and de-familialization by the state are caused by social democracy in Europe, but its cause in Asia is what I would like to consider in this analysis.

3. Varieties of familialism and de-familialization in Asia

So how should we position the care regimes of each society in terms of the two directions in de-familialization? It appears that the tendency towards de-familialization through the market is one common to most Asian societies. This trend can be termed “liberal familialism.” Calling it “familialism” while de-familialization of care provision has progressed to considerable degree is due to the fact that the family usually bears the financial burden in de-familialization through the market. We are inclined to say that liberal familialism is a destiny for the societies that are going through “compressed modernity,” because they had to face demographic and social changes without a well-developed welfare state. However, we should pay more attention to the policy decisions East Asian governments have made.

One group that diverges from liberal familialism is China and Singapore, in terms of childcare. This is because, based on the socialist policies in China and the developmentalist policies in Singapore, they have both taken policies that promote the use of female labour. We can term these “socialist familialism” in China and “developmentalist familialism” in Singapore.

Another case that diverges from liberal familialism is Japan. Japan’s immigration policy does not allow the entry of unskilled workers, so does not allow

the entry of foreign care workers, who are the usual solution to care problems in Asia. I believe that the reason Japan is taking a different path to other Asian societies is “semi-compressed modernity” it has experienced.

The paper focuses on most recent changes in the 2000s in Asian societies. The major findings are as follows. (1) Most governments in East and Southeast Asian societies have implemented new policies on care, prompted by social issues such as low fertility, needs for early education and predicted population ageing. However, their policy focus is on de-familialization policies through market and community as well as familialization policies. (2) The transitional socialist society, China, is witnessing a trend of re-familialization just as in European post-socialist countries but the changes in Vietnam are not so manifested. (3) The emphasis on the role of community is a common trend in Asia and Europe and in socialist and capitalist countries. (4) The role of the market is even more emphasized, sometimes with subsidies from the state.

Selected References

Emiko Ochiai and Barbara Molony, 2008, *Asia's New Mothers: Crafting Gender Roles and Childcare Networks in East and Southeast Asian Societies*, Folkestone, Kent: Global Oriental.

Emiko Ochiai, 2009, “Care Diamonds and Welfare Regimes in East and South-East Asian Societies: Bridging Family and Welfare Sociology,” *International Journal of Japanese Sociology*, 18: 60-78.

Emiko Ochiai, 2010, “Reconstruction of Intimate and Public Spheres in Asian Modernity: Familialism and Beyond,” *Journal of Intimate and Public Spheres*, No.0 (Pilot Issue) : .2-22.

落合恵美子、宮坂靖子、周维宏、山根真理编著 2010《亚洲社会的家庭和两性关系----中日韩新泰（五国六地）实证和比较研究》世界知识出版社

Emiko Ochiai, 2011, “Unsustainable Societies: The Failure of Familialism in East Asia's Compressed Modernity,” *Historical Social Research*, 36 :219-245 (March).

Emiko Ochiai, Aya Abe, Takafumi Uzuhashi, Yuko Tamiya and Masato Shikata 2012 “The Struggle against Familialism: Reconfiguring the Care Diamond in Japan,” in Shakra Razavi and Silke Staab eds., *Global Variations in the Political and Social Economy of Care: Worlds Apart*, New York and London : Routledge.

落合恵美子・赤枝香奈子編 2012『アジア女性と親密性の労働』京都大学学術出版会

落合恵美子編 2013『親密圏と公共圏の再編成—アジア近代からの問い』京都大学学術出版会

Emiko Ochiai and Kenichi Johshita, Forthcoming, “Prime Ministers' Discourse in Japan's Reforms since the 1980s: Traditionalization of Modernity rather than Confucianism,” in Sirin Sung and Gillian Pascall eds., *Gender and Welfare State in East Asia: Confucianism or Equality?*, Palgrave.

Late Modernity or a modern social (welfare) formation?

Welfare Society and Welfare State in the Era of the Spectacle: Late Modernity, Early Humanity and the Tribes of Global Contemporaneity.

Sven E O Hort

Seoul National University, Korea, & Linnaeus University, Sweden

Abstract

It is often argued that European welfare states and Asian developmental states are the most successful state forms in recent history. What about their futures? Are they converging towards modern developmental welfare states? In the world of today there is an abundance of uncertainty – permanent volatility in Late Modernity versus the presumed stability and sustainability of a bygone era – and it is definitely pertinent to ask: Which is the Epoch, and who is the Human Individual? What kind of development are “we” – as interdependent human beings – witnessing at the moment? Where are societies and states heading in the present era of global human and social development? Towards something that can be labelled modern social welfare formations, or are they closer to more basic human survival units, even warfare states? Are these units building, consolidating and developing, even re-building or recreating existing human welfare schemes and systems? Furthermore, are communities and countries going in the same direction, towards a singular (“social welfare”) modernity along a civilizing process, or are they cases of chronologically parallel trajectories going in different and divergent directions beyond the geo-cultural polar opposites East and West? Do they belong to the same “timeworld”, or are they worlds apart in time and hyperspace? “Life and Humanity in Late Modern Transformation Beyond East and West” also raise questions about “Early Humanity”: is there an East Asian welfare regime on its way; is Korea one of its prime examples? Is Scandinavia re-building its welfare states under “compressed modernity”, and what kinds of differences and similarities are there between Asian and European patterns?

The welfare state is a European invention although it has spread to other parts of the world, not least East Asia and more recently throughout South and Southeast Asia. However, in the last two or three decades the idea of the egalitarian and democratic welfare state has been foreign to the dominant mode of global thinking about the organisation of society and state. The global consensus approach has regarded state intervention in the market economy – growth-supporting measures (even planning), heavy taxes, generous welfare benefits, increased public responsibility including anti-corruptive measures – as fundamentally flawed and against the long-term viability of a free and open society. This is also where the most recent globalisation theories have met the most prevalent theories in comparative welfare state research without taking into account other types of secular and non-secular thoughts.

“It is widely thought that the Nordic countries have found some magic way of combining high taxes and lavish welfare systems with fast growth and low unemployment... Yet, the belief in a special Nordic model, or “third way,” will crumble further in 2007.”

The Economist, The World in 2007, Edition, 2006

Introduction: Welfare Society and State in the Epoch of the Spectacle

Scandinavian welfare society is Nobel class, its welfare state a media hype easy to burn and exploit, part of a broader set of European welfare states, nevertheless often proclaimed the embodiment of this notion and practice. Are the timing of these societies and state “late”, or are they simply “modern”, even “early modern” to use a concept the historians make much use of. In the notes to follow the “magic” of the Nordic countries will be discussed. These pages are part of a larger project on the development of civil society and social policy institutions above all in Sweden, but here briefly compared also with its Nordic neighbours.

European welfare states and Asian developmental states are the most successful state forms in recent history. The welfare state is a more than century-old European invention – from Bismarck to Beveridge social policies became a hallmark of the interventionist state – although it has spread to other parts of the world, North America and the Pacific early on, more recently to East Asia and most recently throughout South and Southeast Asia. Welfare was added to state in the battle against Hitler’s warfare state and has survived its founding moment. The new state was a survival unit that offered more than blood, sweat, tears – and death. In care of the state, human being could live a civilized life in decency and dignity – in welfare society supposedly in control of their own state.

The Developmental state is of more recent origin and closely associated with East Asia: state-led regulatory capitalism in Japan in particular after Hiroshima, later also post-war growth and reconstruction in South Korea and Taiwan, also Hong Kong and Singapore, mainland China most recently. Chronologically later but in many respect parallel to welfare, development offered Hope for a Future – Life, better lives, not death though sweat and tears, even blood. Presumptively “backward” societies under authoritarian rule were able to rapidly catch-up with more “advanced” ones; compressed Modernity – in a “civilizing process”?

Today, in the early decades of the 21st century, human society is faced with accelerated and rapid transformation under conditions of biological, cultural, ecological, financial and political survival. On the agenda is the *developmental welfare state*; as a survival unit a blend of East Asian and North-West European practices reaching far beyond the limits of their respective geophysical limitations. If states are closely related to space – territorial monopoly of administrative resource extraction and violence – they are also situated in time. Late Modernity is gratefully taken from the Conference invitation – late modern transformation – and provokes me to introduce Early Humanity: this is the era of the spectacle where everything is instantly consumed, digested and thrown up whether academic or vulgar.

Thus, the suggestion is that industrial capitalism has not yet conquered the world “as we know it”, nor has the welfare state and its adjacent “civilized society”. Humanity is only at the start of a still long journey, maybe the end of the beginning. In the pages to come I will put forward some ideas or notes on the making and remaking – or building and re-building – of welfare societies and states during the present conjuncture. Happiness and welfare are nowadays catchwords in both politics and the social sciences, so also (South) Korea and Scandinavia. What about society and state? Twenty-five years after the transition from military dictatorship to representative rule in Korea, and more than twenty years after the major social transformation or transition in the vicinity of the far North of Europe, the disappearance of the East, there are many “bewildering questions” with an impact on macro-“theory”. First out a note on the spectacle, then the Nordic countries, later Korea (and its neighbours) – finally it is time to return to and reach beyond the spectacle.

Jottings on the Epoch and its Society: the Spectacle

All that is solid melts and hopefully disappears downwards or up in the stratosphere; if still visible on earth on the verge of ecological catastrophe or disaster. East and West change direction, meaning and place mocked by the spectacle of South or North – Korea? – with a little help from what remain of the old West or what is coming of the new East. Riding a bicycle under such conditions require balancing skills. It is like walking in darkness waiting for the moon, or the stars. Surprise around the corner, or the bike in the ditch?

Time and again, the lateness of Modernity has come to the fore in the aftermath of its post-modern after-effects. The precursor of Late is Early. After the eclipse of ultramodernity, any philologically inclined archaeologist of modernity, not to speak of an archeologically disposed philologist of this era, knows to situate her excavation or examination in temporality. The time of the *La société du spectacle* was according to its sequel the early decades of the last century, though the moment of its original volume was during the autumn before the Paris spring (Debord 1967). It was not an immediate success, no late modern best-seller, but it reached out to those who went into the streets, the street-fighting generation. Since, three different English translations have appeared, not to mention other languages. It is one of those rare examples that in the rear have defined its age, its proposed founding moment though not generally accepted. Nevertheless, far from part of received wisdom the spectacle as taken hold beyond its initial settings.

It is probably all too early to subscribe to the idea that commodification has completed its colonisation of social life as mere representation; the decline of being into having, and having into mere appearing; the spectacle as the defining social relationship between people mediated by images. In advance of many other realist magicians Debord defined the spectacle as the systematic confluence of capitalism, media and government. The spectacle is the inverted telescope in which relations between commodities have supplanted relations between human beings. Decommodification of course modifies such a course of action, recommodification strengthen its gradual take over modern transformations of humanity whether late or not so late. But the supposed rapidity of change reinforces its fundamentals. Thus, instead of lateness, implicitly the end of X or Y, the present stage of the transformation of modernity – the human “civilizing process” – will be periodized as the Epoch of the spectacle; its society a mirror-image of this era.

In the sections to follow the transformation of the welfare states and societies of the Far North – tribes of global contemporaneity – after the imposition of decommodification as their defining characteristics will be scrutinized in the light of more recent development welfarism in East Asia, Korea in particular.

Under the Umbrella of the Nordic, or Next Supermodel?

Economics, geography and politics all matter, as do time, language, and perceptions of contemporaneity (the “Epoch”). Human institutional and social relationships are formed in the intersection between material/physical space and chronological/real time. Both are reciprocally influenced by moral/spiritual topography in which also welfare models may flow or not. In February this year (2013), slightly more than half a decade after being put in the dustbin by London *Economist* the same journal had found the magic way or the next supermodel – in the Far North around or close to the Baltic Sea. Nevertheless, it is necessary to move behind and beyond the constructions of the new Millennium. The starting-point of

the new Nordic era can be located in the mid- or late 1980s, perhaps a little earlier, others would move the clock in the other direction.

With the fall of the Berlin wall, one Baltic nation-state went into the abyss (DDR) while three or four others appeared on stage (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, maybe also Russia should be added). States including welfare states are, thus, also survival units, which as institutions and nations may also opt for dissolution or unification depending also on the workings of a broader state system (cf Kaspersen 2008 & 2005). It is in the context of such an international organizational system that the previously crippled Nordic imagination has prospered in recent decades in sharp contrast to the time when for instance Nordek was perceived; the 1971 economic union between five Nordic nations-states finally turned down by Finland after a supposed Njet from its superpower neighbor to the East. The notes to come hint at some issues which are in dire need of further inter-Scandinavian comparative investigations and reasoning not least in light of the disappearance of the former neighboring East.

More than 20 years have passed since the collapse of the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe – the “totalitarian welfare state” or the “structural model of welfare” in the words of Harold Wilensky (1975) and Ramesh Mishra (1976), respectively. This heralded the neoliberal transition from Soviet-style socialism to “late or post-”modern contemporary global communist capitalism, with China at the forefront after the break-up of the Sino-Soviet world in the late 1950s. The European Social model had a brief sunny season following Jacques Delors’ grandiose plan, before ending in September 2008. In contrast, after a purgatory welfare-state decade for Finland and Sweden, the “Nordic model” thrived during the first decade of the new Millennium and continues to do so into the second (cf Hilson 2008). This is particularly so after the global/American financial meltdown. Not only have the words of the Dane Gösta Esping-Anderson travelled the world, so have the feminist ideas of a generation of Scandinavian social researchers. From Buenos Aires to Havana, and from Hanoi to Seoul, not to speak of Beijing and Shanghai (however, with the partial exception of Pyongyang), the Nordic Model has been up for scrutiny by Anneli Anttonen, Birte Siim, Barbara Hobson, Martha Szebehely, Kari Waernes as well as a fair number of the other sex. They have all followed in the steps of an earlier generation led by Alva and Gunnar Myrdal but perhaps most prominently pursued by the golden generation of Norwegian social researchers (cf. Mjösseth 1991).

The idea of common resources possessed and utilized by imagined welfare communities consist of a set of rights (both to claim and act), and obligations or duties to contribute and pay taxes. This is not just for the money but for the common good or human dignity is a society where classes have not disappeared. The right to claim comprises legitimate appropriations upon the community and its polity for services and support. The right to act is not just the political right to vote on election-day. It also includes labor legislation most often also family and gender law expanding the right to act of children, employees and self-employed including farmers and sometimes also persons leaving the rural farmlands usually for the insecurity/poverty regime of the urban informal sector, and perhaps women in particular. Claim rights reduce the discretion of patronage by administrators, bosses, business, middlemen, and politicians. Rights to act on the part of social subordinates are intended to restrict the powers of employers, fathers, husbands, and parents (cf. Therborn 1995). The relationship between these two sets of rights has differed between the four Nordic countries, but this is not the right place to stress the differences to an unnecessary degree. In the forefront are the similarities advertised as the supermodel.

The Nordic welfare model necessitates a brief summary of its common characteristics:

- Broad-based preventive measures directed towards the unemployed, poor and destitute
- Comprehensive child allowances for all families with children

- Free or inexpensive education in public or to some degree also private educational institutions
- Free or inexpensive health, old age, and disability care
- Universal old-age pensions
- Income programs, including benefits for the disabled housewives, the ill, orphans, and the unemployed
- Human shelter through general housing policies

Or as a developed model in which not only social but also fiscal welfare figures preeminently; there is no such thing as a free lunch. The right to pay tax and claim a benefit is intrinsically linked to each other. This is the public CPR in an IC whether national or local.

Table 1: A macro typology of welfare models and the social division of public social and fiscal welfare

	Residual model		Status model		Institutional model	
	Social division of welfare		Social division of welfare		Social division of welfare	
<i>Dimensions</i>	<i>Public social welfare</i>	<i>Fiscal welfare</i>	<i>Public social welfare</i>	<i>Fiscal welfare</i>	<i>Public social welfare</i>	<i>Fiscal welfare</i>
1. Target group	Poor	Taxpayers (groups of taxpayers)	Economically active	Taxpayers (groups of taxpayers)	All citizens	Taxpayers (groups of taxpayers)
2. Most important system of rules	Selective (discretion)	Selective (taxpayers)	Selective (work)	Selective (taxpayers)	Universal	Selective (taxpayers)
3. Criteria for assignment of benefits	Discretionary need assessment	Rights (tax law)	Rights	Rights (tax law)	Rights	Rights (tax law)
4. Level of benefits	Minimum standard	Normal standard (generous)	Normal standard	Normal standard (generous)	Normal standard	Normal standard (generous)
5. Most important source of financing	Taxes	Tax expenditures	Insurance premiums	Tax expenditures	Taxes (and premiums)	Tax expenditures
6. Degree of redistribution	Probably modest	Small (regressive)	Moderate	Small (regressive)	Probably relatively large	Small (regressive)
7. Degree of social control	Strong	Small	Moderate	Small	Small	Small
8. Status of	Small	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal

receivers		(high)		(high)		(high)
9. Social expenditures as percentage of GNP*	Low (less than 10%)	High/Medium?	Medium (10-20%?)	High/Medium?	High (more than 20%?)	Low
10. Status of social policy in relation to the economy	Marginal	Strengthening the marginalisation of social policy	Inferior	Enforcing inferiority	Relatively equal status	Strengthening economy in relation to social policy

Source: Ervik (2000)

* Social expenditures are here defined as including both direct public expenditures and fiscal welfare spending in the form of “tax expenditures”.

Before and after World War II, historical compromises were achieved all over far Northern Europe. These were facilitated by the historical freedom of small land-owners and fisherman, and the absence of excessive state powers due to the special relationship between tribal congregations, the Protestant churches, and the absolutist monarchies. Throughout Scandinavia, a movement developed that combined growth and welfare for the good of the great majority led by a coalition representing workers and farmers.

This model and its constituent common pool resources (CPRs), located in imagined-cum-factual communities, will again be the main focus in this brief overview of the most recent decades. However, written in the spirit of the 600 years old Union of Kalmar, celebrated as late as in 1997, and the since 1954 rather open labor market; its human tribal components and their relationships to territory and throne on and off will be highlighted throughout these pages. Without excessive state pressure in imagined communities at different levels of civil society and the tributary states, CPRs have been assembled throughout Scandinavia (ca also Knudsen 2000; Knudsen and Rothstein 1994; and Grell 1992). Although variation within the imagined welfare communities is subsumed under the headings of nation-states, local cooperation and government is not entirely absent. There are more than one thousand municipalities involved. There are a similar number of dioceses, with several thousand geophysical parishes within the four Augsburg confessional kingdoms. This reaches back to the archaic order and the early formation of Christendom in far Northern Europe. In addition, there are the 19th century “free churches” of farmers, laborers, revivalists, teetotalers and suffragettes, although the teetotalers always have been of minor importance in Denmark (cf. Sulkonen 2000). In Finland, the pietists remained within the established church. During the Tsarist era, an Orthodox church saw the light of day in Helsinki and the Eastern border regions. These areas had to wake up to post-Soviet immigration. A third layer of new, urban and rural systemic social movements are also visible: ethno-national abrahamite migrants, eugenicists, evangelicals, feminists, Greens, New Age, sports. Finally, there may be a fourth 21st-century layer of virtual movements as part of the imagined communities of the Far North; pirates of various kinds, at present even with representation in the European Parliament.

This part of the paper starts with the imagined community of Denmark and ends with Swedish civil society, before a few concluding remarks on the universality of the Nordic model in the context of comparative research. The constituent parts of this model and the larger European social model have conquered the imagination. What comes out of the ensuing picture is only a brief look at its variety.

The flexicurity of the Danish model

Policy diffusion in the Far North has a long history, pre-dating the advent of best practices and learning by global examples. After the Great Depression, the Nordic countries made their marks on the international scene and continued to do so for a long time. Denmark did so first. It was the leading light of Scandinavian welfare reform, with agricultural protection, labor market measures, and increased social spending as part of the deal between the collective interests of farmers and laborers. Agrobusiness thrived in a Grundtvigian setting (Christiansen et al. 2006). Nazi occupation changed the intra-Nordic order. Möller, the key Swedish social reformer during the first part of the 20th century, imported into Sweden the ideas and visionary plans of the Danish social engineers Bramsnaes and Steincke. This laid the foundation for another welfare system very similar to the Danish one. Only a decade after the end of the Second World War, Sweden came to symbolize the Nordic welfare model in the works of UK Labour politician Anthony Crosland (Anderson 1961). Full employment and high-quality public health and social services became a hallmark of this model, as well as high taxes and generous insurance benefits. This was much better than what Harold MacMillan and Sir Alec Douglas-Hume could offer the British electorate.

However, the Danish model also had an urban radical profile including enlightened civil servants and urban intellectuals with a background in the resistance movement that conjured images of early day care for children, cigar-smoking Copenhagen feminists leaving the kids for the job, and libertarian old-age care that made the more respectable Swedish social institutions look lackluster. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Denmark remained in second place, with a welfare system fairly similar to the Swedish, almost as good and a great deal more flexible already at this time. However, at the end of the 1970s there was the anti-tax uprising led by the solicitor Mogens Glistrup and his populist political party. In the 1980s, Denmark saw the reappearance of high unemployment, but no further extension of active labor market measures (Norby Johansen 1986; cf. also Miller 1991 and Mortensen 1995). The social insurance system had to take the responsibility for all the unemployed without the necessary means to bring them back to the labor market. Thus, it was possible for university students to continue their studies on rather generous unemployment benefits. However, the mainstream political parties – Social Democracy, the Social Conservatives, Venstre, the Radical Left, and the Socialist Left – took the heat and defended the system with the exception of study allowances. Meanwhile, the labor market organizations renegotiated to the benefit of the employers. There was more flexibility to lay off employees in cases of low demand while active labor market measures and life-long education expanded. Denmark was the first Nordic country to embrace neo-liberal social policies – with a human face. It became the pioneer of Nordic new public management (cf. Regeringen 1997).

Flexicurity became the name of the new Danish game. This was a flexible labor market, backed up by a traditional Nordic social security safety net and the cradle-to-deathbed local social services. Together with strenuous efforts to balance the budget and control an escalating public debt, the imagined welfare communities (local, regional and national governments, as well as the labor market organizations) succeeded in bringing Denmark back to the Nordic family of nations (Kaspersen 2008; cf. also Kvist 2011, Abrahamson 2010, and Jensen 2005). When the state tried to reorganize its internal institutions – the welfare municipalities – its success was limited to the peninsula of Jutland. The prosperous ILWCs around Copenhagen remained indifferent and rejected central state management of civil society; Hamlet-style class struggle. In their contribution to the European Welfare Systems (Original German edition 2008) Christoffer Green-Pedersen and Michael Baggesen Klitgaard summarize the development of the Danish system under the heading “Between economic constraints and popular entrenchment: the development of the Danish welfare state 1982-2005” (“Im Spannungsfeld von wirtschaftlichen Sachzwängen und öffentlichen Konservatismus” was the German title):

Twenty-five years of reform developments have in some ways adapted the Danish welfare state further to the universal ideal of the Scandinavian type of welfare state...It may be seen as a paradox that this accommodation implied significant retrenchments in unemployment benefits, early retirement, social assistance and disability pensions...Prior to the reforms, Danish unemployment benefits were extremely generous and probably as close to a genuine 'citizen-wage' as any Western democracy has ever been, which was recognized as a fundamental threat to the strategic solidarity and thus political legitimacy of the universal welfare state" (p.148).

Moreover, throughout this transformation, Denmark was always on top of Richard Estes' happiness index long before this had become a lucrative social science business. At the end of this period, growth returned, high taxes persisted, and unemployment decreased considerably. Maybe the happy Danes would argue that their welfare benefits and services were "lavish". The Danish miracle – also beneficial to young Swedish jobseekers in the south, and the southern Swedish housing market – survived almost until 9.15. The contradictions of the Danish welfare paradox are still around in neoliberal globalism, sustained by a territorially imagined welfare community of cultural radicals, devoted royalists, and quarrelling tribalists. They are defending a national currency though it is tied to the euro. Many of these also have a second home in rural southern Sweden. The exception is the foreign-born, who also suffered from another turn to the political right in the late 1990s when welfare benefits no longer were universal but ethnified with higher reimbursement rates for native Danes. After a general election in 2011, this apparent injustice was removed by a new left-leaning government. A year later, after another election this time in Egypt, Denmark anew became an exporter of its welfare model (Hajighasemi 2012).

Finland: A model that cracked but was temporarily sustained by the Nokia cell phone

Twentieth-century Finnish history is in many respects exceptional, with civil war and war with Soviet Union (Alestalo et al. forthc.). In the late 1980s, Finland was the late-comer that looked to the West and became a close Nordic family member. As of 1991, it was free and independent and soon an EU- and euro member-state, though not fully integrated into the Atlantic community (NATO). Neither is the Swedish speaking community of Åland fully integrated with the republic of Finland, its current suzerain. Thus, there is more to add on the history of what once was the Eastern half of the kingdom of Sweden. In the first half of the 19th century after its conquest Tzarist Russia embarked on massive fortifications of this archipelago in the South-western part of the present Finnish territory. During the Crimean war these were destroyed and seized by the British and French navies ruling the Baltic waves. After the October revolution the Ålanders in 1917 wanted to join Sweden and made a petition to its kings. However, the newly independent republic rejected this proposal and instead offered home rule under Finnish sovereignty. The issue was resolved by the newly founded League of Nation which in 1921 drew up an international convention signed by ten states which confirmed and guaranteed the status of independent region, the demilitarization of 1856 and also neutralized Åland. The compromise was supplemented by an agreement between Finland and Sweden on how these guarantees were to be realized and the Norwegian Nobel Peace Prize committee awarded the Swede Hjalmar Branting the medal. Afterwards this convention has become an admired global example of a peaceful and successful solution to minority conflict also including several nation-states – a journey from warfare to welfare state. Furthermore, similar to the Faroe Islands and Greenland – under Danish jurisdiction – the Åland Islands have since 1970 its own representation in the Nordic Council. In advance of the Finnish EU entrance the Autonomy Act was revised and agreed upon by both parties, and Åland has since continued to conduct its domestic affairs: education, health, the promotion of industry and welfare but also policing though the court system is national. Moreover, when Finland joined the EU in 1995, the Ålanders had the opportunity to stay

outside but gave its consent. In a special protocol to the treaty of accession between the EU and Finland it is stated that Åland shall be regarded as a third territory with respect to the purchase of land, doing business and indirect taxation. Today, Åland is an example of an advanced imagined welfare community with a vibrant civil society.

The achievements of the Finnish welfare state were a success story to the ruling Agrarians, as well as their many political partners: the conservative Unity Party, the Swedish People's Party, Social Democracy, and even what remained of the former Communist Party (at the end for a while led by a Swedish-language poet). The political landscape of Finland was one of consensus-seeking large majorities. For decades, the Agrarian Party had been the constant broker between the various interests within this coalition, a Swedocentric big business in lumber and timber waiting in the wings.

Finland got a welfare system similar to the Swedish and Danish ones. Its specific characteristics reflected historical choices (cf Hiillamo & Kangas 2009). On the one hand, there was a local community welfare system, including general social services, special services for certain populations, and income security for those in need. On the other hand, there was a rights-based income security system at the level of the imagined national welfare community. Both education – publicly funded and provided from primary to tertiary, a more recent success story – and universal public health were outside the social protection system. Housing and agricultural policies were similar to the Swedish system. Both deserve to be mentioned in this context as the Finnish state and municipalities after 1945 had to provide land to Karelians leaving Soviet-conquered land in the East. Although it was more centralized in some respects, in others the Finnish welfare system was more decentralized than its Swedish counterpart. One example is the affluent Swedish-speaking community on the island of Åland, which since 1995 has also been something of an EU tax haven and has a high degree of self-determination over social welfare affairs.

Moreover, Nokia started to conquer the virtual world in the 1990s. This began after the collapse of the Finnish economy in the wake of the break-up of its superpower neighbor, the Soviet Union and its after-effects also in Sweden. Finnish forestry survived while the dockyards and similar heavy-industry Soviet exporters went bankrupt (cf. Kosonen 1993). Despite a turbulent crisis, with municipal or voluntary soup kitchens popping up all over the country, the national and local institutions of the welfare state survived, only to stress the sustainability of the welfare state in the worst years of an employment and fiscal crisis. Millenarianism aside, the secular apocalypse theory had to wait for another time. There was life after Soviet death. Nokia caught the imagination of post-modern aesthetics and economics, proving that Finland had found a way to combine high taxes and a not so lavish welfare system with fast growth, if not low unemployment. Matti Kautto and Matti Heikkilä concluded that the Nordic model stood on “stable but on shaky grounds” (1999). Six years later, Olli Kangas was much more optimistic when he and Joakim Palme dared to ask if the most brilliant future of the Nordic model had passed (2005). At that time, Nokia cell phones were outcompeting Ericson and Motorola on the consumer electronics market. Most Finns felt relieved after being severely wounded a decade later. Kangas and Palme even included a chapter on the relationship between the Nordic model and the information society in their UN-sponsored message to the world (Himanen 2005; also the co-author of a book in 2002 with Manuel Castells). Otherwise, it was the usual suspects who argued the case for the future of the welfare state. This is also true with the latest output from the community of Nordic comparative welfare state researchers, where Finland remains in the forefront (Kvist, Fritzell, Hvinden & Kangas 2011).

Finland's success stands tall, but is still marred by its historical ethno-national tribal barriers. Even the Swedish-language minority, although fully eligible for all social benefits and services, has a hard time protecting its social and tribal rights. In the last decades, local communities' struggles over scarce resources have been bitter and hard-fought between the

two recognized ethno-national communities. Nevertheless, the majority of both groups belongs to the same religious congregation and speaks the same language of atonement, although with two different tongues. A new populist anti-Nordic party saw the light of day in 2011. The (True) Finns attacked the followers of the Swedish People's Party and the EU consensus (Jungner 2011). Furthermore, Finland has remained a fortress regarding modern global immigration, despite that it shares an American emigration history with its neighbors. It is also part of the 1954 passport-free internal Nordic labor market, whereby half a million Finns left for Sweden, although many have returned and re-settled in Finland. The country has not managed to remain immune to this global process. Nevertheless, the number of immigrants and their children differ considerably from Norway, even more so from Denmark and Sweden. Its educational system is first class in comparative research.

In toto, the Finnish welfare state and its local extensions made a full-scale comeback after an economic backlash (cf. Kangas 2011; Kangas & Saari 2009; Saari 2001). However, in spite of recurring populist movements and parties, there was never a full-scale political welfare backlash in Finland. Support for the welfare state has consistently been strong in the Eastern part of Scandinavia (Kroll 2005; Kroll, Blomberg & Svallfors 2000). Finland had difficulty making ends meet after 9.15. In the aftermath of the American financial meltdown the national debt reached alarming levels, although far from the PIIGS. In euroland, it belongs to the net payers. In its defense of the national interest, its national government has been looked upon by the dominant Euro-union players as a naysayer. In 2012, however, Nokia has reached junk-bond status outcompeted by Samsung and other Asian companies. All that is solid melts into air, or into the river of time.

Norway: Saviour of the Nordic Model during the *Decennium horribile*?

In 1990, however, it was not an individual business company – Statoil or Hydro – but the entire nation-state and its shared North Sea oilfields that had made its way to the top of the human mountain. The Norwegian CPR was already an imagined national welfare community and had gradually been building a joint framework from the break-up of the dynastical union with Sweden in 1905, particularly after 1945 (Sejersted 2005; Åmark 2005). The early post-war emphasis on economic reconstruction was visible in the OEEC-sponsored medium-term plans (Hort & Kuhnle forthc.). There was also continued unification of a large number of imagined local welfare communities. Along the west coast of Norway, a welfare state emerged that, in axiological terms and cosmopolitan outlook, differed from its neighbors. The social engineers in Oslo envied the Swedish welfare system, but also looked at the Danish model and beyond. Norway was a laggard, if not comparable to Finland. It took a while before the poor-law system was replaced by a universal social-security model (Lödemel 1997). Even the Norwegian supplementary pension system, which was so controversial in Sweden, went through Parliament with general approval (Kuhnle et al. 2012; cf. also Ervik 2000). Moreover, the social housing policy through the State Housing Bank made home ownership possible for a great majority of Norwegians, contributing to the initial impasse of spectacular “decommodification” (cf. Esping-Andersen 1985).

The Norwegian welfare state has enlarged its activities during the last two decades, particularly in the domain of family policy, which has also been an example for Germany (Lappegård 2011; Skovedal Lindén 2009). The welfare municipality acquired a status comparable to its Danish prototype, although more resourceful. As with the other Nordic countries, a national association of local government is an important lobby for a regional policy that is independent of European directives (Nagel 1991). In other areas such as activation, employment and income maintenance, there have been incremental changes with a mostly egalitarian re-distributional profile (Hvinden 2011; Helgesen 1997). This system has adapted to the winds of transformation, but it would be a tremendous exaggeration to talk about the “fall of the welfare state” in Norway (Wahl 2011; cf. also Mjøsseth et al. 1994). No

Nordic welfare state has fared better than Norway during the last two decades, whether governed by the center-right without the support of the populists, or the center-left coalition of labor, farmers and left Greens due to its new political economy. Norway is the richest country among the four family members, and it is still an egalitarian society where the gospel of neo-liberalism has been petrified throughout decades of welfare-state recalibration, and restructuring. That does not preclude the existence of a pro-welfare but tribal neo-nationalist populism that took its toll on July 22nd 2011 in the darkest moment in recent Norwegian labor-movement history.

In 20th century Norway, there was always more to the welfare state than Social Democracy. Moreover, there is a similar pattern of society-state relationships in the imagined welfare community to the other Nordic countries. Thus, there was also the old state structure of the church, which was divided early and more conservative for a longer time than in the other Nordic countries. There were also the 19th-century free churches of atheists, farmers, fishermen, labor, revivalists, teetotalers, and suffragettes. In recent decades, this has been enlarged by a numerous networks of new social movements in civil society, centered in the imagined local welfare communities. Lutheran work ethics have remained strong and oil-wealth has been saved to a degree making any public debt outside the orbit of hegemonic imagination whatever the Populist Party said or did; the Petroleum Fund being firmly in the hands of the respectable Centre whether Right or Left. Voluntary welfare has been part of this moral platform as a complement to tax-financed or organized social-welfare institutions. This residual prevailed longer than in Denmark and Sweden (cf. Kuhnle & Selle 1991). Moreover, occupational welfare, in cooperation with employers and trade unions, replaced earlier paternalistic welfare regimes in the factories. With the advent of an extremely affluent society, social movements and ecclesiastical institutions returned to the scene, as providers of welfare to special populations and as significant defenders of CPRs in areas that had earlier been organized through outside reciprocal arrangements. In other words: Norway became the last Soviet state in the words of a (male) Swedish Social Democratic Minister of Industry. It is a matter of dispute if this also includes the state feminism that has permeated Norwegian – and Nordic – welfare society-state developments in recent decades.

Sweden – From Mr. Crosland’s to David Cameron’s dreamland?

Sweden almost always occupies center stage in any examination of this (Next) Supermodel, and in a brief overview such as the present one it is its relationship to its “umbrella” that will be touched upon below. After the *decennium horribile*, the 1900s, Sweden returned to the scene with a new economy in its IT revolution. It was not big business in Sweden. However, its young entrepreneurs caught the imagination of the world at large; at odds with the emerging tax-financed busine(wo)men in welfare. The anti-authoritarian and free-spirited Swedish school system was suddenly up for scrutiny and given a fair share of the reason behind the success of Swedish innovators in the third industrial revolution of communication technology. Sweden has risen to the top not only in human welfare indices, but also in economically oriented global competitive rankings. This is the country the present leader of the former Empire is fondly looking into pleasing his hosts. British Prime Minister David Cameron was probably not given a copy of international best-seller *Bitterbitch* (Sveland 2011), the account and assessment of gender equality by a member of a younger cohort of feminists that recently conquered the emancipated world, when he in 2012 briefly visited Stockholm.

Sweden and its welfare state have not fully recovered from the awkward decade and the Norwegian race to the top. It is still hard to accept the more than century-long surrender of its western-most Atlantic province, although the tribe has a more reasonable attitude and behavior to its benign neighbors. Job opportunities on the free Nordic labor market and westward labor mobility have become so common that they are taken for granted and easily

forgotten as a cause behind the diminished social spending. In the late 1980s, the Swedish model was considered world-class. Two decades later, it was a slimmed down version of the original model the Social Democrats handed over to their welfarist successors. Several sets of institutional change in particular became international export goods into the “Next Supermodel”. On the one hand, the 1990 tax reform should serve as a model for others to follow, according to international organizations. The same is true of the pension reform a decade later. The new metropolitan policy mechanisms of the early 2000s have also been highlighted, at least within the European Union. After the financial meltdown of 2008, the bail outs of private banks in the early 1990s were also again back on the international agenda. Thus, the worst deficiencies of the system were already visible in the early 1990s, in the absence of a return to high-quality active labor market measures and a less-than-universal sickness cash benefit insurance system.

More than half a decade after the turn to a new political order, it is a second- or third class version of the original regime that is up for scrutiny. This is most visible in the collapse of the coverage rate in unemployment insurance. Looking at the Swedish welfare system from the angle of education, the Social Democratic decentralization of the early 1990s, paired with the more recent neoliberal privatization, have combined the worst of two worlds of welfare capitalism. This has made the Finnish school system a best practice in the Far North of Europe (cf. Sahlberg 2011). In Swedish elderly care, one scandal after the other has contributed to further distrust in the welfare system. Thus, the apparent tendency towards a tax-financed private welfare-market society has put the imagined welfare community on trial, in a letter after the Supermodel appeared in early February juicily reiterated by a professor in urban planning at the Stockholm Royal Institute of Technology:

“According to Bagehot British politicians look longingly at Sweden’s approach to the public-private provision of welfare services (March 16th). One factor he did not mention, however, is that Swedish schools, hospitals, clinics and so on, have been sold for paltry sums, well under their real market value. The new private owners have made profits that are far above the returns found in other parts of the economy. In Sweden privatized schools can close when there is a drop in the number of students attending and the owners can merely declare insolvency and start a new school under a new name. Patients are often forced to move from one hospital to another or sent home prematurely. Elderly people in care centres who are incontinent forgo having their pads changed because the owners say it costs too much. Another big shortcoming of privatized services has been the lack of adequate monitoring by the public authorities. British politicians should properly monitor the impact of the Swedish model first before falling in love.”

Khake 2013

The national welfare community in particular is under scrutiny, although corruptive practices been visible on local markets. Compared to the other Nordic countries, the Swedish welfare system no longer stands out. The exception may be parental insurance and similar gender-equality programs. Denmark is close behind in terms of gender-neutral child- and family-friendly policies. Norway has been catching up, and Finland has made a remarkable return to the top end of welfare capitalism. Comparing the Nordic countries, the paradox is that the more Swedish politicians and top civil servants speak about world class, the less proof there is of such an edge. In a wider spectrum of comparison, the Nordic countries stand out, whichever index is scrutinized. This tells more about the state of the rest of the world – the planet of slums – than about Scandinavia.

The resurgence of the Nordic model in the Epoch of the Spectacle

In the first and second decade of the new century, the Nordic model surged. It is a distinct, unified model of the Far North, beyond a preoccupation with minor differences. Norway led the way, overshadowing Denmark. Finland and Sweden soon followed suit and were able to participate in a friendly families-of-nation competition and coordination. When the European model dwindled, the Nordic welfare model again gained momentum. Thus, it is no coincidence that there is a Nordic, blurred Beveridgean-Bismarckian road from the vacillated post-colonial Labour of Mr. Crosland to the resolute neo-imperial Blue Labor of Mr. Cameron. Thus, no interruption in Etonian surveillance of the Far North; simultaneously with a brief visit to Stockholm in 2012 by the British PM for a Baltic-Nordic meeting of North European Prime Ministers, the Joint Committee of Nordic Labour Movement Organizations (SAMAK) succeeded in getting the Swedish Patent Agency to authorize “The Nordic Welfare Model” as its brand name as part of launching a long-term research project sponsored by this association and led by the Norwegian research institute Fafo. The business-sponsored Norwegian think-tank Civita protested immediately and an intense social media conversation began about the wisdom of the action taken by SAMAK and the Swedish Patent Agency. To many, this was a suspect sign of sectarian thinking within the respectable Left; or a show of its entrepreneurial spirit.

Several Scandinavian researchers were actively involved, apart from lobbyists and pundits. The stakes were high, as model was a crown jewel for all involved, having made considerable advances on the international stage (cf. Hort 2007). The World Bank espoused the experience of the social and political system of these countries (e.g., Marshall & Butzbach 2003). After the 2007 credit crunch and the collapse of the Western banking system, the bail out of banks in Sweden during the first half of the 1990s became a prototype for others to follow. Thus, instead of crumbling further, the Nordic model reached a new zenith and continued to do so during the subsequent Eurozone crisis (cf. Bildt & Borg 2011). Thus, during the Epoch of the Spectacle there is added value in securing its copyright. The infringement on the freedom of thought by SAMAK poses hard questions to the Nordic political and research communities, including FAFO. However, this affair also shows that Nordic Social Democracy not only acts short-sightedly. The time-horizon of the new research project was towards 2030 and the type of movements that will exist in the meantime throughout the Far North, but also in the larger Eurasian and global context, is of considerable interest to both a suspicious global polity and an international research branch that is still in much demand.

The geography of comparative welfare state research and its temporality give a hint to the global ups and downs of its research object. In this afterword, the focus has been on the third generation of this kind of social research. This section places special emphasis on Sweden in the larger family of nations. Is Sweden just one of many European welfare states, or part of a separate (if related) Nordic model? During the hypocrisy generated by the launching of the Euro and the enlargement of the European Union, there was also talk of a European social model, in contrast to the American example. From the Maastricht Social Protocol to the UK signing of this document in 1997, a European social policy discourse emerged. Still, such measures were confined to inter-union migration, while welfare policy remained a national task. Despite this, various soft-coordination initiatives were promulgated by the former Swedish Director-General of the Union Employment directorate. With the escalation of the Eurozone crisis, it was no understatement to conclude that the social solidarity between the member-states of the monetary union was rather weak, and talk about a European social model soon came to an end. Instead, it is the welfare model of the Far North that has travel around the globe. While the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain), maybe even France after presidential and Parliamentary elections in 2012, belongs to the bad guys, in gendered language the Nordic countries are good girls. It is under the umbrella of the Nordic model that Sweden with its two-sided or Janus-faced welfare state, has continued to attract worldwide attention.

In the midst of the first decade of the 2000s, the four Nordic countries made their mark on a plethora of indices of best practices, from gender equality to well-being. Thus, it was widely thought that the Nordic countries had found some magic way of combining high taxes and lavish welfare systems with fast growth and low unemployment, as the *Economist* complained in 2007. However, the neoliberals have not come away empty-handed, as tax-financed pro-profit welfare has flourished in Sweden. Moreover, underemployment, unemployment and de-industrialization are still also social problems within the politics of the third industrial revolution that created space for non-profit or voluntary welfare going back into the Nordic church-state special relationship. The sustainability of the two-sided Nordic model has been demographically, culturally, and politically prospering on the outskirts of Eurasia. Growth is fragile or volatile, but continues to mobilize resources, monetary as well as human. Taxes are still high, and welfare benefits and services are not always that lavish or generous. Nevertheless, the model comprises a transnational imagined community of four ethno-national tribes (five, if the Swedes in Finland are counted separately) and two main languages (Finnish and the other Scandinavian languages). It subsumes thousands of imagined local welfare communities, sustained by old and free churches. There are also virtual communities of the lay social movements and networks in civil society exposure, “welfare scandals,” and other public discontent including critical social media and the European Parliament. Moreover, it is no longer only the People’s House and the municipal town halls, but also the old parish halls and houses that hear lamentation over the ways of the world. To Mr. Cameron’s dismay, this is not (yet) Murdoch land. But for the unapologetic member of this nationhood, the grim conclusion from the Swedish 2010 election is that the celebrated welfare model produced two cabinet alternatives – one new and the other red-green – and one (inward-looking but welfarist) opposition similar to the pathways of late 20th century Denmark and Norway.

The dawn of the Korean Welfare State?

This was the model welfare state Koreans I met last fall had encountered, most often rather rosy narratives from its heydays; pictures taken before the *decennium horribile*. Life and Humanity in Late Modern Transformation: Beyond East and West is the heading for this Conference. In the pages to come I will put forward some ideas or notes on the making and remaking – or building and re-building – welfare societies and states during the present era/conjuncture. Happiness and welfare are nowadays catchwords in both politics and the social sciences, so also (South) Korea. What about society and state? Twenty-five years after the transition from military dictatorship to representative rule in Korea, and more than twenty years after the transition to a new world, the global end of the class-based and conflictual bipolar East/West/East divide, there are many “bewildering questions” with an impact on macro-“theory”.

The emphasis on the East in this paper is derived from my understanding of the theatre of war in Korea and its vicinity; the paradox that most Southerners do not acknowledge the end of the cold war but ignore the spectacle of war on its peninsula. The spectre of a reunified welfare state has a long way to go and so have two separate administrative survival units (SAR in Chinese). The residential highs of Kim Il-sung’s monumental Pyongyang do not look that different from Seoul’s, only the magnificent office buildings – the skyscrapers of Samsung, Hyundai, LG etc. – are absent in a civilizing process that is closer to Benjamin than Elias; the Juchetower the Master of Man’s invincibility.

Half a century after the beginnings of the Scandinavian welfare model, growth and welfare entered the scene in the South under the auspices of a ruthless labour regime in the factories (and on the campuses), or the societal military dictatorship of generals Park and Chun. In a rather unique trajectory, Korea became a latecomer to the world of welfare; the generals knew

or got to know that people wanted more than growth or development. When the communist Christian churches joined the movement and an Olympics was in the wings, the transition started. Since “transitology” has taken off.

The coming of the Korean welfare state as part of a broader East and Southeast Asian pattern has already been outlined, but a few moments may need repetition (cf. Hort & Kuhnle 2000/2008). From the late 1980s paper laws were transformed into institution-building. Fairly generous if in no way full-scale health and pension programs saw the light of day, after the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis also unemployment benefits, in Korean employment insurance – another sign of the spectacle. In a special report to the world of business, culture and finance last year the London *Economist* – “Asia’s Next Revolution” (2012) – noted that the tigers had turned “marsupial”: “In 2008 Korea introduced an earned-income tax credit, a universal basic pension and an insurance scheme providing long-term care for the elderly. December’s presidential election is fast becoming a game of welfare one-upmanship. As all these systems mature... welfare will become integral to the state.”

Presidential candidate promised not only welfare, but also happiness. I had encountered this issue before as part of a cross-cultural research team sponsored by the Korean Academy of Science and the City of Seoul. Happiness and well-being in ten cities including Seoul and Stockholm had produced results that the financier of the survey found unnecessary to confirm a third term. After two rounds of interviewing in late 2006 and 2007, and lavish conferences at the Plaza and Shilla in January the preceding years respectively the percentages were fairly robust: with 82 at the top Stockholm and Toronto stood out, while the inhabitants of Seoul joined Beijing and Tokyo at the other, disappointing end.

Thus, in the fall of 2012, in Seoul there was no shortage of demand for welfare models, and into this demand the Supermodel fitted months before it was made global in London. When I dared to explain that Korea was in dire need not only of welfare but also of an institutional set-up – CPRs and a tax hike - to make it more than an image the makers of the future turned a deaf ear. Perhaps I remained them of an intruder, a northerner?

At the end of a Road, or at a ?

Modernity and enlightenment thought are forward-looking artifacts actively encouraging human beings to seek and make a future, even a better or greater future; the idea of progress. In contrast, archaic and religious perceptions are either backward-looking or status-quo oriented; a golden age or heavenly kingdoms typical representations in which the present is a casual and immaterial abode. Modernity accentuated the idea of worldly progress spurred by anticlerical and peasant uprisings. The Revolt in the Netherlands set in motion a number of upheavals that in the end became the bourgeois revolution, the era of republican-secular enlightenment and nationhood in the midst of imperial ambitions, colonialism and human slavery. Bismarck began building a Reich, Beveridge built and re-built an Empire, FDR shaped a New Deal out of a long-gone victorious Revolution and a coercive but unifying Civil war. The ten days that choked the world underscored the idea of earthly emancipation worldwide which, however, met forceful and violent resistance. Utopian dreams and the communist scenario haunted the well to do and the rulers of the day, and continue to do so? During the 20th century, working class politics proliferated making previously solid social relationships less sustainable necessitating and provoking creativity and social innovations. In between Empire, revolution, counter-revolution, world and civil wars in the Far North of Europe movements and social reformers set out on a road that on and off met with curious engagement. The historical compromise between civil society, capitalism and welfare state came to symbolize these ambitions. A quarter of a siècle ago it was the Swedish welfare model that climaxed at a time the Epoch of the Spectacle went truly global. But the admirers keep on viewing what is going on among Northern tribes of contemporaneity.

List of Literature:

To be added